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I. INTRODUCTION
This article will discuss recent developments in the field of appellate
practice in Florida.] Although this article will focus primarily on cases
decided between July 1, 1997 and June 30, 1998, it will also deal with
certain cases decided shortly before and after that period which are either of
particular interest to the appellate practitioner or which provide the
background for, or the culmination of, issues that were addressed by cases
decided throughout that period.
In a broad sense, every appellate decision falls within the scope of
appellate practice. Decisions relating to substantive areas of the law,
however, are more properly dealt with in articles relating to those
substantive areas and therefore will not be discussed here. Rather, this
1. For a discussion of developments in appellate practice for 1993, 1995, 1996, and
1997, see Anthony C. Musto, Appellate Practice: 1997 Survey of Florida Law, 22 NOVA L.
REv. 29 (1997) [hereinafter 1997 Survey]; Anthony C. Musto, Appellate Practice: 1996
Survey of Florida Law, 21 Nova L. Rev. 13 (1996) [hereinafter 1996 Survey]; Anthony C.
Musto, Appellate Practice: 1995 Survey of Florida Law, 20 NOVA L. REv. 1 (1995)
[hereinafter 1995 Survey]; Anthony C. Musto, Appellate Practice: 1993 Survey of Florida
Law, 18 NOVA L. REv. 1 (1993) [hereinafter 1993 Survey].
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article will focus on matters relating to practice in the appellate courts and
will examine those areas. Additionally, this article will not discuss cases
relating to the preservation of particular issues, nor will it discuss the
question of whether particular errors were harmless.
II. ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS
Chief Justice Major B. Harding of the Supreme Court of Florida issued
two administrative orders of significance to appellate practitioners. One
dealt with the impact of modem technology on Florida Rule of Appellate
Procedure 9.210, which states that the text of briefs "shall be printed in type
of no more than 10 characters per inch."2 The order noted that "[w]hile this
requirement may have made eminent sense in the early days of
computerization, it is difficult to justify, and sometimes impossible to honor,
in a day when computers instantaneously perform typographic functions
once available only to the most skilled manual typesetters." The order went
on to state that "[floremost among these functions is the ability to adjust
spacing so that individual characters take up only so much horizontal space
as is necessary" and that "[w]e are nearing the day when these
proportionately spaced fonts will be the only ones installed on most
computers." 4 The order indicated that the problems created by the new
technology are twofold: 1) because the number of characters per inch will
vary throughout the document, attorneys and court clerks are "left in a
quandary about whether briefs actually meet the rules' standards;" and 2)
"briefs should not circumvent the 5page-length requirements through the
simple expedient of adjusting fonts."
Noting that the supreme court had referred the matter to the Florida
Appellate Court Rules Committee for modifications to the existing rule, the
order adopted "a clear-cut interim solution to this problem" 6 It did so by
stating that no typed brief shall be rejected for failure to comply with the
font requirements if it meets the following criteria:
2. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.210(a)(2).
3. Order on Rule 9.210, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, Chief Justice Major B.
Harding (on file with author).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
1998
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(1) It is reproduced in a font that is:
(a) 12 point type or larger if the font is not proportionately
spaced, provided the font does not exceed ten characters
per inch, or
(b) 14 point Times Roman (or similar) type or larger if the
font is proportionately spaced; and
(2) It includes a statement certifying the size and style of type
used in the brief (e.g., 14 point proportionately spaced
Times Roman; 12 point Courier New, a font that is not
proportionately spaced). 7
The order further notes that its criteria are modeled after the requirements of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit8 and may be
interpreted in light of them.9
The other order established a uniform case numbering system for the
Florida court system. 10 It directs that the appellate courts are to implement
the new system by January 1, 2000, and that trial courts may implement it as
early as January 1, 1999.1 Furthermore, the courts must implement a
uniform case numbering system before providing the public with access to
court data via the Internet or by January 1, 2003, whichever occurs first. 
2
Supreme court case numbers will begin with "SC," while district court cases
will begin with the number of the district, followed by the letter "D."'13 The
court designation will be followed by the year and then by sequential five-
digit numbers that will start with "00001" each year.14 For example, the first
case in the First District Court of Appeal in 2000 will be numbered
1D200000001. A similar approach will be taken with regard to county and
circuit court cases, with each county being identified by an assigned two-
digit code at the beginning of the case number and with the addition of two-
7. Id.
8. 11 th Cir. FED. R. App. P. 28-2(d) & 32-4.
9. Order on Rule 9.210, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, Chief Justice Major B.
Harding (on file with author).
10. Order, Chief Justice Major B. Harding (on file with author).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
[Vol. 23:1
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letter designations for court types.15  There will also be optional branch
16location and party/defendant identifiers.
The order stated:
[s]uch a system is required to ensure that, in this age of technology,
case numbers include unique identifiers that easily distinguish the
origin of a case, type of case, year of filing, and numerical
sequence of a case when case numbers are displayed externally in
an automated format for public access.
7
lIn. JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA
In State v. Matute-Chirinos,1s the State sought certiorari in the third
district to review a pretrial ruling in a capital murder prosecution.' 9 Pursuant
to a request by the state, the district court certified the case as one having
great effect on the administration of justice throughout the state requiring
immediate resolution by the supreme court.20
The supreme court noted that the provisions of Article V, section
3(b)(5) of the Florida Constitution, which allow it to review trial court
decisions that are passed through district courts by certification, states that
the court:
[m]ay review any order or judgment of a trial court certified by the
district court of appeal in which an appeal is pending to be of great
public importance, or to have a great effect on the proper
administration of justice throughout the state, and certified to
require immediate resolution by the supreme court.
The court then found that "[t]his provision does not give this [c]ourt
jurisdiction to accept a certification by a district court except in cases in
which an appeal is pending."22 Since the case at issue had been before the
district court on a petition for a writ of certiorari, the court found that the
15. Order, Chief Justice Major B. Harding (on file with author).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. 713 So. 2d 1006 (Fla. 1998).
19. Id. at 1007.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1007 (quoting FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(5)).
22. Id.
1998
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constitutional provision did not provide it with jurisdiction.23 The court
noted that it had previously accepted jurisdiction under similar
circumstances in State v. Hootman24 and concluded that the decision to do so
25had been erroneous.
IV. APPEALS FROM COUNTY COURTS TO DISTRICT COURTS
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. U.S.A. Diagnostics,
Inc.,26 a county court denied a motion to compel arbitration but certified to
the fourth district, pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure
9.030(b)(4), a question of great public importance. 27 The appellate court
asked the parties to address the question of whether it had jurisdiction and
both responded by seeking to have the court rule on the merits of the case
and to answer the certified uestion. 28 "We can do so only if we have
jurisdiction," the court stated. "We do not," it concluded.30
The court recognized that its jurisdiction under Florida Rule of
Appellate Procedure 9.030(b)(4) to review county court orders certified to
be of great public importance is limited to final orders31 and to non-final
32orders otherwise appealable to the circuit court under Rule 9.140(c), which
deals with appeals by the state in criminal cases.33 Since the order on the
motion to compel arbitration was neither final nor an order under Rule
9.140(c), the court found that it "does not have discretionary jurisdiction to
review this certified question. ' 34 Rather, the court pointed out, "appellate
jurisdiction of non-final orders [entered by county courts] that determine
entitlement to arbitration lies in the circuit courts. 35  Accordingly, the
appeal was transferred to the appropriate circuit court.36
23. Matute-Chirinos, 713 So. 2d at 1007.
24. 709 So. 2d 1357 (Fla. 1998).
25. Matute-Chirinos, 713 So. 2d at 1007.
26. 696 So. 2d 1334 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
27. Id. at 1334.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.030(b)(4)(A).
32. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.030(b)(4)(B).
33. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.030(b)(4)(B).
34. State Farm, 696 So. 2d at 1335.
35. Id.
36. Id.
[Vol. 23:1
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V. APPELLATE REVIEW BY CIRCUIT COURTS
The third district held in Metropolitan Dade County v. Hernandez 37
that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to consider an appeal from a hearing
officer's order upholding a citation for a county animal control violation.
38
The court relied on the fact that the county code provided that a violator or
the county could seek to overturn the order of the hearing officer by making
application to the county court for a trial de novo on the merits.3 9 The court
found that the county was authorized by sections 162.13 and 162.21(8) of
the Florida Statutes to adopt such a method of review.40
In quashing a circuit court decision that had reversed the hearing
officer's determination, the third district stated that while it "sympathize[d]
with and appreciate[d] both Mr. Hernandez's and the County's frustration
with the amount of time, energy and heartache this case has caused," it
"believe[d] that the proper course will at last be followed, which will clear
this matter up for both parties."4'
In Oceania Joint Venture v. Ocean View of Miami, Ltd.,42 a petitioner
sought certiorari review in the third district of an order from the appellate
division of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals denying a motion for
reinstatement of an appeal. 43 The petitioner asserted that a prior order of
dismissal based on the failure to join an indispensable party was void
because it had been entered by only one circuit judge, rather than by a three-
judge panel as required by a local rule.44
The petitioner did not raise the issue regarding the local rule at the time
the motion to dismiss was considered, neither in a certiorari petition that
sought review of the dismissal order in the third district, nor in a subsequent
certiorari petition that requested the supreme court to order the district court
to accept jurisdiction and reverse the circuit court's order.45 The third
district rejected the petitioner's contention that the local rule was
jurisdictional in nature and that a claim that it was violated could therefore
be raised at any time.46 In denying certiorari, the court said:
37. 708 So. 2d 1008 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
38. Id. at 1009.
39. Id. at 1010.
40. Id.
41. Hernandez, 708 So. 2d at 1011.
42. 707 So. 2d 917 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
43. Id. at 918.
44. Id. at 919.
45. Id. at 917.
46. Id. at 918.
1998
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[T]he three-judge panel requirement... is a rule of court that is
procedural rather than jurisdictional in nature. Consequently,
Oceania's failure to timely challenge, in its prior appeals, the order
of dismissal on the grounds that it was entered by one circuit judge
has resulted in a waiver of this issue.
4 7
VI. NONAPPEALABLE ORDERS
In Polk County v. Sofka, 48 a plaintiff obtained a verdict against the
county in a suit to recover for injuries sustained in an automobile accident.49
Subsequent to the county's motion for a new trial being granted, the parties
executed a settlement agreement which provided for a judgment in the
plaintiff s favor.50 The agreement also provided that the county might seek
review of two appellate issues relating to the trial court's refusal to dismiss,
enter summary judgment for the county, or grant a directed verdict against
the plaintiff.5' The agreement further provided:
that the intermediate appellate court ha[d] jurisdiction to hear [the]
[county's] appeal... ;" that "[t]he record on appeal [would] be the
record as it exist[ed] at the time of the entry of the Stipulated Final
Judgment;" and that, "if the intermediate appellate court, for any
reason, determine[d] [that] there [was] no jurisdiction or standing, or if
the appeal [was] not dispositive of the issue of [the county's]
liability.... the Stipulated Final Judgment [would] be void, and the
parties [would] be entitled to again proceed to trial.
5 2
The second district affirmed the judgment and certified a question
relating to the merits of the case.53 The supreme court declined to answer
the question, concluding that the district court had lacked jurisdiction to hear
the appeal5 4 The court noted that neither side had requested that the order
granting a new trial be set aside and that the county be permitted to withdraw
its motion.55 The court therefore found that the county, "having requested
47. Oceania Joint Venture, 707 So. 2d at 918-19.
48. 702 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 1997).
49. Id. at 1244.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Polk County v. Sofka, 675 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
54. Sojfka, 702 So. 2d at 1245 (Fla. 1997).
55. Id. at 1244.
[Vol. 23:1
11
: Nova Law Review 23, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1998
Musto
and received a new trial," was "deemed to have waived its right immediately
to seek appellate review of rulings made prior to, or during, the previous
trial."56
The court recognized that the parties had stipulated to the district
court's jurisdiction, but pointed out that "'parties cannot stipulate to
jurisdiction over the subject matter where none exists.' 57 The court also
agreed with a statement made by the parties in a joint brief on the
jurisdictional question that the court's conclusion "'will result in a waste of
judicial resources."' 58 In light of the fact that courts are bound to take notice
of the limits of their authority and to notice jurisdictional defects and enter
appropriate orders,59 however, the court found the waste of judicial resources
to be regrettable but unavoidable.
60
In Hastings v. Demming, the supreme court found that "[n]onfinal
orders denying summary judgment on a claim of workers' compensation
immunity are not appealable unless the trial court order specifically states
that, as a matter of law, such a defense is not available to a party. 62 The
63decision approved the district court decision under review and disapproved
the decisions in Breakers Palm Beach, Inc. v. Gloger6 4 and City of Lake
Mary v. Franklin65 to the extent that they are inconsistent with the reasoning
expressed in the opinion.
66
Cases in which district courts held that orders were not appealable
include Health Care Associates, Inc. v. Brevard Physicians Group, P.A., 67
(confirming in part and modifying or vacating in part an arbitration award);
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Bravender,68 (assessing
attorney's fees as the result of discovery misconduct); Rowell v. Florida
Department of Law Enforcement,69 (refusing of the Florida Department of
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1245 (quoting Cunningham v. Standard Guar. Ins. Co., 630 So. 2d 179, 181
(Fla. 1994)).
58. Id. at 1244.
59. Soflca, 702 So. 2d at 1244 (quoting West 132 Feet v. City of Orlando, 86 So. 197,
198-99 (Fla. 1920)).
60. Id.
61. 694 So. 2d 718 (Fla. 1997).
62. Id. at 720.
63. Hastings v. Demming, 682 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
64. 646 So. 2d 237 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
65. 668 So. 2d 712 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
66. Hastings, 694 So. 2d at 720.
67. 701 So. 2d 118 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
68. 700 So. 2d 796 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
69. 700 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
1998
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Law Enforcement to certify an individual's eligibility to have her criminal
record sealed); Park Imaging, Inc. v. Steadfast Insurance Co.,7° (granting
partial summary final judgment providing that the amount of money an
insured's insurance company had to spend on costs and expenses in
defending the insured, including attorney's fees, would reduce the insurance
company's monetary limit of liability insurance by the amount of those costs
and expenses); Gomez v. Gomez,71 (non-final order granting wife's motion to
join her brother-in-law as a defendant in her dissolution action); Kalantarilv.
72Kalantari, (granting interlocutory order denying a motion to set aside an
antenuptial agreement); Estate of Nolan v. Swindle,73 (authorizing previously
appointed administrator ad litem to file an action seeking to set aside will
and revocable living trust on the ground that beneficiaries had exercised
undue influence); Lynbrook Court Condominium Ass'n. v. Arana,
74
(determining that a case had not been dismissed, entered subsequent to an
order stating that the case shall stand dismissed thirty days from the date of
the order unless it appeared that the matter was diligently being prosecuted
within that thirty day period); Caribbean Transportation, Inc. v. Acevedo,75
(order stayinF action and retaining jurisdiction pending arbitration); Salzverg
v. Salzverg, 6 (bifurcating order which simply dissolved the parties'
marriage); and, Thomas v. Silvers,77 (denying motion to dismiss for failure to
serve complaint within 120 days as required by Florida Rule of Civil
Procedure 1.070(i)).78
VII. FINAL ORDERS
In Hills v. State,79 the first district rejected a claim that an order
approving mental treatment pursuant to section 916.107(3) of the Florida
Statutes was non-final because it was only effective for a period of ninety
days, and the appellee could once again petition to continue treatment once
this period had expired.8° The court determined "that this potentiality does
70. 700 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
71. 702 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
72. 711 So. 2d 1368 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
73. 712 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
74. 711 So. 2d 249 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
75. 698 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
76. 696 So. 2d 1278 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
77. 701 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
78. The court certified conflict with Mid-Florida Assoc., Ltd. v. Taylor, 641 So. 2d 182
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994) and Comisky v. Rosen Management Serv., Inc., 630 So. 2d 628
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (en banc).
79. 699 So. 2d 735 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
80. ld. at 736.
[Vol. 23:1
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not render the order at issue nonfinal, since it clearly marked an end to
judicial labor as to the matters then pending before the trial court. 81
82The fourth district, in Roshkind v. Roshkind, addressed the issue of
whether a post-dissolution final order in a modification proceeding "is a
final judgment, to be appealed by plenary appeal, or an order entered after
final judgment, reviewable as a non-final appeal under Florida Rule of
Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(4)."83
The court noted that although case law "would support an argument that
petitions for modification are not independent actions, the orders entered in
modification proceedings have all the aspects of final judgments. 84 The
court therefore concluded that such orders are final judgments, subject to
motions for rehearing under the Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.530(a),
85
and appealable as plenary appeals.
The fourth district also examined the question of finality in the context
of appeals taken by persons who were not parties to the proceedings in the
86lower tribunal. In Shook v. Alter, a lawyer representing a party in the trial
court sought certiorari review of an order holding him in indirect civil
contempt. The district court entered an order redesignating the petition for
88writ of certiorari as a final appeal. The court noted that the distinction was
important because a petitioner seeking certiorari carries "a heavier burden
than an appellant must carry on appeal., 89 The court indicated that it was
publishing its order "so that the Bar will know that, where a final order is
entered against a non-party such as, for example, a lawyer or a witness, the
appropriate method for review of that order is by final appeal."
9 °
The petitioners in Borja v. Nationsbank of Florida9l sought mandamus
to compel the trial court to amend a final judgment that inadvertently
92
omitted the names of some of the parties to the action. Due to the
omission, the petitioners claimed that a final judgment was never entered
81. Id.
82. 717 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
83. Id. at 544.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. 715 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
87. Id. at 1082-83.
88. Id. at 1083.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. 698 So. 2d 280 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
92. Id. at 280.
1998
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against the omitted parties. 93 The respondents maintained that the omissions
were merely technical errors that did not affect the finality of the judgment.94
The third district found the omissions to be "a mere clerical error" that
would not affect the judgment's finality.95 Accordingly, the court directed
the trial court to amend the judgment to include the names of the omitted
parties nunc pro tunc on the date of the original final judgment.
96
VII. NOTICE OF APPEAL
In Raysor v. Raysor,97 the first district encountered a situation in which
a notice of appeal was mailed to the post office box maintained by the clerk
of the lower tribunal five days prior to the expiration of the thirty-day period
established by Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(b) for the filing of
98
such notices. The notice was not filed with the clerk, however, until the
morning after the thirty day period expired.99
The court rejected the appellant's argument that the facts established
that the notice of appeal was delivered to the clerk's post office box on the
final day of the thirty day period. 1°° The court went on to indicate that even
if it was assumed that the notice did reach the post office box on the thirtieth
day, "we would conclude that [the appellant] nonetheless failed to timely
'file' the notice of appeal with the clerk of the trial court."''1 The court
further noted that "[g]enerally, a paper is deemed to be 'filed' when it is
delivered to the proper official and received by that official to be kept on
file," and concluded that "merely mailing the notice or having the notice
placed in a post office box within the required time period is not
sufficient."'
0 2
The court then went on to state:
By publishing this opinion, our intent is not to single out counsel
for appellant, who by all appearances mailed the notice of appeal in
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Borja, 698 So. 2d at 281.
97. 706 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
98. Id. at 400.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 401.
101. Id.
102. Raysor, 706 So. 2d at 401 (citing Blake v. R.M.S. Holding Corp., 341 So. 2d 795
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977)).
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a manner that under ordinary circumstances would have resulted in
timely receipt by the clerk. On the contrary, given the relative
frequency with which situations such as this occur, our purpose is
to reiterate the point that one who foregoes the opportunity to
personally deliver time critical documents to the clerk, and instead
elects to entrust those documents to postal authorities or some
other delivery mechanism, does so at his or her own peril.
10 3
The fourth district in Bove v. Ocwen Financial Corp.,'° 4 denied a
motion to amend a notice of appeal that timely sought review of a final
judgment. 1°5 Some two months after the filing of the notice, the trial court
entered a judgment taxing costs.1° 6 After the time for appealing the cost
judgment had expired, the appellants moved to amend the notice of appeal so
as to allow them to appeal the cost judgment. 10 7 In the motion, the appellants
stated that they were not seeking reversal of the cost judgment except in the
event the final judgment was to be reversed.
0 8
The court found that it "must deny the motion to amend the notice of
appeal on jurisdictional grounds because no notice of appeal was filed within
[the time for appealing] the cost judgment."'1 9 The court went on to suggest
an alternative method of dealing with similar situations:
Having to file a separate notice of appeal from a judgment for
costs or attorney's fees, entered after a notice of appeal has already
been filed from the main judgment, requires, of course, the
payment of an additional filing fee. Where, as here, the only
reason for appealing the second judgment is in the event the main
judgment is reversed, parties should consider stipulating that the
second judgment would be vacated if the main judgment were
reversed. Such a stipulation would not only save the appellant the
additional filing fee, but would also save both parties attorneys'
fees and would not expose the appellee to having to bear the cost of
that filing fee in the event the cost judgment is reversed.'10
103. Id.
104. 23 Fla. L. Weekly D564 (4th Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 25, 1998).
105. Id. at D564.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at D564-65.
109. Bove, 23 Fla. L. Weekly at D565.
110. Id. (footnote omitted).
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In Turner v. City of Daytona Beach Shores,'I I the fifth district
dismissed an appeal in which the notice of appeal was untimely, rejecting the
appellant's claim that he had filed an earlier, premature, notice of appeal.
1 2
The document referred to by the appellant was a pleading entitled "Motion
to Strike the Sham Pleadings by Defendants Objection to Plaintiffs Notice of
Hearing and Defendant's Entry of a Order for Final Summary Judgment In
the Alternative, A Notice of Appeal," the last paragraph of which stated,
"The Plaintiff herein is providing a Notice of Appeal, if the Court issues an
Order in favor of the contemptuous Attorney and the Defendants."" 3
The court found, the purported notice "does not even come close to
complying with the requirements of Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure
9.110(d) and 9.900(a), and glaringly omits 'the name of the court to which
the appeal is taken.""' 4 The court recognized that Florida Rule of Appellate
Procedure 9.110(m) "allows for some leeway for premature appeals," but
interpreted the rule to require "some previous action by the trial court about
which an appellant wishes to complain.""15 The purported notice having
been filed "before any appealable decisions were rendered by the trial court
and five months before any of the defendants filed a motion leading to the
final judgment from which the appellant tardily filed an appeal," the appeal
was dismissed."
16
Several cases dealt with the question of whether the filing of particular
motions in the trial court delayed the rendition of an order, so as to make
timely a notice of appeal filed within thirty days of the order denying the
motion, but more than thirty days after the order appealed from.
Some examples include: 1) motion for clarification directed to final
order of dismissal did not delay rendition;" 7 2) motion to set aside final
judgment was intended to operate as a motion for rehearing and suspended
rendition;" 8 3) pending motion to amend complaint, filed prior to entry of
summary final judgment, did not stay rendition of the judgment, despite the
fact that the trial court had reserved ruling on the motion; 119 4) motion for
rehearing directed to a circuit court order granting a stay of a driver's license
111. 702 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
112. Id. at 632-33.
113. Id. at 633.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Turner, 702 So. 2d at 633.
117. Tyler v. State, 718 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
118. Olson v. Olson, 704 So. 2d 208 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
119. DiPaolo v. Rollins Leasing Corp., 700 So. 2d 31 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
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suspension did not delay rendition because motions for rehearing are not
authorized with regard to non-final orders; 120 5) motion for reconsideration
after a final summary judgment, although mislabeled, was in substance a
proper motion for rehearing and thus suspended rendition; 12 6) motion for
rehearing was unauthorized, and rendition was not delayed by its filing
because order denying arbitration was non-final; 122 and 7) post-judgment
contempt order in a dissolution proceeding, although reviewable as an appeal
from a non-final order under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure
9.140(a)(4) is actually a final order and motion for rehearing therefore delays
its rendition.
123
IX. STAYS
In St. Mary's Hospital, Inc. v. Phillipe,124 the fourth district found to be
constitutional section 766.212 of the Florida Statutes which allows a district
court, in order to prevent manifest injustice, to stay an arbitration award
entered pursuant to section 766.207 of the Florida Statutes.12' The
defendants in the case claimed that the statute infringed on the supreme
court's exclusive authority to prescribe rules of procedure, in that it
abrogates the automatic stay provision of Florida Rule of Appellate
Procedure 9.310.126 The court disagreed, finding that in enacting the statute,
the legislature "created a modified right to judicial review of arbitration
awards,"' 27 review that "includes an equally substantive right to payment of
the award during review unless the court finds that a stay is necessary to
prevent manifest injustice.",2 1
In light of its interpretation of the statute, the court stated, "[w]e cannot
say that such substantive legislation infringes on the supreme court's power
to regulate procedures in appellate proceedings."129 The court went on to
120. Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Bond, 696 So. 2d 949 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
121. Magnum Towing, Inc. v. Sunbeam Television Corp., 23 Fla. L. Weekly D850 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 1, 1998).
122. Josephthal Lyon & Ross, Inc. v. C & A Fin. Programs, Inc., 709 So. 2d 1384 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
123. Remington v. Remington, 705 So. 2d 920 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
124. 699 So. 2d 1017 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
125. Id. at 1019.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Phillipe, 699 So. 2d at 1020.
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certify "the question of constitutionality to the supreme court for its
definitive resolution."'3 °
The fifth district, in Department of Safety v. Stockman, 3 t dealt with the
issue of whether a circuit court has the authority to stay the administrative
suspension of a driver's license pending certiorari review by the circuit
court.
132
The court found that "the circuit court, as the direct reviewing court,
has the inherent power and discretion to suspend the administrative order,
pending certiorari review.' 33  Not according the circuit court this
discretionary power, the court recognized, would likely render review of
such orders "meaningless."' 134 To illustrate its point, the court noted that the
license suspension in the case under review was for six months.' 35 "If this
order could not be stayed pending review,"1 36 the court said, "the suspension
time, or a great deal of it, would likely run before the circuit court ruled on
the petition for certiorari review.'
137
The court rejected arguments based on sections 322.2615(13), 322.272,
and 322.28(6) of the Florida Statutes, interpreting those provisions as simply
providing no automatic stay pending review of a license suspension.!
38
In State Department of Environmental Protection v. Pringle,1 39 the first
district granted a motion to reinstate an automatic stay imposed by Florida
Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.3 10(b)(2)' 40 and vacated by the trial court.
141
The case involved an order enjoining state agencies from arresting
commercial fishermen for possessing and/or using certain fishing nets.
142
The appellees' motion to vacate the automatic stay was based on a sheriff's
affidavit which stated that he and other sheriffs were concerned about "rising
130. Id. (footnote omitted).
131. 709 So. 2d 179 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
132. Id. at 180.
133. Id. (footnote omitted).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Stockman, 709 So. 2d at 180.
137. ld. at 180-81.
138. Id. at 180.
139. 707 So. 2d 387 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
140. The rule provides that the timely filing of a notice of appeal automatically operates
"as a stay pending review, except in criminal cases, when the state, any public officer in an
official capacity, board, commission, or other public body seeks review." FLA. R. APP. P.
9.310(b)(2).
141. Pringle, 707 So. 2d at 389.
142. Id. at 388.
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tensions" 143 regarding the issue and setting forth what the appellate court
termed "clear implication of possible violence" between fishermen and law
enforcement officers.
144
The court noted that the fourth district, in St. Lucie County v. North
Palm Beach Development Corp.,"45 had explained that the automatic stay is
based on a policy rationale and that automatic stays "should be vacated only• . ,,146
under the most compelling circumstances.
After considering the evidence, the court found "no compelling reason
to vacate the.., stay."'147 Indeed, the court indicated that granting a stay for
the reasons asserted "would impermissibly reward those citizens who would
use threats (implicit or otherwise) of violence in response to an unpopular
law, at the expense of those who would follow or attempt to lawfully
challenge or change the law within this state's democratic institutions.' 48
X. INDIGENCY
In Quigley v. Butterworth, 149 a prisoner serving a life sentence appealed
a circuit court's dismissal of his declaratory judgment action. 15 He moved
the district court of appeal to allow him to proceed in forma pauperis, and
the court transferred the motion to the circuit court for a determination of the
prisoner's indigency status. 151 The circuit court denied the motion because
the prisoner failed to meet the requirements of section 57.085 of the Florida
Statutes, which calls for prisoners seeking waiver of prepayment of court
costs and fees due to indigency to file an affidavit of indigency with the
court. 152 As a result of this ruling, the district court ordered the prisoner to
pay the appellate filing fee of $250.153
The prisoner then filed a second motion with the district court, entitled
"Appellant's Second Motion for Leave to Proceed on Appeal without
143. Id. at 389.
144. Id. at 390.
145. 444 So. 2d 1133 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
146. Pringle, 707 So. 2d at 390 (quoting St. Lucie County v. North Palm Beach Dev.
Corp., 444 So. 2d 1133, 1135 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984)).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. 708 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 1998).
150. Id. at 270.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 270-71.
153. Id. at 271.
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Payment of Costs.' ' 154 The court again transferred the request to the circuit
court, which again denied the motion.155 Subsequently, the district court
dismissed the appeal for failure to pay the filing fee.'
56
The prisoner petitioned the Supreme court of Florida for mandamus to
compel the district court to reinstate his appeal and permit him to proceed in
forma pauperis.15 7 The supreme court agreed with the prisoner that his
second motion should have been treated as a motion for review of the circuit
court's initial denial under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.430.' 58
Relying on Rule 9.040(c),159 which provides that "[i]f a party seeks an
improper remedy, the cause shall be treated as if the proper remedy had been
sought," the court transferred the cause to the district court "for
consideration of the denial of indigency status."' 
60
In Willis v. State,161 a criminal defendant who was represented by the
Public Defender at trial, was convicted of possession of cocaine with intent
to sell and filed a notice of appeal. 162 Ruling on the defendant's motion for
an order of insolvency applicable to the appeal, the trial court appointed the
Public Defender but required the defendant to pay the appellate filing fee• • 163
and the cost of the trial transcripts. Nothing in the record reflected that
the defendant had the ability to pay those costs.
64
After the first district dismissed the appeal for failure to pay the filing
fee, the defendant filed a financial affidavit showing that he had only twenty-
five dollars and sixty-three cents in his prison account and twice petitioned
the court to reinstate the appeal. 165 The district court directed the trial court
to reconsider the defendant's indigency status.' 66 That court reiterated its
prior order, stating that the defendant's affidavit was invalid because,
although it was sworn to and subscribed before a notary public, it was not
sworn to under penalty of perjury;' 67 that the defendant was unresponsive in
154. Quigley, 708 So. 2d at 271.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. FLA. R. APp. P. 9.040(c).
160. Quigley, 708 So. 2d at 271 (quoting FLA. R. App. P. 9.040(c)).
161. 708 So. 2d 939 (Fla. 1998).
162. Id. at 940.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Willis, 708 So. 2d at 940.
167. Id.
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answering the questions on the affidavit;168 and that because the defendant
"'was not homeless, destitute or totally without assets' before his arrest and
because he was a known and convicted drug dealer, he must produce
'credible evidence to support the proposition that he was then or now totally
insolvent. ' ' ' 169 Pursuant to the trial court's order, the district court again
required the defendant to pay the filing fee to maintain his appeal. 7°
The defendant then petitioned the Supreme court of Florida for a writ of
habeas corpus to enable him to pursue his appeal.171 The court granted the
petition, stating:
[W]e find it difficult, if not illogical, to conclude that the trial court
could find the financial affidavit in this case to be valid and
sufficient to prove that Willis was insolvent for the purpose of
hiring appellate counsel but find the affidavit to be invalid and
insufficient to prove that he was insolvent for the purpose of paying
the filing fee and the transcript costs. If a financial affidavit was
properly executed for the purpose of granting the defendant public
assistance of counsel, it necessarily follows that the affidavit was
properly executed for all purposes. While a defendant may be
found indigent for the purpose of receiving public assistance of
counsel, yet solvent to pay other costs and fees, the record must
justify the order of partial indigency. Merely noting that a
defendant is a convicted drug dealer and not homeless is not, in our
view, a sufficient justification for declaring that person to be
solvent to pay filing fees and other costs.1
In Ferenc v. State,'73 a criminal defendant's motion to proceed in forma
pauperis in his appeal from the denial of a motion for post-conviction relief
was denied based on the trial court's finding that the appeal was frivolous.
174
On appeal, the fifth district found this denial, apparently based on section
57.085(8) of the Florida Statutes (1995), 175 which authorizes trial courts to
dismiss frivolous proceedings instituted by indigent prisoners under certain
168. Id. at 940-41.
169. Id. at 941.
170. Id.
171. Willis, 708 So. 2d at 941.
172. Id.
173. 697 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
174. Id. at 1263.
175. Id.
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circumstances, to be improper because the statute does not apply to criminal-. 176
proceedings or collateral criminal proceedings.
A criminal defendant in Martin v. State177 argued that he should be
considered indigent for purposes of appeal based on his testimony that he
had a Chapter 7 personal bankruptcy case pending and that certain property
he owned was the subject of an action to foreclose a mortgage.'78 The fourth
district disagreed.
As to the bankruptcy claim, the court stated:
The mere fact that one has filed for relief under chapter 7 of the
Bankruptcy Code does not by itself establish indigency for
purposes of an appeal under section 27.52 [of the Florida Statutes].
For one thing, income earned by a debtor after filing for relief
under the bankruptcy law is not part of the bankruptcy estate. For
another Martin's unadorned claim of bankruptcy fails to address
exempt property under bankruptcy law.
Moreover, bankruptcy connotes insolvency. Under the Bankruptcy
Code, insolvency means that one's debts exceed the value of one's
property. In contrast, indigency under section 27.52 is related to
income or, alternatively, the ability of a defendant to pay for an
attorney without substantial hardship to the defendant's family.
Thus, without more, mere insolvency under bankruptcy law cannot
be equated with indigency under section 27.52.179
The court also addressed the foreclosure claim.
So too with the foreclosure. Knowing that a foreclosure
proceeding is pending with regard to real property owned by a
defendant in a criminal case hardly establishes the section
27.52(2)(b) standard for indigency. The record in this case does
not tell us, for example, the amount of the claimed debt in the
foreclosure proceeding; nor does it tell us the value of the property
to be foreclosed. For all we know, the value greatly exceeds the
debt, and [the] defendant has equity which he could use to pay for
an attorney. And even that, of course, fails to consider whether it is
176. Id.
177. 711 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
178. Id. at 119.
179. Id. at 120 (footnotes omitted).
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apparent that the mortgagee will ultimately prevail in the
foreclosure action.
180
The court also discussed "the question of transfers of property and
income by Martin to family members, including his mother."" The court
stated:
We do not believe that section 27.52 allows transfers of property
and money by a defendant to family members in order to create the
insolvency required for court-appointed counsel. To do so would
require the public to pay for lawyers for defendants whose
appearance of need was specifically created for that purpose. That
amounts to a fraud on the courts as well as the
taxpayers. Voluntary transfers of property to family members to
create indigency for the appointment of counsel are just as much
fraudulent conveyances as are such transfers by debtors to avoid
payment to their creditors.
182
In light of the above factors, and the existence of evidence that the
defendant's real property had been used for income producing purposes, the
fourth district upheld a circuit court determination that the defendant was not
indigent.
183
XI. FILING FEES
In Milligan v. Palm Beach County Board of County Commissioners,'
84
the Supreme court of Florida upheld a circuit court's conclusion1 85 that
Florida's counties do not have to pay appellate filing fees on behalf of
indigent criminal defendants.
186
The court pointed out that "Article VIII, section l(b) of the Florida
Constitution provides that disbursement of county funds must be by general
law."'187  The court found "no provision in... any.., statute which
mandates that counties disburse funds to pay appellate filing fees on behalf
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Martin, 711 So. 2d at 120-21.
183. Id. at 121.
184. 704 So. 2d 1050 (Fla. 1998).
185. The fourth district had certified that the circuit court order passed on an issue of great
public importance requiring immediate resolution by the supreme court. Id. at 1051.
186. Id.
187. Id.
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of indigent criminal defendants." Rejecting the comptroller's argument
that such disbursement was required upon an in pari materia reading of
certain statutes, the court found "that when the legislature has intended
counties to pay certain costs, it has expressly provided for such
disbursements." 89
The court found that its decision would only have prospective
application, "meaning that refunds of filing fees which counties have paid
before issuance of this opinion are not required."' 190 The court also, by
separate administrative order, "directed the clerks of the appellate courts to
stop collecting filing fees for cases filed on behalf of indigents beginning on
the date this opinion is issued [January 8, 1998]. " 191
The fourth district, in In re Payment of Filing Fees,' discussed the
situation that exists when a notice of appeal is filed without the payment of
the appellate filing fee. 19 3 The court recognized that "[b]ecause there is a
strict time deadline for filing a notice of appeal .... lawyers for parties taking
an appeal may be forced to act quickly to preserve the right but without
prepayment of these costs to the attorney by the client."' 194  The court
indicated that as a result, it often receives notices of appeal unaccompanied
by the fee,' 95 and that, in such cases, it routinely enters "an order directing
the attorney who filed the appeal to pay the filing fee or file a determination
of indigency.' 96  In an increasing number of cases, the court indicated,
attorneys have been failing to respond to these orders,197 and the court wrote
on the subject "to make a point in the hope that the practice will cease."
198
The court stated that "[the mere fact that the client is obligated to
reimburse the attorney for the costs advanced does not relieve the attorney of
the duty to tender the filing fees to this court when the appeal is initiated."'
99
The court continued, "consequently, we rightfully look to the attorney
initiating the appellate process to pay the filing fees due this court. ' '2°°
188. Id.
189. Milligan, 704 So. 2d at 1052 (footnote omitted).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. 22 Fla. L. Weekly D2341 (4th Dist Ct. App. Oct. 8, 1997).
193. Id. at D2341.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Payment of Filing Fees, 22 Fla. L. Weekly at D2341.
198. Id.
199. Id. at D2342.
200. Id.
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The court went on to dispel the "mistaken assumption that a later
decision by the client not to pursue the appeal, and the filing of a voluntary
dismissal, will relieve the attorney of responding to our order for
payment. 2°1 The court noted "[t]he filing fee is an entry fee to the appellate
process, not a fee for prosecuting the appeal to a final result, °20 2 and stated
that "[w]hen the appeal is later abandoned, that is the decision of the litigant
and does not affect the liability for the fees due to commence the process. 20 3
The court also said:
We wish to make clear that we do not "bill" anyone, most
especially not clients, for payment of our filing fees. We instead
enter an order to the person filing the notice of appeal to pay the
filing fee (or produce an order of indigency) within 10 days or
sanctions will be imposed. The continued failure to pay is then a
failure to comply with an order of the court, not a mere failure to
respond to a bill from a creditor.
204
XIL. COUNSEL
205In Davis v. Meeks, the first district dealt with a situation in which two
attorneys jointly instituted an appeal on behalf of a client. 206 Subsequently, a
third attorney, who represented the client in related litigation, filed a notice
207
of appearance and a notice voluntarily dismissing the appeal. The two
attorneys who instituted the appeal moved to strike the notice of voluntarily
dismissal and to disqualify the third attorney, asserting that due to factors
pertaining to the related litigation, the attorney stood to gain if the judgment
against the client was upheld and that he therefore had a conflict of
* 208interest. The third attorney responded that he had discussed with the
client the benefits and detriments of proceeding with the appeal and that they
had jointly determined that the client's best interests were served by
dismissal of the case. 2°9  This response was accompanied by a sworn
201. Id.
202. Payment of Filing Fees, 22 Fla. L. Weekly at D2342.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. 709 So. 2d 184 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
206. Id. at 185.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
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affidavit of the client, in which the client stated that she approved of the
filing of the notice of dismissal as it was her wish to have the appeal
dismissed.21°
The court found that although it was undisputed that the two attorneys
were at one time authorized to pursue the case, it was clear that any such
authorization had been revoked. The court concluded that "[u]nder these
circumstances, determining who best represents her interests in this case is
not the province of this court, but rather of [the client] herself."212 "The
wisdom of her choice is not for us to decide," the court continued, "and the
consequences of that choice present issues for resolution in another forum on
another day. 213
XI. RECORD ON APPEAL
214In Fleming v. State, a criminal defendant moved for rehearing of the
second district's summary affirmance of his appeal, brought pursuant to215
Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(i), claiming that he was denied
an opportunity to file a brief.21 6 The defendant cited Summers v. State,217 in
which the court ruled that summary records contemplated by the rule must
be paginated and indexed by the circuit court clerks according to the
218
requirements of Rule 9.200(d), and asserted that his case was decided
while he was awaiting the index from the clerk to use in providing proper
record citations in his brief.
219
The court noted that, subsequent to Summers, the rule at issue was
amended to require that briefs be filed within fifteen days of the filing of the
notice of appeal. 220 The court then stated:
We decline to apply the requirements of Summers under this
amended version of the rule because to do so would require that the
210. Davis, 709 So. 2d at 185.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. 709 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
215. The rule sets forth the procedures to be used in appeals from summary denials of
motions for post-conviction relief.
216. Fleming, 709 So. 2d at 135.
217. 570 So. 2d 990 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
218. See Fleming, 709 So. 2d at 135.
219. Id.
220. Id.
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clerk index and paginate the record and send it to appellant, who
would then be required to file a brief, all within fifteen days of the
filing of the notice of appeal. No clerk in the district regularly
prepares summary records in this fashion and we do not believe the
rules intend that summary records be paginated and indexed.21
Noting that the defendant had conceded that the fifteen day requirement
postdated Summers and the defendant neither sought an extension of time for
his brief nor filed a motion asking the court how to reconcile the fifteen day
requirement with Summers, the court determined that the defendant had
222
waived his right to file a brief and denied rehearing.
XIV. TRANSCRIPTS
223In Guardianship of Halpert v. Rosenbloom, PA. the fourth district
"reluctantly" 224 reversed an award of attorney's fees because it failed to "set
forth findings as to the time reasonably expended, the hourly rate, or other
factors, if any, considered." 225 The court's reluctance stemmed from the fact
226that the trial court proceedings were not transcribed, meaning that a new
hearing would be required. 227 The lack of a transcript did not preclude
appellate review, the court found, because the reversible error appeared on
the face of the order.228
Although considering itself compelled by precedent to reverse, the court
stated that "[w]ere we writing on a clean slate, we might consider this error
harmless" or "[a]t a minimum, ... impose a waiver by the offended party's
failure to draw the error to the attention of the trial court.",
229
In Estopinan v. State, 23 there was a transcript of the trial proceedings,
albeit one that the second district termed as being "full of errors and
inaccuracies due to the poor performance of the court reporter."' 31 Because
221. Id. at 135-36.
222. Id. at 136.
223. 698 So. 2d 938 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
224. Id. at 939.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 940.
228. Halpert, 689 So. 2d at 939.
229. Id. at 940.
230. 710 So. 2d 994 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
231. Id. at 995.
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the appellant was "precluded from meaningful appellate review" due to the
"abysmal" transcript, the case was reversed and remanded for a new trial.
2 32
XV. EXTENSIONS OF TIME
233In Publix Supermarkets, Inc., v. Arnold, an attorney filed a motion for
an extension of time, stating in the motion that he had contacted the
opposing counsel and that no objection to the request had been made.2 4
After the opposing counsel did file an objection which indicated that she had
not been contacted, the court ordered the attorney who filed the motion to
respond.235 The attorney indicated that when he signed his motion, he
believed that his assistant had contacted the opposing counsel and had
received no objection. 36
The court first pointed out that Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure
9.300(a) "contemplates that counsel, not a secretary or an assistant, shall
contact opposing counsel regarding an extension of time. '237 The court found
that "[t]he problem here is that appellant's counsel delegated this important
function to his assistant and then misrepresented to this court that it was he
who had made the contact.
'2 38
Because of counsel's failure to comply with the appellate rule and his
erroneous representations, the court, by separate order, directed counsel to
pay $250 to the clerk of the court.239 "In closing," the court stated, "we note
that, if a lawyer is too busy to personally contact opposing counsel to
determine whether there is an objection to a motion for an extension of time
for filing a brief, perhaps that lawyer is overextended." 240
The first district, in Stoutamire v. State,241 granted a motion for
extension of time to file an appellant's initial brief in an appeal from an
order summarily denying a motion for post-conviction relief. The court
232. Id. at 996.
233. 707 So. 2d 1161 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
234. Id. at 1161.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Publix, 707 So. 2d at 1161.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 1161-62.
241. 703 So. 2d 1065 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
242. Id. at 1066.
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wrote "only to explain a change in the Rules of Appellate Procedure
concerning briefs in such cases."
243
The court noted that effective January 1, 1997, Florida Rule of
Appellate Procedure 9.140(g), which governed such appeals, was
redesignated as Rule 9.140(i) and amended to provide in pertinent part that
"no briefs. . .shall be required, but any appellant's brief shall be filed within
15 days of the filing of the notice of appeal." 244
The court then stated that although it was granting the motion for
extension of time despite the fact that it had been filed well after the fifteen
day period conterhplated by the rule,245 "we remind litigants that normally
motions for extensions of time to file a brief filed after the time for filing the
brief has expired, will not be granted."'246 Although most appeals governed
by the rule involved in the case "are handled by litigants pro se,"247 the court
stated that it "will not hesitate" 248 to apply its normal approach in such
proceedings. 249 "The fact that [litigants] are not represented by a lawyer
does not excuse them from complying with the procedural rules,"' 50 and, the
court continued, "[1]itigants should be on notice that in appeals pursuant to
Rule 9.140(i), the initial brief is due within 15 days from the filing of the
notice of appeal."' ' 1
XVI. DISQUALIFICATION OF APPELLATE JUDGES
In 5-H Corp. v. Padovano,252 the Supreme Court of Florida considered a
petition for a writ of prohibition that sought to prevent all of the judges of
the first district from presiding over the petitioner's appeal that was pending
in that courtY3 The petitioners' attorney had handled a prior, related appeal
in the first district, in which a panel of the court ruled against the attorney's
clients. 4 The attorney filed a motion for rehearing in which he "suggested
that the panel not only disfavored one of his clients, but also favored
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Stoutamire, 703 So. 2d at 1066.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Stoutamire, 703 So. 2d at 1066.
252. 708 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 1997).
253. Id. at 244.
254. Id.
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opposing counsel. 255  In addition, in referring to opposing counsel's
argument, the attorney argued that "'what is truly appalling is that... the
panel in the instant appeal would buy such nonsense and give credence to
such "total b[---]-s[---]. ' '256 Moreover, in a footnote, the attorney stated
that "'the use of the term "'total b[---]s[---]' without the inclusion of at least
2 or 3 intervening expletives is very kind and generous under the
circumstances."'
257
The court denied the rehearing motion,258 and then had its clerk forward
a copy of the motion to The Florida Bar to review the appropriateness of its
comments and language and to determine whether disciplinary proceedings
should be instituted against the attorney.2 9 Subsequently, The Florida Bar
filed a formal complaint against the attorney, who in turn reported the matter
to the Judicial Qualifications Commission (JQC).26° The complaint against
the attorney was dismissed upon a finding of no probable cause, while the
petition before the supreme court was silent as to what action, if any, was
taken on the report to the JQC.26'
In the appeal giving rise to the prohibition proceeding, the attorney, on
behalf of his clients, moved to disqualify the judges of the first district from
262presiding over the case. The motion asserted that such disqualification
was mandated in light of the circumstances of the prior appeal.263
Each judge on the court not otherwise disqualified considered the
264motion in accordance with In re Estate of Carlton, which calls for
appellate judges to determine for themselves "both the legal sufficiency of a
request seeking [their] disqualification and the propriety of withdrawing in
any particular circumstances." 265 Some of the judges voluntarily recused
themselves, but four of the remaining judges denied the disqualification
motion as legally insufficient.266
The supreme court denied the petition for prohibition, holding "that a
Florida judge's report of perceived attorney unprofessionalism to The
255. Id.
256. Id. at 245 (citations omitted).
257. 5-H Corp., 708 So. 2d at 245 (citations omitted).
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. 5-H Corp., 708 So. 2d at 245.
263. Id.
264. 378 So. 2d 1212 (Fla. 1979).
265. Id. at 1216.
266. 5-H Corp., 708 So. 2d at 24546.
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Florida Bar (or, conversely, an attorney's report of perceived judicial
unprofessionalism to the JQC) is, in and of itself, legally insufficient to
support that judge's disqualification. 267
The court pointed out that under the applicable ethical rules and canons,
"Florida judges, just like every other Florida attorney, have an obligation to
maintain the integrity of the legal profession and report to the Florida Bar
any professional misconduct of a fellow attorney." 268 It stated that the
petitioner's argument that the court should disqualify the district court
judges was "untenable ' 269 because "such a holding would not only contradict
both the letter and spirit of the canons and rules discussed above, but also
discourage Florida judges from reporting questionable attorney behavior to
the Florida Bar for fear of the possible repercussions (such as those sought in
the present case)." 270 The court continued, "Encouraging such reporting also
eliminates any incentive for an attorney to seek a Florida judge's
disqualification by intentionally provoking that judge into filing a report
with the Florida Bar. Simply stated, encouraging such reporting discourages
underhanded 'judge shopping' and 'forum shopping.' 271
In concluding that disqualification would not be compelled in the
context of an attorney filing a report with the JQC, the court relied on the
specific wording of Florida Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3E.(1) cmt.,272
as well as district court decisions holding that neither a party's expressed
intent to file a JQC complaint,273 nor the institution of a civil suit against a
judge, 4 constitutes a legally sufficient ground for recusal. The court
explicitly disapproved of other district court decisions that were inconsistent
with the court's opinion. 5
"Of course," the court added, "regardless of whether such reports to
The Florida Bar or the JQC have been filed, disqualification remains
available where it can be shown that 'the judge has a personal bias or
prejudice concerning a party or a party's lawyer.' ',276
267. Id. at 246.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 247.
270. Id.
271. 5-H Corp., 708 So. 2d at 247 (footnote and citations omitted).
272. Id. at 248.
273. Cherradi v. Andrews, 669 So. 2d 326 (FIa. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
274. Dowda v. Salfi, 455 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
275. 5-H Corp., 708 So. 2d at 248.
276. Id. (citing Fla. Code Jud. Conduct Canon 3E(1)(a) (emphasis added by the court)).
1998
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XVII. MOOTNESS
277In Kay v. Erskine, an appeal was taken from a circuit court order
vacating a county judge's blanket order of recusal in all cases in which
certain attorneys appeared as counsel.278 The fourth district reversed,
finding that the judge's resignation from the bench prior to the circuit court's
entry of the order had rendered moot the relief sought.279
280In Bostic v. State, the first district dismissed a criminal appeal as
moot due to the death of the appellant.281 The appellant's estate argued that
the appeal was not moot because the trial court had imposed a fine on the
282appellant that the State could attempt to collect from the estate. In light of
the State's representation that it would not attempt to collect the fine,
however, the court concluded that the appellant had not shown good cause
why the appeal should not be dismissed.
28P
The first district also found the death of a litigant to render an appeal
moot in Lund v. Department of Health.284 There, a doctor who was
appealing the suspension of his medical license died while the appeal was
285pending. His personal representative urged the court to decide the case for
the sole purpose of determining the appellant's right to prevailing party
attorney's fees under section 120.595(5) of the Florida Statutes (Supp.
1996).286
The court noted that "[a] generally recognized exception precluding
dismissal of an otherwise moot case occurs in situations wherein collateral
legal consequences affecting the rights of a party may flow from the issues
to be decided.' 287 This exception, the court continued, "applies to cases in
which the consequences consist of property, advantages or rights that the
appellant would lose as a collateral result of the lower court's decision if the
appellate court were to dismiss the appeal and allow the lower court's
decision to stand., 288 By contrast, the court found, the appellant hoped "to
277. 710 So. 2d 751 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
278. Id. at 752.
279. Id. at 753.
280. 708 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
281. Id. at 696.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. 708 So. 2d 645 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
285. Id. at 646.
286. Id.
287. Id. (citing Godwin v. State, 593 So. 2d 211,212 (Fla. 1992)).
288. Id.
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obtain a 'collateral legal benefit' that would arise.. .if the appeal were to be
decided in appellant's favor."
289
Concluding that the appeal was not moot simply to determine whether
the appellant was entitled to attorney's fees after prevailing on appeal
"would be a broad expansion of the concept of 'collateral legal
consequences,"' the court stated. 29° Declining to so expand the concept, the
court concluded "that the possibility of an attorney's fee award under section
120.595(5) is not a collateral legal consequence which would preclude
dismissal when the death of a party renders the appeal moot."
291
Another first district decision involving mootness was Physicians
Health Care Plans, Inc. v. State of Florida, Agency for Health Care
Administration.292 There, an appeal was taken from a final administrative
order denying a petition to initiate rulemaking.293 Approximately one week
before oral argument, the agency that had denied the petition instituted a
294proceeding to develop a proposed rule on the subject of the petition. The
agency candidly acknowledged that it was "not a coincidence that the
proposed rule development was initiated shortly prior to the date of oral
argument. 295
The court recognized that the agency's institution of the rulemaking
process came well after it was required by law.296 Because the appellant's
proposed rule could be considered by the agency in the newly instituted rule
development proceeding, however, the court found that the agency's belated
initiation of rulemaking granted the appellant all the relief that would have
been available on appeal. Accordingly, the case was dismissed as moot.
A mootness claim was rejected by the fourth district in Taxpayers
Ass'n. of Indian River County, Inc. v. Indian River County.299 In that case, a
circuit court dismissed petitions for certiorari that sought review of action of
a county commission regarding the purchase of a number of residential
lots.3°° The circuit court's decision was based on the fact that the county had
289. Lund, 708 So. 2d at 647.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. 706 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
293. Id. at 113.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Physicians Health Care Plans, Inc., 706 So. 2d at 113-14.
298. Id. at 114.
299. 701 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
300. Id. at 898.
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already closed on the lots. The fourth district agreed with the petitioners'
claim that the issue was capable of repetition because the county might
purchase additional lots, a contention which the county did not deny.
Accordingly, the court found that "the dismissals for mootness were
improper.' 3°3
In Khazaal v. Browning, ° a default final judgment of foreclosure was
entered but shortly thereafter was redeemed. 0 5 On appeal, the appellees
contended that the case was moot because the payment resulting in
redemption was voluntary due to the fact that the appellant could have
moved for a stay pending review or posted a supersedeas bond.3°' The fifth
district, after first reiterating the concept it expressed in Great American
Insurance Co. v. Stolte307 that "there does not appear to be a rationale
underlying the rule that voluntary payment of the judgment renders the case
moot, precluding appeal while involuntary payment does not," disagreed3
The court stated, "payment by appellant in this case was involuntary in that
no stay was issued and payment was not made as part of a compromise, but
rather to preclude a foreclosure sale. '3°
XVm. STANDING
310
In Save Anna Maria, Inc. v. Department of Transportation, the
second district concluded that an environmental group had standing to
appeal from a Department of Environmental Protection ("DEP") denial of a
request by the Department of Transportation ("DOT") for a dredge and fill
permit.3" Although the order under review actually granted the group's
motion to dismiss, DEP rejected a hearing officer's finding with respect to
the public interest, concluding instead that DOT did provide reasonable
assurance that the proposed project was clearly in the public interest. 312 The
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. 707 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
305. Id. at 400.
306. Id.
307. 491 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
308. Khazaal, 707 So. 2d at 400.
309. Id.
310. 700 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
311. Id. at 16.
312. Id. at 115.
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environmental group argued that, left unchallenged, the decision would
become res judicata when the issue is revisited in court.313
Recognizing the general rule that parties cannot file proceedings to
review an order of judgment in their favor, the court indicated that the
question of whether the environmental group's appeal should be permitted
was "not an easy question to answer., 314 The environmental group urged the
view expressed in State Road Department of Florida v. Zetrouer315 that
"[t]he mere fact that a litigant secures a judgment in his favor does not
necessarily mean that there may not be some aspect of said judgment at
which he would be aggrieved and which would present grounds for review
by an appellate court."316 Noting that res judicata and collateral estoppel
concerns had been addressed in the context of a similar issue in General
Development Utilities, Inc. v. Florida Public Service Commission,317 the
court found that "[o]n balance, these authorities compel the conclusion that
[the environmental group] should be permitted to prosecute this appeal. 318
In Barnett v. Barnett,3 19 the fourth district dismissed an appeal arising
from a dissolution action. 320 A bank had moved, in the trial court, to
establish the priority of its lien over that of the parties' attorneys with
respect to the proceeds of the sale of a sculpture.321 It did not, however,
move to intervene or to consolidate its pending foreclosure case with the
dissolution action.322 The bank assigned to the wife any rights it might have
to appeal the order denying it priority, and the wife filed an appeal in her
capacity as assignee.
323
The court found that since the bank was not a party to the trial court
proceeding, it had no standing to appeal the adverse order. The court
noted that Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.020(f)(1) defines
"'[a]ppellant' as a 'party who seeks to invoke the appeal jurisdiction of a
313. Id. at 114.
314. Id. at 115 (citing Employers Fire Ins. Co. v. Blanchard, 234 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1970)).
315. 142 So. 217 (Fla. 1932).
316. Save Anna Maria, Inc., 700 So. 2d at 115 (quoting State Road Dep't v. Zetrouer,
142 So. 217, 218 (Fla. 1932)).
317. 385 So. 2d 1050 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
318. Save Anna Maria, Inc., 700 So. 2d at 116.
319. 705 So. 2d 63 (Fla. 4th Dist. CL App. 1997).
320. Id. at 64.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Barnett, 705 So. 2d at 64.
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court, ' '' 325 and that "[tjhe general rule is that a non-party is a 'stranger to the
record' who cannot 'transfer jurisdiction to the appellate court."' 326 The
court distinguished the case from In re Receiverships of Guarantee Security
Life Insurance Co.327 based on the fact that in that case, "even though the
litigants were not parties to the statutory receivership proceeding, they had
standing on appeal to challenge the order that directly impacted the
development of the case in which they were named defendants.
32
The fifth district dismissed an appeal in Cocoa Academy for Aerospace
Technology v. School Board of Brevard County329 when the appellant was
not a legal entity, but simply the name of a program at a high school.330 The
court found that "[ilt is a basic premise that unless an in rem proceeding is
before the court, a cause of action must be conducted by or opposed by a
'person' recognized under the laws of this state.",331 Dismissing the appeal,
the court found that "[i]n the instant matter, only one party, the appellee,
School Board, is visible to this court, and Cocoa Academy of Aerospace
Technology, although designated as the appellant, is not.,
332
XIX. PRESERVATION OF ERROR
The fourth district, in Murphy v. International Robotics Systems, Inc.,33 3
discussed at length the subject of improper closing arguments that were not
objected to during trial, "in the hopes that a litigant considering an appeal to
this court, whose best hope for reversal is unobjected-to argument of
counsel, will carefully consider whether it is worth the cost."334 The opinion
noted that "[i]n the thirty-three years since this court was created, it has
never granted a new trial in a civil case grounded solely on improper
argument when there was no objection during trial., 335 It also pointed out
that "[a]lthough the Florida Supreme court has reversed for a new trial based
325. Id. (quoting FLA. R. APP. P. 9.020(f)(1)) (emphasis added by the court).
326. Id. (quoting Forcum v. Symmes, 133 So. 88, 89 (1931)).
327. 678 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
328. Barnett, 705 So. 2d at 64.
329. 706 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
330. Id. at 398.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. 710 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
334. Id. at 588.
335. Id. at 587.
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on unobjected-to closing argument, the last time it did so in a civil case was
in 1956."336
The court provided an extensive overview of Florida case law relating
to the issue. It stated that "we do not think improper, but unobjected-to,
closing argument in a civil case is something so fundamental that there
should be an exception to the rule requiring an objection."3  The court
further stated that "we do not think we are being inconsistent with our
supreme court when we all but close the door on allowing this issue to be
raised for the first time on appeal.
338
XX. ORAL ARGUMENT
In Whitehead v. Dreyer,339 counsel for one of the appellees was denied
the opportunity to present oral argument on behalf of his client.340 Prior to a
decision by the court, that attorney filed a motion for rehearing, contending
that he was entitled to participate in oral argument because he filed a brief as
an appellee.
341
The fifth district recognized that "[a]lthough Florida Rule of Appellate
Procedure 9.020 defines an appellee as every party other than the appellant,
the committee notes to that rule observe the term appellee 'has been defined
to include the parties against whom relief is sought and all others necessary
to the cause."' 342 Pointing out that relief was not being sought against the
appellee represented by the attorney who moved for rehearing and that the
appellee was not a necessary party to the appealed judgment, the court
denied the motion.343
XXI. SANCTIONS
344
In Mercade v. State, the second district concluded that a pro se,
incarcerated appellant had brought a frivolous appeal from a trial court order
denying a motion to correct an illegal sentence.345 The court consequently
336. Id. at 589 (citing Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Strickland, 88 So. 2d519 (Fla. 1956)).
337. Id.
338. Murphy, 710 So. 2d at 590.
339. 698 So. 2d 1278 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
340. Id. at 1280.
341. Id.
342. Id. (citing 1973 Amendments to Committee Notes, FLA. R. APP. P. 9.020(g)).
343. Id.
344. 698 So. 2d 1313 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
345. Id. at 1313.
1998
38
Nova Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [1998], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol23/iss1/1
Nova Law Review
recommended that the Department of Corrections exercise its discretion to
subject the appellant to the forfeiture of gain time in accord with section
944.28 of the Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996).346
The court stated:
We use this case.. .to send a message to prisoners collaterally
attacking sentences imposed by the trial courts of this district that
we fully intend to invoke the applicable provisions of section
944.28, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996), governing the forfeiture of
gain time and the right to earn gain time in the future, when we are
confronted with a frivolous appeal, such as this one, from the
denial of a motion for postconviction relief.347
The court went on to discuss the statute to which it had referred. It
noted that effective July 1, 1996, section 944.28(2)(a) was amended in part
to provide that "'[a]ll or any part of the gain time earned by a prisoner
according to the provisions of law is subject to forfeiture if such prisoner...
is found by a court to have brought a frivolous suit, action, claim, proceeding
or appeal in any court."' 348 It also pointed out that the legislature in section
944.28 (2)(c) "vested sole discretion in the Department of Corrections to
declare a forfeiture of a prisoner's gain time for any violation of section
944.28(2)(a), including the bringing of a frivolous appeal. 349
The court went on to state:
It is manifestly clear to us that by amending section 944.28(2)(a),
the Florida Legislature sent a definite message to prisoners such as
the appellant that the initiation of frivolous legal proceedings
before the courts of this state, including the bringing of frivolous
appeals, will no longer be tolerated as a matter of public policy and
that the consequence of bringing such proceedings may result in the
Department of Corrections imposing the harshest of sanctions
available to punish a prisoner-a longer period of incarceration
through the forfeiture of gain time. We fully intend to implement
this legislative policy expression.
350
The court also noted that it was not the first appellate court "to rely on
the provisions of section 944.28(2)(a) in an attempt to stem the flow of
346. Id.
347. Id. at 1314.
348. FLA. STAT. § 944.28(2)(a) (Supp. 1996).
349. Mercade, 698 So. 2d at 1315.
350. Id.
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frivolous post-conviction appeals,35 citing to three fifth district cases, two
of which provided a warning to defendants that further pursuit of frivolous
appeals would subject them to sanctions as provided in 944.28(2)(a),35 2 and
one of which353 "direct[ed] the Department of Corrections to forfeit the
applicable gain time" of one of the individuals who had been previously
warned.354
The Mercade court stated that "[a]lthough we share the same
frustrations over frivolous post-conviction appeals as do our colleagues on
the Fifth District, we conclude that we do not have the authority to simply
direct the Department of Corrections to forfeit a prisoner's gain time after
finding that the prisoner's appeal is frivolous." The court therefore
declined to follow the "'direct' approach" taken by the fifth district.3  The
court then stated:
We express our confidence, however, that if we consistently
implement the legislative policy expressed in section 944.28(2)(a)
in the manner we have done in this case, and if the Department of
Corrections consistently invokes the procedures of section
944.28(2)(c) when notified that a particular prisoner has brought a
frivolous appeal before us, then prisoners will be dissuaded from
bringing frivolous postconviction appeals because of the looming
specter of the loss of a prisoner's most precious commodity-gain
time.357
XXII. EXTRAORDINARY WRITS
A. Certiorari
In North Beach Association of St. Lucie County, Inc. v. St. Lucie
County,358 a landowner filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the circuit
court to challenge a rezoning order.359 After the landowner amended the
351. Id. at 1316.
352. Ferenc v. State, 697 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Hall v. State, 690
So. 2d 754 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
353. Hall v. State, 698 So. 2d 576 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
354. Id.
355. Mercade, 698 So. 2d at 1316.
356. L
357. Id.
358. 706 So. 2d 62 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
359. Id. at 63.
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petition to allege additional grounds, the circuit court dismissed the petition,
concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the substantive arguments
in the amended petition.36°
Reviewing the dismissal, the fourth district granted certiorari, stating
that "[a] petition for certiorari may be amended to include additional
substantive arguments when the interests of justice are served thereby. 36'
The court noted that it is "not entirely uncommon" for appellants to move to
file amended briefs to raise additional issues and that the court grants such
motions when appellants gave satisfactory explanations as to why they did
not raise the issues in their initial briefs and when there is no prejudice to
opposing parties.362 "We see no reason not to extend the same reasoning to
the amendment of petitions for extraordinary relief," the court stated.
363
District court decisions involving requests for certiorari included Patton
v. State,3 4 (certiorari proper method of seeking review of order committing
criminal defendant to custody of Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Services after a determination that he was incompetent to proceed);
Taxpayers Ass'n. of Indian River County, Inc. v. Indian River County,365
(certiorari granted by district court when circuit court improperly concluded
that petition for certiorari filed in circuit court to review action of county
commission was moot); Larkin v. Pirthauer,366 (order disqualifying attorney
from representing personal representative of an estate reviewable b
certiorari); Billings, Cunningham, Morgan & Boatwright, P.A. v. Isom,%
(certiorari proper to review law firm's motion to withdraw as counsel);
Board of County Commissioners v. Brabham, 36 (certiorari is appropriate
method of reviewing order which awards counsel fees to court-appointed
attorneys in criminal cases); Lerner v. Lerner,369 (certiorari granted to quash
order granting a motion to compel the listing of a marital home for
immediate sale); Rutherford, Mulhall & Wargo, P.A. v. Antidormi,37°
(certiorari granted to quash order requiring law firm, that had imposed a
restraining lien on its office file for a former client who disputed the fee
charged, to turn the file over to the client before the fee was paid); Okaloosa
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. North Beach Ass'n of St. Lucie County, 706 So. 2d at 63.
364. 712 So. 2d 1206 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
365. 701 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
366. 700 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
367. 701 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
368. 710 So. 2d 230 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
369. 708 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
370. 695 So. 2d 1300 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
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County v. Custer,371 (certiorari appropriate to review denial of motion to
dismiss complaint for failure to comply with medical malpractice presuit
requirements); Gunning v. Brophy,372 (certiorari granted to vacate an order
compelling a petitioner to respond to interrogatories that was entered after a
notice was filed removing the case to federal court); Code Enforcement
Board v. Bustamont,373 (appellate decision of circuit court quashed on
petition for writ of certiorari when circuit court had reversed a decision on
an appeal which was untimely and as to which the appellant had waived not
only the grounds of but the right to appeal in the first place); Leveritt &
Associates, P.A. v. Williamson,374 (certiorari granted to quash circuit court's
affirmance of trial court's final judgment when circuit court refused to
review issue of whether the trial court erred in denying motion to disqualify
trial court); and, WFTV, Inc. v. Hinn, 375 (certiorari granted to quash order
denying motion to strike a punitive damages claim).
B. Prohibition
In Valitos v. State,376 a criminal defendant sought prohibition after a
trial judge denied a motion for disqualification based on the fact that the
judge, in acceding to a request to order a presentence report on the propriety
of youthful offender sanctions, announced that doing so would be a "'waste
of the Court's time.' 3 77 A response to the petition, filed by the Attorney
General on behalf of the trial judge, stated that the "'trial court merely
indicated she did not think it would be appropriate to sentence petitioner as a
youthful offender, but she nonetheless would consider sentencing petitioner
as such. ' '3 78 The response concluded that there "'has been no showing that
petitioner would not receive a fair hearing and sentence before this
judge.' , 37 9
The second district noted that in reviewing motions for disqualification,
trial judges may look only at the facial sufficiency of the motions and that
attempts to refute charges of partiality exceed the scope of the inquiry and
establish grounds for disqualification. 38 The court further stated that "[t]his
371. 697 So. 2d 1297 (Fla. lst Dist. CL App. 1997).
372. 22 Fla. L. Weekly D2167 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
373. 706 So. 2d 1383 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
374. 698 So. 2d 1316 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
375. 705 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 5th Dist. CL App. 1998).
376. 707 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
377. Id. at 344.
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. Id.
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principle applies with equal force to a response filed in a prohibition
proceeding in the appellate court by the trial judge whose partiality is
questioned, and the response refutes factual allegations or conclusions., 38'
Based on these principles, the court found that "[t]he response filed on
behalf of the trial judge in this proceeding creat[ed] 'an intolerable adversary
atmosphere between the trial judge and the litigant"' and consequently
382granted prohibition.
C. Effects on Appeals of Prior Denials of Petitions for Writs of Prohibition
In Sumner v. Sumner,383 the second district declined to follow the lead
of the third and fourth districts, holding that denials of petitions for writs of
prohibition will not bar subsequent, post-trial review unless the order of
denial states that it is with prejudice or otherwise evinces an unequivocal
384determination by the court that the merits were considered. The court's
conclusion was consistent with its historical approach to the issue, an
approach that was rejected by the third district in Obanion v. State.385 In
Obanion, the court determined that petitions which are denied without
comment will be deemed to constitute determinations on the merits, barring
the issues raised from being litigated on subsequent appeals. 386 The fourth
district adopted the Obanion approach in Hobbs v. State.387 In Barwick v.
388State, the supreme court approved of the use by the third and fourth
districts of the Obanion approach, but declined to adopt it for itself,
concluding instead that petitions filed in the supreme court would preclude
subsequent review only when the order denying the petition specifically
stated that the denial was with prejudice. 389
D. Mandamus
In Sheley v. Florida Parole Commission,390 an inmate appealed from a
circuit court order denying his petition for a writ of mandamus to review an
381. Valltos, 707 So. 2d at 344.
382. Id. at 345.
383. 707 So. 2d 934 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
384. Id. at 934.
385. 496 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
386. Id. at 980.
387. 689 So. 2d 1249 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
388. 660 So. 2d 685 (Fla. 1995).
389. Id. at 691.
390. 703 So. 2d 1202 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (criminal division en banc).
[Vol. 23:1
43
: Nova Law Review 23, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1998
Musto
order suspending his presumptive parole release date.391 The first district
acknowledged that "final judgment on a complaint for writ of mandamus is
reviewable by appeal," but concluded that this principle did not apply to the
case under review because the circuit court petition was filed "as an
appellate remedy to review quasi-judicial action of a lower tribunal. 392
Under such circumstances, the court concluded, circuit court orders denying
mandamus are "reviewable in the district court by certiorari under rule
9.030(b)(2)(B), and not by a subsequent plenary appeal on the merits of the
case."
3 93
In Orange County v. Love,394 a criminal defendant was acquitted of the
charges brought against her in county court.395 Subsequently, that court
certified some, but not all, of the defendant's claimed costs. 396 She then filed
a petition for mandamus in the circuit court to compel certification of all
claimed CoStS.397 At the hearing on the petition, the county, which was
responsible for reimbursing the costs allowed, appeared and objected to a
majority of the costs. 398 The circuit court granted the petition, finding that
the county court should certify all costs incurred by the defendant, except
those which she conceded were not reimbursable, and the county
appealed. 399 The fifth district noted that the county was never a proper party
to either the criminal case or the mandamus and that there was no order
requiring the county to pay the costs. 4° Accordingly, the court found that
the county lacked standing to bring the appeal.401
E. Habeas Corpus
In McCray v. State,4°2 a criminal defendant, who had received a death
penalty that was reduced on appeal to life imprisonment without parole for
twenty-five years, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging the
391. Id. at 1204.
392. Id. at 1204-05.
393. Id. at 1205.
394. 703 So. 2d 1138 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
395. Id. at 1139.
396. Id.
397. Id.
398. Id.
399. Love, 703 So. 2d at 1139.
400. Id.
401. Id.
402. 699 So. 2d 1366 (Fla. 1997).
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effectiveness of his appellate counsel.4°3 The petition was filed fifteen years
after the original appeal. 4 4 4
The court found the petition to be barred by laches.4°5 Noting that
"[t]he unwarranted filings of such delayed claims unnecessarily clog the
,406court dockets and represent an abuse of the judicial process," the court
stated:
To remedy this abuse, we conclude, as a matter of law, that any
petition for a writ of habeas corpus claiming ineffective assistance
of appellate counsel is presumed to be the result of an unreasonable
delay and to prejudice the state if the petition has been filed more
than five years from the date the petitioner's conviction became
final. We further conclude that this initial presumption may be
overcome only if the petitioner alleges under oath, with a specific
factual basis, that the petitioner was affirmatively misled about the
results of the appeal by counsel.
4 °7
In Lewis v. Florida Parole Commission,408 the appellant filed a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus in the tenth circuit in Polk County, where he was
incarcerated, claiming that there was insufficient evidence to support the
revocation of his parole.40 9 On motion of the parole commission, the court
transferred the case to the second circuit on the theory that the commission is
located in Leon County, within that circuit.410 That court dismissed the
petition as an abuse of the writ based on the conclusion that the appellant
had filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the second circuit challenging
his presumptive parole release date and could and should have raised the
issues from the habeas corpus petition in the mandamus action.4 '
403. Id. at 1366.
404. Id. at 1367. The petition was not barred by the two-year limitation period under
Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(j)(3)(B) for petitions alleging ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel because Rule 9.140(j)(3)(C) provides that the two-year period "shall not begin
to run prior to the effective date of this rule" and the petition at issue was filed within two years of
the effective date.
405. Id. at 1386.
406. Id.
407. McCray, 699 So. 2d at 1368 (Fla. 1997).
408. 697 So. 2d 965 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
409. Id. at 965.
410. Id.
411. Id. at 965-66.
[Vol. 23:1
45
: Nova Law Review 23, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1998
Musto
412On appeal, the first district reversed, holding that the second circuit
"did not have territorial jurisdiction to rule on such petitioning' 413 because
"a habeas petition challenging a parole revocation must be filed in the
county where the prisoner is incarcerated. 414 The court went on to state that
"[o]n the other hand, the proper method of challenging a presumptive parole
release date is by a petition for writ of mandamus, filed in the Circuit Court
of Leon County. '4 1 Simply put, the court found that the appellant had
instituted each of his two proceedings in the proper court.
The court rejected the Parole Commission's argument that the issue of
venue was moot because the appellant did not appeal the change of venue to
the second district, where Polk County is located.416 The court found that
even if it were to accept that argument, the order under review would still
have to be reversed because the circuit court in Leon County lacked
"territorial jurisdiction' 417 over the action. The court also declined the
Parole Commission's request to "engage in a harmless-error analysis
41 8
because "[a]s this is a matter for the courts of another district, we believe it
would be improper for this court to in any way comment on the
meritoriousness of appellant's claim., 41 9 Finally, the court also rejected the
Parole Commission's "fallback position" that the matter be remanded with
instructions to dismiss the petition without prejudice to refile in the
appropriate court. 420 The court felt that such a result would be "unjust and
inappropriate" since the appellant had "already filed the matter in the proper
court, and the Parole Commission improperly moved to change venue."'421
The court therefore remanded with instructions to transfer the petition back
422to the tenth circuit.
Venue was also at issue in Calloway v. State.423 There, a defendant
appealed from the denial of his petition for habeas corpus that had been filed
412. Id. at 965.
413. Lewis, 697 So. 2d at 965.
414. Id. at966.
415. Id. (citing Porter v. Florida Parole and Probation Comm'n, 603 So. 2d 31 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1992)).
416. Id.
417. Id.
418. Lewis, 697 So. 2d at 966.
419. Id.
420. Id.
421. Id.
422. Id.
423. 699 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
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424in Dade County, which constitutes the eleventh circuit. The defendant had
been convicted in the seventeenth circuit and could no longer file a timely
motion for post conviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal
Procedure 3.850 in that circuit.425 He admitted that he filed his petition in
Dade County in an attempt to avoid the limitations period of rule 3.850.426
The third district dismissed the appeal on two grounds. First, the court
stated that "[a] petition for habeas corpus cannot be used to circumvent the
two-year period for filing motions for post-conviction relief.' 427 The court
then went on to say, "[a] more significant reason for our dismissal of this
appeal, however, is that the trial court in Dade County was without
jurisdiction to entertain defendant's petition. '[A] circuit court has no
jurisdiction to review the legality of a conviction in another circuit .... ,,428
The fifth district relied on Calloway in dismissing an appeal from the
429denial of a habeas corpus petition in McLeroy v. State. In that case, the
petitioner, who had been convicted in the eleventh circuit, filed his petition
in the fifth circuit, where he was incarcerated.43° The fifth district pointed
out that "[g]enerally, a petition for writ of habeas corpus should be filed in
the jurisdiction where the petitioner is incarcerated., 431 The court went on to
state, however, that "petitions for writ[s] of habeas corpus which allege
ineffective assistance of counsel are properly filed in the court where the
original sentence was imposed.,
432
F. Coram Nobis
In Peart v. State,433 the third district receded from Beckles v. State,434
and held that coram nobis is not an available remedy to defendants who were
not advised of the deportation consequences of their pleas in criminal
424. Id. at 849,
425. Id.
426. Id.
427. Id. (citing Scott v. Dugger, 604 So. 2d 465, 470 (Fla. 1992); Leichtman v.
Singletary, 674 So. 2d 889, 891-92 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. (1996)).
428. Calloway, 699 So. 2d at 849-50 (quoting State v. Broom, 523 So. 2d 639, 641 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1988)).
429. 704 So. 2d 151 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
430. Id. at 152.
431. Id.
432. Id.
433. 705 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (en bane).
434. 679 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
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cases.435 The court pointed out that the function of a writ of coram nobis is
to correct errors of fact, and that the failure to advise of deportation
consequences is an error of law. 6 The court therefore concluded that the
proper remedy for defendants to pursue is post-conviction relief pursuant to
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850.
The court recognized that because defendants who are not in custody
cannot seek post conviction relief under the rule, such relief is "never
available" to defendants who are released on "time served," without any
period of probation or community control.438 The court recognized that "this
may be a harsh and unfair result" as to such defendants.439 "However," the
court continued, "there is no present mechanism that provides relief under
these circumstances, and it is beyond this Court's authority to alter the
procedural rules to provide this relief."440 The court went to suggest that the
supreme court "consider whether a rule should be adopted to address the
issue."441 The court also certified that its decision conflicted with the
decisions in Marriott v. State442 and Wood v. State.443
XXIII. APPEALS IN CRIMINAL CASES
A. Trial Court Jurisdiction During Pendency of Appeal
In Daniels v. State,444 a defendant who had a pending appeal from an
order revoking community control filed a motion for post conviction relief in
the trial court.445 The motion was denied and the first district affirmed,
despite finding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider the post
conviction motion during the pendency of the appeal.446 The Supreme Court
of Florida quashed the district court's decision and remanded with directions
that the trial court's order on the motion be vacated.447 The court stated:
435. Peart, 705 So. 2d at 1062.
436. Id.
437. Id.
438. Id. at 1063.
439. Id.
440. Id.
441. Peart, 705 So. 2d at 1063.
442. 605 So. 2d 985 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
443. 698 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
444. 712 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 1998).
445. Id. at 765.
446. Id.
447. Id.
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[D]uring the pendency of a defendant's direct appeal, the trial court
is without jurisdiction to rule on a motion for postconviction relief.
Consistent with Meneses and Hall, we hold that a ruling on the
merits of the postconviction motion rendered by the trial court is a
nullity, and, consequently, a decision by the appellate court that
affirms or reverses the trial court's ruling is also a nullity.448
The fourth district, in Griner v. State,449 also addressed the impact of a
pending appeal on the trial court's jurisdiction to consider a motion for post
conviction relief.450 There, a defendant sought such relief with regard to
convictions for certain charges while an appeal was pending from
convictions on other charges that had been included in the same information,
but had been severed for trial.45' Noting that the State cited no authority in
support of its argument that the trial court lacked jurisdiction, the appellate
court found that the defendant had "clear legal right to a ruling on his motion
for post conviction relief.
452
B. Flight
The State moved to dismiss a defendant's appeal in Griffis v. State453 on
the ground that the defendant had absconded after jury selection, was tried
and convicted in absentia and was not returned to custody for six years, at
454which time he was adjudicated and sentenced. Relying on State v.
Gurican,455 the State asserted that the defendant's flight constituted a waiver
of the right to appellate review.456  Finding the case to be "materially
indistinguishable" from Gurican, the first district granted the State's
•457
motion. The court noted, however, the defendant's argument that many of
the policy considerations underlying the decision in Gurican were
subsequently rejected by the United States Supreme Court in Ortega-
Rodriguez v. United States.458 The court recognized that the decision in
448. Daniels, 712 So. 2d at 765 (citing State v. Meneses, 392 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 1981); Hall
v. State, 697 So. 2d 237 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. (1997)).
449. 705 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
450. Id. at 650.
451. Id.
452. Id. (citing Moore v. Kaplan, 640 So. 2d 199 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994)).
453. 703 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
454. Id. at 523.
455. 576 So. 2d 709 (Fla. 1991).
456. Griffis, 703 So. 2d at 523.
457. Id.
458. 507 U.S. 234 (1993).
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Ortega-Rodriguez was based on the Supreme Court's exercise of its
supervisory powers over the federal courts as opposed to any federal
constitutional principle, and that the Supreme Court of Missouri in State v.
Troupe,4 9 had declined to follow Ortega-Rodriguez, adhering instead to an
approach consistent with Gurican. 4 W Nonetheless, the court certified to the
Supreme Court of Florida the question of whether Gurican should be re-
evaluated in light of Ortega-Rodriguez.461
C. Appeals After Pleas of Guilty or Nolo Contendere
The defendant in Harriel v. State462 pled guilty and was sentenced
pursuant to a negotiated plea.463 After his appointed counsel filed a notice of
appeal, a State motion to dismiss the appeal was denied without prejudice.4&
The Public Defender handling the appeal then filed a brief pursuant to the
dictates of Anders v. California,465 which allows court appointed counsel to
satisfy their ethical obligations when they can identify no meritorious issues
466to raise on appeal. In reconsidering and granting the State's motion to
dismiss, the court wrote an opinion "to establish a procedure for reviewing
motions to dismiss appeals from convictions and sentences based on
voluntary pleas of guilty or nolo contendere without reservation" of the right
to appeal a dispositive issue.
467
The court pointed out that under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure,
9.140(b)(2)(B) which incorporates the dictates of Robinson v. State, 68
defendants who plead guilty or nolo contendere without reservation may
appeal only:
(i) the lower tribunal's lack of subject matter jurisdiction;
(ii) a violation of the plea agreement, if preserved by a motion to
withdraw plea;
459. 891 S.W.2d 808 (Mo. 1995).
460. Griffis, 703 So. 2d at 523 n.1.
461. Id. at 523.
462. 710 So. 2d 102 (FIa. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (en banc).
463. Id. at 102-03.
464. Id. at 103.
465. 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
466. Hardel, 710 So. 2d at 103.
467. Id.
468. 373 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 1979).
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(iii) an involuntary plea, if preserved by a motion to withdraw
plea;
(iv) a sentencing error, if preserved; or
(v) as otherwise provided by law.4 6
9
Given this fact, the court stated:
[W]e hold that the state may move to dismiss an appeal from a plea
of guilty or nolo contendere without reservation, on the basis that
the issues identified in Robinson are not implicated, with sufficient
references to the record to support its position, and the appellant
may file a response. We can then review the record to determine
whether the appellant made a motion to withdraw the plea to
preserve the issues of voluntariness of the plea and violation of the
plea agreement or filed a motion to correct a sentencing error. If
no motions have been filed, we will determine whether the other
Robinson issues of subject matter jurisdiction or illegality of
sentence exist. If they do not, we will dismiss the appeal as
frivolous. If they do, we will deny the motion to dismiss, and the
appellant can file a brief, Anders or otherwise.
470
The court added that if the state does not move to dismiss appeals from
guilty or nolo contendere pleas, it will still examine the record and brief to
determine whether a properly preserved Robinson issue exists.471 If no such
472issue exists, the court will summarily affirm. If one does, it will "treat the
issue as in any other comparable appeal. 473
In Vaughn v. State,474 the defendant pled nolo contendere and reserved
the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress, which the trial court
had found to be dispositive. 475  The trial court's determination as to
dispositiveness was based on its belief that the state would not have been
able to convince the jury of the defendant's guilt without the evidence that
476
was the subject of the suppression motion.
469. Harriel, 710 So. 2d at 104 (citing FLA. R. ApP. P. 9.140(b)(2)(B)).
470. Id. at 106.
471. Id.
472. Id.
473. Id.
474. 711 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
475. Id. at 64.
476. Id. at 65.
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The first district court noted that it had previously held on several
occasions that issues are dispositive only if there will be no trial of the case
regardless of the result of the appeal.477 The court therefore concluded that
the trial court had applied an incorrect legal rule in finding the issue to be
dispositive.478 Since, under the facts of the case, there existed ample
evidence, independent of that to which the motion was directed, for the State
to proceed to trial, the court found that the issue was not dispositive and
dismissed the appeal.479
D. Appellate Review of the Sufficiency of the Evidence
In Barton v. State,480 the first district agreed with a defendant that
certain evidence was improperly admitted at trial.481 The court went on to
review the defendant's sufficiency of the evidence claim and, in doing so,
faced the question of whether it could consider the improperly admitted
evidence in deciding the sufficiency issue.482 "It does not follow," the court
found, "that the defendant is entitled to a judgment of acquittal merely
because evidence that is critical to the court's finding of sufficiency was
,48341improperly admitted." Relying on the decision in Lockhart v. Nelson,484
the court pointed out that some procedural errors might be corrected on
- . • 485 c
remand, thereby allowing the evidence to be used again. "Consequently,"
the court concluded, "the appellate courts must consider the sufficiency of
the evidence and alleged trial errors separately. 486
E. Reviewable Orders
Numerous cases passed on the question of whether particular orders in
criminal cases were reviewable by appellate courts. These cases included:
State v. Allen,487 (state may appeal from order partially denying claim for
477. Id.
478. Id. at 66.
479. Vaugln, 711 So. 2d at 66.
480. 704 So. 2d 569 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
481. Id. at 573.
482. Id.
483. Id.
484. 488 U.S. 33 (1988).
485. Barton, 704 So. 2d at 573 (citing Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33 (1988)).
486. Id.
487. 22 Fla. L. Weekly D2155 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. Sept. 12, 1997).
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restitution); Downs v. State,488 (defendant mal appeal from order designating
him a sexual predator); Thomas v. State, (same); Torres v. State,4
(defendant cannot appeal from order denying motion for violation of
probation hearing, proper procedure is to seek a habeas corpus in the circuit
491of incarceration); Oser v. State, (defendant cannot appeal from order
denying motion to mitigate); Brown v. State,492 (defendant cannot appeal
from order denying motion to mitigate, but when circuit court's denial was
based on an erroneous determination that the defendant's motion was
untimely, court treated appeal as a petition for writ of certiorari, granted
petition, and remanded for proper consideration of the motion).
F. Belated Appeals
In Trowell v. State,493 the first district examined the trial court's denial
of a defendant's motion for a belated appeal,494 citing Thomas v. State495 and
concluding that the defendant was not entitled to an appeal because he had
entered a negotiated plea of guilty and waived his right to appeal matters
relating to the judgment.496
The appellate court noted that Thomas was inconsistent with a
substantial body of case law from the first district as well as other district
courts.497 Thus, the court receded from Thomas to the extent that the
decision in that case required defendants seeking belated appeals to state
what issues they would have raised on appeal, whether or how those issues
would have been dispositive, or how they were otherwise prejudiced. 498 The
court went on to state:
[T]here should be no difference between a defendant's right to a
belated appeal, if the evidence discloses that the delay was not
attributable to his or her own neglect, and the right to a timely
appeal, insofar as any requirement that the defendant make a
preliminary showing of merit. In both cases, a statement of
488. 700 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
489. 22 Fla. L. Weekly D2541 (4th Dist. Ct. App. Nov. 5, 1997).
490. 700 So. 2d 1247 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
491. 699 So. 2d 844 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
492. 707 So. 2d 1191 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
493. 706 So. 2d 332 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (en banc).
494. Id. at 333.
495. 626 So. 2d 1093 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
496. Trowell, 706 So. 2d at 333.
497. Id. (citations omitted).
498. Id.
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meritorious issues is irrelevant to one's entitlement to appeal.
Similarly, there should be no difference between a defendant's
right to a belated appeal from a conviction following trial or after a
plea, because, in either instance, if the appeal had been timely filed,
an initial statement of arguable points would be irrelevant to the
right to appeal.499
Thus, the court said:
[W]e are of the firm belief that the only relevant inquiry, once a
request for a belated appeal is made, is whether the defendant was
informed of his or her right to an appeal and thereafter timely made
a request for an appeal to his or her attorney or other appropriate
person. If the appeal proceeds from the entry of an unconditional
guilty or nolo contendere plea, it may, due to appellant's failure to
submit any issue cognizable under Robinson [v. State] ,50
eventually result in dismissal by an appellate court, but issues of
merit are not required as a precondition to the appeali
01
Recognizing that subsequent to the trial court's ruling, Florida Rule of
Appellate Procedure 9.1400)(1) was amended to provide that petitions
seeking belated appeals are to be filed in the appellate courts, the court
construed the motion in the case as a properly filed petition and granted it.
502
The court noted that its decision conflicted with several decisions from other
district courts50 3 and certified the conflict.5°4
In Denson v. State,505 the fifth district discussed how to deal with
50factual questions relating to requests for belated appeals. 06 The petitioner
there sought a belated appeal and the State, despite not specifically disputing
the petitioner's allegations, argued that in the absence of a sworn affidavit
from trial counsel or supporting documentation, neither of which had been
499. Id. at 334-35.
500. 373 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 1979). For a discussion of the issues that can be raised
under Robinson after a plea of guilty or nolo contendre, see Section XXIII (C) of this article.
501. Trowell, 706 So. 2d at 337 (citing Baggett v. Wainwright 229 So. 2d 239 (Fla.
1969); Amendments to the Florida Rule ofAppellate Procedure, 685 So. 2d 773 (Fla. 1996)).
502. Trowell, 706 So.2d at 338.
503. Gonzalez v. State, 685 So. 2d 975 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Loadholt v. State,
683 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Zduniak v. State, 620 So. 2d 1083 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1993); Bridges v. Dugger, 518 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
504. Trowell, 706 So. 2d at 338.
505. 710 So. 2d 144 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
506. Id.
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provided, an evidentiary hearing should be required.50 7 The court disagreed,
noting that Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(j), which governs
belated appeals, does not require a petitioner to provide an affidavit from
trial counsel and stated that, "[i]nstead, the state must dispute the petitioner's
sworn claim, if not by affidavit, at least by specific allegations."10 Where
there is an absence of disputed fact, the court stated, "the petition will be
granted without an evidentiary hearing." 50 9
G. Appeals By the State
In State v. Rincon,510 as authorized by section 924.07(1)(j) of the
Florida Statutes,51 the State appealed from a judgment of acquittal entered
after the jury had returned a guilty verdict.5 12 The defendant asserted that
notwithstanding the statutory authority, the appeal ran afoul of double
jeopardy. 513 The court rejected the defendant's argument, concluding that
"double jeopardy is a consideration only when a retrial of the defendant
would be necessitated by a reversal of the trial court's ruling."514 Since
reversal in the case under review would result not in a retrial, but in the
reinstatement of the jury verdict, the court considered the merits of the
515case.
H. Cross-Appeals
In Hudson v. State,516 a defendant appealed from convictions for
trafficking in and conspiracy to traffic in 200 or more, but less than 400,
grams of cocaine. 517 The State, on cross-appeal, asserted that the trial court
erred in granting a motion for judgment of acquittal as to charges that the
defendant was guilty of offenses involving 400 or more grams of cocaine.
5 18
507. Id.
508. Id. at 145.
509. Id.
510. 700 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
511. Id.
512. Id. at 412.
513. Id. at414.
514. Id. (quoting Ramos v. State, 457 So. 2d 492, 494 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1984)
(emphasis added by the court)).
515. Rincon, 700 So. 2d at 413.
516. 711 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
517. Id. at 245.
518. Id.
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The first district examined section 924.07 of the Florida Statutes, which
confers on the state the right to appeal certain orders in criminal cases.
519
First, the court looked to section 924.07(1)0),520 which allows the state to
appeal from a "ruling granting a motion for judgment of acquittal after a jury
verdict. 521 Reading this provision in the context of the double jeopardy
clauses of the federal and state constitutions, the court found that "this
statutory provision plainly contemplates appeal from a judgment of acquittal
only if the judgment of acquittal follows a guilty verdict. 5 22
The court went on to consider section 924.07(1)(d), which authorizes
state appeals from rulings on questions of law when defendants are
convicted and appeal from the judgment.5 3 The court determined that "[i]n
keeping with precedent" and with the rule of statutory construction that
specific statutes control over general ones on the same subject,524 it would
"decline to construe the general language of subsection (1)(d) as overriding
the specific provision in subsection (1)(j).,, 525 The state's cross-appeal was
therefore dismissed. 26
In State v. Fedor,527 the State appealed from an order excluding certain
evidence and the defendant filed a cross-appeal directed to another portion
of the order appealed from.52 Subsequently, the State voluntarily dismissed
its appeal and the fifth district faced the issue of whether it had jurisdiction
to hear the cross-appeal. 29
The court noted that a cross-appeal can continue after a main appeal is
dismissed "if the cross-appeal could have been appealed on its own merits,
independent of the [sic] main appeal. 5 30 Since a criminal defendant has no
independent right to appeal a pretrial order, but can do so only by cross-
appeal to review a related issue which was resolved in the same order that
the state is appealing, the court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction and
531dismissed the case.
519. Id. at 246; see FLA. STAT. § 924.07 (1995).
520. Id.
521. Hudson, 711 So. 2d at 246 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 924.07(1)G) (1995)).
522. Id.
523. Id. at 247.
524. Id.
525. Id.
526. Hudson, 711 So. 2d at 247.
527. 714 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
528. Id. at 526.
529. Id.
530. Id.
531. Id. at 526-27.
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I. Public Defenders
The Supreme Court of Florida, in In re Public Defender's Certification
of Conflict,532 approved an order of the second district which addressed the
large number of criminal appeals involving indigent defendants represented
by the Public Defender's Office for the tenth circuit who were "not receiving
timely appellate review. 533  The second district's order had been
precipitated by a motion from the Public Defender to withdraw in 248 cases
"due to what the Public Defender deemed to be 'an excessive caseload."'
534
The order indicated that the second district was reviewing cases in which the
defendants had served their prison sentences or had completed their
probation before the Public Defender filed its briefs with the court. 35 At
oral argument, the supreme court was advised that the number of cases then
536delinquent exceeded 640. The order required the Public Defender to
accept no appellate cases until further order and mandated that the chief
judges of the circuits within the district "appoint qualified attorneys to
represent indigents in appeals arising in their respective circuits.
5 37
The order acknowledged that it was placing an enormous financial
burden on the counties, but explained that without such a drastic step, the
court would be unable to fulfill its "constitutional duty to provide
meaningful review to indigent criminal defendants. 538  In approving the
order, the supreme court stated:
The facts in this record establish a significant problem of
constitutional magnitude that must immediately be addressed. We
do not want to face a situation where a significant number of
defendants convicted of felony offenses must be released on bond
because their appeals of right are not being timely addressed due to
the lack of counsel required to be provided under the United States
Constitution. We must provide an immediate short-term solution
to this crisis.
539
532. 709 So. 2d 101 (Fla. 1998).
533. Id. at 102.
534. Id.
535. Id.
536. Id.
537. Public Defender's Certification of Conflict, 709 So. 2d at 102.
538. Id. at 103.
539. Id.
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The supreme court additionally required the chief judge of the second
district, the Public Defender, and the Attorney General to provide status
reports on September 1, 1998, (about five months after the date of the
opinion) "as to whether the order should be continued, modified, or
terminated," and requested that the legislature consider providing an
emergency fund to help the affected counties.540 In concluding, the court
said:
We strongly believe that there needs to be a long-term as well as
a short-term solution, and, in this regard, we would encourage the
creation of a special committee or commission by the legislature to
examine the structure and funding of indigent representation in
criminal cases. We firmly believe that this type of delay in the
criminal justice process, as illustrated in this case, can be
eliminated by a joint effort of all interested parties. This Court is
very willing to participate and provide necessary resource
assistance to develop a viable solution to this ongoing problem.54
In a specially concurring opinion that was joined in by Justice Wells,
Justice Overton suggested "that the time has come to reevaluate the structure
of how we provide Public Defender representation." 542 He set forth some
proposed structural changes: the elimination of the five district appellate
offices and the representation by each Public Defender's office of the
defendants from its jurisdiction, the creation within each Public Defender's
office of a separate section for conflict cases for both trial and appeal, and
that these conflict sections be funded to handle the capital collateral
representation of defendants sentenced to death in other circuits. 5 43 Justice
Overton ended his opinion by stating:
In conclusion, these structural changes should provide better
representation for indigent defendants, assist in alleviating
problems counties are facing in paying for the cost of conflict
counsel, provide a unified administrative structure for funding, and
provide more effective administration of collateral representation
in capital cases. With the implementation of such changes, the
legislature should be better able to focus on other problems
540. Id. at 104.
541. Id.
542. Public Defender's Certification of Conflict, 709 So. 2d at 104 (Overton, J.,
concurring specially).
543. Id. at 105.
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confronting the effective administration of our criminal justice
system.
544
XXIV. APPEALS IN JUVENILE CASE
In State v. T.M.B.,545 the Supreme Court of Florida reviewed several
cases in which the respondents pled either guilty or nolo contendere in
juvenile delinquency proceedings and attempted to appeal the final orders of
delinquency. The State had opposed the appeals, arguing that the
respondents were required by sections 924.051(3) and (4) of the Florida
Statutes, to preserve their claims for review. 547 The first district rejected the
state's argument, concluding that section 924.051 applies only to criminal
cases, not juvenile matters, 548 but certified the issue to the supreme court.5 4 9
In approving the district court's conclusion, the supreme court found that
because "the terms and conditions of juvenile appeals are addressed
exhaustively in chapter 39 [of the Florida Statutes] ... [i]t is ... clear that
the legislature intended chapter 39 to govern juvenile apeals ... [and] that
section 924.051 is inapplicable to juvenile proceedings."
551In A.G. v. Department of Children and Family Services, the fourth
district examined the issue of whether an order adjudicating a child
dependent is a final appealable order or whether it is a non-final order that
can be reviewed in a subsequent appeal from a later disposition order.
552
The court concluded that such orders are final and certified conflict with the
fifth district's decision in Moore v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Services.
553
544. Id.
545. 716 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 1998).
546. Id. at 269.
547. Id.
548. Id. at 270.
549. Id. at 269.
550. T.M.B., 716 So. 2d at 271.
551. 707 So. 2d 972 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
552. Id. at 972.
553. 664 So. 2d 1137 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995). The court noted that both Moore
and G.L.S. v. Department of Children and Families, 700 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997),
which the first district certified as conflicting with Moore, dealt with termination of parental
rights. "[W]e view the issue of appealability, vel non, of an adjudicatory order to be the same in
dependency proceedings," the court said. A.G., 707 So. 2d at 972. For a discussion of the
decision in G.LS., see supra Part XXV. at 96.
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In Department of Juvenile Justice v. J.R.,554 the Department of Juvenile
Justice ("DJJ") appealed from an order adjudicating "a juvenile as a
delinquent and committing him to a specific treatment program., 55 5 The
juvenile moved to strike DJJ's notice of appeal and brief, which argued that
the trial court exceeded its authority by specifying the detention program
placement. 6 The juvenile pointed to the fact that section 985.234(1)(b) of
the Florida Statutes (1997), provides that in appeals by the state, the State
Attorney is to file the notice of appeal and the fact that other provisions of
chapter 985 call for the State Attorney to represent the state in the trial court
and for the Attorney General to do so on appeal.557 The Attorney General
also appeared and took the position that the juvenile's motions should be
granted. 58
The first district disagreed, noting that "[s]ection 985.23(1)(d) provides
that parties to the case shall include representatives of DJJ" and found that
DJJ was "not the prosecuting authority (i.e., 'the state'), but rather
appear[ed] in its capacity as the legal custodian of the child committed to its
care. 559 The court determined that "the right DJJ seeks to vindicate on
appeal is unique to its role as the custodian charged with the care of a
delinquent child," and denied the juvenile's motions. 60
In E.P.H. v. Wright,561 the fourth district found that habeas corpus is the
proper method for reviewing orders of secure detention. 562  The court
recognized that section 985.215(5)(a) of the Florida Statutes, states that such
orders shall be deemed final orders reviewable by appeal, but agreed with
the first district in T.L.W v. Soud563 that "this statute is unconstitutional as a
legislative attempt to provide for appeal of non-final orders." 564  Judge
Farmer dissented, expressing the belief that the legislature's power to
establish substantive rights includes "the power to say when a right is so
important that the judicial determination of it is final for purposes of
554. 710 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
555. Id. at 212.
556. Id.
557. Id.
558. Id. at 213.
559. Department of Juvenile Justice, 710 So. 2d at 213.
560. Id. at 214.
561. 708 So. 2d 673 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
562. Id. at 674.
563. 645 So. 2d 1101 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
564. E.P.A., 708 So. 2d at 674 (citing T.L.W. v. Soud, 645 So. 2d 1101 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1994)).
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appellate review" and indicating that he "would certify conflict with
T.L. W ,
565
XXV. APPEALS FROM ORDERS TERMINATING PARENTAL RIGHTS
In G.L.S. v. Department of Children and Families,566 a father appealed
from two orders, an order terminating his parental rights, and a disposition
order committing the minor children to the legal care, custody, and control of
567the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. The order
terminating parental rights was entered eighteen days before the disposition
order, and the notice of appeal was filed twenty-four days after the
568disposition order. Thus, although the notice was timely as to the
disposition order,569 the first district was faced with the issue of whether the
notice was timely with regard to the termination order.
The father argued only the disposition order was a final order and that
had he filed a notice of appeal from the termination order, it would have
been premature and thus "held in abeyance until the entry of the final
disposition order., 570  The court disagreed, holding that "an adjudication
order in which parental rights are actually terminated is a final, appealable
order, subject to immediate review." 571 Because the notice of appeal was not
timely as regards to the termination order, the appeal was dismissed. 572 The
court noted that its dismissal was without prejudice to the father's right to
seek a belated appeal573 and certified that the decision was in conflict 574 with
two fifth district cases.
575
565. 708 So. 2d at 674.
566. 700 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
567. Id. at 97.
568. Id.
569. Under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.110(b), a notice of appeal must be
filed within 30 days of rendition of the order from which review is sought. FLA. R. APP. P.
9.11 O(b).
570. G.LS., 700 So. 2d at 98.
571. Id.
572. Id. at 99.
573. Id.
574. Id.
575. Lewis v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 670 So. 2d 1191 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Moore v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 664 So. 2d
1137 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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XXVI. ATTORNEYS' FEES
576In Berry v. Scotty's, Inc., an appellant requested attorney's fees after
prevailing in an appeal from an order of the Unemployment Appeals
Commission.577 The second district noted that when statutes provide for
awards of appellate attorneys' fees, and the lower tribunals are circuit or
county courts, the court grants entitlement to an award of fees and remands
for the trial court to determine the amount of the award.578 The court noted,
however, that the statute at issue in the case, section 443.041(2)(b) of the
Florida Statutes, was "unusual," in that it directs the appellate court to "'fix'
the award.
5 79
The court recognized that the third district had observed in Cheung v.
Executive China Doral, Inc.,58 that since the statute offers no criteria for
determining the amount of an award, the common law principles in Florida
Patient's Compensation Fund v. Rowe,581 were applicable.5 82 The second
district agreed with the analysis of Cheung, but decided that rather than
appoint a judge as a commissioner to determine the fee, as the third district
had in Cheung, it preferred "to relinquish jurisdiction to the appeals referee
to conduct further proceedings on the matter."
583
XXVII. COSTS
In Porter v. State,584 a criminal defendant under a sentence of death,
who was represented by the Capital Collateral Representative ("CCR")
appealed from the denial of a motion for post-conviction relief.585 Incident
to that appeal, the defendant filed a motion that sought to have the county
pay the cost of transcribing the various hearings in the trial court.86  In
denying the motion, the supreme court noted that in Hoffman v. Haddock,58 7
it had held that CCR is statutorily required "to provide for the collateral
576. 23 Fla. L. Weekly D930 (2d Dist. CL App. Apr. 8, 1998).
577. Id. at D930.
578. Id.
579. Id.
580. 638 So. 2d 82 (Fla. 3d Dist. CL App. 1994).
581. 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1989).
582. Berry, 23 Fla. L. Weekly at D930.
583. Id.
584. 700 So. 2d 647 (Fla. 1997).
585. Id. at 648.
586. Id.
587. 695 So. 2d 682 (Fla. 1997).
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representation of any person convicted and sentenced to death in this state
and is to be responsible for the payment of all necessary costs and
expenses."' 588 The court went on to "clarify that [its Hoffman] decision
includes court reporter fees for transcription of the proceedings to be
included in the record on appeal., 589 The court further stated:
We rule on this motion by this opinion to express our conclusion
that payment of all postconviction costs out of CCR's budget is not
only statutorily required but is necessary to carry out the legislative
intent expressed in section 27.7001, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996).
Moreover, we believe it will further the goal of accounting for and
controlling costs in postconviction proceedings and further the
efficient processing of postconviction capital cases.
590
Because postconviction costs were historically paid by the counties, the
court urged CCR and the Commission on Administration of Justice in
Capital Cases "to immediately assess the impact of these costs on CCR's
budgets in each of the CCR offices and at an early time do what is necessary
to make the legislature aware of the need to appropriate the funds to cover
these CoStS.",
5 9 1
The fifth district, in Rehman v. ECC International Corp., 59 rejected a
claim that lost interest on a cash bond posted on appeal was a recoverable
cost. The court noted Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.400(a) which
indicates that "taxable costs" shall include certain things, including the
catch-all phrase "other costs permitted by law," but does not specifically
refer to lost interest.593 The court subsequently stated:
Courts do not allow as taxable costs interest which theoretically
accrued on other kinds of costs expended by a party to an appeal,
such as the payments for transcripts, depositions, exhibits and the
like. Without an express authorization in the rules to treat
theoretical lost interest on a cash bond posted by an appellant, we
agree it should not be a taxable cost.
594
588. Porter, 700 So. 2d at 648 (Fla. 1997) (quoting Hoffman v. Haddock, 695 So. 2d
682, 684 (Fla. 1997)).
589. Id. at 648.
590. Id.
591. Id. at648-49.
592. 707 So. 2d 752 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
593. Id. at 752-53.
594. Id. at 753.
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In Okeelanta Corp. v. Bygrave5 95 the plaintiffs brought a class action
596and obtained a final summary judgment in their favor. The defendants
appealed and the judgment was reversed for further proceedings.5 97  On
remand, four defendants moved for, and received an order taxing appellate
costs, while a fifth agreed to defer hearings on its motion for a cost judgment
until there was an ultimate prevailing party in the underlying case.598
On appeal from the order taxing costs, the fourth district agreed that "at
this point in the proceedings, absent members of the class may not be liable
for costs." 599 The court noted that "[a] judgment cannot be entered without
knowing against whom it may operate" and that "[a]t the present time, an
impediment to entering a cost judgment is the inability to identify who,
besides the class representatives, may be judgment debtors. ' 6°  The court
therefore concluded that "because it has not been established which
members of the class might ultimately be liable for these costs, we reverse
the order and direct that it be deferred until the conclusion of the case."' 0 '
In Fleitman v. McPherson,602 a petitioner sought certiorari to quash a
trial court order denying a motion to disqualify the respondents' attorney and
that attorney's law firm from representing the defendant.60 3 After the order
was quashed with respect to the disqualification of the attorney at trial, but
upheld with respect to the disqualification of the law firm, the petitioner
moved to tax costs.604 The trial court determined that since the appellate
court's "ruling affirmed in part and reversed in part, it could not be
determined which side prevailed.'"605 It "further found it must consider the
results of the entire litigation, not merely an interlocutory certiorari review,
and that it would be inappropriate to tax costs at this time."60
6
The petitioner sought review of the trial court's order, asserting that he
had prevailed in the certiorari proceeding, that he had timely moved to tax
appellate costs, that the trial court did not need to take any additional action
on the issues involved in the certiorari action, and that the applicable rules
595. 22 Fla. L. Weekly D1769 (4th Dist. Ct. App. June 16, 1997).
596. Id. atD1769.
597. Id.
598. Id.
599. Id.
600. Okeelanta, 22 Fla. L. Weekly at D1770.
601. Id.
602. 704 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
603. Id. at 588.
604. Id.
605. Id.
606. Id.
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and case law precluded the trial court from deferring its ruling.607 The
respondent replied that since there had been no ruling by the trial court, there
was nothing for the appellate court to review, other than the question of
whether the trial court abused its discretion in taking the motion under
advisement.
60 8
The first district found that in the certiorari proceeding, the "petitioner
prevailed on the question of disqualification of the attorney, while
respondents prevailed on the question of disqualification of the law firm."
6°9
The court went on to state that
[s]ince no further action need be taken by the trial court with
respect to the attorney disqualification issue, it appears the trial
court failed to apply the correct law, and abused its discretion, in
declining to make a determination as to the prevailing party for
purposes of an award of appellate costs with respect to the petition
for certiorari.
610
Further, the court found that the "trial court also erred in delaying a
decision as to costs pertaining to an interlocutory appeal, based on a
determination that the court must consider the results of the entire
litigation." '  The court noted that while "[a]n attorney's fee award cannot
be made until the prevailing party in the underlying litigation is
determined[,] ... the prevailing party under rule 9.400(a) is the party who
prevailed in the appellate proceeding that was the subject of the motion to
tax costs."'612 Therefore, the court reversed the order deferring ruling and
remanded "with directions to make a determination as to the party who
prevailed on the significant issue in the petition for certiorari review, and for
an award of costs."
6 13
XXVIHI. BOARD CERTIFIED APPELLATE LAWYERS
In The Florida Bar re Ash,614 the Supreme Court of Florida upheld the
denial of an attorney's application for certification as a Board Certified
607. Fleitman, 704 So. 2d at 588-89.
608. Id. at 589.
609. Id.
610. Id.
611. Id.
612. Fleitman, 704 So. 2d at 590.
613. Id.
614. 701 So. 2d 552 (Fla. 1997).
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Appellate Lawyer. The denial had been based on the applicant's failure to
disclose the fact than an appellate court had ordered her to show cause why
sanctions should not be imposed on her for the manner in which she handled
615a particular case. On her certification application, the applicant had stated
"N/A" in response to two questions that asked her to list and explain "all
cases in which your competence or conduct was raised as a basis for [ ]
relief.. .by the court" and "all cases in which your conduct was adversely
commented upon in writing by ajudge."616
In upholding the denial of the application, the court found that the show
cause order was a document that the applicant "was unequivocally required
to disclose on her application."' 617 The court went on to state, "Indeed, it is
difficult to conceive of a clearer violation of the oath of truthfulness at the
conclusion of the application." 61 8 The court also submitted the matter to The
619Florida Bar to determine whether any disciplinary rules were violated.
XXIX. A LOOK INTO THE FUTURE
The Supreme Court of Florida Judicial Management Council has
established a committee to study issues relating to per curiam affirmances
without opinions. The committee will make recommendations as to whether
written opinions should be required in all cases, whether a system should be
adopted under which some opinions are not published, and other concerns.
The Florida Appellate Court Rules Committee has recommended to the
supreme court that per curiam affirmances that do no more than provide
citations to authorities be published only in table form. The committee has
also recommended adopting a rule that would provide that the denial of an
extraordinary writ would not constitute a determination on the merits unless
the court order specifically indicates otherwise or evinces an unequivocal
determination by the court that the merits were considered. As discussed in
Part XXII.C of this article, such a rule would incorporate the conclusion
reached by the supreme court and the second district and would require the
third and fourth districts to change their approach regarding such matters.
Both the committee and the Florida Courts Technology Commission
continue to study the concept of adopting a vendor-neutral citation system.
615. Id. at 553.
616. Id.
617. Ash, 701 So. 2d at 554.
618. Id.
619. Id.
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Of course, the courts over the coming year will provide answers to
many of the questions raised by the cases discussed in this article. These
answers, as they frequently do, will likely generate new questions. These
questions, and others, will continue to provide the large number of court
decisions that shape the field of appellate practice.
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his legal practice on the law of condominium associations. Since 1992 he has served as a
delegate to the Community Associations Institute/Florida Legislative Alliance. He is a
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1. The reference to "community associations" means any mandatory membership
corporation tied to the ownership of real property, which corporation has a right of lien for the
collection of assessments. See FLA. STAT. § 468.431(1) (1997). The most common forms of
community associations are condominium associations, cooperative associations, and
homeowners' associations. This survey covers legislation and cases from July 1, 1997 to June
30, 1998. Condominium related arbitration decisions; Declaratory Statements; and 1998
Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Home penalty guidelines, which
are found at Rules 61B-20, 21 and Rule 61B-78, Florida Administrative Code, should also be
examined by readers for a comprehensive review of legal authorities affecting Florida
community associations for the period covered by this Survey.
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I. LEGISLATION
A. Condominiums
Amending Florida's governing statute for condominiums, section 718
2of the Florida Statute, seems to be one of the Florida Legislature's favorite
pastimes. Before a legislative session begins, no one seems to know what
ideas will be thrown into the caldron. After the session ends, many wonder
why the changes were needed, and in many cases, what they mean.
There are approximately two million condominium residents in the
State of Florida, whose communities are operated by some twenty thousand
associations. Not surprisingly, the "condo vote" is a potent force in
Florida's political climate. The perceived need to address individual
constituent problems through legislation results in the state's condominium
laws almost being in a constant state of change.
Florida's first Condominium Act was enacted in 1963, and was
basically an enabling statute that allowed developers to create a
condominium. 4 When first written, the Condominium Act occupied six
pages in the statute book.5 Today it occupies forty-seven pages with double
columns on each page.
6
During the 1970's, significant consumer reforms were written into the
Condominium Act.7 Notwithstanding the changes, the condominium
development boom continued. Quite naturally, legislative efforts began to
focus on operational areas. The Condominium Act was substantially
rewritten in 1976, and renumbered from section 711 to section 718, with an
effective date of January 1, 1977.8 The 1977 Act is still the basic format of
today's Condominium Act.
In 1986, substantial amendments were again made to the Condominium
Act.9 These amendments largely focused on operational issues, which
2. FLA. STAT. § 718 (Supp. 1998). Hereinafter referred to as "'he Condominium
Act" or "the Act."
3. Letter from Bureau Chief Philip Nowicki, Bureau of Condominiums, to former
State Senator Dudley (Apr. 2, 1998 on file with the Nova Law Review).
4. FLA. STAT. § 711 (1963).
5. Id.
6. FLA. STAT. § 718 (Supp. 1998).
7. See, e.g., 1972 Fla. Laws ch. 72-201; 1974 Fla. Laws ch. 74-104. All citations to
Florida's session laws in this article refer to the changes to the Condominium Act currently
found at FLA. STAT. § 718 (Supp. 1998).
8. 1976 Fla. Laws ch. 76-222 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. § 718 (1977)).
9. 1986 Fla. Laws ch. 86-175 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. § 718 (Supp.
1986)).
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arguably tried to make it easier for boards of directors to operate
associations.
10
Again, in 1990, there were a substantial number of amendments to the
Act, adopted largely due to the initiative of the Florida Bar's Committee on
Real Property, Subcommittee on Condominiums and Planned Unit
Developments." In general, these amendments focused on technical glitches
in the statute, and were generally favorable to the facilitation of association
operations.
Then, in 1991, the legislative philosophical pendulum radically shifted.
The 1990 Legislature created a "Condominium Study Commission"'12 that
went to nine cities around the State of Florida and listened to public
comment about perceived problems in condominium living. 13 In February of
1991, the Study Commission generated a 143-page report, which
recommended numerous and significant changes to the condominium
statute.14  The end result was the legislature's adoption of a major
amendment package to the Condominium Act (a thirty-nine page bill), 5
which fundamentally altered the philosophical underpinning of condomin-
ium operations.
After publication, the law raised considerable furor, particularly with
board members. As a result, the legislature, in a special session convened to
address a budget crisis, decided to suspend implementation of the law, 16
which (after removal of some of the most controversial provisions) became
law in 1992.17 Thus, it is plausible to state that the "progression" of the
Condominium Act has gone from a developer's enabling statute, to a
consumer protection statute, to a "pro-board" statute, to a "pro-unit owner"
(or "anti-board") code of procedures.
The 1990's have been described as the "zenith of legislative
micromanagement for Florida's condominium and cooperative
communities."' 18 Although there has been no evidence of legislative intent to
re-evaluate the regulatory excesses, which burden condominium
communities, there remains an apparently irresistible urge to "open up" the
10. Id.
11. 1990 Fla. Laws ch. 90-151 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. § 718 (Supp.
1990)).
12. 1990 Fla. Laws ch. 90-218.
13. See Final Report of The Condominium Study Commission, February 1991.
14. Id.
15. 1991 Fla. Laws ch. 91-103 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. § 718(1991)).
16. 1992 Fla. Laws ch. 91-426.
17. 1992 Fla. Laws ch. 92-49 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. § 718 (Supp.
1992)).
18. Joseph E. Adams, Community Associations, 21 NOVA L. REv. 69, 70 (1996).
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Condominium Act each year for some "improvement." The legislature
likewise remains willing to satiate those desires.
There were two condominium bills which passed out of the 1998
Legislative Session, both becoming law without the Governor's signature. 9
The first is chapter 98-195, of the Laws of Florida.20 Chapter 98-195
became a law on May 24, 1998.21 The main thrust of chapter 98-195 was the
statutory codification of various regulations that had been previously
adopted by the Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile
Homes ("the Division"), and which still are a part of chapter 61B of the
Florida Administrative Code.
22
In 1996, the Florida Legislature directed each state agency to review its
rules by no later than October 1, 1997, and to provide the "Administrative
Procedures Committee [with] a listing of each rule, or portion thereof,
adopted by that agency before October 1, 1996, which exceeds the
rulemaking authority permitted by" the Administrative Procedures Act.23
This mandate, codified in section 120.536(2), of the Florida Statutes, further
directed the 1998 Legislature to consider whether specific legislation
authorizing the rules so identified, or portions thereof, should be enacted.2 4
The statute also requires each agency, by January 1, 1999, to "initiate
proceedings pursuant to [section] 120.54, [of the] Florida Statutes, to repeal
each rule, or [a] portion thereof, identified as exceeding the rulemaking
authority permitted by" the Administrative Procedures Act, and for which no
legislative grant of authority was given to the agency by the 1998
Legislature. The Department of Business and Professional Regulation
identified twenty rule provisions which the Department believed exceeded
the scope of its rulemaking authority under the Administrative Procedures
Act.25 The Department recommended legislative treatment of fifteen of the
identified rules. Most of the provisions found in chapter 98-195 emanate
from that request.26
Section 718.104(2) of the Condominium Act was amended to codify a
Division rule providing that a developer must file the recording information
for a declaration of condominium within thirty "business days" of the date of
19. 1998 Fla. Laws ch. 98-195; 1998 Fla. Laws ch. 98-322.
20. 1998 Fla. Laws ch. 98-195.
21. Ch. 98-195, § 9, 1998 Fla. Laws 1726, 1733 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §
718 (1998)).
22. FLA. ADMIN CODE ANN. r. 61B (1998).
23. Ch. 96-159, § 9, 1996 Fla. Laws 159, 159 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §
120.536(2) (1997)).
24. See id.
25. Id.
26. 1998 Fla. Laws ch. 98-195.
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filing the declaration of condominium in the county public land records. 27
The statute further requires the Division to prescribe a form for filing such
information. 28 A similar provision has been added to Section 718.403(8) of
the Condominium Act, dealing with recordation of phase amendments.2 A
developer is likewise required to notify the Division within thirty "business
days" of filing a phase amendment, again on a form to be prescribed by the
Division.
30
Sections 718.502 and 718.503 of the Act have been amended regarding
a condominium unit purchaser's right to void a contract for the purchase of a
condominium unit (from a developer) within fifteen days of the execution of
the purchase and sale agreement.31  Unfortunately,. these changes add
additional confusion to the law. The amendment to section 718.502(b) of
the Act is a rule codification and states that a "developer may not close on
any contract for sale or contract for a lease period of more than [five] years
until the developer prepares and files with the [D]ivision documents
complying with the requirements of' the Condominium Act and Division
rules, and the "[D]ivision notifies the developer that the filing is proper and
the developer prepares and delivers all documents required by [the
Condominium Act] to the prospective buyer." 32
The amendment to section 718.503(b) of the Condominium Act
introduces the confusion. 33  The new clause provides that although a
developer may not close for fifteen days following the execution of a
purchase and sale agreement, and delivery of required disclosure documents
must be made to the buyer, a developer now is permitted to close if the
"buyer is informed in the 15-day voidability period and agrees to close prior
to the expiration of the 15 days. 34 This clause, in addition to containing an
apparent typographical error (should "in" be "of' or "within"), or at least
confusing grammar, seems to conflict with the disclosure language found in
section 718.503 of the Condominium Act which provides: "ANY
27. Id. § 1, 1998 Fla. Laws 1727, 1727 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §
718.104(2) (Supp. 1998)).
28. See id. § 1, 1998 Fla. Laws at 1727 (amending FLA. STAT. § 718.104(2) (Supp.
1998)).
29. See id. § 5, 1998 Fla. Laws at 1730 (amending FLA. STAT. § 718.403(8) (Supp.
1998)).
30. Id.
31. Ch. 98-195, §§ 6-7, 1998 Fla. Laws at 1730-33 (codified as amended at FLA.
STAT. §718.502-503 (Supp. 1998)).
32. Id. § 6, 1998 Fla. Laws at 1730 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. § 718.502(b)
(Supp. 1998)).
33. Id. § 7, 1998 Fla. Laws at 1730-33 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §
718.503(b) (Supp. 1998)).
34. Id.
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PURPORTED WAIVER OF THESE VOIDABILITY RIGHTS SHALL BE
OF NO EFFECT.,
35
Further, in the case of Asbury Arms Development Corp. v. Florida
Department of Business Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales,
Condominiums, and Mobile Homes,36 the Second District Court of Appeal
held that the above quoted language in the statute means what it says, and
that the fifteen day voidability period could not be waived.37 Given the
holding of this case, it might be questioned whether the legislature intended
to remove this language from section 718.503(1)(a)1 of the Condominium
Act.
Section 718.117 of the Condominium Act has been amended to codify
another Division rule regarding notification to the Division relative to the
termination or merger of condominiums, or the dissolution or merger of
38condominium associations. Pursuant to the new law, a board of directors
must notify the Division "before taking any action" to terminate, merge, or
dissolve.39 Within thirty "business days" after recordation of the action, the
Division must likewise be notified.40 These reporting requirements apply to
all associations, not only those operated by developers.
Section 718.301 of the Condominium Act has been amended with the
addition of a new subsection (6),41 which specifically empowers the Division
with the "authority to adopt rules pursuant to the Administrative Procedure
Act to ensure the efficient and effective transition from developer control of
a condominium to the establishment of a unit owner controlled
association." 42
Likewise, a new provision of the "Roth Act ''43 section of the
Condominium Act was added.44 New section 718.621 of the Condominium
Act specifically empowers the Division to adopt rules "to administer and
ensure compliance with developers' obligations with respect to
condominium conversions concerning the filing and noticing of intended
35. FLA. STAT. § 718.503(1)(a)1 (Supp. 1998).
36. 456 So. 2d 1291 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
37. Id. at 1293.
38. Ch. 98-195, § 3, 1998 Fla. Laws 1729, 1729 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §
718.117 (Supp. 1998)).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. § 4, 1998 Fla. Laws at 1726, 1729 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT.
§718.301(6) (Supp. 1998)).
42. Id. See also, Ch. 98-200, § 221, 1998 Fla. Laws 1892, 1892 (codified as amended
at FLA. STAT. § 718.501(1)(f) (Supp. 1998)).
43. FLA. STAT. § 718.604 (1997).
44. Ch. 98-195, § 8, 1998 Fla. Laws 1726, 1733 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §
718.621 (Supp. 1998)).
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conversion, rental agreement extensions, rights of first refusal, and
disclosure and postpurchase protections."45
The final changes of chapter 98-195 deal with operational details of
condominium associations. "46 Perhaps the most nonsensical clause of the
1998 amendments to the Condominium Act is a new provision found at
section 718.112(2)(b)4 of the Act.47 This new law permits a member of the
board of directors, or a committee, who is not present at a board or
committee meeting, to "submit in writing his or her agreement or
disagreement with any action taken" by the board or the committee, after the
48
meeting has occurred. The statutory clause goes on to say that this
expression of "agreement or disagreement may not be used as a vote for or
against the action taken and may not be used for the purposes" of
constituting a quorum for the board or committee.49 There is nothing in prior
law which would have prohibited such written expressions of "agreement or
disagreement." Since the law specifically states that these expressions
cannot be used as a vote for or against the action, nor for the purpose of
creating a quorum, it is certainly unclear as to the intended significance of
this provision.
Another operational issue embodied in chapter 98-195 involves
statutory codification of a Division rule permitting telephonic conference50
call meetings for association boards of directors. Since most condominium
associations are not-for-profit corporations governed by section 617 of the
Florida Statutes, it should be noted that section 617.0820(4) has, for a
number of years, permitted associations to participate in regular or special51
board meetings by telephone conference calls. Section 617.0825(2) of the
Not-For-Profit-Corporation Act would also extend such a right to
52committees. In any event, the Condominium Act now clearly states that
the board or any committee may conduct meetings by telephone. 3 The
statute also codifies a Division rule, which requires that a speaker phone
must be used at the situs of the meeting, so that the conversation of those
board or committee members attending by telephone may be heard by the
45. FLA. STAT. § 718.621 (Supp. 1998).
46. 1998 Fla. Laws ch. 98-195.
47. Id. § 2,1998 Fla. Laws at 1727-28 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. § 718.112
(2)(b)(4) (Supp. 1998)).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Ch. 98-195, § 2, 1998 Fla. Laws 1727, 1728 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §
718.112(2)(b)(5) (Supp. 1998)).
51. FLA. STAT. § 617.0820(4) (1997).
52. FLA. STAT. § 617.0825(2) (1997).
53. Ch. 98-195, § 2, 1998 Fla. Laws 1726, 1728-29 (codified as amended at FLA.
STAT. § 718.112(2)(b)(5) (Supp. 1998)).
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board or committee members attendinj the meeting in person, as well as by
any unit owners present at the meeting.
4
The final operational amendment of chapter 98-195, new section
55718.112(2)(c) of the Act codifies a Division rule, which requires that any
association rule regulating unit owner statements at board or committee
meetings must be in writing.56 Presumably, if there is no written rule, a
board cannot limit the "frequency, duration, and manner" of unit owner
statements at board or committee meetings.
The much more significant condominium bill that passed out of the
1998 Legislative Session is found at chapter 98-322 of the Laws of Florida,
which became law without the Governor's signature on May 30, 1998 .
Chapter 98-322 is actually an amalgamation of several pre-filed bills, which
were combined during the legislative process. One of the more significant
topics in the Pre-filed legislation, relating to the governance of "master
associations, 5  was withdrawn from consideration by the legislation's
sponsors, at the request of the Division. 9
Perhaps the most significant legislative enactment from the 1998
Session was an amendment to section 718.111(6) of the Act, having to do
with consolidated financial operations of pre-1977 "phase" condominiums.
60
As has been the case from topics as wide-ranging as trimming mangrove
trees to conducting bingo games, the language now engrafted into the Act by
the 1998 amendment to section 718.111(6) arose out of the perceived plight
of a single condominium community, which sought to address its
apparently questioned consolidated financial operations by seeking statutory
54. Id.
55. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 61B-23.002(10) (1998).
56. Ch. 98-195, § 2, 1998 Fla. Laws 1727, 1728 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §
718.112(2)(c) (Supp. 1998)).
57. 1998 Fla. Laws ch. 98-322.
58: See, e.g., Downey v. Jungle Den Villas Recreation Ass'n, 525 So. 2d 438 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
59. The Division has recently appointed a "study group" to consider the advisability
of "master association" and related legislative initiatives for the 1999 Legislative Session.
60. Ch. 98-322, § 2, 1998 Fla. Laws 2757, 2757 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §
718.111(6) (Supp. 1998)). The reference to "phase" condominiums in section 718.111(6) of
the Act is a misnomer. True "phase" condominiums are developed under section 718.403 of
the Act, and are sometimes known as "expandable" or "flexible" condominiums. The "phase"
condominium for purposes of section 718.111(6) consolidated operations are more accurately
described as "series" condominiums. See also Gary A. Poliakoff, Condominiums, The
Assessment Dilemma, 54 FLA. B.J. 268 (1980).
61. The Innisbrook condominium community in the Tarpon Springs area (on file with
the author).
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change.62 The bill initially introduced into the legislature would have been
limited to condominiums that were operated "as part of a rental pool in a
hotel or resort-type setting, where each unit of a similar type and square
footage receives a uniform rental income... [and where] the condominium
units were registered and sold as securities with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC)" (i.e., the initial bill would have probably only applied to
this particular community).63
According to information obtained by this author, another multi-
condominium community, with the Division support, requested that the
Bill's sponsors expand the statutory language, and allow any pre-1977 multi-
condominium community to provide for consolidated financial operations in
the declaration or in the bylaws, upon less than unanimous approval of the
unit owners. 65 The Division's stated reason for supporting such legislation
was that there are a significant number of older "phase" projects that are
operating in an "illegal" consolidated financial fashion anyway, with many
cases involving such operations going back twenty years or more.
Although there is undoubtedly adequate public policy to support this
amendment, particularly in the case of associations that have always
operated on a consolidated financial basis, the law presents some ambiguity,
and also some constitutional concerns. The new statute provides that an
association that has operated on a consolidated financial basis "may continue
to so operate," as long as the authority for same is contained in the
applicable declarations of condominium, or the bylaws.67 The reference to
such authority having to be in the original version of the declarations or
bylaws was omitted by the amendment.
Accordingly, associations that have been operating on a consolidated
financial basis may legitimize such actions by amending the declaration of
condominium or bylaws. The statute goes on to state that an association "for
such condominiums"6 9 may provide for consolidated financial operations by
62. Ch. 98-322, § 2, 1998 Fla. Laws 2757, 2757 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §
718.111(6) (Supp. 1998)).
63. H.R. 3321, 15th Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1998).
64. As Vice-Chair and Condominium Committee Chair of Community Associations
Institute's Florida Legislative Alliance during the 1998 Legislative Session.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Ch. 98-322, § 2, 1998 Fla. Laws 2757, 2757 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §
718.111(6) (Supp. 1998)).
68. Id.
69. It is unclear whether "such condominiums" means multi-condominium
associations that have heretofore operated on a consolidated financial basis or any multi-
condominium association where the first declaration was recorded prior to January 1, 1997,
although the latter interpretation seems more plausible.
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"amending its declaration pursuant to [section] 718.110(1)(a) or by
amending its bylaws and having the amendment approved by not less than
two-thirds of the total voting interests." It is unclear whether the two-
thirds standard is applied only to bylaw amendments (regardless of the
percentage vote stated in the bylaws to amend them), or whether the two-
thirds standard also serves to qualify the vote necessary to amend the
declaration of condominium (regardless of the vote required in the
declaration for amendment of the declaration). By reference to section
718.1 10(1)(a) of the Act, which incorporates a two-thirds standard, as well
as the lack of a comma in the text of the amendment, 71 it is reasonable to
conclude that a two-thirds vote of all voting interests is required whether the
declaration or bylaws is used as the vehicle for the amendment.
Although valid public policy may be served by legitimizing long-
standing "illegal" consolidated financial operations for certain communities,
it is submitted that the "invitation" which has been extended to other multi-
condominium associations (which had found a way to comply with the
previous law) may also result in unintended consequences. The
Condominium Act requires the declaration of condominium to specify the
percentage of, "and manner of sharing common expenses and owning
common surplus" in a residential condominium, which must be the same as
72the ownership of undivided shares in the common elements. The
Condominium Act further states that any amendment to the declaration,
which changes the percentage of sharing common expenses, must receive
unanimous approval of all unit owners and lienors.73
Additionally, the provision in the declaration regarding the sharing of
common expenses is a contractual right,74 and the law in effect when those
contracts were entered into (recordation of the declarations of
condominium), "is controlling as if engrafted onto the condominium
documents. 7  In addressing a somewhat analogous issue, the Second
District Court of Appeal held that changes to the Condominium Act could
not be applied to alter assessment allocation provisions in the declaration,
even where the declaration incorporated future amendments to the
70. Ch. 98-322, § 2, 1998 Fla. Laws 2757, 2757 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §
(718.111(6) (Supp. 1998)).
71. FLA. STAT. § 718.110(1)(a) (1997).
72. FLA. STAT. § 718.104(4)(g) (1997).
73. FLA. STAT. § 718.110(4) (1997).
74. Pepe v. Whispering Sands Condominium Ass'n, 351 So. 2d 755 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1977).
75. Suntide Condominium Ass'n v. Division of Fla. Land Sales, and Condominiums,
Dep't of Bus. Regulation, 463 So. 2d 314, 317 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
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Condominium Act.7 6 Further, since the declaration of condominium is a
contract, 77 it is certainly arguable that the retroactive application of the 1998
amendments to section 718.111(6) of the Act will create an unconstitutional
impairment of vested contract rights.
78
Another significant (and regrettably ambiguous) 1998 change to the
condominium statute involves the insurance requirements of section
718.111(11)(a) of the Act and the "budget guarantee" provision of section
718.116(9) of the Act.80 As a result of Hurricane Opal, certain developers
found they had unanticipated exposure arising out of uninsured or under-
insured storm damage.8'
The premise of a "budget guarantee" is that, during the initial sales
phase, a developer should be excused from paying assessments on its
inventory units, so as to not bear a disproportionate burden in maintenance
of the community, when its "units" are typically unsold, and thus not
"consuming" services of the condominium association.82  The "budget
guarantee" language in section 718.116(9) of the Act permits the developer
to excuse itself from the payment of common expenses on developer-owned
units, so long as the developer guarantees in the purchase contracts, the
prospectus, or the condominium documents, that assessments against non-
developer unit owners will not exceed a stated dollar amount during the
83guarantee period. In exchange for this excusal from paying assessments,
the developer agrees to "cap" the nondeveloper unit owner's assessments,
and must further undertake to fund any deficit incurred in the operation of
the condominium (including funding of reserves, unless properly waived)• • 84 ..
during the guarantee period. Obviously, reconstruction of condominium
property after a catastrophic storm event is a common expense of the
condominium. If insufficient proceeds from insurance exist to reconstruct
the community, then the developer would be called upon to fund any
76. Island Manor Apartments, Inc. v. Division of Fla. Land Sales, Condominiums,
and Mobile Homes, 515 So. 2d 1327, 1329 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
77. Pepe, 351 So. 2d at 757.
78. Fleeman v. Case, 342 So. 2d 815, 818 (Fla. 1976).
79. Ch. 98-322, § 2, 1998 Fla. Laws 2757, 2757-59 (codified as amended at FLA.
STAT. § 718.111(11)(a) (Supp. 1998)).
80. Id. § 7, 1998 Fla. Laws at 2780-81 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §
718.116(9)(a) (Supp. 1998)).
81. Sun-Sentinel, July 16, 1998, at § 1D, available in 1998 WL 12822301; Tampa
Tribune, Aug. 18, 1997, at 1, available in 1997 WL 10802497; Tampa Tribune, May 31,
1997, at 4, available in 1997 WL 10789835, at *8.
82. Ch. 98-322, § 7, 1998 Fla. Laws 2780, 2780-81 (codified as amended at FLA.
STAT. § 718.116(9) (Supp. 1998)).
83. Id.
84. FLA. ADMiN. CODE ANN. r. 61B-22.004 (1998).
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reconstruction costs not covered by the nondeveloper unit owners'
assessments, at the guaranteed level. While some might argue that with the
rewards come the risks, the 1998 Legislature apparently decided to let
developers "have their cake and eat it too." 85
Section 718.111(1 1)(a) of the Condominium Act now provides that "[a]
unit-owner controlled association shall use its best efforts to obtain and
maintain adequate insurance." 86 Previously, the law required all associations
to use "best efforts" to obtain such insurance. 87 As to developer-controlled
associations, the law now requires the association to use "due diligence" in
obtaining and maintaining such insurance . 8 Neither the term "best efforts"
nor "due diligence" are defined in the statute.89 There is no expression of
legislative intent, at least from the language of the statute itself, as to
whether "due diligence" is intended to be a higher or lower standard than
"best efforts."' 9 Section 718.111(11)(a) of the Act, as amended, goes on to
provide that a developer's "[f]ailure to obtain and maintain adequate
insurance during any period of developer control shall constitute a breach of
fiduciary responsibility by the developer appointed members of the board of
directors of the association, unless said members can show that despite such
failure, they have exercised due diligence." 91  At least, this legislative
pronouncement will soften the impact of a 1992 appellate court decision,
which exonerated developer appointees to the board of directors in a claim
of breach of fiduciary duty involving the failure to renew a fire insurance
policy, when fire destroyed common area buildings. 92
The provisions of section 718.116(9) of the Act, which further
implements this new policy, provides that "if a developer-controlled
association has maintained all insurances required the common expenses
incurred during the guarantee period resulting from a natural disaster or an
act of God, which are not covered by insurance proceeds" may be assigned
against all unit owners, as well as their successors and assigns, "on the date
of such natural disaster or act of God." 93 The developer's units are, of
85. Similar legislation was introduced in the 1997 Legislative Session and failed to
progress through the process.
86. FLA. STAT. § 718.111(11)(a) (Supp. 1998).
87. FLA. STAT. § 718.111(11)(a) (1997).
88. FLA. STAT. § 718.111(1)(a) (Supp. 1998).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Ch. 98-322, § 2, 1998 Fla. Laws 2757, 2757 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §
718.111(11)(a) (Supp. 1998)).
92. Munder v. Circle One Condominium, Inc., 596 So. 2d 144, 145 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1992).
93. Ch. 98-322, § 7, 1998 Fla. Laws 2781 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §
718.116(9) (Supp. 1998)).
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course, included in any such assessment. It is interesting to note that the
developer-controlled association is permitted to levy an assessment for "the
common expenses incurred during the guarantee period," providing they
"result" from a natural disaster or an act of God.94 Therefore, not only
would the actual cost of reconstruction be assessable against the unit owners,
but also any other costs "resulting" from the natural disaster, which would
presumably include engineering fees, attorney's fees, insurance
consultant/adjuster fees, and perhaps more.
The new law does not clarify how the expenses are to be "assigned,"
and no treatment is given to the issue of whether the assessments would be
booked to the units on an "accrual" basis, when the damage occurs, or on a
"cash" basis, when the work is actually done.95 The latter approach, cash
basis, seems more practical and will possibly result in further developer
excusal, since a developer will most likely have transferred title to units
between the time of a casualty and the repair work being done.
Another insurance related change to the Condominium Act effectuated
by the 1998 Legislature involves the issue of "fidelity bonding," which is
also a misnomer, since there is typically no "bond" purchased, but rather an
insurance policy, sometimes called an "employee dishonesty" or "crimes
coverage" policy. 96 There have been previous legislative attempts to
address this issue. For instance, in 1992, the Act was amended to implement
a minimum schedule of fidelity bonds based upon the association's annual
gross receipts.97 The 1992 statute required "bonding" of any person who
could "control or disburse" association funds, and specifically identified
such persons as the association president, secretary, the treasurer, and any
other person with check signing authority.98 The new statute also requires
"bonding" of persons who "control or disburse," using the same definitional
scheme, but also stating that persons who "control or disburse" include, but
are not limited to the president, secretary, treasurer, and any person with
check signing authority.99 It is unclear who else was intended to be covered.
Most significantly, the new law requires that the bond or insurance
policy must cover "the maximum funds that will be in the custody of the
94. Id. § 7, 1998 Fla. Laws at 2781 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §
718.116(9)(a)(1) (Supp. 1998)).
95. Id.
96. Id. § 2, Fla. Laws at 2758 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. § 718.111(11)(d)
(Supp. 1998)).
97. Ch. 92-49, § 3, 1992 Fla. Laws 435, 444 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §
718.112(2)G) (Supp. 1998)).
98. Id.
99. Ch. 98-322, § 2, 1998 Fla. Laws 2753, 2758 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §
718.111 (11)(d) (Supp. 1998)).
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association or its management agent at any one time."1° This language
creates a potential ambiguity as to whether an association must obtain a
fidelity bond for all of the funds that would be in the "custody . . . of its
management agent," when a large management company may control
millions of dollars, for many different associations. It is doubtful that this
was the legislative intent, or that the statute would be applied in that fashion.
Although this legislation is founded upon legitimate policy objectives,
and perhaps reiterates advice that most community association legal
practitioners would give to their clients anyway, whether the benefits
outweigh the burdens remains to be seen. If an association levies a major
special assessment for a significant repair project, it will have a large sum of
money under its "control" at one time, although it may spend that money
very quickly. It is unknown how the insurance market will adjust to the need
for flexibility that will be necessary for associations in obtaining adequate
insurance in such cases. Also, the law of supply and demand being what it
is, it further remains to be seen whether insurance companies will adjust
rates for "fidelity bonding," which has heretofore been a fairly insignificant
aspect of most associations' insurance premiums, to account for increased
exposure and/or its new "captive market." It should also be noted that the
Division has taken the position that the 1998 amendment to the fidelity
bonding section of the statute will not be enforced by the Division as to pre-
existing insurance contracts, until such contracts are up for renewal.' 0'
Section 718.111(12)(c) of the Act has been amended to include the
year-end financial reporting information required by the Act as part of the
disclosure documents that are to be made available to prospective unit
. 102
purchasers. Section 718.111(12) of the Act requires the association to
maintain an "adequate number" of these year-end reports, along with copies
of the declaration of condominium, articles of incorporation, bylaws, and
rules, and all amendments to the foregoing, as well as the "Question and
Answer Sheet."' 0 3 The "adequate number of copies" must be maintained "on
the condominium property to ensure their availability to unit owners and
prospective purchasers."104 This segment of the statute, which is not new,
does not take into account that many condominium communities do not have
on-site office facilities and, instead, a management company or other agent
serves as the repository of official records.
100. Id.
101. See Memorandum from Bureau of Condominium Legal Department to Bureau
Chief (June 19, 1998) (on file with the Nova Law Review).
102. Ch. 98-322, § 2, 1998 Fla. Laws 2753, 2759 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT.
§ 718.111(12)(c) (Supp. 1998)).
103. See FLA. STAT. § 718.111(12) (Supp. 1998).
104. See id.
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The inclusion of the year-end financial reporting information as a
required disclosure document is also enunciated in section 718.503(2) of the
Act as part of the documents that a nondeveloper seller must give to a
prospective buyer prior to closing. 105 Likewise, these year-end reports now
also comprise part of the disclosure documents that a developer must append
to the prospectus prior to the sale of a unit, as provided in section 718.504 of
the Act.106 This change is clearly an improvement to the statute, at least for
those who believe that prospective condominium unit purchasers should
"know what they are getting into" prior to the purchase of a unit. Providing
year-end financial reports (although the statute is not clear, it presumably
means the latest year-end report) will permit prospective purchasers to
review the association's reserve funding policy, and other assessment
spending trends, such as special assessments.
Another financially oriented change to the Act was approved by the
1998 Legislature. There has been an ongoing debate within the
condominium industry as to whether associations should be allowed to
"commingle" operating funds and reserve funds. Proponents of
"commingling" argue that associations should be allowed to maximize
investment returns, which can usually be accomplished by obtaining the
higher account balances affiliated with "commingling" all of the association
funds in a single account.107 Opponents of commingling investment and
reserve funds argue that reserve funds are sacrosanct under the law, and
should be kept out of "harm's way," lest the board of directors be tempted to
spend money set aside for capital expenditures on operational 
needs.10
The 1991 amendments to the Condominium Act prohibited an
association from commingling investment and operating funds. 109 Prior to
the effective date of this change, the 1992 Legislature changed section
718.111(15) of the Act to permit commingling of operating and reserve
funds "for purposes of investment."' 10 The game of "legislative ping-pong"
continued when the 1995 Legislature once again absolutely prohibited
105. Ch. 98-322, § 5, 1998 Fla. Laws 2769, 2770 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT §
718.503 (2) (Supp. 1998)).
106. Ch. 98-322, § 6, 1998 Fla. Laws 2770, 2770 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §
718.504 (Supp. 1998)).
107. Ch. 98-322, § 2, 1998 Fla. Laws 2757, 2759 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §
718.111(15) (Supp. 1998)).
108. Id.
109. Ch. 91-103, § 4, 1991 Fla. Laws 724, 728 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §
718.111(15) (1991)).
110. Ch. 92-49, § 2, 1992 Fla. Laws 437, 440 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §
718.111(15) (Supp. 1992)).
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commingling.'" In the latest volley, associations may now, once again
"commingle," so long as the commingling is done for "investment
purposes. ' 12  Of course, only the future will tell whether the "anti-
commingling" forces will once again have their way.
The 1998 Legislative session produced two amendments involving the
election of condominium directors. The first is another example of a law
of statewide application that exists to address the concerns of one Florida
condominium association.' Apparently, it was discovered that a
condominium director in Dade County had been convicted of a felony.n 5
After the association determined that Florida law would not prohibit a
convicted felon from serving on its board, legislative reform was sought to
address this.' 6 During the session, proposed legislation was introduced that
would prohibit any "felon" from serving on the board of directors of a
condominium association 1 7 When it was pointed out to the legislation's
sponsors that this might prohibit expatriates of oppressive foreign
governments (e.g., Cuba, Libya, etc.) from serving on a condominium board,
the legislation's sponsors wrote an amendment providing that the conviction
must have occurred in a court of record in the United States.! 8 It was
pointed out to the sponsors that an association only has ten to twenty days to
mail out election ballots after receipt of unit owners' self-nomination
forms." 9 Thus, they could not be expected to conduct criminal background
checks within that time period. Therefore, sponsors approved further
amendatory language for the Bill, which provided that an association's
election of a convicted felon would not affect the validity of any action of
the association's board of directors taken prior to the discovery of the
conviction.
20
As a result, section 718.112(2)(d)l of the Condominium Act now
provides that in order to be eligible for board membership, a person must
111. Ch. 95-274, § 35, 1995 Fla. Laws 2524, 2525 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT.
§ 718.111(15) (1995)).
112. Ch. 98-322, § 2, 1998 Fla. Laws 2757, 2759 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §
718.111(15) (Supp. 1998)).
113. Ch. 98-322, § 3 1998 Fla. Laws 2759, 2762-64 (codified as amended at FLA.
STAT. §§ 718.112(2)(d)1, (2)(d)8 (Supp. 1998)).
114. Ch. 98-322, § 3, Fla. Laws 2759, 2762 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §
718.112) (Supp. 1998)).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. H.R. 3321, 15th Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1998).
119. Id. See also FLA. STAT. § 718.112(2)(d)3 (1997).
120. H.R. 3321, 15th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1998).
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meet the requirements "set forth in the declaration. ' 2 Further, the law
provides that "[a] person who has been convicted of any felony by any court
of record in the United States and who has not had his or her right to vote
restored.., is not eligible for board membership."122 Finally, this clause in"
the statute now provides that "[tihe validity of an action by [a] board is not
affected if it is later determined that a member of the board is ineligible for
board membership due to having been convicted of a felony."'
23
Although this statute is certainly an instructive case study on how
condominium legislation in Florida is sometimes conceived and enacted, it is
doubtful that this law will have any practical effect on the operation of most
condominium associations. Perhaps the most problematic aspect of the law,
and presumably an unintended consequence, is the language in the new
statute which states that in order to be eligible for board membership, a
person must meet the requirements "set forth in the declaration."'124 As a
practical matter, very few declarations of condominium associations contain
qualifications for board membership, and the Condominium Act does not
require the declaration to contain such information.' 5 In fact, the Act
requires the bylaws to set forth the manner of selection of boards of
126directors. It could now be argued that the failure of a declaration of
condominium to establish board membership requirements results in any
person, whether or not a unit owner, being eligible to run for the board, with
qualifications contained in the articles of incorporation or bylaws having no
consequence. It is submitted that the legislature did not intend this result.
The other statutory change involving board elections involves a long-
standing conflict between provisions of the Not-For-Profit Corporations
Act, 27 and a Division rule involving whether vacancies on condominium
boards are filled for the unexpired term thereof, or only until the next annual
election. z9 Notwithstanding the general precedence that the statute should
be afforded over an agency rule, the Division has historically adopted the
position that the rule stating that vacancies are filled only through the next
general election is enforceable and would be enforced. 3 ° The 1998
amendment eliminates any potential inconsistency, and clearly negates the
121. FLA. STAT. § 718.112(2)(d)1 (Supp. 1998).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See FLA. STAT. § 718.104 (1997).
126. See FLA. STAT. § 718.112(2)(a)(1) (1997).
127. FLA. STAT. § 617.0809 (1997).
128. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 61B-23.0021(13) (1998).
129. Id.
130. Id.
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Division's rule.' 31 The statute now provides that vacancies occurring on a
board of directors, before the expiration of a term, may be filled by the
remaining directors or sole director, or the directors may elect to hold an
election in conformance with statutory procedures. In either case,
"[u]nless otherwise provided in the bylaws, a board member appointed or
elected . . . shall fill the vacancy for the unexpired term of the seat beingfilled." 13 3
In another game of "legislative ping-pong,"'134 the legislature has once
again attempted to address the percentage vote required to waive or spend
"reserve" funds. 135 There are two issues involved in this subject. First, is
the vote required to waive or reduce the funding of reserves for a given
year's budget, 136 and second, the vote required to spend those statutory
reserves (or the interest earned thereon) for a nonscheduled purpose, after
the funds have been so designated. 37 The 1977 version of the Act did not
even mandate the establishment of reserves. 38  In 1979, the Act was
amended to require the funding of reserves for roof replacement, building
painting, and pavement resurfacing.' 39 The 1979 statute further permitted
waiver of reserves by a "two-thirds vote at a duly called meeting of the
association."'14  The two-thirds standard was reduced to a majority in
1980. 141 The 1991 amendment to the statute added the clause that "[r]eserve
funds and any interest accruing thereon must remain in the reserve account
for authorized reserve expenditures, unless their use for other purposes is
approved in advance by a vote of the majority, of the voting interests present
at a duly called meeting of the association."
131. FLA. STAT. § 718.112(2)(d)1 (Supp. 1998).
132. Id.
133. Ch. 98-322, § 3, 1998 Fla. Laws 2759, 2764 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §
718.112) (Supp. 1998)).
134. See supra Part I.A for a discussion regarding "commingling."
135. Ch. 98-322, § 3, 1998 Fla. Laws 2759, 2765 (amending FLA. STAT. § 718.112).
136. See FLA. STAT. § 718.112(2)(f)2 (Supp. 1998).
137. See FLA. STAT. § 718.112(2)(f)3 (Supp. 1998).
138 See FLA. STAT. § 718.112(2)(f)2 (1977).
139. Ch. 79-314, § 6, 1979 Fla. Laws 1666, 1667 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §
718.112(2) (k) (1979)). A later amendment added any other component with a deferred
maintenance expense or replacement cost exceeding $10,000.00. Ch. 86-175, § 6, 1986 Fla.
Laws 1207, 1207 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. § 718.112(2)(f)(2) (Supp. 1986)).
140. Ch. 79-314, § 6, 1979 Fla. Laws 1666, 1667 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §
718.112(2)(k) (1979)).
141. Ch. 80-323, § 2, 1980 Fla. Laws 1391, 1392 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §
718.112(2)(k) (Supp. 1980)).
142. Ch. 91-103, § 5, 1991 Fla. Laws 728, 731 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §
718.112(2)(f)(3) (1991)).
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In 1994, the statute was amended to eliminate the reference to
"members present" for votes to waive reserves, with the required vote being
a majority"of the total voting interests voting in person or by
limited proxy.., at a duly called meeting of the association." 143 However,
the parallel provision of section 718.112(2)(f)3 of the Act, relating to use of
reserves for nonscheduled purposes, was not amended, so reserves could still
be used for nonscheduled purposes by a vote of the majority "of the voting
interests present at a duly called meeting.
144
The 1995 Legislature did not help matters when it addressed these
voting requirements. Section 718.112(2)(f)2 of the Act was amended to
strike the reference to "majority of the total voting interests voting in person
or by limited proxy" and to replace same with the standard "by a majority
vote at a duly called meeting of the association."145 It would be fair to
conclude that the 1995 version of the statute stood for the proposition that
waiver of reserves could be effectuated by a "majority of a quorum" vote.
Unfortunately, the 1995 Legislature also amended section 718.112(2)(f)3 of
the Act, and specifically struck the word "present" from the statute, leaving
this subsection of the statute saying that use of reserve funds or interest
accruing thereon for nonscheduled purposes could only be authorized by "a
vote of the majority of the voting interests, voting in person or by proxy at a
duly called meeting of the association." 46 Many commentators perceived
this as a "flip-flop" of the previous year's law 47 to mean that reserves could
now be waived by a majority of a quorum, but once established, use of
reserves for nonscheduled purposes would require approval of a majority of
the entire voting interests.
Although the 1998 Legislature certainly chose a worthwhile candidate
for statutory clarification its amendment to section 718.112(2)(f)3 of the Act
falls short of the mark.14 The reference to "a vote of the majority of the
voting interests voting in person or by limited proxy at a duly called meeting
of the association" is replaced by the standard of "a majority vote at a duly
called meeting of the association." 149 It is submitted that the difference
143. Ch. 94-350, § 7, 1994 Fla. Laws 2505, 2508 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §
718.112)(2)(f)(2) (Supp. 1994)).
144. Ch. 94-350, § 7, 1994 Fla. Laws 2505, 2508 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §
718.112(2)(f)(3) (Supp. 1994)).
145. Ch. 95-274, § 36, 1995 Fla. Laws 2525, 2528-29 (codified as amended at FLA.
STAT. § 718.112(2)(f(2) (1995)).
146. Ch. 95-274, § 36, 1995 Fla. Laws 2525, 2529 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT.
§ 718.112(2)(f)(3)).
147. See FLA. STAT. § 718.112(2)(f)3 (Supp. 1994).
148. Ch. 98-322, § 3, 1998 Fla. Laws 2759, 2765-66 (codified as amended at FLA.
STAT.§ 718.112(2)(f)(3) (Supp. 1994)).
149. Id.
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between the two concepts, at least based upon the grammar and words used,
is difficult to perceive. It is assumed that since the legislature undertook
amendment of this section, it was intended to amend prior law, and that the
legislature would not engage in a futile act. The Division has espoused this
view and has announced its position that both the vote to waive or reduce
reserves, as well as the vote to use reserves (or the interest earned thereon)
for nonscheduled purposes is now based on the "majority of the quorum"
standard. 50
In a relatively minor change to the Act, section 718.112(2)(f)1 now
provides that an association no longer needs to list the budget categories
specified in section 718.504(20) of the Act, if those expenses do not apply to
a particular association.15' Pursuant to a Division rule, 52 an association's
budget is required to reflect "n/a" in the column beside items that do not
apply to that association (e.g., recreational lease fees, common area taxes,'53 ..
etc.). Although it is debatable whether the previous statute required such a
silly disclosure anyway, 154 the Division was nonetheless pursuing non-
adherence to this technicality as a violation of the law. Therefore, although
one would hope that matters of greater import should command the attention
of our elected and appointed representatives, it appears appropriate to have
eliminated this problem.
The final amendment to the Condominium Act that was adopted in
1998 deals with the allocation of bulk cable television service charges to a
condominium association. 155  Prior to 1991, it had been held that a
condominium association's provision of cable television services, as part of
the condominium budget, was not a proper common expense.
56
In 1991, the legislature amended chapter 718.115(b) of the Act to
provide that cable television services would be a proper common expense.157
The 1991 statute provided that "the cost of a master antenna television or
duly franchised cable television service obtained pursuant to a bulk contract
shall be deemed a common expense" as so provided in the declaration, and if
150. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 61B-22.005(7) (1998).
151. FLA. STAT. § 718.112(2)(f)1 (Supp. 1998).
152. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 61B-22.003(1)(d) (1998).
153. Id.
154. The 1997 version of section 718.112(2)(f)l of the Florida Statutes required the
proposed budget to show certain expense classifications "if applicable." FLA. STAT. §
718.112(2)(f)1 (1997).
155. Ch. 98-322, § 4, 1998 Fla. Laws 2768, 2769 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §
718.115 (Supp. 1998)).
156. See In Re: Petition For Declaratory Statement of Becker, Courtyards of Broward
Condominium Ass'n, Inc. DFLSCMH Case No. 89L-75.
157. Ch. 91-116, §3, 1991 Fla. Laws 1241, 1241-42 (codified as amended at FLA.
STAT. § 718.115(1)(b) (1991)).
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the declaration of condominiums did not so provide, bulk cable television
services could still be a proper common expense, "if it is designated as such
in a written contract between the board of administration and the company
providing ...cable television service."' 8 It seemed that the legislative
intent (or the intent of the lobbyists for the cable industry) was that if the
board so wished, a condominium association would be able to buy bulk
cable television service, and charge all of the members. Obviously, it is not
very difficult to designate the service as a common expense in the contract.
The perceived inequity created by this law was that many condominiums
assess "common expenses" based upon the square footage of the individual
units, as opposed to equal assessments for each unit. Accordingly, an
apartment a few hundred square feet larger than the unit next door could pay
more for the exact same services under a bulk cable arrangement (a specified
number of outlets, basic channels, etc.). Of course, in any condominium
association with assessments keyed to unit size, the same could be said for
all services "consumed" (and paid for) by the larger units on a greater
percentage basis than the smaller units.
In an apparent effort to achieve equity, the 1998 Legislature has created
an amorphous new category of "common expenses" that may not be equal to
a unit's ownership of the common elements, nor its sharing of other
"common expenses."'159 The 1998 amendment to section 718.115(1)(b) of
the Act provides:
If the declaration [of condominium] does not provide for the cost
of... cable television .. .as a common expense, the board of
administration may [still] enter into... a contract [for bulk service]
and the cost ... will be a common expense but allocated on a per-
unit basis rather than a percentage basis if the declaration provides
for other than an equal sharing of common expenses.
160
The law further provides that any contract entered into before July 1,
1998, and where the cost of services is not divided equally among all unit
owners, the internal allocation of the expenses (i.e. to an equal basis), may
be made by vote of "a majority of the voting interests present at a regular or
special meeting of the association."1 61 Although the statute presents some of
the constitutional and retroactivity issues that pertain to the "phase"
condominium associations' consolidated financial operations, 162 it appears
158. Id.
159. Ch. 98-322, § 4, 1998 Fla. Laws 2768, 2769 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §
718.115) (Supp. 1998)).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. See supra Part I.A.
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that certain associations now have a vehicle to more "fairly allocate cable
television charges" (although owners of the smaller units probably do not
think so).
B. Cooperatives
Although lip service is usually given to the need to keep changes to the
Cooperative Act 763 in step with changes to the Condominium Act, the reality
is that this does not happen. Although the cooperative form of ownership
has been statutorily recognized in Florida since 1974, 64 cooperative
development in Florida has been limited. The most often stated reason is
that the mortgage banking industry is not comfortable with the concept of
loaning money secured by a share of stock and a "muniment of title," as
opposed to a fee simple deed to real estate. In the writer's experience, there
are very few residential cooperative apartment buildings throughout the
state, and there has been almost no cooperative development for new
apartment buildings in Florida for the last fifteen years. The bulk of
cooperatives which are still being created are "mobile home cooperatives,"
as defined in section 723.0791 of the Florida Statutes.165 The most often
stated reason why there is still cooperative development in the mobile home
context is that most of these communities are the consequence of residents'
purchase of rental mobile home parks ("park buy-outs"). Since the
Cooperative Act' 66 does not require lot surveys to create a valid cooperative,
as would the Condominium Act,167 or a platted subdivision,168 the park
owners selling the parks, and the residents buying the parks, can save
substantial costs by avoiding a survey requirement.
Like legislative amendments in years past, the 1998 amendments to the
Cooperative Act did not keep pace with the 1998 amendments to the
Condominium Act. Most of the "Division rule" provisions from chapter 98-169 -•,,• ,
195 were included, while none of the "substantive" changes from chapter
98-322170 were included in the Cooperative Act. The clauses that were
included are essentially identical to those pertinent to condominiums,
discussed above. Some include thirty days notice after recording the
163. FLA. STAT. § 719 (1997).
164. FLA. STAT. § 711.42-.47 (Supp. 1974). See also Ch. 74-104, § 15, 1974 Fla.
Laws 163, 176 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §§ 711.41-.47 (Supp. 1974)).
165. FLA. STAT. § 723.0791 (1997).
166. FLA. STAT. § 719 (1997).
167. FLA. STAT. § 718.104(4)(e) (1997).
168. Id.
169. 1998 Fla. Laws ch. 98-195 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. § 718 (Supp.
1998)).
170. See supra Part I.A.
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cooperative documents,' 7' notice to the Division of dissolution or merger; 172
board and committee member right to "agree or disagree" with board or
committee action; 173 provision for telephonic board and committee
conference calls-174 requirement that unit owner meeting participation rules
be in writing;173 Division rulemaking authority for transfer of control;
176
requirement for filing phase cooperative documents with the Division;
1 77
prohibition against closing until disclosure documents have been provided to
the Division; 178 provision for waiver of fifteen-day voidability; 179 and
Division rule making authority with respect to conversion. 180
C. Homeowners' Associations
When Florida first enacted a homeowners' association statute in
1992,181 many felt that the "camel had gotten its nose in the tent" and that the
statutory regulation of homeowners' associations would suffer the same
politically driven growth that has plagued the condominium community.
Fortunately, at least so far, those prognostications have not come true.
The growth of the homeowners' association statute182 seems to be somewhat
more controlled than legislative developments in the condominium industry.
What the future holds, of course, remains to be seen. Perhaps indicative of
things to come is legislation that was introduced for homeowners'
associations in the 1998 Legislative Session, but not passed. One bill,183 if, • • 184
passed, would have placed homeowners' associations under the
jurisdiction of the Division. The bill would have required, inter alia,
arbitration of homeowners' association "disputes" in the Division's
condominium arbitration program.
171. See supra Part I.A.
172. See supra Part I.A.
173. See supra Part I.A.
174. See supra Part I.A.
175. See supra Part I.A.
176. See supra Part I.A.
177. See supra Part I.A.
178. See supra Part I.A.
179. See supra Part I.A.
180. See supra Part I.A.
181. Ch. 92-49, § 34, 1992 FIa. Laws 488, 488 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §
617.302 (Supp. 1992)).
182. See FLA. STAT. § 617.301 (1997 & Supp. 1998).
183. S. 2068, 15th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1998); H.R. 4129, 15th Leg. Reg. Sess. (Fla.
1998).
184. See section 617.301(7) of the Florida Statutes for the definition of a
"homeowners' association." FLA. STAT. § 617.301(7) (1997).
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The legislation which did pass for homeowners' associations is found in
chapter 98-261 of the Laws of Florida, which became law without the
Governor's approval on May 28, 1998 and became effective on October 1,
1998.185 The original version of the bill contained a right to rescind
contracts for the sale and purchase of parcels in homeowners' association
communities for failure to comply with disclosure obligations of the
statute. 1 6 At the behest of the developers' and home builders' lobbies, the
ultimate bill was substantially watered down, with the recision remedy being
the main casualty of the negotiation process. 1
7
Section 617.303(8) of the statute has been amended to require
developer-controlled associations and developers to maintain association
funds separately from the developer's funds, and separately from the funds188
of any other community association. Similar to the recent changes to the
condominium statute, the law for homeowners' associations has been
amended to provide that reserve and operating funds of the association shall
not be commingled prior to turnover, 190 although the association "may
jointly invest reserve funds."' 9' This language is apparently intended to
permit the pre-turnover "commingling" of operating and reserve funds for
"investment purposes," as is the case for condominiums. After turnover,
there appears to be no prohibition against "commingling," for investment
purposes or otherwise.
Section 617.307 of the statute pertaining to homeowners' associations
192has been amended by the creation of a new sub-section (3). This new
clause provides a "laundry list" of items that a developer is required to turn
over to the board of directors of the homeowners association within ninety
days of transition of control from the developer to the nondeveloper
homeowners. 193 The list is similar to the list for condominiums, 194 with the
most notable omission being the requirement for an audit.
19 5
185. 1998 Fla. Laws 98-261.
186. H.R. 3321, 15th Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1998).
187. Ch. 98-261, § 4, 1998 Fla. Laws 2280, 2281 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §
689.26 (Supp. 1998)).
188. Ch. 98-261, § 1, 1998 Fla. Laws 2277, 2278 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §
617.303 (Supp. 1998)).
189. See supra Part I A.
190. Apparently they may be commingled after turnover. Ch. 98-261, § 1, 1998 Fla.
Laws 2277, 2278 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. § 617.307(3) (Supp. 1998)).
191. Id.
192. Ch. 98-261, § 2, 1998 Fla. Laws 2278, 2278-79 (codified as amended at FLA.
STAT. § 617.303 (Supp. 1998)).
193. Id.
194. See FLA. STAT. § 718.301(4) (1997).
195. See FLA. STAT. § 718.301(4)(c) (1997).
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A new section 617.3075 has been added to the law for homeowners'
associations, which takes aim at apparent developer abuses involving the
inclusion of onerous terms in homeowners' association documents. 96 New
section 617.3075 declares that "the public policy of [Florida] prohibits the
inclusion or enforcement of certain types of clauses in homeowners'
association documents."'197 Among the forbidden clauses are those which
have the effect of granting a developer unilateral ability to change
homeowners' association documents, including declaration of covenants,
articles of incorporation, and by-laws, after transition of control. 9 Also
forbidden are clauses that prohibit or "restrict" homeowners' associations
from filing a lawsuit against the developer after tumover.1 99 Modem
practice for many developers includes governing document restrictions
against post-turnover suits, usually involving a requirement for super-
majority from the property owners.200 Finally, clauses that permit a
developer after transition of control to cast votes in an amount that exceed
one vote per residential lot are declared to be against public policy. 201
The new statute declares all such clauses, granting a developer
unilateral amendment rights after turnover, lawsuit restrictions or post-
transition preferential voting rights, to be "null and void as against the public
policy of this state."202 The legislature appears to provide a "grandfathering"
clause in section 617.305(2) of the statute,203 wherein it states that the public
policy described above "prohibits the inclusion or enforcement of such
clauses created on or after the effective date of this section., 20 4 Since the
clauses are presumably "created" when the governing documents are
recorded, filed, or created, it appears that the legislature did not intend for
this law to apply to pre-existing governing documents for homeowners'
associations.
The final amendment to chapter 98-261 of the Florida Laws does not
205
actually involve the statute for homeowners' associations, but rather
chapter 689.26 of the Florida Statutes, which somewhat generically
196. Ch. 98-261, § 3, 1998 Fla. Laws 2279, 2279-80 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
617.3075 (Supp. 1998)).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Ch. 98-261, § 3, 1998 Fla. Laws at 2279-80 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 617.3075
(Supp. 1998)).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. FLA. STAT. § 718.301 (1997).
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2207
regulates conveyances of land.2 °6 Section 689.26 has been amended2°7 to
require any contract or agreement for sale of a parcel of land in a community
operated by a homeowners' association to incorporate a bold faced
disclosure summary, as well as "a statement that the potential buyer should
not execute the contract or agreement until they have received and read the
disclosure summary required [by the law]." °8  Unfortunately, the law
contained no remedy for its violation. 209 As noted above, the right to rescind
for statutory noncompliance was removed from the final version of the
Bill.2
10
II. APPELLATE COURT DECISIONS
A. Condominium Dispute Jurisdiction; Arbitration
One of the most positive effects of the 1991 changes to the
Condominium Act was the institution of a mandatory, nonbinding program
212for the arbitration of condominium disputes, although the legislative
findings "that unit owners are frequently at a disadvantage when litigating
against an association" 213 and "that the courts are ...overcrowded with
condominium ...disputes' 214 are suspect in light of the absence of any
known empirical data to support those findings. Nonetheless, it is clear that
the arbitration process for the resolution of condominium "disputes" has
been a significant improvement to the industry, providing a forum for parties
to condominium disputes a reasonable opportunity to be heard. Although
each citizen is guaranteed access to the courts, the simple truth of the
matter is that harried circuit court judges are often not the best public
servants to hear many condominium disputes. In many cases, the
enforcement or interpretation of a house rule or internal policy may seem
petty or inconsequential. In other cases, the intricacies of complex or poorly
written statutory provisions are foreign to many trial judges, many of whom
206. FLA. STAT. § 689.26 (1997).
207. Ch. 98-261, § 4, 1998 Fla. Laws 2280, 2280-81 (codified as amended at FLA.
STAT. § 689.26 (Supp. 1998)).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. See supra Part I A.
212. Ch. 91-103, § 5, 1991 Fla. Laws 728, 732 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §
718.112 (1991)); ch. 92-49, § 23, 1998 Fla. Laws 468, 468 (codified as amended at FLA.
STAT. § 719.1255 (Supp. 1998)).
213. FLA. STAT. § 718.1255(3)(a) (1997).
214. Id. § 718.1255(3)(b).
215. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21.
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do not come from real estate or corporate law backgrounds, and all of whom
are called upon to be "experts" in almost any aspect of Florida's laws, on
any given day.
Arbitrators appointed by the Division are accustomed to mundane
matters 216 and are also well schooled in some of the subtle complexities of
Florida condominium law, such as the difference between a material
modification of appurtenances 217 and material alterations of common
elements.218
During the past several legislative sessions, there has been a continuous
effort to refine what types of "disputes" will be resolved in the Division's
arbitration program, and what matters must still be referred to court.
Likewise, there has been a noteworthy amount of reported appellate
litigation involving the topic. For the period covered by this survey, four
reported appellate decisions touch upon the issue of what "disputes" are
arbitrable or how the court must interact in the process. 219
In Cypress Bend Condominium I Ass'n, Inc. v. Dexner, the
Association and Mr. Dexner entered into arbitration proceedings regarding
Dexner's alleged violation of condominium regulations. 22 Upon entry of an
adverse arbitration order, Dexner filed suit seeking a trial de novo pursuant
to section 718.1255(4) of the Florida Statutes.221 "While the order contained
a certificate of service by mail dated May 19, 1997, Dexner did not file his
action until June 19, 1997, thirty-one (31) days later." 222
The Association thereafter filed a motion in the trial court for summary
judgment, arguing that the suit was untimely filed pursuant to Rule 61B-
45.343(2) of the Florida Administrative Code, and parallel provisions of the
Act.223 The Association argued that the trial court did not have jurisdiction,
due to Dexner's untimely filing of a complaint for trial de novo.
The circuit court denied the Association's motion, holding that since
Dexner had served a copy of this suit by mail within thirty-five days of the
order, it was timely pursuant to Rule 60Q-2.002 of the Florida
Administrative Code, which allows five days for mailing.225 The Fourth
District Court of Appeal found the thirty day requirement of the statute and
216. For example, the most recent Subject Matter Index published by the Division's
arbitration program discloses some 60 reported Final Orders on pet disputes.
217. FLA. STAT. § 718.110(4) (1997).
218. FLA. STAT. § 718.113(2) (1997).
219. 705 So. 2d 681 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. (1998).
220. Id. at 681.
221. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 718.1255(4) (1997)).
222. Id.
223. Id. (citing FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 60Q-2.002 (1998)).
224. Dexner, 705 So. 2d at 681.
225. Id. at 681 (citing FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 60Q-2.002 (1998)).
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226 227
rule to be jurisdictional. Citing Markham v. Moriarty, the fourth district
held that the circuit court exceeded its jurisdiction by not granting the
Association's motion.2 28
In Summit Towers Condominium Ass'n v. Coren, 229 a unit owner filed
suit against the condominium association regarding the Board's assignment
of parking spaces. 230 Although the court characterized the complaint as
alleging "multiple theories in several counts," 231 the court stated that the unit
owner essentially alleged that the board members preferentially assigned
themselves additional parking spaces unavailable to other unit owners.
The unit owners' complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well
as damages.
2 33
The appellate court ruled that the trial court erred in denying the
Association's motion to stay the action pending arbitration under the
234Condominium Act. The court rejected the unit owner's contention that the
dispute involved "title to any unit or common element," 235 which is excluded
from the statutory definition of "dispute", and ruled that the "dispute"
involved the board's authority to require a unit owner to "take any action, or
not to take any action, involving that owner's unit or the appurtenances
thereto, 236 which is included in the statutory definition. Although the
court does not provide an extended analysis of the "multiple theories"
asserted by the unit owner, the case is consistent with those cited by the
court, which favor sending condominium "disputes" to arbitration wherever
238possible. 239
The case of Ruffin v. Kingswood E. Condominium Ass 'n, runs counter
to the above noted trend in the cases of "when in doubt, arbitrate."240 The
Association brought an arbitration proceeding against unit owner Mary
226. Id.
227. 575 So. 2d 1307 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
228. Dexner, 705 So. 2d at 682.
229. 707 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
230. Id. at 417.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Coren, 707 So. 2d at 417.
235. FLA. STAT. § 718.1255(1)(b) (1997).
236. FLA. STAT. § 718.1255(1)(a)(1) (1997).
237. Coren, 707 So. 2d at 417.
238. See Carlandia Corp. v. Obemaur, 695 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App 1997);
Blum v. Tamarac Fairways Ass'n, 684 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
239. No. 97-1683, 1998 WL 689766, *1, *1 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. Oct. 7, 1998).
Telephone conversation with Rod Tennyson, Counsel for Appellee Association (Sept. 2,
1998).
240. Id.
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Ruffin, and her son, Paul Ruffin. 241 The Association alleged that Paul Ruffin
was a tenant, and that because of physical altercations on the Association's
premises involving Mr. Ruffin, both Mrs. Ruffin (the mother/unit owner)
and Mr. Ruffin (the son/tenant) were in violation of the condominium
documents, which prohibited unit owners from "permitting immoral or
illegal acts or a nuisance on the property." 242 In the arbitration action, the
Association requested that the Division issue an order requiring Mr. Ruffin
to vacate the premises, and to further restrain Mr. Ruffin from further entry
onto the condominium property. Mr. Ruffin, in his answer to the
Association's petition, informed the arbitrator that his mother had moved
away from the condominium and that the matter was therefore moot.2 43 The
Association countered that because it still "wanted protection against [Mr.
Ruffin's] possible return to the premises," it was entitled to an order stating
that "Mr. Ruffin shall remain away and off the condominium property."
2
Although not clearly stated in the opinion, it appears that the Division
obliged the Association and entered such an order.
Mr. Ruffin filed a complaint for trial de novo within the prescribed time
frame.245 "The Association moved for summary judgment... on the ground
that the whole case was moot because [Mrs.] Ruffin had moved from the
condominium (and later died). 246 Thus, the Association argued, Mr. Ruffin,
who was never a unit owner, and allegedly a "tenant," had no "standing to
request a trial de novo." 247  The trial court accepted the Association's
argument, entered summary judgment on this ground, and reserved
jurisdiction as to an award of attorney's fees.248
In a surprising decision, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, sua
sponte, ruled that the Division did not have subject matter jurisdiction in the
initial arbitration action as to Mr. Ruffin.249 The court held that subject
matter jurisdiction is conferred upon a court by constitution or statute and
may not be created by waiver. The court ruled that "[t]he Division should
have dismissed the petition prior to the entry of the order enjoining" Mr.
Ruffin from coming on to the condominium property.2 1 Thus, the fourth
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Ruffin, 1998 WL 689766, at *1.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Ruffin, 1998 WL 689766, at *2.
250. Id.
251. Id.
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district held that the request for "trial de novo was not moot."252 The court
concluded that since Mr. Ruffin had requested the vacation of the arbitration
order in his complaint, and "because the arbitrator had no subject matter
jurisdiction to enter the order [in the first instance] .... the relief [sought]
should have been granted.
' ' 53
Although the result in this case will apparently create certain
inefficiencies for the litigants therein, 2 4 and although it is unclear why the
appellant, Mr. Ruffin, would have an incentive to continue litigating this
case if his mother had moved away from the condominium and died
assuming he did not intend to return,255 it is submitted that the court's
decision is technically correct if the arbitrator indeed lacked "subject matter
jurisdiction." Curiously, however, the fourth district in Ruffin does not
consider the decision of its sister court in the third district case of Sterling
Condominium Ass'n v. Herrera.26 Although Sterling arose in* a slightly
different procedural setting, the third district held "that the statute is not
jurisdictional and that, therefore, the circuit court did not lack subject matter
jurisdiction to hear this dispute.' 2 7
The third district in Sterling also noted that the unit owner waived her
right to compel arbitration by filing an answer and otherwise actively
participating in circuit court litigation.2 It is unclear from the Ruffin case
why the same waiver arguments would not apply to Mr. Ruffin's conduct,
unless section 718.1255 of the Condominium Act does invoke "subject
matter jurisdiction."259 It is arguable that a conflict now exists between the
third and fourth districts as to this issue.
260In Clark v. England, the unit owner, England, filed a complaint in
circuit court against the condominium association and certain individual
directors for malicious prosecution, negligence, breach of fiduciary duty,
slander, and conspiracy.261 The Association and its directors filed a motion
252. Id.
253. Id. at *3.
254. The Association presumably still has standing under section 718.303(1)(e) of the
Florida Statutes to pursue court action against a tenant, although the action may be moot.
FLA. STAT. § 718.303(1)(e) (1997).
255. The prospect of exposure to the Association's attorney's fees seems to be a
plausible theory.
256. 690 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
257. Id. at 704-05.
258. Id. at 705.
259. See Ruffin v. Kingswood E. Condominium Ass'n, No. 97-1683, 1998 WL
689766, *1, *1 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. Oct. 7, 1998).
260. 715 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
261. Id. at 366.
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262to stay in the circuit court action and to compel arbitration. The circuit
court denied the motion to refer the matter to arbitration. 263 The Association
and its directors appealed. 2 a
In affirming the trial court's ruling, the Fifth District Court of Appeal,
after quoting much of the statute, stated that section 718.1255 of the Florida
Statutes "applies only to disputes between a unit owner and a condominium
association." 2 65 The court held that the "prevailing authority's interpretation
of the statute" requires that the only litigants entitled to participate in
arbitration proceedings are unit owners and associations. Without
providing much detail as to the underlying facts of the case, the court
concluded that "[a]lthough [Mrs. England] was a unit owner when she filed
[suit] in September of 1997, she was not a unit owner when [her] causes of
action arose, on January 14, 1997. "267
The dissenting opinion sheds a little more light on the underlying facts.
Apparently, the owner of the unit in question was a corporation, of which
Mrs. England was a director.268 The core of the dispute involved the
corporation's right to assign to Mrs. England, individually, the right to run
for a seat on the board of directors of the condominium association.269
According to the dissenting opinion, Mrs. England asserted her right to run
for the board at a meeting of the board of directors, and when she refused to
leave the meeting after the board's request that she do so, she was
arrested.270 The dissenting judge reasoned that since the corporation's right
to designate Mrs. England as its representative to run for the Board is
"within the contemplation of the arbitration provision and has now replaced
the corporation as the owner of the unit, it appears that only she can seek the
answer."
271
The majority opinion establishes the principle that when a "cause of
action arises" is the benchmark for determining whether a party is entitled to,
or required to, submit to the statutorily mandated arbitration process.
Although this case can be somewhat limited to its own unique facts, the
establishment of a "when the cause of action accrues" standard could have
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Clark, 715 So. 2d at 367.
266. Id. (citing Blum v. Tamarac Fairways Ass'n, 684 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1996)).
267. Clark, 715 So. 2d at 367.
268. Id. (Harris J., dissenting).
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
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significance in future arbitration decisions, particularly those where a unit
owner sells a unit during the pendency of an arbitration proceeding.
B. Community Association Assessment Cases
After its third trip through the appellate courts, it is perhaps likely that
the dispute over charges for bus rides from the Sheffield and Greenbrier
Condominiums in Palm Beach County has generated enough attorneys' fees
to provide all of the litigants with chauffeured limousine trips to their
shopping excursions for the rest of their lives. In Sheffield B Condominium
Ass'n, v. Scudder,272 the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that the trial
court misinterpreted its mandate in Scudder v. Greenbrier C Condominium
Ass'n,273 referred to as "Greenbrier II" in the opinion. 274 "In Greenbrier II,
[the appellate court] reversed the trial court's holding that the 'one-rider
rule' imposed by the Association was reasonable. 275 The appellate opinion
in Greenbrier II stated that "while the 'one-rider rule' was unreasonable ....
the balance of the transportation assessments imposed by the Association
was valid. 276 The mandate in Greenbrier II was "for the trial court to
determine the amount of the improper assessment, which would have been
the amount charged pursuant to the 'one-rider' rule, and [for the trial court
.. , ,,277
to] adjust the accounting on the transportation assessment accordingly.
Apparently, "however, on remand the Unit Owners convinced the trial
court that the entire transportation assessment was invalid simply because
[the fourth district had] determined the 'one-rider' surcharge to be
unreasonable" in Greenbrier II. 27 The trial court's order was thus reversed,
with instructions "to enter judgment in favor of the Association on all issues
except the 'one-rider' surcharge." 279
The fourth district also reversed the trial court's order assessing•.• 280
prevailing party attorney's fees against the association. On remand the
trial court was directed to "determine the prevailing party of [the] litigation,"
272. 698 So. 2d 1270 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
273. 663 So. 2d 1362 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
274. Sheffield, 698 So. 2d at 1271 (citing Scudder v. Greenbrier C. Condominium, 663
So. 2d 1362 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995)). See also Joseph E. Adams, Community
Associations, 21 NOVA L. REV. 69, 79-81 (1996).
275. Sheffield, 698 So. 2d at 1271.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Sheffield, 698 So. 2d at 1271.
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while "being mindful that the Association has prevailed on all but one
issue.
281
Undoubtedly, the most significant assessment collection case for
Florida's community association practitioners is Bryan v. Clayton.12 In its
per curiam opinion, the Fifth District Court of Appeal confronted the
question of "whether maintenance assessments [for a condominium]
homeowner's association are 'debts' for purposes of [compliance with] the
Fair Debt Collections Practices Act,"' 3 and the Florida Consumer Collection
Practices Act.284 Relying on a series of federal district court cases, Florida's
fifth district concluded that the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act did not
embrace association assessments. 285
Apparently, while the Bryan case was still pending on a motion for
rehearing, the United States District Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
issued the decision of Newman v. Boehm, Pearlstein, & Bright, Ltd.,286
287which is the first federal appellate decision on the issue. In Newman, Mr.
and Mrs. Newman had received a collection letter from a law firm, which
had been sent on behalf of the board of directors of a condominium
association.28 "The letter informed the Newmans that they were in default
on their obligation to pay" common expenses, and sought past due, . 289 ,
maintenance fees, late fees, interest, and attorney's fees. "The letter stated
that if the amount demanded was not paid within thirty days, the association
would commence [foreclosure] proceedings. 290 The Newmans filed suit
against the law firm pursuant to the Fair Debt Collections Practices Ac291
("FDCPA"), alleging that the law firm failed to provide a "validation
292
notice" and specifically alleging that the letters did not disclose that the
"defendants were attempting to collect a debt and that any information
obtained would be used for that purpose. ' 293 The unit owners also "asked
the district court to certify a class comprised of all individuals who had
281. Id.
282. 698 So. 2d 1236 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
283. Id. at 1237 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (1994)).
284. Bryan, 698 So. 2d at 1237 (citing FLA. STAT. § 559.55 (1997)).
285. Id. (citing Azar v. Hayter, 874 F. Supp. 1314 (N.D. Fla. 1995) aff'd, 66 F.3d 342
(11th Cir. 1995)).
286. 119 F.3d 477 (7th Cir. 1997).
287. Id. at 480. A companion case was also consolidated in this appeal. Id. at 477.
288. Id. at 479.
289. Id.
290. Newman, 119 F.3d at 479.
291. Id. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (1984).
292. Newman, 119 F.3d at 479 (citing Avila v. Rubin, 84 F.3d 222, 226 (7th Cir.
1996)).
293. Id.
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received similar letters from the defendant law firms and to agoint plaintiffs
as class representatives" (and their counsel as class counsel).
Relying on several federal district court decisions, the trial court
dismissed the action. 295 Upon appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
acknowledged that "no federal court ha[d] yet concluded that the obligation
to pay a condominium assessment constitutes a 'debt' under the FDCPA,"
and went on to specifically hold that association assessments do constitute a
"debt."2 96 The court noted that the "credit requirement" from the case of
Zimmerman v. HBO Affiliate Group 297 had been recently rejected by another
Seventh Circuit panel in the case of Bass v. Stolper, Koritzinsky, Brewster &
Neider, S.C. 298 The Seventh Circuit, in Newman, held that the obligation to
pay assessments arose upon the purchase of a unit, thereby satisfying the
requirement of a "transaction" to create the "debt." 299 The Court also found
it undebatable that the assessments were used for "personal, family, or
household purposes."
3°°
Notwithstanding the opinion of the federal Seventh Circuit, Florida's
fifth district, in Bryan, declined to change its ruling, after due consideration
of the appellee's motion to stay or recall mandate. 30 The fifth district noted
that although "part of the text of our opinion might have been different," had
it had the opportunity to consider the opinion of the federal Seventh Circuit
in Newman, its "decision to affirm would not have been different. '302 The
Bryan court remained unconvinced, notwithstanding the opinion of the
Newman court, that condominium assessments constitute a "consumer
debt. ,3
03
Since the FDCPA is a federal statute, it seems reasonably clear that the
opinion of the federal Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals will take precedence
over a decision from a state intermediate appellate court. Although the
Bryan court reaches the better decision in terms of policy, 3°4 prudent
practitioners are well-advised to comply with the FDCPA.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 479-80.
296. Id. at 480.
297. 834 F.2d 1163 (3d Cir. 1987).
298. Newman, 119 F.3d at 479 (citing Bass v. Stulper, Koritzinsky, Brewster & Neider,
S.C., 111 F.3d 1322 (7th Cir. 1997)).
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Bryan, 698 So. 2d at 1237.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 1237-38.
304. Community association interest groups should urge Congress to review this
matter.
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The case of Southeast & Associates, Inc. v. Fox Run Homeowners
Ass'n,30 5 involves foreclosure of a condominium association lien, and the
adequacy of constructive service of process.306 A $90.00 "assessment for
semi-annual maintenance became due on July 1, 1995," which Mr. and Mrs.
Love, the unit owners, failed to pay.30 7 "The association sent'a notice of
delinquency by certified mail to the Loves' [unit at the condominiuml,
warning that the association could file a lien" if payment was not made.
308
"The notice was accepted by someone on behalf of the Loves, who signed
the return receipt card. ' 3°
After nonpayment, the association filed a lien, sending a thirty-day
notice of intent to foreclose to the same address, which was again accepted
on the Loves' behalf.310 "Just before the expiration of this thirty-day period,
a partial payment was sent to the association. 3 1' The association notified
the Loves that full payment would be necessary to avoid foreclosure.
312
The association subsequently initiated a foreclosure action, and hired a
process server to serve the foreclosure complaint on the Loves.313 The
process server could not locate the Loves at the unit, and made nine attempts
to serve them there.314 "Unbeknownst to the association, the Loves were
residing at their New York address., 315  "The process server [also]
performed two skip traces and.. ." asked the neighbors on both sides of the
property if they knew where the Loves had been.3 6 Other efforts, including
tracing a business address, were also fruitless.3 37
Subsequently, the association served the Loves by publication.318
"[A]fter filing an affidavit of diligent search by the process server and an
affidavit of constructive service executed by the association's counsel," a
default was entered in the suit.319 A foreclosure judgment was subsequently
entered .320
305. 704 So. 2d 694 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
306. Id. at 695.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Southeast & Assocs., Inc., 704 So. 2d at 695.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Southeast &Assocs., Inc., 704 So. 2d at 695.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Southeast &Assocs., Inc., 704 So. 2d at 695.
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"Southeast and Associates was the successful bidder at the foreclosure
sale. '  Nine days after a certificate of title was issued, the "Loves moved
to set aside the sale based on an insufficient service of process." 322 The sale
was set aside when the trial court entered an order finding lack of diligent
search and inquiry by the association. 323 The Fourth District Court of
Appeal reversed, finding that the association had made a diligent search. 32
4
The court analyzed the policies served by the constructive service
statute, the doctrine of void versus voidable titles, and the impact on
marketability of title that uneven judicial treatment of the adequacy of
constructive service can have.325 The court distinguished other association
cases where lack of diligence was shown, concluding that the association's
process server had demonstrated "diligent search and inquiry. ' 326 The court
implicitly concluded that, at best, voidable title had passed, which by virtue
of Southeast's unquestioned status as a bona fide purchaser, would have
extinguished any claim by the Loves. In concluding, the court noted that the
Loves "could easily have provided the association with their New York
address," and further found it relevant that "someone on their behalf kept
signing for the certified letters, sending in a partial payment. ' 327
The case of Limner v. Country Pines Condominium Ass'n, touches
upon a very important issue to many condominium associations; the
relationship between the association's assessment lien and the lien of a
foreclosing mortgagee.129 Unfortunately, the reported decision is largely
devoid of a discussion of the facts underlying the particular litigation.330
The court begins its opinion by ruling that section 718.116 of the
Florida Statutes "limits the mortgagee's liability in [that] case to the lesser
of six months of unpaid assessments or one per cent of the original mortgage
debt.' 33' The court goes on to state that "[t]he amendment to the statute does
not apply to this lawsuit," because the suit was filed before the effective date
of the statute.332 The court does not specify which "amendment to the
statute" it is discussing. It is presumably the 1994 amendment to section
321. Id.
322. Id. at 696.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 696-97.
325. Southeast & Assocs., Inc., 704 So. 2d at 696.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 697.
328. 709 So. 2d 154 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
329. Id.at 154.
330. Id.
331. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 718.116(1)(b)(1) (1997)).
332. Id.
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718.116 of the Act,333 because that is the only amendment to the relevant
portions of the Act since the 1993 version, which the court cites as the
controlling authority.334
The court held that there is nothing in the statute to indicate that the
provisions of section 718.116, dealing with a mortgagee's liability for six
months of unpaid assessments or one percent of the original mortgage debt,
do not equally apply to a former unit owner who has taken back a first
mortgage as part of a sale of a unit, apparently the issue in this case.335
Although the opinion's failure to recite the facts hampers the ability to more
thoroughly analyze the logic of the decision, it is not evident how the 1994
amendment to the Act would have benefited either party to the litigation.
Further, although the court's unembellished statement that "La~pplication of
the statute does not amount to a constitutional violation" raises one's
curiosity, the lack of proper recitation of facts (when the mortgage was
recorded, when the foreclosure judgment was taken, who bid at the
foreclosure sale or whether a deed in lieu of foreclosure was involved, the
parties' theories and arguments, etc.) unfortunately render this case to one of
limited precedential value for community association legal practitioners.
The case of Gainer v. Fiddlesticks Country Club, Inc.,337 involved a
homeowners' association's ability to require a purchaser at a tax sale to buy
an "equity certificate" in the country club/homeowners' association. 338 The
relevant declaration of covenants required every purchaser of a lot in the
subdivision to purchase an equity certificate, thus becoming a member of the
country club, which also served as the governing homeowners' association
for the development.339 "On November 7, 1994 Mr. Gainer purchased a tax
deed for a lot in Fiddlesticks.,,340 After the association's demand that Mr.
Gainer purchase an equity certificate, and his refusal to do so, lien and
foreclosure proceedings were commenced.341 At trial, Mr. Gainer argued
that the declaration provision requiring purchase of the equity certificate did
not survive the tax sale pursuant to section 197.573 of the Florida
Statutes.342 This statute "has long provided that a covenant does not survive
a tax sale if it requires 'the grantee to expend money for any purpose, except
333. Ch. 94-350, § 10, 1994 Fla. Laws 2511, 2511 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT.
§ 718.116(1)(b)(1) (1997)).
334. Limner, 709 So. 2d at 154.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. 710 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
338. Id. at 76.
339. Id. at 77.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Gainer, 710 So. 2d at 77 (citingFLA. STAT. § 197.573 (1993)).
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one that may require that the premises be kept in a sanitary or sightly
condition or one to abate nuisances or undesirable conditions.' 343 The
second district concluded that there was no dispute that the purchase of an
equity certificate did not fall within the quoted exception to the law.
344
Section 617.312 of the Florida Statutes was enacted in 1995. 34  This
section provides that restrictions contained in a declaration of covenants
survive a tax sale.34 6 The association was able to convince the court that
although the 1995 amendment to the law was not binding per se, the
amendment was an effort to clarify exemptions previously contained in the
statute, recognizing that homeowners' associations were not commonplace
when the exceptions to the statute were written into the law, and the fact that
homeowners' associations were not subject to statutory regulation at all until
1992.347 Citing State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance, Inc. v. Laforet 348 and
Landi v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co., the second district, in
Gainer, 350 rejected the notion that there was an ambiguity in section 197.573
of the Florida Statutes, or that it was clarified by the subsequent enactment
of section 617.312.351
Had the 1995 amendment to section 617.312352 not occurred, this
decision would have a devastating impact on homeowners' associations in
Florida. Purchasers at tax sales could essentially accept the benefits of the
association's maintenance of their property, and the consequent
enhancement of their property's value, but would not be called upon to
contribute to the expenses of doing so. Fortunately, the 1995 amendment to
section 617.312 of the statute for homeowners' associations should
substantially limit the application of this case.
343. Id. at 76.
344. Id.
345. Ch. 95-274, § 62, 1995 Fla. Laws 2553, 2553 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT.
§ 617.312 (1995)).
346. FLA. STAT. § 617.312 (1995).
347. Although these arguments do not appear in the reported opinion, the writer is
familiar with the arguments made to the court both at trial and on appeal, as a consequence of
having served as general corporate counsel to Fiddlesticks Country Club, Inc. during the
period of the litigation.
348. 658 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 1995).
349. 529 So. 2d 1170 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
350. Gainer v. Fiddlesticks Country Club, Inc., 710 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1998).
351. Id. at 77 (citing State Farm Mut. Auto Ins., Inc. v. Laforet, 658 So. 2d 55 (Fla.
1995)); Landi v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 529 So. 2d 1170 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1988).
352. FLA. STAT. § 617.312 (1995).
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C. Community Association Litigation Pleading Cases; Class Actions
The case of Concerned Class Members v. Sailfish Point, Inc.353
presented "an issue of first impression for [the] Florida state courts [to-wit]:
whether individual, non-named class members who have not formally
intervened in a class action have standing to appeal a final judgment binding
on all class members., 354 The court announced:
Prior to approval of a settlement agreement ending [the underlying]
class action litigation between the 524 residents of the Sailfish
Point development and the developer, Mobil Land Development
Corporation, a group of fourteen class members calling themselves
"Concerned Class Members" sought to be named as additional
party plaintiffs and to intervene in the litigation as a subclass.
355
The trial court denied the "Concerned Class Members" motion to intervene
and be named as party plaintiffs, but did allow them to be heard on a
separate motion which would require a vote from the residents on the
356proposed settlement with Mobile Land Development Corporation.
The residents voted, and, by majority vote, approved the settlement
agreement, which was ultimately approved by the court.3 57 "Twelve of the
fourteen Concerned Class Members filed a notice of appeal from the order
approving the settlement." 358 The original class representatives, the Sailfish
Point Owners representatives, moved to dismiss the "Concerned Class
Members" appeal."3 9
The fourth district, noting the lack of authority in Florida, found it
appropriate to look at applicable federal cases as persuasive authority. 360
The court noted that the "[flederal courts addressing the issue are split, with
the Eleventh Circuit joining the majority of federal courts in holding [that]
non-named class members must intervene formally in the class action to
[have] standing to appeal. 36'
The fourth district found particularly persuasive the rationale of Guthrie
v. Evans,362 which held, inter alia, that "class actions could become
353. 704 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
354. Id. at 201.
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. Sailfish Point, 704 So. 2d at 201.
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. 815 F.2d 626 (llth Cir. 1987).
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unmanageable and non-productive if each member could individually decide
,,363to appeal.' The fourth district concluded that "because the Concerned
Class Members did not intervene [in the trial of the case], nor did they
appeal the trial court's denial of their motion to establish a subclass," they
lacked standing to appeal approval of the settlement agreement. 364
The case of Arvida/JMB Partners v. Council of Villages, Inc.,365 dealt
with the elements parties seeking class action certification in community
association litigation need to establish. 366 The Council of Villages, Inc.
(Council), the Country Club Maintenance Association, Inc. (CCMA), the
Master Homeowners' Association for the [Broken Sound PUD (Planned
Urban Development)], and six residents filed suit against various developer
entities (Arvida) and the Broken Sound Club, a private country club.367 The
Council is an organization formed by some of the homeowners in the Broken
Sound PUD for the purpose of seeking turnover of the Club to the property
owners in Broken Sound.368 Count I of the plaintiff's complaint claimed
that:
Arvida violated Boca Raton city ordinances by (1) not turning over
ownership of certain open spaces to an organization of property
owners, (2) arranging that members be charged for use of this open
space, and (3) obtaining park credit for facilities that became the
property of a private club, when, according to the ordinance, they
should have been the property of an organization of the property
369owners.
Count II of the suit was for civil theft.370  Count III sounded in
constructive trust and Count IV pled unjust enrichment. 371 The trial court
granted class certification on Count I, violation of city ordinance, denied
class certification on Count Il, constructive trust, while omitting to make a
determination respecting Count II, civil theft and Count IV, unjust
enrichment.
372
363. Sailfish Point, 704 So. 2d at 202 (citing Guthrie v. Evans, 815 F.2d 626, 628
(1 th Cir. 1987)).
364. Id.
365. 23 Fla. L. Weekly D1766 (4th Dist. Ct. App. July 29, 1998).
366. Id. at D1767.
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. Arvida, 23 Fla. L. Weekly at D1767.
371. Id.
372. Id.
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The case was also complicated by the fact that there were certain non-
defendant appellants who were given leave to intervene in the trial
proceedings relative to class certification.373 These nondefendant appellants
were the owners of apartment complexes, which might be converted into
condominiums. 374 The apartment building owners argued that the single
family homeowners' interests were antagonistic to those of the apartment
building owners, and so the Council should not serve as the class
representative.375 The trial court added "to the proposed class... [of] single
family homeowners in the PUD,' ,37 6 the apartment building owners, and all
other property owners within the Broken Sound PUD to its certification of a
class for Count I violation of city ordinance. "The court concluded [that] the
issue was essentially whether there was violation of an ordinance
requirement that all of the open space reserved for common use be owned in
fee simple by an organization of property owners within the PUD.' 377
On appeal, the plaintiffs/appellees/cross-appellants sought certification
of two classes: "Class A, consisting of all resident single family
homeowners, to assert the objective of turnover of ownership of the Club,
and Class B, consisting of equity owners in the Club, to seek recision of past
Club membership purchases and [a] refund of amounts paid as membership
fees. 3 78 The Fourth District Court of Appeal concluded that since certain
defendants in the suit, namely the developers, were also property owners
within the PUD, a class of all property owners would have interests adverse
to those of the other members of the class certified by the trial court, and
thus these property owners should not be included in the class.3 7 9 The court
also applied the same rationale to the Broken Sound Club, which it found
would have an interest directly adverse to the interests of the individual
property owner-members of the class.38 ° In attempting to sort out the various
classes, the court noted that the dispute sub judice presented "the
quintessential scenario for class action treatment."8 The court found it
improbable that individual members of the class would have the resources to
pursue their common interests individually, or alternatively that the courts
"would be clogged ad infinitum with the individual suits. ' '38 2 Noting that
"Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.220(a)(2) requires only that the resolution
373. Id.
374. Id.
375. Arvida, 23 Fla. L. Weekly at D1767.
376. Id. Count I alleged a violation of Boca Raton city ordinances. Id.
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. Arvida, 23 Fla. L. Weekly at D1767.
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. Id.
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of common questions of law and fact affect all or a substantial number of
class members," the court held that the adequacy of representation
requirement can be met where the named representatives of the class have
interests in common with the proposed class members.383
Moving to a discussion of the various counts in the complaint, the court
held that the issue involving an alleged violation of a city ordinance does not
384sound in fraud, and was thus properly certified as a class action count. As
to the remaining three counts, the court assumed that the two counts not
certified by the trial court, Counts II and IV, were rejected for class
certification, the trial court also specifically rejected count HI, constructive
trust for class certification.385
The fourth district ruled that Count II, sounding in civil theft, charges
"willful, intentional and wrongful diversion of the golf course open space,
and refusal to return the property or the proceeds obtained as a result of the
diversion of the ownership rights. 386 Stating that an action for civil theft is
not tantamount to an allegation of misrepresentation or fraud, the fourth
district held that the civil theft count should have been certified as a class
action count.
387
Likewise, the appellate court held that the trial court erred in refusing to
388
certify Count III, constructive trust, for class certification. The court
noted that "[f]raud claims which have been considered unamenable to class
action [treatment] arise from circumstances in which each defrauded party
has a legally distinct claim, each depending on its own facts."
Notwithstanding the fact that the count in the complaint alleged that the
developer failed to disclose the inadequacy of the golf facilities to
accommodate the entire ultimate population of Broken Sound, the appellate
court found that "a substantial number of the members of the class ...
[would] have a common interest in the remedy. 390 Thus, the court also
reinstated Count III, constructive trust, as amenable to class action
treatment.39' Finally, in consideration of Count IV, unjust enrichment, the
court summarily held that the common interests of a substantial number of
members of the class would be adequately represented in the count for
compensatory damages.
392
383. Id. at D1767 (citing FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.220(a)(2)).
384. Arvida, 23 Fla. L. Weekly at D1768.
385. Id.
386. Id. at D1768.
387. Id.
388. Id.
389. Arvida, 23 Fla. L. Weekly at D1768.
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. Id.
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Graves v. Ciega Verde Condominium Ass'n,393 arose out of the
foreclosure of a construction lien.394 "Fred Graves (Graves) was a licensed
general contractor who performed repair work to the exterior siding of the"
Ciega Verde Condominium buildings.395 A dispute erupted,- resulting in
Graves' filing of a lien for approximately $52,000, the unpaid contract
amount.396 Graves subsequently sought to foreclose the construction lien, by
filing a foreclosure suit.397 "In the foreclosure action, Graves alleged that
each unit owner was liable for a proportionate share of the expenses of"
maintaining the common elements. 393' "Graves recorded a notice of lis
pendens against all of the unit owners," sued each unit owner individually,
and named the association as the class representative. 399 "Service of process
was issued against Ciega Verde, both individually and as the class
representative." 40 The association answered both individually and as class
representative, and discovery ensued.40 1 "Thereafter, the contract portion of
the action was set for binding arbitration," in which the association
402participated. Graves prevailed in the arbitration, recovering his total
demand.40 3 Graves served the association with "a motion to confirm the
arbitration award and to set [the] cause for trial on the foreclosure action." 404
The trial court entered a judgment foreclosing thirty of the thirty-two units
because two had been released during the pendency of the litigation.
Some two years after the initial filing of the suit, the association
retained new counsel, who filed a motion to set aside the foreclosure
judgment, claiming that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to order
foreclosure. 40 5 The trial court granted the motion and required Graves to
personally serve each individual unit owner. Graves complied with the
order. "[T]he unit owners [then] moved to dismiss the amended complaint
claiming that Graves filed the amended complaint on May 23, 1994, and
therefore, service on the unit owners had not been accomplished within 120
393. 703 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
394. Id. at 1110. For applicable law on construction liens see FLA. STAT. §§ 713.001-
.37 (1997).
395. Graves, 703 So. 2d at 1110.
396. Id.
397. Id.
398. Id.
399. Id.
400. Graves, 703 So. 2d at 1111.
401. Id.
402. Id.
403. Id.
404. Id.
405. Graves, 703 So. 2d at 1111.
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days from filing the original complaint." 4 6 "The trial court granted the
motion to dismiss, and entered an order dismissing the individual unit
owners from the action. Because the applicable statute of limitations had
expired, Graves was precluded from bringing a new foreclosure action
against the unit owners." 407
At issue on appeal was whether the trial court obtained jurisdiction over
the individual unit owners through service of process on the association. 408
Citing Rule 1.221 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, the fourth district
held that the unit owners, "as members of the class, have a common interest
regarding the maintenance of the common elements of the condominium
property."4 In addressing the unit owners' arguments that they should have
received individual service to satisfy "due process concerns, the Fourth
District responded that the association has "a fiduciary and statutory duty to
give notice of a lawsuit to the unit owners."4"
The result in Graves certainly seems equitable on the merits. Clearly,
the association has the fiduciary duty to represent the interests of all unit
owners in the litigation. Additionally, any unit owner who does not wish to
subject his or her unit to a potential foreclosure action may relieve his or her
condominium parcel of the lien by exercising any of the rights of a property
412owner under Chapter 713, or "by payment of the proportionate amount
attributable to his or her condominium parcel. '413 The courts' imposition of
a new "fiduciary and statutory duty to give notice of a lawsuit to the unit
owners" 414 is cause for concern. Although most associations will routinely
report on the nature and status of pending litigation, an association is only
obligated by statute to "give notice" of a lawsuit if the association's liability
in an action exceeds insurance coverage; 415 when the association is
contesting ad valorem taxation for all units in a condominium project;416
when the association is involved in litigation with exposure of more than
406. Id.; see also FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.170(1).
407. Graves, 703 So. 2d at 1111.
408. Id.
409. Id.
410. Id. at 1112 (citing Kesl, Inc. v. Racquet Club of Deer Creek II Condominium, 574
So. 2d 251 (Fla. 4th Dist Ct. App. 1991)).
411. Id.
412. FLA. STAT. §§ 713.001-.37 (1997).
413. FLA. STAT. § 718.121(3) (1997).
414. Graves, 703 So. 2d at 1112.
415. FLA. STAT. § 718.119(3) (1997).
416. FLA. STAT. § 194.011(3)(e) (1997).
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$100,000.00; 4'7 and when the association is named as class representative of
the unit owners in an eminent domain proceeding. 418
D. Community Association Litigation-Attorney's Fees
Undoubtedly, the prospect of exposure for payment of an adversary's
attorney's fees serves to discourage the litigation of cases without substantial
merit. The Florida Condominium Act has long evinced a prevailing party
419attorney's fees approach to dispute resolution. The case of Ares v.
Cypress Park Gardens Homes I Condominium Ass'n, Inc.,42° involves a
condominium unit owner's suit against his association for "production of
[official] records, injunctive relief, and an accounting."421  The parties
settled the unit owner's claims in mediation but apparently decided to defer
resolution of entitlement to attorney's fees.42 According to the opinion, the
parties agreed that a special master would be appointed to determine which
party prevailed on each issue.423 "The [special] master issued a report and
recommendation finding that [the unit owner] succeeded on one claim, that
the Association prevailed on three claims, and that one of the claims did not
support an award of fees to either party under the statute." 424 Over the unit
owner's objection, the trial court confirmed the master's recommendations
and awarded the fees accordingly.
42 5
After concurring (without recitation of the facts of the case) that the
association prevailed on the count for production of official records, the
court further held that there was no error in the trial court's ruling that
section 718.303(1) of the Condominium Act does "not authorize attorney's
fees in an action for an accounting." 426  This aspect of the decision is
curious, since section 718.303(1) confers a right of action by a unit owner
against the association. 427 Although a suit for accounting is typically a two-
stage proceeding, first establishment of the right to an accounting and then
the actual accounting itself,428 an "accounting" is essentially an equitable
417. FLA. STAT. § 718.504 (1997).
418. FLA. STAT. § 73.073(3) (1997).
419. FLA. STAT. § 718.1255(4)(k) (1997).
420. 696 So. 2d 885 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
421. Id. at 886.
422. Id.
423. Id.
424. Id.
425. Ares, 696 So. 2d at 886.
426. Id.
427. FLA. STAT. § 718.303(1) (1997).
428. See A-1 Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Vilberg, 222 So. 2d 442, 444 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1969).
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remedy419 that is based upon a legal relationship directly established by the
Condominium Act, which establishes a fiduciary relationship between the
430officers and directors of an association and the unit owners.
With respect to Mr. Ares' request for injunctive relief, the second
district concluded that the lower court erred in finding that the association
prevailed on the unit owner's request that the trial court enjoin the
association from further violations of its bylaws and the Condominium
Act.43' While agreeing that a perpetual mandatory injunction, requiring an
association to abide by its documents and comply with the law is
432inappropriate, the second district noted that the issue before the master
was not whether Mr. Ares would have prevailed on a claim for such an
injunction.433 Rather, the court noted that the master was called upon to
determine whether the unit owner had been successful on his claim as it was
resolved in the settlement agreement.43 4 The second district, noting the
association's admission of various statutory and documentary violations in
its answer, held that the unit owner prevailed in his endeavor to require the
association's adherence to its bylaws and the Condominium Act.435 In
apparent dicta, the court also noted that the unit owner's complaint, seeking
an injunction which prohibited the association from conducting its affairs "in
violation of the law and condominium documents" is distinguishable from
"perpetual prohibitory injunctions," and apparently enforceable.436
In Cuervo v. West Lake Village HI Condominium Ass'n, Inc.,437 various
"ousted directors" appealed the ultimate award of attorney's fees to the
438
association. The genesis of the dispute was a contested condominium
election. 439 The appellants, claiming to be victorious, seized control of the
association's bank account and transferred funds to a different bank.440 The
association contested the validity of the election. 44' The appellants filed for
429. See Manning v. Clark, 56 So. 2d 521, 524 (Fla. 1951).
430. FLA. STAT. § 718.111(1)(a) (1997).
431. Ares v. Cypress Park Garden Homes I Condominium Ass'n, 696 So. 2d 885, 887
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
432. Id. See also Indian Trail Homeowners Ass'n, Inc., v. Roberts, 577 So. 2d 998
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
433. Ares, 696 So. 2d at 887.
434. Id.
435. Id.
436. Id.
437. 709 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
438. Id. at 598.
439. Id.
440. Id.
441. Cuervo, 709 So. 2d at 598.
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arbitration pursuant to section 718.1255 of the Act.442  "During the
arbitration proceeding, the association was represented by [a] law firm."443
During the pendency of the arbitration proceedings, the same law firm "filed
a three-count complaint against [the] appellants and the association's former
management company," seeking return of the association's funds, damages
for conversion, and damages for "breach of fiduciary duty for its role in the
subject election." 44  "The association pled an entitlement to attorney's fees"
as well.445 The action was stayed "pending the resolution of the arbitration
proceeding." 446 4
The arbitrator ruled in favor of the association." 7  The lower court
entered a temporary injunction requiring the appellants to relinquish the
association's funds." 8 The appellants also filed an answer and affirmative
defenses to the complaint, as well as a counterclaim. The same law firm that
had been representing the association up to this point in the proceedings
filed an answer and affirmative defenses to the counterclaim." 9 In response
to the filing of a counterclaim against the association, the association's
insurance carrier retained a second law firm to represent the association in
the litigation. 45  The second firm filed an answer to, and thereafter
defended, the counterclaim.451 The two law firms continued to represent the
association's interests in the matter, although "the gravamen of both the
main action and the counterclaim action centered around the issue of the
validity of the appellants' election as directors. 452  Before trial, the
association prevailed in obtaining partial summary judgment and was
determined to be the prevailing party. The law firm initially3 retained by the
association was awarded approximately $45,000 in fees. 45  There is no
mention of an award of fees to the firm retained by the insurance carrier.
On appeal, noting that the issues raised in the main action and
counterclaim "were inextricably intertwined such that a determination of the
issues in one action would necessarily be dispositive of the issues raised in
the other,"454 the court ruled that the trial court erred when it failed to
442. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 718.1255 (1997).
443. Cuervo, 709 So. 2d at 599.
444. Id.
445. Id.
446. Id.
447. Id.
448. Cuervo, 709 So. 2d at 599.
449. Id.
450. Id.
451. Id.
452. Id.
453. Cuervo, 709 So. 2d at 599-600.
454. Id.
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consider and reduce the attorney's fees awarded to the first firm for the
duplication of their legal efforts with the second firm.455 Finding it
undoubtable that the actions of the two firms were "duplic[ative] and
overlapping," the court concluded that "the most appropriate way of
accomplishing [the] task [would be] to reduce the fee awarded to the [first
firm] by the reasonable value of all of the [second firm's] services in this
cause."' 45 6 Although the court was undoubtedly justified in reducing the fees
awarded to the extent they were duplicitous or overlapping, it is submitted
that it is unfair to the association to reduce the fees payable to its primary
counsel by the reasonable value of services performed by insurance-
appointed counsel.
First, there is no suggestion in the opinion that the fees charged by the
association's primary law firm were unreasonable. Second, there is no
statement in the opinion that the association (or its insurance carrier) sought
compensation for the fees incurred by the insurance company-appointed
counsel. Therefore, recognizing that "a party has the absolute right to hire as
many attorneys as it desires,"a5 there is no evidence that the appellants were
called upon to compensate for overlapping efforts. The reality is that many
community associations are more comfortable having their general counsel
represent the association's interests in litigation matters. When insurance
company-selected counsel is brought into the case through the filing of
counterclaims, or in cases where the association is sued as a defendant, the
association should retain the option of keeping its general counsel in the case
without being penalized by an arbitrary standard that reduces fees payable to
the association's general counsel by the amount reasonably incurred by the
insurance company-appointed firm.
E. Covenant Enforcement
Mora v. Karr,458 involves the doctrines of waiver and estoppel.459 Mr.
460Karr wished to purchase a home in a deed restricted community. He
desired to tear down the existing residence and build a "larger home with a
three-car garage. ' 46' The "deed restrictions [permitted] only a two-car
garage and [required] a thirty-five foot setback., 462 Prior to buying the
property, Mr. Karr obtained an agreement from the original developer, "as
455. Id. at 599.
456. Id.
457. Id. at 600.
458. 697 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
459. Id. at 887.
460. Id. at 888.
461. Id.
462. Id.
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well as the adjacent property owners on either side, the Xaviers and the
Moras, waiving the two deed restrictions."
463
During construction of his new home, Mr. Karr received a letter from
Mr. Mora threatening suit over violation of the restrictive covenants. 464
Mora filed suit and sought a temporary injunction.465 "The day before the
hearing [on the motion for temporary injunction,] the Moras moved to
amend to add the Moores as additional plaintiffs, which was granted. 466
Mr. Moore testified that although he was being represented in the action by
the same attorney as the Moras, he was not obligated to pay any attorney's
fees to the Moras' counsel.467
The trial court denied the temporary injunction, holding that "the
waiver, . . . the change in conditions in the neighborhood since the
imposition of the restrictive covenants, and the fact that there was little
likelihood that the appellants would prevail on the merits," 468 justified denial
of their motion for a temporary injunction. Citing Enegren v. Marathon
Country Club Condominium West Ass'n, Inc.469 the court held that the
Moras' claim was barred by the doctrine of waiver.470 As to the Moores'
claim, the appellate court, citing a Supreme Court of Florida case from
1930,47' held that the Moores' delay in "seeking relief until eight or nine
months after construction commenced would warrant denial" of their request
for injunctive relief.472
Miami Lakes Civic Ass'n v. Encinosa73 is the latest in a series of
cases474 which grant associations the right to interpret or apply deed
restrictions beyond the four comers of the deed restriction and its verbiage
itself.475 Mr. Encinosa constructed a deck in the back yard of his home
"without the prior approval of the Miami Lakes Architectural Control
Committee [ACC] as required by certain restrictive covenants." 476  The
463. Mora, 697 So. 2d at 888.
464. Id.
465. Id.
466. Id.
467. Id.
468. Mora, 697 So. 2d at 888.
469. 525 So. 2d 488 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988). The Enegren case is actually most
often cited as an estoppel case.
470. Mora, 697 So. 2d at 888 (citing Enegren, 525 So. 2d at 488).
471. Mercer v. Keynton, 127 So. 859 (Fla. 1930).
472. Mora, 697 So. 2d at 888 (citing Mercer v. Keynton, 127 So. 859 (Fla. 1930)).
473. 699 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
474. See, e.g., Europco Management Co. of Am. v. Smith, 572 So. 2d 963 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Coral Cables Inv., Inc. v. Graham Cos., 528 So. 2d 989 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1988).
475. Encinosa, 699 So. 2d at 271.
476. Id.
19981
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covenants permitted the ACC to refuse approval of plans "on any ground,
including purely aesthetic grounds, which in the sole and uncontrolled
discretion of said Architectural Control Committee shall seem sufficient. 477
After completion of the deck, Mr. Encinosa submitted plans to the ACC,
which denied the after-the-fact submittal.478 The ACC found that "the deck
was too large and 'out of context with what was going on in the surrounding
properties and on the lake as a whole."' 479
The trial court held that the association could not enforce the covenant,
as it had engaged in selective enforcement by "allow[ing] other violations to
go unchecked.4 a 0 The trial court "also determined that there was a lack of
criteria or guidelines for construction of decks. 4 1
However, the appellate court held that once "[tihe association ... put
on a prima facie case demonstrating Encinosa's violation of the restrictive
covenants, the burden shifted to Encinosa to show that the association had
acted in an unreasonable or arbitrary manner., 482  On the selective
enforcement issue, the appellate court held that Encinosa had not provided
"competent substantial evidence to support such a finding., 48 3 Although no
other suits had been filed against homeowners for alleged deed restriction
violations, the appellate court was satisfied that the record reflected that all
other disputes were resolved by voluntary compliance.484 With respect to the
homeowner's argument that the deed restrictions contained insufficient
guidelines, the court held that the ACC's disapproval was based upon the
fact that Encinosa's dock was "much larger in scale than the other structure
on the lake. ' 485 Thus, the appellate court implicitly found that "the look" of
the neighborhood constituted a sufficient criteria for the ACC's review of
dock construction plans. Although it was certainly a challenge for the court
to balance the free use of one's property with the collective aesthetic needs
of a deed restricted community, it seems that the court recognized that not
every conceivable construction request will be addressed through a written
covenant. The general character of the neighborhood can be used as a
legally valid basis by an architectural committee in reviewing construction
plans and requests.
477. Id.
478. Id. at 272.
479. Id.
480. Encinosa, 699 So. 2d at 272.
481. Id.
482. Id. at 272 (citing Killearn Acres Homeowners Ass'n v. Keever, 595 So. 2d 1019
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992)).
483. Encinosa, 699 So. 2d at 272.
484. Id.
485. Id. at 273.
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F. Various Tort Liabilities
Although most community associations are not for profit corporations
generally engaged in a cooperative effort to enable residents to provide for
each others' health, safety, and welfare, the Florida courts have nonetheless
applied premises liability duties to associations, which are similar to those of
a landlord in the landlord/tenant context.486 Lotto v. Point East Two
487Condominium Corp., involves a suit by a condominium resident, Mrs.
Lotto, who sued the association after "[s]he tripped and fell on a portion of
an exterior sidewalk which [was] cracked and partially uneven. 488 Mrs.
Lotto admitted that she had regularly "walked over [the] same stretch of
sidewalk" on many occasions. 9 The association acknowledged that the
sidewalk was cracked and deteriorated, but that it was not unreasonably
dangerous.490 "The association argued that it had no duty to warn [Mrs.
Lotto] of the condition of the sidewalk because [its] deteroirated condition
was obvious." 491 The trial court agreed with the association and entered
summary judgment in the association's favor.492
On appeal, the third district agreed with the trial court, holding that the
association did not have a duty to warn Mrs. Lotto.4 93 However, the court
went on to state that the obviousness of the condition did not relieve the
association of the duty to repair the sidewalk.494 Applying duties from the
Second Restatement of Torts relative to invitees, the court held that there
remained a factual issue as to "whether the association should anticipate"
that residents would use the sidewalk and thus encounter the cracked and
uneven concrete, "notwithstanding that the condition was obvious" and that
the invitee "would be harmed thereby. 495 Based upon the necessity of this
inquiry, the court concluded that summary judgment was not appropriate. 496
The court did note that Mrs. Lotto's familiarity with the condition of the
sidewalk, and "her decision to proceed to encounter the risk," would raise
the question of "whether she was comparatively negligent."
497
486. See, e.g., Czerwinski v. Sunrise Point Condominium, 540 So. 2d 199, 200-01
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
487. 702 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
488. Id. at 1361.
489. Id.
490. Id.
491. Id.
492. Lotto, 702 So. 2d at 1361.
493. Id. at 1362.
494. Id.
495. Id.
496. Id.
497. Lotto, 702 So. 2d at 1362.
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The case of The Ocean Ritz of Daytona Condominium v. G.G.V.
Associates, Ltd.,4 98 addresses the issue of "whether the economic loss rule
bars a negligence action in the context of a third-party beneficiary of a
professional consultant's contract when the plaintiff is seeking to recover
only economic [damages]. 499
The condominium association sued the developer, the engineering
company employed by the developer, and an architectural firm employed by
the engineering company "for economic damages resulting from the faulty
conversion of an apartment complex into a condominium project." 5" The
asserted liability of the consultant was based on "its alleged faulty inspection
and inaccurate disclosure and [the] report [it] prepared pursuant to its
contract with the engineering company." 5°I It was alleged that the report
was intended to meet the developer's obligation pursuant to section 718.616
of the Condominium Act, and that the report was therefore "intended to
inure to the benefit of the condominium [unit] purchasers." 502 "The trial
court granted summary judgment in favor of the consultant, holding that the
association's negligence action was barred by the economic loss rule."
503
In ultimately affirming the trial court's decision, the Fifth District Court
of Appeal engages in a thorough review of Florida's "economic loss rule"
case law. The court held that "purely economic expectations arising from
of the relationship between a condominium association and the parties
responsible for the construction of the condominium" are not the types of
interests intended to be protected by tort law. 505 Although this case is clearly
consistent with the progeny of "economic loss rule" cases, it is this writer's
opinion that the denial of a remedy to innocent and often unsophisticated
condominium home buyers is the single worst disservice done by Florida's
courts to Florida's community association citizens. As most succinctly
observed by former Chief Justice Barkett:
If the allegations of the homeowners in this case are true, their
homes are literally crumbling around them . . . . The courts,
including this one, have said "too bad." I find that answer
unacceptable in light of the principle underlying Florida's access to
498. 710 So. 2d 702 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
499. Id. at 702.
500. Id.
501. Id.
502. Id.
503. G.G.V. Assocs., 710 So. 2d at 702-03.
504. Id. at 703-05.
505. Id. at 704 (quoting Sandarac Ass'n, v. W.R. Frizzell Architects, Inc., 609 So. 2d
1349 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992)).
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courts provision: that absent compelling, countervailing public
policies, wrongs must have remedies.
50 6
One of the most common fears expressed by potential community
association volunteers is the exposure to personal liability. Fortunately, the
courts have once again emphasized that individual directors of condominium
associations cannot be held liable for a negligence action, even when such
actions were clearly wrong.5 7 One such case involved a suit by Mr. Perlow,
"individually and as the trustee for a group of condominium [unit]
owners... against two directors of the condominium association, [Mr.]
Goldberg and [Ms]. Leb." 508 "The alleged breach of fiduciary duty was the
directors' failure to properly administer insurance proceeds from Hurricane
Andrew." 50 9 In considering the interplay of the Condominium Act,510 the
Florida Business Corporation Act,511 and the Florida Not-for-Profit
Corporation Act,512 the court concluded that more than simple negligence
must be pled and proved before personal liability can be successfully
asserted against an association director.5 13 Fraud, criminal activity, and self-
dealing/unjust enrichment are the only situations in which a director of an
association may be held personally liable for his or her acts or omissions
emanating from service on the board. 4 The court distinguished B & J
Holding Corp v. Weiss, 515 "where the initial directors of a condominium
association were held individually liable for failure to collect maintenance
payments on unsold units."5 6  The court found that B & J was
distinguishable because that case involved self-dealing by a developer's
appointees to the board of directors in the form of the directors not collecting
assessments from the developer, to the detriment of the association, and
giving5 1 reater loyalty to the director's relationship to the development
entity.
506. Casa Clara Condominium Ass'n, v. Charlie Toppino & Sons, Inc., 620 So. 2d
1244, 1248 (Fla. 1993) (Barkett, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
507. See Perlow v. Goldberg, 700 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
508. Id. at 149.
509. Id.
510. FLA. STAT. § 718 (1997).
511. FLA. STAT. § 607 (1997).
512. FLA. STAT. § 617 (1997).
513. Perlow, 700 So. 2d at 149.
514. Id. at 150.
515. 353 So. 2d 141 (Fla. 3d. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
516. Perlow, 700 So. 2d at 150 (citing B & J Holding Corp. v. Weiss, 353 So. 2d 141
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977)).
517. Id.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This topic was last surveyed in 1996 by Rohan Kelley.' Although this
survey does include some material from late 1996, its main focus is on cases,
statutes, and rules from 1997 through the middle of 1998.
Once again, attorneys' fees and creditors' claims lead the list of the
most active topics. There was also a substantial amount of activity in the
homestead area. In addition, two 1998 cases on Florida's deadman's
statute,2 demonstrate the need for a legislative reform of this arcane statute.
Recent legislation and rule changes are addressed in separate sec-
tions. While the authors elected to discuss some of these changes in detail,
the majority of the changes are covered in a summary fashion. Finally, there
were a number of cases worthy of discussion, but which did not fit neatly
into any particular category. These cases are addressed under the heading
"Cases of Interest."
II. ATrORNEYS' FEES
Could it be true? Have we finally reached some semblance of stability
(and sanity) in the arena of attorney compensation? Over the past eight
years, Florida courts and the legislature have completely overhauled our
attorneys' fee statute on at least three separate occasions. After all of the
changes, we ended up, for the most part, exactly where we were when the
journey began; attorneys' fees are presumed reasonable if they are tied to a
certain percentage of the estate assets.4
This circuitous journey has, however, itself produced additional
problems for the practitioner. Practitioners have encountered three entirely
different methods for computing a "reasonable fee" in the 1990's: 1) the
1. Rohan Kelley, Trusts & Estates: 1996 Survey of Florida Law, 21 NOVA L. REV. 385
(1996). Mr. Kelley's survey addressed case law and statutory changes from 1994 through the
first half of 1996. Id.
2. FLA. STAT. § 90.602 (1997).
3. See FLA. STAT. § 733.6171 (1997); FLA. STAT. § 733.6171 (1995); FLA. STAT. §
733.6171 (1993).
4. See FLA. STAT. §§ 733.617, 733.6171 (1997).
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Supreme Court of Florida's 1991 decision in In re Estate of Platt;5 2) the
1993 version of section 733.6171 of the Florida Statutes;6 and 3) the 1995
version of section 733.6171 of the Florida Statutes.7 Each of these methods
is capable of producing substantially different amounts in attorneys' fees.8
Thus, one of the most important questions for the practitioner is which
statute governs the computation of fees for any particular estate.
The 1993 and 1995 statutes specifically provided that they were to ap-
ply to all estates which remained open as of the statute's effective
date.9 Almost immediately, however, these provisions providing for retroac-
tive application of the statute came under constitutional attack. 10 The
5. 586 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 1991). In Platt, the Supreme Court of Florida held that
attorneys' fees could not be computed as a percentage of the estate. Id. at 336-37. Instead, the
Platt court required that fees be computed using the hourly-based lodestar method set forth in
Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985). Platt, 586 So. 2d
at 336-37.
6. FLA. STAT. § 733.6171 (1993). The 1993 version of section 733.6171 provided for a
bifurcated computation of a "presumed reasonable" fee based on the sum of the following two
parts: a) the first part was tied to the liability or "risk" assumed by the attorney and was:
an amount equal to [two] percent of the inventory value of the estate assets
and the income earned by the estate during the administration and, if the
estate is required to file an estate tax return, an additional [one] percent on the
balance of the gross estate as finally determined for federal estate tax
purposes . . . [and b) the second part compensated] the attorney for the
professional time expended and was based upon the hourly based lodestar
method (similar to that in Platt).
Id. § 733.6171(3).
7. FLA. STAT. § 733.6171(3) (1995). The 1995 version of the statute, still in effect
today, provides for the computation of a "presumed... reasonable" fee for ordinary services
based upon a percentage of probate assets. Id. § 733.6171(3). The percentage varies depending
upon the size of the estate with a smaller actual percentage due for larger estates. Id.
8. See Kelley, supra note 1, at 390-400 for an excellent discussion of the changes in
the fee statutes throughout the 1990's.
9. FLA. STAT. § 733.6171(8) (1993) (providing that "[t]his section shall apply to
estates in which an order of discharge has not been entered prior to its effective date but not to
those estate in which attorneys' fees have previously been determined by order of [the] court after
notice"); FLA. STAT. § 733.6171(10) (1995) (providing for retroactive application with a
provision identical to the 1993 statute).
10. The Fifth District Court of Appeal was the first to address the issue in Williams
College v. Borne, 656 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995) ("Williams College 11") and
Williams College v. Borne, 670 So. 2d 1118 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996) ("Williams College
III"). The Williams College courts held that retroactive application of the statute would be
unconstitutional. See Williams College 11, 670 So. 2d at 1121. Without discussing Williams
College If or III, and without addressing the constitutionality of retroactive application, the
Fourth District Court of Appeal reached the opposite result in Bitterman v. Bitterman, 685 So. 2d
1998]
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Supreme Court of Florida ultimately addressed these constitutional issues in
Bitterman v. Bitterman."1
An abbreviated version of the facts of Bitterman is worth repeat-
ing. Stephen Bitterman, the decedent's son and co-personal representative,
raised objection to the administration of the estate at almost every
turn. 12 According to the fourth district, Stephen "either object[ed), or threat-
ened to object, to items such as his mother's petition for family allowances,
her continued use of an automobile titled in the decedent's name, her
petition for homestead ...to the home in which she was living, and her
retention of certain personal property."'13 Stephen also attempted to void
both his mother's and brother's gifts under the will. He became "intimately
involved with every detail" of the case.' 4 In fact, Stephen directed that all
correspondence and pleadings be sent to him for review. Moreover, a review
of his attorney's phone records showed over 350 calls between Stephen and
the firm. 15 Stephen took the liberty of calling his attorney at home, in his
car, and even while he was on vacation.16 After all of this, Stephen furiously
contested the fees for his attorney, and for the administrator ad litem who
was appointed to assist in the administration of the estate.
17
The issue before the Bitterman court was which statute would govern
the computation of fees.18 The attorneys in Bitterman commenced represen-
tation prior to the effective date of the 1993 statute.' 9 The attorneys argued
that their compensation was to be computed under the 1993 statute per
20
section 733.6171(8) of the Florida Statutes. The Bitterman court held that
retroactive application of the 1993 statute would be unconstitutional. 2' The
court reasoned that the attorneys' right to receive fees and the corresponding
obligation to pay those fees vests at the time the attorney begins his
representation of the estate, and that the Florida Legislature could not
retroactively enhance this substantive right or obligation by legislative
861, 866 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996). The Bitterman case was appealed to the Supreme Court
of Florida, setting the stage for one of the most important trust and estate decisions of 1998. Id.
11. 714 So. 2d 356 (Fla. 1998).
12. Id. at 358.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 360.
15. Id.
16. Bitterman, 714 So. 2d at 360.
17. Id. at 361.
18. Id. at 358.
19. Id. at 359.
20. Id. See also FA. STAT. § 733.6171(8) (1993).
21. Bittennan, 714 So. 2d at 364-65.
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enactment.22 Accordingly, the fees for the attorneys in Bitterman were to be
computed under the 1991 statute.23
For the practitioner, this means: 1) if representation was commenced
prior to October 1, 1993, fees are computed under Platt; 2) if representation
was commenced after October 1, 1993 but before July 1, 1995, fees are
computed under the 1993 version of section 733.6171 of the Florida
Statutes; and 3) if representation was commenced after July 1, 1995, fees are
computed under the 1995 version of section 733.6171 of the Florida
Statutes.24
Many commentators have focused as much on what the Bitterman court
did not say as what it did say. The Real Property, Probate, and Trust Law
Section of the Florida Bar filed an amicus brief with the Supreme Court of
Florida in support of retroactive application of the statute.25 The section's
apparent loss before the court, however, actually produced several smaller
victories. First, many attorneys were quick to point out that the court could
have struck down the entire statute and found that computing attorneys' fees
on the basis of a percentage of the estate was impermissible as explained in
Platt.26 By not striking down the statute as a whole or even discussing this
option, the court may have tacitly acknowledged the constitutionality of the
new statute and that fees can be computed as a percentage of the probate
estate.27 In addition, the Bitterman case may actually provide a windfall for
an attorney who commenced representation after the effective date of the
1993 statute but before the 1995 statute. The Bitterman case would place
the attorney under the 1993 statute that generally permits much higher fees.28
22. Id. at 364 (adopting and quoting extensively the fifth district's decision in Williams
College III). The Williams College III court (and consequently the Bitterman court) relied upon
the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Florida in Young v. Altenhouse, 472 So. 2d 1152 (Fla.
1985), which held that the right to attorneys' fees is governed by the statute in effect at the time a
cause of action accrues. Id. at 1154.
23. Bilterman, 714 So. 2d at 364.
24. See FLA. STAT. § 733.6171 (1995).
25. Bitterman, 714 So. 2d at 358.
26. 586 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 1991).
27. See, e.g., Robert Goldman, Bitterman v. Bitterman and Section Amicus Activity,
Remarks at 18th Annual Legislative Update and Recent Case Law Review of the Real Property,
Probate, and Trust Law Section of the Florida Bar (July 24, 1998).
28. Bittennan, 714 So. 2d at 364. This advantage, however, may be more theoretical
than real. As explained by Mr. Kelley in his 1996 survey of this topic, the bifurcated
computation produced by the 1993 statute was widely perceived by the bench, the media, and the
bar as resulting in grossly excessive fee. Kelley, supra note 1, at 395. In fact, most courts would
scoff at the notion of awarding a presumed reasonable fee under the 1993 statute.
1998]
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An additional intriguing aspect of the Bitterman case was the Supreme
Court of Florida's holding concerning the "inequitable conduct doctrine. 29
Surprisingly, neither the Bitterman nor the Williams College v. Borne30 case
arose in the context of the method of computing a reasonable fee. Rather,
the issue before both courts was whether the attorney for the personal
representative could recover fees for litigating over fees ("fees on fees")
pursuant to section 733.6171(7) of the Florida Statutes.31 The 1991 version
of the statute did not permit an attorney to recover fees on fees.32 Because
the attorneys in Bitterman commenced representation prior to the effective
date of the 1993 statute, the Bitterman court held that they were not entitled
to recover fees on fees under the statute.33
The Bitterman court nevertheless allowed recovery of fees on fees
based upon the "inequitable conduct" of Stephen Bitterman. 34 The court
held that "[t]he inequitable conduct doctrine permits the award of fees
[when] one party has exhibited egregious conduct or acted in bad faith. 35
The court noted that 'bad faith may be found not only in the actions that led
to the lawsuit, but also in the conduct of litigation,"' and that inequitable
conduct can be found when a party acts "vexatiously, wantonly, or for
oppressive reasons" or with "recalcitrance and callous attitude."
36
The standard of "recalcitrance" or "egregious conduct" is much
different than the standards we are accustomed to under section 57.105 of
the Florida Statutes, such as no "justiciable issue of either law or fact. 37
The Bitterman court specifically found that section 57.105 did not apply
because the arguments concerning retroactive application of the fee statutes
raised justiciable issues.38 In fact, Stephen Bitterman ultimately prevailed.39
29. See Bitterman, 714 So. 2d at 365.
30. 670 So. 2d 1118 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
31. See Williams College 11, 670 So. 2d at 1120-21; Bittennan, 714 So. 2d at 358,364.
See also FLA. STAT. § 733.6171(7).
32. See FLA. STAT. § 733.6171 (1991); See also In re Platt, 586 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 1991)
(noting that an attorney cannot recover fees on fees under the 1991 statute).
33. See Bitterman, 714 So. 2d at 364.
34. See id. at 365.
35. Id.
36. Id. (quoting Dogherra v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 679 So. 2d 1293, 1298 (9th Cir. 1982)
(citations omitted)).
37. FLA. STAT. § 57.105(1) (1997). Under section 57.105 of the Florida Statutes, fees
can only be awarded where there is "a complete absence of a justiciable issue of either law or fact
raised by the ... losing party." Bitterman, 714 So. 2d at 364-65 (quoting Whitten v. Progressive
Cas. Ins. Co., 410 So. 2d 501,505 (Fla. 1982)); see also FLA. STAT. § 57.105(1) (1997).
38. Bitterman, 714 So. 2d at 364-65 (noting that the uncertainty of the application of the
1993 changes was sufficient to place this Bitterman case outside of section 57.105).
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The court found, however, that Stephen's conduct during the course of the
administration of the estate and the fee dispute was "the type the conduct for
which the inequitable conduct doctrine was intended to apply. 40
The Bitterman court tempered its holding by noting that the doctrine is
"rarely applicable."4' However, the threat of attorneys' fees under
Bitterman's inequitable conduct doctrine should still prove to be a valuable
tool for any litigator, including a probate litigator faced with spurious estate
or trust litigation. Prior to Bitterman, there was generally little risk for a
recalcitrant will contestant, especially one who had his or her attorney on a
contingency fee, in continuing with litigation in the hopes of extracting a
settlement. The chance of a beneficiary being charged with fees individ-
ually, beyond his or her share of the estate,42 under section 57.105 is remote
because will contests almost always raise justiciable issues of fact.43 The
inequitable conduct doctrine should, at the very least, provide another
"arrow in the quiver" of personal representatives who are forced to defend
groundless litigation.
The issue of "fees on fees" also arose in other contexts over the past
year. In In re Estate of Good,44 the attorney for the personal representative
hired a law firm to litigate the reasonableness of his attorneys' fees.45 The
issue before the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Good was whether the
law firm representing the personal representative's attorney could recover its
fees from the estate.4 The Good court held that the attorney for the attorney
for the personal representative could not recover fees under section
733.6171(7) of the Florida Statutes.47 The court reasoned that "the scenario
could be extended to an absurd degree in that the attorney for the personal
39. Id. at 364.
40. Id. at 365.
41. See i.
42. It is well-settled that a beneficiary's share of the estate can be charged with attorneys'
fees under section 733.106(4) of the Florida Statutes, which provides "the court may, in its
discretion, [determine] from what part of the estate [fees] shall be paid." See FLA. STAT. §
733.106(4) (1997).
43. See, e.g., Williams v. King, 711 So. 2d 1285, 1286 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998)
(holding that beneficiary shouldn't have been charged for fees individually under section 57.105
even though the trial court found her claims "frivolous and without merit" because "there was
some small... basis to file the suit in good faith").
44. 696 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
45. Id. at 877.
46. Il
47. Id. at 877-78. See also FLA. STA. § 733.6171(7) (1997).
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representative's attorney could hire a third law firm to litigate over the
reasonableness of its fees. 48
In so holding, the Good court itself may have created an absurd
dichotomy. According to the court, if the attorney for the personal
representative represents himself and litigates to recover fees, the attorney
can recover his litigation fees from the estate under section 733.6171(7) of
the Florida Statutes.49 However, if the attorney hires another lawyer to
proceed with that same litigation, the attorney is forced to pay the attorneys
fees out of his own pocket. This is true regardless of the fact that the fees
could be the same in either case.
In Zepeda v. Klein,50 the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that an
51
attorney could not recover fees on fees in a guardianship case. Section
744.108(1) of the Florida Statutes allows an attorney to recover fees for
"services rendered.., on behalf of the ward. ' 2 The court reasoned that in a
contested fee hearing the interests of the attorney and the ward are adverse.
53
The court also relied upon the Platt case, which had held that the 1991
version of probate statute did not permit an attorney to recover for time
obtaining a fee award. 54
Most practitioners are familiar with the concept that an attorney who
provides a benefit to the estate is entitled to recover fees from the estate.
This concept is codified in section 733.106 of the Florida Statutes.5" In In re
56Estate of Paris, the question before the second district was whether the
attorney for an interested person was required to plead entitlement to
attorneys' fees in his initial pleading filed with the court, or at the very least
prior to trial.57 The attorney in Paris had successfully litigated a will contest
to conclusion, but failed to request attorneys' fees in his response to the
petition for administration. In denying fees from the estate, the trial court
held that the Supreme Court of Florida's decision in Stockman v. Downs
58
required the request for attorneys' fees to be pled.59  The Paris court
48. Id. at 877.
49. See Hurley, 480 So. 2d at 877; see also FLA. STAT. § 733.6171(8) (1997).
50. 698 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
51. Id. at330.
52. FLA. STAT. § 744.108(1) (1997).
53. Zepeda, 698 So. 2d at 330.
54. Id.
55. See FLA. STAT. § 733.106(3) (1997).
56. 699 So. 2d 301 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
57. Id. at 302.
58. 573 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 1991).
59. Paris, 699 So. 2d at 302.
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reversed, holding that section 733.106 allows the attorney to apply for fees at
any time during the pendency of the estate.6 Accordingly, the attorney
could petition for fees after the will contest had ended.
61
What may come as surprise to some is that the "benefit to the estate"
concept does not necessarily carry over into trust law. In Frymer v.
Brettschneider,62 a trust beneficiary sought to recover attorney's fees and
costs from trust assets for successfully defending the validity of a
trust.63 The trial court allowed the beneficiary to recover her fees from the
trust under section 737.402(2)(u) of the Florida Statutes, which provides:
"[u]nless otherwise provided in the trust instrument, a trustee has
the power... [t]o pay taxes, assessments, compensation of the trustee, and
other expenses incurred in the collection, care, administration, and
protection of the trust." 64
The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed. Relying on principles
of statutory construction, the court found that section 737.402(2)(u) applied
only to expenses incurred by a trustee. 66 The court reasoned that if the
legislature had intended a beneficiary to recover his or her attorney's fees
after upholding the validity, they could have so provided.6 7
The Frymer court also refused to allow the beneficiary to recover under
the "common fund" rule, holding that she did not satisfy all of the elements
of the rule.6 The common fund rule requires that a "class," who did notcontribute to the lawsuit, "receive substantial benefits as a result of the
60. See id. The court relied upon its prior decision in Carmen v. Gilbert, 615 So. 2d.
701 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
61. See Paris, 699 So. 2d at 302 (citing Stockman v. Downs, 573 So. 2d 835 (Fla.
1991)).
62. 710 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
63. Id. at 11.
64. Id. at 11-12.
65. Id. at 12.
66. l
67. Frymer, 710 So. 2d at 12.
68. Id. at .13. The common fund rule generally permits the award of fees from a fund or
estate which has been benefitted by the rendering of legal services. See generally Hurley v.
Slingerland, 480 So. 2d 104, 107 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985). There are five prerequisites
which must be met: a) the existence of a fund over which the court has jurisdiction and from
which fees can be awarded; b) the commencement of litigation by one party which is terminated
successfully; c) the existence of a class which received, without otherwise contributing to the
lawsuit, substantial benefits as a result of the litigation; d) the creation, preservation, protection,
or increase of the fund as a direct and proximate result of the efforts of counsel for that party; and
e) a reasonable relationship between the benefit established and the fees incurred. Id. at 107-08.
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litigation.,,69 The Frymer court found that the only beneficiary benefitted by
the litigation was the beneficiary who defended the suit.
70
Another recent case shows that not every attorney, rendering a benefit
to an estate, is entitled to recover fees from a probate estate under section
733.106 of the Florida Statutes.7' In Suntrust Bank v. Nichols, 72 the Fifth
District Court of Appeal refused to award fees to the attorney for the
decedent's court-appointed guardian after the guardian successfully
petitioned the court for revocation of a prior will and had a second will
admitted to probate.73 The court found that the guardian was an "interloper"
in the estate case because he did not have an interest in the outcome and
therefore was not an "interested person" under sections 731.201(21) 74 and
733.109(1) 75 of the Florida Statutes.76 The Nichols court also refused to
award fees to the guardian's attorney for work performed on behalf of the
guardian, which was tainted with a conflict of interest.77
This conflict of interest aspect of the Nichols holding was consistent
with another 1997 case, In re Estate of Montanez.78 In Montanez, the court
reversed a fee award to an attorney who had represented a personal
representative which the court found was not qualified to serve and had
engaged in a conflict of interest transaction with the estate.79 The personal
representative in Montanez was the decedent's professional guardian. 80 The
guardian was not a trust company, a banking corporation, savings
association, or Savings and Loan and therefore was not qualified to serve
under sections 733.305 and 660.41 of the Florida Statutes.81  More
importantly, the guardian had a conflict of interest in that the decedent's
estate had a potential claim against the guardian and the decedent's nursing
69. Frymer, 710 So. 2d at 12 (citing GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR
BOGERT, THE LAW OFTRUSTs & TRUSTEES § 972 (2d ed. 1983)).
70. Id. at 12.
71. Suntrust Bank v. Nichols, 701 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 109-10.
74. FLA. STAT. § 731.201(21) (1997). "Interested Person" is defined generally to mean
"any person who may reasonably be expected to be affected by the outcome of the particular
proceeding involved." Id.
75. FLA. STAT. § 733.109(1) (1997). Section 733.109 provides in relevant part that "any
interested person... may... petition the court... for revocation of probate." Id.
76. Nichols, 701 So. 2d at 109-10.
77. Id. at 108.
78. 687 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
79. Id. at 946-47.
80. Id. at 945.
81. Id. at 946.
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home for neglect. The guardian entered into a settlement releasing itself
and the nursing home from liability on this claim.83 In a scathing opinion
directed to the guardian's attorney, the court found that neither the attorney
nor the guardian could recover any fees for their voidable acts.84
In Teague v. Hoskins,85 the Supreme Court of Florida addressed the
statutory priority of attorneys' fees in a situation where the assets of the
estate are insufficient to pay all of the claims of creditors. 86 The question
certified from the lower court was:
ARE ATTORNEY'S FEES ASSESSED AGAINST THE PER-
SONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF AN ESTATE AN EXPENSE
OF ADMINISTRATION AND THUS CLASS 1 PRIORITY OR
ARE THEY "OTHER CLAIMS" GRANTING THEM CLASS 8
STATUS? 7
In Teague, the personal representative brought an action against a
guardian for a beneficiary, alleging that the guardian breached a contract
with the estate to waive the beneficiary's rights to homestead and elective
share.88 "The personal representative rejected an offer of judgement... to
resolve the action" and ultimately lost at trial.89 The guardian was awarded
attorneys' fees under the offer of judgment statute.90 The trial court and
district court held that the guardian's attorney's fees were a Class eight
priority under section 733.707 of the Florida Statutes.91 The Supreme Court
of Florida reversed.92 The court found that the fees were generated because
of "the affirmative action of the personal representative" and were thereford
"entitled to inclusion in Class one [as] costs and expenses of
administration." 93
82. Id. at 945-46.
83. Montanez, 687 So. 2d at 945-46.
84. Id. at 947 (noting that the attorneys, "better than anyone else, knew or should have
known that the personal representative's attempt to settle the creditor's claim was self-dealing,
and created an inherent conflict.").
85. 709 So. 2d 1373 (Fla. 1998).
86 Id. at 1374.
87. Id. at 1373.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1374.
90. Teague, 709 So. 2d. at 1374.
91. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 733.707 (1997).
92. See Teague, 709 So. 2d at 1374.
93. Id- at 1374-75.
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The Teague court noted that if the "personal representative exceeded
[its] authority in bringing the action or in rejecting the offer of judgment,
then the trial court should surcharge the personal representative, not deny
Class 1 priority status to the obligation."94 The court also distinguished the
Teague case from cases in which a third party prevails on a claim against the
estate predicated on the decedent's liability. 5 In those cases, fees of the
third party remain Class eight status because they are not generated by
affirmative action of the personal representative.
96
The final case in this section should serve as reminder to all probate
attorneys to draft their fee agreements carefully. In Brooks v. Degler,97 the
attorney had a signed contingency fee agreement with an estate beneficiary
in a will contest. 98  The agreement provided that the attorney would
represent the beneficiary "in a claim for damages" against the personal
representative and other estate beneficiaries. 99 The attorney was successful
in getting the "will admitted to probate and [his client] appointed as personal
representative."' 10 The court held, however, that the attorney was not
entitled to recover fees under the contingency agreement. 101 The court
reasoned that the fee agreement only applied to "a claim for damages" and
recovery from that claim. 0 2  Although the attorney was successful "in
getting the will admitted to probate and [his client] appointed personal
representative; [a] claim for damages [never] materialized." 1 3 However, the
attorney was permitted to recover fees under section 733.106.104
III. CREDITORS' CLAIMS
During the past ten years, there has been quite a bit of activity in the
area of creditors' claims. The 1997 case of United States Trust Co. of
94. Id. at 1375.
95. Id. at 1374.
96. Id.
97. 712 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
98. Id at 420.
99. Id. (emphasis omitted).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 421. The actual issue in Brooks was whether the attorney was entitled to
recover fees from the estate under section 733.106 and then again from his client under the terms
of his fee agreement (i.e., double-dip). Brooks, 712 So. 2d at 420-21. The Court never
addressed this issue, finding instead that the contract was invalid. Id.
102. Id. at421.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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Florida Savings Bank v. Haig, °5 continued this trend and seems to be a
mixed bag for the probate practitioner.1 6 It appears that the Haig case may
have raised more questions about creditors' claims than it answered.
Prior to the 1988 United States Supreme Court decision in Tulsa
Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope,1°7 it was generally accepted
among most states, 08 and certainly well-settled in Florida,10 9 that notice by
publication barred the claims of known creditors if such claims were filed
later than the time period allowed by section 733.702 of the Florida
Statutes."0 The Supreme Court's decision in Pope was a substantial change
in the law with regard to creditors' claims. The Pope court held that if a
creditor's identity is "known or reasonably ascertainable" by the personal
representative, due process requires that the creditor be given notice by mail
or such other means which will ensure actual notice of the claims period."'
As a result of the Pope decision, Florida's rules and statutes were
revised to comply with the due process requirements mandated by the
Supreme Court. 112 Unfortunately, both Pope and Florida's rules and statutes
left us with many unanswered questions. For example, what is a "reasonably
ascertainable" creditor under section 733.212(4)(a) of the Florida Statutes?
Is an individual with a judgment recorded in the public records of the
decedent's home county a "reasonably ascertainable" creditor? What is a
"diligent search" for creditors as required by section 733.212(4)(a)? What
would constitute an "impractical and extended" search for creditors, which is
not required of the personal representative under section 733.212(4)(a)?
105. 694 So. 2d 769 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
106. Id. at 770.
107. 485 U.S. 478 (1988).
108. See David T. Smith & Robert M. Winick, Known or Ascertainable Estate Creditors:
The Pope Decision, FLA. B. J. 66 ( Oct. 1988).
109. See Public Health Trust v. Estate of Jara, 521 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1988); Coley v. Estate of Odom, 500 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 1st Dist. CL App. 1986). After Pope, a
new opinion was issued in Jara, finding notice by publication to known creditors was
constitutionally insufficient. Public Health Trust v. Estate of Jam, 526 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1988).
110. See Smith, supra note 108, at 66.
111. Pope, 485 U.S. at491.
112. See In re Rules of Probate and Guardianship Procedure, 537 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 1988);
Estate of Gleason v. Gleason, 631 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994); In re Estate of Hill,
582 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991). For example, section 733.212(4)(a) of the Florida
Statutes includes a requirement for a "diligent search" for "reasonably ascertainable" creditors.
See also In re Estate of Puzzo, 637 So. 2d 26, 29 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (relying on Pope,
and now requires that all known creditors actually be served with a copy of the Notice of
Administration before the claims period to begin to run as to that creditor).
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The Fourth District Court of Appeal of Florida attempted to answerS• 113
some of these questions in the Haig opinion. In Haig, the decedent sold a
house and provided the purchaser with a written guarantee that "a portion of
the house would be free of leaks and cracks." ' 14 The house did, in fact, leak
and the purchaser attempted to make a claim against the decedent's estate
but missed the claims period by eight days. 15 Finding that the purchasers
were "reasonably ascertainable creditors," the trial court granted their
petition to extend time to file a claim in the estate.! 6 The Fourth District
reversed, and in doing so, attempted to provide some guidance to
practitioners who remained confounded by some of Pope's unanswered
questions. 17
The district court held that because "contingent" or "conjectural"
claimants are not "ascertainable" creditors, Pope does not require that they
receive actual notice of the claims period.1 8 The court defined a "contingent
claim"e as "'one where the liability depends upon some future event, which
may or may not happen, which renders it uncertain whether there will ever
be a liability.""' 19
The Haig court commented on the search for creditors required of the
personal representative under section 733.212(4)(a) of the Florida Statutes,
by quoting with approval the case of Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co.,"' which stated: '[n]or do we consider it unreasonable for the
State to dispense with more certain notice to those beneficiaries whose
interests are either conjectural or future or, although they could be
discovered upon investigation, do not in due course of business come to the
knowledge of the common truste.' '. 2.
Although its language is far from clear, it is the opinion of the authors
that Haig represents a small but significant retreat from Pope and could
prove extremely troublesome to contingent creditors, especially to
113. United States Trust Co. of Florida Sav. Bank v. Haig, 694 So. 2d 769 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1997).
114. Id. at 770.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.at770-71.
118. Haig, 694 So. 2d at 771 (citing Tulsa Professional Collection Servs. Inc. v. Pope,
485 U.S. 478 (1988)).
119. Id. (citing Fowler v. Hartridge, 24 So. 2d 306,309 (1945) (citations omitted)).
120. 339 U. S. 306, 317 (1950).
121. Haig, 694 So. 2d at 771 (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,
339 U.S. 306, 317 (1950)). See also Jones v. SunBank/Miami, N.A., 609 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1992).
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individuals or entities such as lenders, who rely on guarantees. For example,
assume a bank loaned money to "A" relying upon the guarantee of "B." If
"B" dies while "A" is current on the loan, "B's" guarantee is only a
contingent liability. Thus, when "B" dies, the bank is only entitled to
publication notice of the creditor's period. Therefore, if the bank is untimely
in filing its claim, it may be barred from seeking relief against the decedent's
estate based exclusively upon the published notice.
Solutions to this new dilemma are far from simple. Perhaps after Haig,
lenders, or those relying upon guarantees, will be required to define a
guarantor's death as an event of default under the note, which would require
the borrower either to pay off the loan or secure a new guarantor.
The final, and probably most disturbing consequence of Haig, is that it
may encourage a personal representative to avoid providing actual notice to
certain creditors other than what little, if any, notice they receive from
publication. 22 This is especially true for personal representatives who are
also beneficiaries of the estate. This case should certainly put contingent
creditors on notice that a lack of vigilance may now prove fatal to their
collection efforts.
IV. WILLS
The only place to start any discussion on the recent law relating to wills
is the case of Raimi v. Furlong.123 This case should be in the law files of
every probate practitioner. The Raimi case is an excellent source of
authority for Florida law on undue influence, testamentary capacity and civil
conspiracy.124 In addition, this case is a "must read" for anyone concerned
with liability issues relating to banks or trust companies.
The essential facts of Raimi are as follows. The decedent, Evelyn
Gruber, died on March 3, 1995. 12 Her nephew, Manuel Rainii, filed a
petition for administration over her last will ("Raimi Will"). 126  The
decedent's stepdaughter, Estelle Furlong ("Furlong"), filed a separate
petition for administration seeking to admit an earlier will to probate.127 In
addition, Furlong filed a petition to set aside the Raimi Will on the grounds
122. Haig, 694 So. 2d at 771.
123. 702 So. 2d 1273 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (known to some as the "Evelyn
Gruber" case).
124. This article will not specifically address the civil conspiracy issue.
125. Raimi, 702 So. 2d at 1283.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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of undue influence, duress, and lack of testamentary capacity.' 8 In her
petition, Furlong alleged that the Raimi Will was the product of a conspiracy
between some of the decedent's relatives, Sun Bank/Miami and certain
employees of Sun Bank.
129
In a surprising opinion, the trial court declined to admit the Raimi Will
to probate, finding that it was procured by the undue influence of Manuel
Raimi and that the decedent lacked testamentary capacity. 130 In addition, the
trial court found that a "reprehensible conspiracy" had been formed
"between the decedent's relatives, Sun Bank/Miami and certain Sun Bank
employees.' 3 1 The trial court also ruled that the bank was "negligent in its
hiring, training, retention and supervision of [some of] its
employees."' 132 Based on the foregoing, the court entered judgment against
all defendants, jointly and severally, in the amount of $1,533,689.55. 13 The
court further assessed punitive damages against Sun Bank in the amount of
$4,500,000, against Manuel Raimi in the amount of $2,000,000 and against
two Sun Bank employees in the amount of $1,000,000 each. 34 In what was
surely a relief to the banking industry, as well as to all of the defendants, the
appellate court reversed on all counts. 35
In the Raimi opinion, the Third District Court of Appeal provided an• , 136
excellent recitation of Florida law on undue influence, even though it did
not really reveal any new law in this area. The court provided a good
definition of undue influence, 137 outlined the elements that must be
established to raise a presumption of undue influence,' 38 including a list of
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Raimi, 702 So. 2d at 1283.
131. Id. at 1284.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Raimi, 702 So. 2d at 1285 (as to judgments against defendants); id. at 1285 (as to the
will contest); id. at 1286 (as to testamentary capacity); id. at 1288 (as to undue influence).
136. Id. at 1286-87.
137. Raimi, 702 So. 2d at 1287 (stating that "[i]nfluence must amount to over persuasion,
duress, force, coercion, or artful or fraudulent contrivances to such an extent that there is a
destruction of free agency and will power of the testator"). See also In re Estate of Carpenter,
253 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 1971); Estate of Brock, 692 So. 2d 907 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996); In re
Estate of Dunson, 141 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (stating mere affection, kindness,
or attachment of one person for another does not itself constitute undue influence).
138. Raimi, 702 So. 2d at 1287. The elements are: 1) "a substantial beneficiary under the
will;" 2) "occupied a confidential relationship with the testator;" and 3) "was active in procuring
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factors for a court's consideration with regard to the element of "active
procurement,"' 139 explained the shifting of the burden to come forward with
evidence' 4" and restated the standard of proof in an undue influence case.
14 1
The court also noted that any undue influence, which may have been used to
procure earlier wills is wholly irrelevant on the issue of whether a
subsequent will is also the product of undue influence. 42
On the subject of testamentary capacity, the court gave every defendant
in a will contest a great statement of Florida public policy1 43 and a good
definition of testamentary capacity, also known as "sound mind."' 44 This
case is a strong reminder that the legal standard for testamentary capacity is
surprisingly low. As the court pointed out, even an insane person may
execute a valid will during a lucid interval. 45 In fact, the court stated that
"[a] testator may still have testamentary capacity to execute a valid will even
though he may frequently be intoxicated, use narcotics, have an enfeebled
mind, failing memory, [or] vacillating judgment."1'4 For those who practice
in the estate area, it is significant to note the court's statement that
the contested will." See In re Estate of Carpenter, 253 So. 2d at 701; Estate of Brock, 692 So. 2d
at 911; Elson v. Vargas, 520 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
139. Raimi, 702 So. 2d at 1207. The court listed the following non-exclusive list of
factors:
a) presence of the beneficiary at the execution of the will; b) presence of the
beneficiary on those occasions when the testator expressed a desire to make a
will; c) recommendation by the beneficiary of an attorney to draw the will; d)
knowledge of the contents of the will by the beneficiary prior to execution; e)
giving of instructions on preparation of the will by the beneficiary to the
attorney drawing the will; f) securing of witnesses to the will by the
beneficiary; and g) safekeeping of the will by the beneficiary subsequent to
execution.
Id. at 1287.
140. Id.
141. Id. The contestant must establish undue influence by a preponderance of the
evidence. Id. (citing Tarsagian v. Watt, 402 So. 2d 471 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981)).
142. Raimi, 702 So. 2d at 1287-88 n.13.
143. Id. at 1286. "It has long been emphasized that the right to dispose of one's property
by will is highly valuable and it is the policy of the law to hold a last will and testament good
wherever possible." Id.
144. Id. To execute a valid will, the testator need only have "the ability to mentally
understand in a general way (1) the nature and extent of the property to be disposed of, (2) the
testator's relation to those who would naturally claim a substantial benefit from his will, and (3) a
general understanding of the practical effect of the will as executed." Id.
145. Raini, 702 So. 2d at 1286.
146. Id. (quoting In re Estate of Weihe, 268 So. 2d 446, 448 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1972)).
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testamentary capacity is determined solely by the testator's mental state at
the time the will was executed.'47
Finally, two other points from the Raimi case are of particular
significance. First, the third district determined that the evidence of the
decedent's incapacity was insufficient as a matter of law. 48 Specifically,
tie court found that the neurologist's testimony was insufficient as a matter
of law to establish the decedent's incapacity because the neurologist could
not offer any opinion as to the decedent's testamentary capacity at any given
time nor did he "allow for the possibility of the decedent having a lucid
interval."'
149
The second point of particular interest is the trial court's ruling as to
Sun Bank. Although the appellate court reversed the judgment against Sun
Bank, it did so on a technicality' 50 without addressing the substantive merits
of the claims against them. This case should be a wake-up call to those who
are concerned with fiduciary liability issues relating to banks and trust
companies doing business in Florida. Perhaps this case was an anomaly, but
it is now in the Reporters and definitely worthy of consideration.
Another case from the Third District Court of Appeal, American Red
151 . . 152Cross v. Estate of Haynsworth,l5l is instructive on two points. First, it is a
good example of the proper use of partial revocation under section 732.5165
of the Florida Statutes. Second, it provides guidance as to the burden of
proof in testamentary capacity cases involving a will executed after a
judicial determination of incapacity.153
The decedent, John Haynsworth, Jr., executed three wills in 1993: the
first in February, the second in July, and the third in November. 54 On July
31, 1993, a probate judge entered an order, nunc pro tunc to May 18, 1993,
which adjudicated Mr. Haynsworth totally incapacitated.' After Mr.
Haynsworth's death on December 29, 1995, competing petitions for
administration were filed by his relatives seeking to probate his February
will and his July will.'
56
147. Id. See also Coppock v. Carlson, 547 So. 2d 946, 947 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
148. Raimi, 702 So. 2d at 1286.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1285. The judgment against Sun Bank was reversed based on a finding that
the claims of negligent hiring, retention and supervision were never pled or tried by consent. Id.
151. 708 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
152. Id. at 603-04.
153. Id. at 604.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Haynsworth, 708 So. 2d at 604.
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The trial court found the February will invalid as a result of undue
influence 1 7 and the November will invalid because the decedent lacked the
testamentary capacity to execute that will.158 Thus, the trial court admitted
the July will to probate.
15 9
The appellate court answered three questions in disposing of this
case: "(1) what is required to establish testamentary capacity in the presence
of a prior adjudication of incompetency, (2) what party bears the burden of
demonstrating testamentary capacity . . . and, (3) if one part of a will is
invalid as the product of undue influence, is the entire will rendered
void?"' 0
As to testamentary capacity, the court set forth its definition,' 61 and then
found an adjudication of incapacity creates a presumption of a lack of
testamentary capacity as to any will executed during the period of such
adjudication, but such presumption may be overcome by proof that the will
was executed during a lucid interval. 162
As to the question of the burden of proof, the court held that "an
adjudication of incompetency shifts the burden of going forward with the
evidence on testamentary capacity to the proponent of the will.' ' 163 Finally,
as to the issue of partial invalidity, the court held that a finding that a portion
of a will is invalid, should not render the entire document void.1
64
Three other 1997 cases deserve a brief discussion. In Larkin v.
Pirthauer,16s the fourth district held that under Rule 4-3.7 of the RulesRegulating The Florida Bar, an attorney who prepared and witnessed a
157. Id. at 605. The trial court invalidated the February will based on a fee award under
the will to the decedent's attorney of approximately five percent of the estate, which the court
determined was obtained by the undue influence of the attorney. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Haynsworth, 708 So. 2d at 605.
161. Id. The court used the same definition of testamentary capacity as the Raimi court.
Rami v. Furlong, 702 So. 2d 1273 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
162. Haynsworth, 708 So. 2d at 606. The court defined "lucid moment" to be "a period
of time during which the testator returned to a state of comprehension and possessed actual
testamentary capacity." Id.
163. Id. (quoting In re Estate of Ziy, 223 So. 2d 42, 43 (Fla. 1969)). Although an
individual declared incapacitated may execute a valid will, an adjudication of incapacity creates a
prima facie case against the proponent of the will. Id.
164. Id. See also Fla. STAT. § 732.5165. The assets ineffectively disposed of by the
invalid portion of the will would pass either through the residuary clause or, if there is no
residuary clause, by intestacy. Haynsworth, 708 So. 2d at 606. See also FLA. STAT. § 732.604
(1995) (failure of testamentary provisions) and FLA. STAT. § 732.101 (1997) ("intestate estate").
165. 700 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
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contested will, may not represent the personal representative in the litigation
aspects of the will contest. 66 Although the attorney was disqualified with
regard to the litigation, the court held that rule 4-3.7 did not disqualify the
lawyer from representing the personal representative with regard to other
matters pertaining to the administration of the estate.1 67
The second case, Sun Trust Bank, Nature Coast v. Nichols,' involved
aspects of both probate and guardianship law. 6 9 In the Nichols case, John
Jones was the court-appointed guardian for Donald Nichols. 170  After
Nichols' death, his daughter-in-law submitted Nichols' purported last will
for probate. Jones filed a petition to revoke the will and submitted a
second will for probate. 72 The trial court revoked probate of the first will
and admitted the will submitted by Jones to probate. 73 Jones requested
attorneys' fees from the court, arguing that he benefited the estate by
submitting the proper will for probate.
74
The fifth district held that because the ward, Nichols, was deceased at
the time the guardian, Jones, sought to revoke probate of the first will, Jones
was an interloper in the estate case.1 75 The court stated that Jones did not
have standing to contest the will under section 733.109(1)176 or section
731.201(21) of the Florida Statutes. 77 As an "interloper" in the estate case,
in which he had no standing, Jones was not entitled to attorneys' fees.
7 8
166. Id. at 183. The court's ruling was based on the fact that rule 4-3.7 generally
prohibits attorneys from being advocates at trials where they may be witnesses on substantive
matters. Id.
167. Id.
168. 701 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997). See infra Part I for further discussion
of this case.
169. See id.
170. Id. at 107.
171. Id. at 109.
172. Id.
173. Nichols, 701 So. 2d at 109.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 109-10.
176. Id. at 110. Section 733.109(1) of the Florida Statutes states that any interested
person may petition the court in which a will is admitted for probate for revocation of probate.
FLA. STAT. § 733.109(1) (1997).
177. Nichols, 701 So. 2d at 109-10. Section 731.201(21) of the Florida Statutes defines
"interested person" as "any person who may reasonably be expected to be affected by the
outcome of a particular proceeding involved." FLA. STAT. § 731.201(21) (1997).
178. Nichols, 701 So. 2d at 110.
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The final case in this section, Kelsey v. Pewthers, 79 deals with the
remedy for a breach of a contract to make a will.1 80 This case is unique
because the court had to fashion a remedy against a promisor who was still
alive. Florida law clearly allows individuals to make contracts which set
forth how their assets will pass upon their death. 181 In addition, Florida case
law had already established that under the circumstances involving mutual
promises to make a will while both promisors were still alive, either of them
could rescind the contract by revoking his or her will, or making a different
disposition of their property after providing proper notice to the other
party. 1 2 The Kelsey case provides a new twist in Florida law because the
plaintiffs had provided independent consideration for the contract, not just a
simple promise to make a reciprocal will. Thus, the Fourth District Court of
Appeal found that the plaintiffs had a viable cause of action for, breach of
contract against the promisor upon her repudiation of the contract.
The promisor, Floraine Kelsey, was a ninety-one year old widow when
she entered into a contract to make a will with her nephew, Troy Pewthers,
and his wife, Martha. 183 Under the contract, the Pewthers were required to
take care of Kelsey for the remainder of her life and as their sole
compensation, the Pewthers were entitled to receive all of the real and
184personal property owned by Kelsey at the time of her death. The Pewthers
provided services to Kelsey for sixteen months, after which Kelsey
terminated the relationship.
185
Finding that Kelsey had breached her contract with the Pewthers, the
trial court awarded the Pewthers damages against Kelsey in the amount of
$242,000 plus prejudgment interest of $37,267.20. 186 The amount of the
damage award, which was based on a "benefit of the bargain" theory,
actually exceeded the amount of Kelsey's total assets as of the date of the
judgment. 187 The appellate court reversed the portion of the trial court
179. 685 So. 2d 953 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
180. Id. at 953.
181. See FLA. STAT. § 732.701 (1997). For an excellent discussion of contracts to make a
will, see DAVID T. SMrrH, FLORIDA PROBATE CODEMANUAL, Ch. 2, at 49 (1998).
182. See Boyle v. Schmitt, 602 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Smith, supra
note 181, at49.
183. Kelsey, 685 So. 2d at 954.
184. Id.
185. Id. Kelsey called her daughter at 5:30 a.m. and told her she was afraid that Troy
Pewther was trying to kill her. Id.
186. Id. at 955.
187. Kelsey, 685 So. 2d at 955. Thejudgment amount was comprised of the present value
of the Pewthers's expected inheritance from Kelsey, as estimated by the Pewther's expert, plus
19981
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judgment relating to contract damages and took on the difficult task of
fashioning an appropriate remedy for the promisor's breach.188 Given the
language of the contract and the fact that the case involved a living promisor,
the court determined that a benefit of the bargain damages were not available
to the plaintiffs.
189
There were several reasons for the court's decision. First, because the
contract did not involve specific property but only property "owned by
Kelsey at the time of her death," the property to which the plaintiff had a
claim could not be identified until the promisor's death. 19° Second, the
promisor may have no property left at her death. 91  Finally, a living
promisor is entitled to the full, unrestricted, use of her property during her
lifetime as long as that use does not constitute a fraud on her agreement.
192
Under the circumstances of this case, the court held that the appropriate
measure of damages was either quantum meruit during the promisor's life or
the imposition of a constructive trust on the promisor's property, allowing
full and unrestricted use on such property during her lifetime, absent proof
of fraud.'
93
V. HOMESTEAD
During the past two years, the Florida courts were moderately active in
the area of homestead law. In the most interesting case, Snyder v. Davis,'
94
the Supreme Court of Florida may even have engaged in a bit of legislating
from the bench. 195 Florida attorneys practicing in the area of estate planning
would be well-advised to review the Snyder case. The three cases we will
address in this section deal with the constitutional protections provided to
Florida homestead. The Florida Constitution protects homestead property in
three ways: 1) Article VII, section 6 provides the homestead with an
exemption from property taxes; 2) Article X, sections 4(a) and (b) protect
several lifetime gifts, less an adjustment for a ten percent life interest to Kelsey's daughter, as
required by the contract. Id. The judge failed to account for the costs of litigation and certain
other of Kelsey's expenses. Id.
188. Id. at956-57.
189. Id. at 956.
190. Kelsey, 685 So. 2d at 954-55.
191. Id. at 955.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 956.
194. 699 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 1997).
195. Id. at 1007 (Harding, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Justice Harding accused the
majority of "creating law, which is more properly the office of the legislature." Id.
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the homestead from forced sale by creditors; and 3) Article X, section 4(c)
sets forth the restrictions upon a homestead owner's right to devise
homestead property.1
96
In the case of Knadle v. Estate of Knadle,19 7 the First District Court of
Appeal provided a clear, albeit harsh, reminder that in order to avail oneself
of the homestead protections provided by Article X, section 4 of the Florida
Constitution, one must closely adhere to the law regarding the devise of
homestead property. 198 The decedent, Evangeline Knadle, died testate at age
eighty survived by two adult children, no spouse and no minor children. 99
Her will directed her personal representative to sell her homestead and add
the net proceeds from the sale to the residue of her estate for ultimate
distribution to her two adult children. 2°° The appellate court held in a
previous case that where a testator directed in her will that her homestead be
sold and the proceeds placed in the residue of the estate for distribution
along with other assets, the property lost its homestead character and was,
therefore, "subject to the claims of creditors." 20  Perhaps as a "look what
you could have done" remark, the court took the time to specifically mention
the case of In re Estate of Tudhope. °2 Because the homestead property in
Tudhope was not converted to dollars before it passed and vested in the
decedent's adult children, the property retained its homestead character and
was not subject to creditors' claims.203
In what was more of a new application of existing law than a new
concept, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Crain v. Putnam2 4
preserved the homestead status of an elderly woman's home despite the fact
that she was not actually living in the house.20 Mrs. Crane suffered
extensive brain damage as a result of an illness and in 1992, was placed in a
nursing home in a vegetative state.206 In 1994, the county property appraiser
196. Id. at 1001-02.
197. 686 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
198. Id. at 632. See also Estate of Price v. West Fla. Hosp., Inc., 513 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
199. Knadle, 686 So. 2d at 632.
200. Id.
201. Id. (citing Estate of Price v. West Fla. Hosp., Inc., 513 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1987)).
202. Id. (citing In re Estate of Tudhope, 595 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992)).
203. Estate of Tudhope, 595 So. 2d at 313.
204. 687 So. 2d 1325 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
205. Id. at 1325.
206. Id.
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denied a homestead exemption 2°7 on her house because she had not lived in
the house for over two years. 208 The trial court agreed and concluded, as a
matter of law, that if the taxpayer "was not actually residing on the property,
for whatever reason, no exemption is available.""2 9
The fourth district reversed, and held that Mrs. Crain was entitled to the
homestead exemption even though she was not physically residing in the
210house. The issue before the court was whether the property was being
"used" within the meaning of section 196.101(1) or (2) of the Florida
Statutes.21 The court found it significant that Mrs. Crain had been
involuntarily removed from her home due to illness, that she was unable to
communicate any intention regarding her residency, that all of her furniture,
clothing and most of her possessions were in the house and that she
212
continued to receive mail there. Florida courts have made similar rulings
with regard to Article X protections, but this appears to be the first case
213involving Article VII and section 196.101 of the Florida Statutes.
The big news in homestead law came from the Supreme Court of
Florida in the case of Snyder v. Davis.214 In Snyder, the Supreme Court of
215Florida may have even engaged in a bit of legislating from the bench. The
facts in Snyder are simple. Betty Snyder died testate survived by an adult
son, Milo Snyder, an adult granddaughter, Kelli Snyder (Milo's daughter),
216
no spouse and no minor children. In her last will, Mrs. Snyder devised her
home to her granddaughter, Kelli.2" The personal representative of Mrs.
Snyder's estate sought to sell the homestead to fund specific bequests, to pay
the cost of administration of the estate and to pay creditors.2 ' 8 Kelli objected
to the sale and claimed the homestead property passed to her free of claims
207. Id. Under section 196.101 of the Florida Statutes, Mrs. Crain's son sought an
exemption from taxes on real estate used and owned as a homestead, as described by Article VII,
Section 6(a) of the Florida Constitution, by totally and permanently disabled persons. Id. See
also FLA. STAT. § 196.101 (1993).
208. Crain, 687 So. 2d at 1325.
209. Id. at 1326.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 1325-26. See also FLA. STAT. § 196.101(1). Section 196.012(4) of the
Florida Statutes defines "use" as "the exercise of any right or power over real or personal
property incident to the ownership of the property." Id.
212. Crain, 687 So. 2d at 1325.
213. Id. at 1326.
214. 699 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 1997).
215. Id. at 1007 (Harding, J., dissenting). See supra note 195.
216. Snyder, 699 So. 2d at 1000.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 1000.
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under the protections of Article X, section 4 of the Florida Constitution.
219
The trial judge ruled that the homestead provisions applied to the devise to
Kelli and, as such, the homestead property was protected from creditor's
claims.220 The Second District Court of Appeal reversed and held that
because the decedent's son, Milo, would have been the sole heir had the
decedent died intestate, Kelli, the granddaughter, could not benefit from the
homestead's protection against creditors. 22'
The district court's position was based on a strict reading of the Florida
Constitution and Florida Statutes.22 Under Article X, section 4(b), the
homestead exemption inures only to a "surviving spouse or heirs of the
owner."223 Because the Florida Constitution does not define "heirs," the
district court looked to section 731.201(18) of the Florida Statutes, which
states: "heirs... means those persons, including the surviving spouse, who
are entitled under the statutes of intestate succession to the property of a
decedent.,2 4 As the district court explained:
If Betty Snyder had died intestate, Milo Snyder would have
inherited everything as her "heir," i.e., next lineal descendant in
line, and Kelli Snyder, under any construction of section 732.103,
would have inherited nothing. This would be so because
inheritance in Florida is "per stirpes." § 732.104, Fla. Stat. (1993).
Because Milo Snyder survived, Kelli Snyder is not an intestate
"heir" of her grandmother.=
In an opinion sprinkled with classic quotes and not so subtle irony, the
Supreme Court of Florida quashed the opinion of the second district. The
Supreme Court of Florida's opinion focused on two primary issues. First,
the court held that, where there is no surviving spouse or minor children, the
constitutional homestead protection against creditors "may inure to the
219. Id.
220. Id. at 1001.
221. Snyder, 699 So. 2d at 1001.
222. Id.
223. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(b); see Snyder, 699 So. 2d at 1000.
224. FLA. STAT. § 731.201(18) (1997).
225. Snyder, 699 So. 2d at 1001. The Second District Court of Appeal followed this
reasoning two more times in 1997 in In re Estate of Farrior, 694 So. 2d 804 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1997) and In re Estate of Hinterleiter, 692 So. 2d 234 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
However, the first district took the opposite view in Walker v. Mickler, 687 So. 2d 1328 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1997). This conflict among the districts precipitated the appeal of Snyder to the
Supreme Court of Florida. Snyder, 699 So. 2d at 1001.
226. Id. at 1005-06.
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benefit of [a] person to whom the homestead property is devised by a
will. '227 Surprisingly, the issue of whether the term "heirs" in the homestead
provisions of the Florida Constitution included devisees under a will had
228never before been addressed by the court. In reaching its conclusion, the
court stated "if we defined the term 'heirs' in the homestead provision by its
strict common-law definition, the very act of devising the homestead would
abolish the homestead protections against creditors. 22 9
The second portion of the court's ruling will certainly be a bit more
controversial. Rejecting a narrow definition of the term "heirs" that would
include only those individuals who would inherit under Florida's intestacy
statute at the death of the testator, the court held that the homestead
provision of the Florida Constitution allows an individual with no surviving
spouse or minor children to devise, by will, homestead property, along with
its protection from creditors, to any family member within the "class" of
persons categorized in the Florida intestacy statute.230
The upside of this ruling is that it allows the testator, rather than fate or
the Florida intestacy statute, to choose who will best preserve and protect the
family homestead property.23 1 The downside of this opinion is that the
millionaire second cousin of the testator' s dead fourth wife could receive the
homestead, with all its accompanying protections from creditors, while the
doctor who treated the testator's last illness remained unpaid. Apparently,
the majority was willing to accept this consequence of their ruling and stated
that they would not be deterred 'simply because 'financially independent
heirs may receive' a windfall."''2 32  In fact, the court stated that the
"homestead protection has never been based on principles of equity."
233
Whether the Supreme Court of Florida's opinion in Snyder furthers the
public policy considerations behind the homestead protections will certainly
be a matter of some debate in the coming years.
227. Id. at 1003.
228. Id. at 1002.
229. Id. at 1003.
230. Snyder, 699 So. 2d at 1005.
231. Id. The court said that to adopt a narrow definition of "heirs" would turn will-
making into an "act of prophecy" because in order to preserve the homestead protections, the
testator would have to predict which of his family would survive him. Id.
232. Id. at 1002 (quoting Public Health Trust v. Lopez, 531 So. 2d 946, 950 (Fla. 1988)).
233. Id.
[Vol. 23:119
147
: Nova Law Review 23, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1998
Simon / Hennessey
VI. DEADMAN'S STATUTE
The mere mention of the deadman's statute is enough to make most
practitioners shudder. So much so, in fact, that many practitioners
inadvertently waive the deadman's statute and ignore the potential impact it
could have on their cases. Two recent cases in this area, In re Estate of
Stetzko234 and Tarr v. Cooper,235 provide some insight into how the
deadman's statute can be a determining factor in the outcome of a case.
In the Stetzko case, the Fourth District Court of Appeal delivered what
could be a fatal blow to the deadman's statute in will contests and other
similar litigation. In Stetzko, the personal representative filed an action to
set aside lifetime transfers of the decedent, which were alleged to be the
product of undue influence and duress.236 The fourth district held that the
statute is waived if the protected person introduces any documentary
evidence concerning the subject matter of the oral communication.2 37 The
court specifically recognized "that in most, if not all, will contests, the
statute will be waived because the person attempting to uphold the will must
first introduce it and show that it was properly executed. Similarly, in other
contests where a protected person must first prove an inter vivos act...
waiver will likely result."'2
38
If the Stetzko case is a good example of when the statute is inapplicable,
the Tarr case is a perfect example of how the deadman's statute should be
used to protect an estate from creditors' claims. In the Tarr case, the trial
court entered a summary judgment against a creditor due, in large part, to the
deadman's statute. 239 The creditor in Tarr attempted to prove the contents of
an oral contract with the decedent. 24 The Tarr court held that without the
creditor's testimony, which was barred by the deadman's statute, the
material terms of the contract could not be established. 24 Hence, summary
242judgment in favor of the estate was appropriate.
The Stetzko and Tarr cases, combined, show the opposite ends of the
spectrum on the deadman's statute and provide recent examples of how
234. 714 So. 2d 1087 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
235. 708 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
236. Stetzko, 714 So. 2d at 1088.
237. Id. at 1090.
238. Id. (quoting CHAR..s W. EHRHARDT, FLORiDA EvI ENCE § 602.1, at 358-59 (1997
ed.)).
239. See Tarr, 708 So. 2d at 615.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
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courts apply this confusing statute. These cases are further evidence of the
need for legislative action on the deadman's statute. The Probate Litigation
Committee of the Real Property, Probate and Trust Law Section of The
Florida Bar has recently formed a committee to examine Florida's
deadman's statute and to make a recommendation regarding its amendment
or repeal.243 Perhaps this committee can make some sense of this terribly
confusing statute.
VII. CASES OF INTEREST
There were numerous cases decided in 1997 and 1998 which do not fit
well into any of the topic areas delineated in this article, but which merit
discussion nonetheless. The first of these cases is the Third District Court of
Appeal's decision in Martin v. Martin. 4  Many practitioners may be
familiar with the 1981 case of DeWitt v. Duce, 24 in which the Florida
Supreme Court held that if a plaintiff has an adequate remedy in probate,
that remedy must be exhausted before the plaintiff can pursue a claim for
246tortious interference with an inheritance. Until 1997, however, there were
no cases which discussed the application of this potential bar to an action for
tortious interference as it related to an inter vivos trust.
In Martin, the decedent's children sued their stepmother alleging that
she tortiously interfered with their right to inherit by unduly influencing the
decedent into making gifts to an inter vivos trust which effectively
disinherited them.247 The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of
the stepmother and held that the claim for tortious interference was barred
because the children had not pursued their claim in the probate proceedings
as required by DeWitt.248 The Martin court reversed and held that the bar to
recovery in DeWitt was not applicable to the case before it.249 The court
reasoned that the assets contained in the trust, which was substantially
funded prior to death, were not part of the probate estate and not subject to
243. Id.
244. 687 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
245 408 So. 2d 216 (Fla. 1981).
246. Id. at 220.
247. Martin, 687 So. 2d at 904.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 905-08. The Martin court was careful to point out that it was only deciding
the particular case based upon the particular facts before it. See id. at 907-08. There may be
other trust cases when DeWitt will serve as a bar to recovery. For example, if the revocable trust
is simply an unfunded trust, into which the will pours over, the result could be different. See id.
at 907 (noting specifically that the trust was ninety-five percent funded).
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administration.250 Even if the children had successfully contested the will,
they would not have received the trust assets.25' Accordingly, the court
permitted the children to proceed with their tortious interference claim
relating to the trust.
252
The Martin case also included an excellent procedural point regarding a
challenge to a will and trust.25 3  Many practitioners proceed under the
misconception that it is always permissible to file their trust actions as part
of the petitions for revocation of probate. The Martin case serves as a
reminder that the proper practice is to file a separate trust complaint under
sections 737.201 and 737.206 of the Florida Statutes. 4 Thereafter, the trial
255court can consolidate the two actions if it is appropriate to do so.
In Stept v. Paoli,256 the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that the
"face of the will doctrine," which essentially sounded the death knell for
malpractice actions against the scrivener of a will by estate beneficiaries,
applies with equal force to revocable trusts.2 57  The "face of the will
doctrine" generally prevents an estate beneficiary from recovering on a
malpractice claim against the attorney who drafted the will unless he or she
can show that the testator's intent as expressed in the will is frustrated, and
the beneficiary's legacy is lost or diminished as a direct result of the
attorney's negligence. 8 The Supreme Court of Florida has interpreted the
"face of the will doctrine" as placing a major limitation on malpractice
actions against drafting attorneys.25 9
The Stept case provides a prime example of how the "face of the will
doctrine" can serve as a bar to a beneficiary's suit. In Stept, the trust
beneficiaries filed a malpractice action against the drafting attorney claiming
250. Martin, 687 So. 2d at 907.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id at 907.
254. Id.
255. Martin, 687 So. 2d at 908.
256. 701 So. 2d 1228 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
257. Id. at 1229.
258. See Espinosa v. Sparber, 612 So. 2d 1378, 1380 (Fla. 1993); Miami Beach
Community Church, Inc. v. Stanton, 611 So. 2d 538, 538 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
259. Espinosa, 612 So. 2d at 1380. Finding the privity exception to be "a limited one,"
the court held an action only lies when the testator's intent as expressed in the will itself, not as
shown by extrinsic evidence, is frustrated due to the negligence of the testator's attorney. Id. The
court reasoned that to allow such evidence would dramatically increase the risk of misinterpreting
the testator's intent, as well as "heighten[ing] the tendency to manufacture false evidence that
could not be rebutted due to the unavailability of the testator." Id. This limitation often proves
very difficult, if not impossible, to overcome. Id.
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that his drafting error in the decedent's revocable trust cost the estate
260
approximately $100,000 in additional estate taxes. The trial court
dismissed the action with prejudice finding that the revocable trust "did not
contain the expressed intent of the testator to avoid or minimize taxes. 26'
On appeal, the beneficiaries acknowledged that the "face of the will
doctrine" would prevent recovery if it applied, but argued that the doctrine
262was not applicable to revocable trusts. The Stept court disagreed, holding
that there is "no reason to expand the limited privity exception" in cases of
revocable trusts.263
In the last case, Nayee v. Nayee,264 one of the issues addressed by the
Court was whether certain informal documents would qualify as "other
statements" within the meaning of section 737.307 of the Florida Statutes,
265thus barring a beneficiary from bringing an action against a trustee. The
Nayee case is both interesting and important because it is the first to explain
what needs to be included in an "other statement" in order to start the statute
of limitations running under section 737.307. The trustee in Nayee was sued
for an accounting of a family trust by the trust beneficiaries, which consisted
of his brother and two nephews.266 The trust had commenced in 1979.
217
The trustee claimed that the beneficiaries were barred from bringing their
.... .. 268
actions because he disclosed his trust dealing in a 1987 meeting. The
trustee had notes from the meeting and copies of handwritten accounts,
which he had provided to the beneficiaries. The handwritten statements
showed a list of payments to various persons and entities, such as the IRS
260. Stept, 701 So. 2d at 1229.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. 705 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
265. See id. at 965. See also FLA. STAT. § 737.307 (1997). Pursuant to section 737.307
of the Florida Statutes, a beneficiary who has received a final, annual, or periodic account or
"other statement fully disclosing the matter" is barred from bringing an action against the trustee
unless a proceeding to assert the claim is commenced within six months after receipt of the
account or statement. FLA. STAT. § 737.307 (1997). There are no other Florida cases defining the
meaning of "other statement."
266. Nayee, 705 So. 2d at 961-62.
267. Id. at 961.
268. Id. at 962. The trustee argued that the beneficiaries were barred under section
95.1 1(3)(p) of the Florida Statutes. See id.
269. Nayee, 705 So. 2d at 963.
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but no explanation for any of the payments was offered. 270 The trial court
granted a motion for summary judgment in favor of the trustee.27 1
The Nayee court reversed, finding, among other things, that the
"informal statements" did not contain sufficient information to start the
statute of limitations running under section 737.307 of the Florida
Statutes.272 The court noted that the "informal statements did not include the
most basic accounting information [and] provided no explanation for any of
the payments. 273
VIII. 1997 AND 1998 STATUTORY CHANGES
The years of 1997 and 1998 were relatively quiet for new legislation in
the areas of estates, trusts, and guardianships. Instead, the legislature
focused its efforts on general housekeeping to resolve ambiguities and
potential problem areas within the statutes. Rather than discuss all of the
changes to the statutes in 1997 and 1998, this article will highlight
significant legislation that is of interest to most practitioners. 74
270. Id. at 965.
271. Id. at 963. The trial court found that the beneficiaries were barred under the general
four-year statute of limitations under section 95.11 of the Florida Statutes. Id. at 962,
272. Id. at 965. See also FLA. STAT. § 737.307 (1997). The court also held that, unless an
accounting is provided to the beneficiaries pursuant to section 737.307 of the Florida Statutes,
which is sufficient to start the six-month period running, an action for an accounting is governed
by common-law laches not by section 95.11 of the Florida Statutes. Nayee, 705 So. 2d at 963.
The court noted that "laches requires a showing of an unreasonable delay in asserting a known
right which causes undue prejudice to the party against whom a claim is asserted." Id. Moreover,
laches does not begin to run until the beneficiary has actual knowledge of an unequivocal act in
repudiation of the trust or actual knowledge of adverse possession by the trustee. Id. at 964. The
court held that the repudiation must be open and "brought home" to the beneficiary. Id. at 964.
273. AL at 965.
274. In addition to the changes set forth in the text to this article, the legislature also
amended: 1) the homestead exemptions to provide that Roth IRAs and medical savings accounts
are exempt from creditors, FLA. STAT. §§ 222.21-.22 (1997); 2) the statutes concerning Viatical
Settlements to include detailed disclosure provisions, misrepresentation penalties, and provisions
for "related provider trusts," FLA. STAT. § 626.9911; 3) the list of property exempt from probate
creditors under section 732.402 to include Florida Prepaid College Program contracts; and 4)
numerous provisions concerning anatomical gifts. FLA. STAT. §§ 732.910-.922 (Supp. 1998).
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A. Florida Intangibles Tax2 75
Earlier this year, the Florida Legislature considered a number of bills
related to the intangibles tax ranging from proposals to repeal the tax in its
entirety to measures designed to close perceived loopholes in the tax. The
Florida Legislature ultimately passed several statutory changes relating to
the intangibles tax, including provisions which: 1) increased the filing
threshold for individuals from five dollars of tax to sixty dollars of tax,
effectively increasing the tax exemption for single individuals from $25,000
to $80,000 and for married individuals from $45,000 to $100,000;276
2) repealed the intangibles tax on one-third of otherwise taxable accounts
receivable; 277 3) exempted certain compensatory stock options as well as
stock received pursuant to the exercise of such options from the intangibles
tax; 278 and 4) reduced penalties for failing to timely file an intangibles tax
return.279
Significantly, the "anti-avoidance" measures never received serious
consideration. Rather than remove the incentives to implement planning
strategies, the legislature actually made such planning more palatable to
many by enacting a provision which allows taxpayers who transfer their
intangibles to out-of-state trusts or partnerships to maintain their existing
asset management relationships with Florida based banks and trust
280companies. Prior to the 1998 legislation, assets managed under
discretionary arrangements by a Florida bank or trust company would
technically be subject to intangibles tax even if such assets were owned by a
non-Florida entity.
In addition to the legislative changes enacted this year, the Department
of Revenue completed an extensive rule-making project dealing specifically
with the application of the intangibles tax to out-of-state trusts and
partnerships. The new rules set forth several "safe-harbor" requirements
275. The authors would like to thank Stephen G. Vogelsang, Esq., a shareholder in the
law firm of Gunster, Yoakley, Valdes-Fauli & Stewart, P.A. for his insight and analysis into the
impact of the Florida Intangible Tax changes.
276. Ch. 98-132, § 2, 1998 Fla. Laws 885, 886 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
199.052(2)).
277. Ch. 98-132, § 6(1), 1998 Fla. Laws 885, 889 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
199.185).
278. Id. § 6(m), 1998 Fla Laws at 889 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 199.185).
279. Ch. 98-132, § 9, 1998 Fla. Laws 891 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 199.282).
280. Ch. 98-132, § 2, 1998 Fla. Laws 886 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 199.052).
(permitting a bank or savings association to act as a fiduciary or agent of the trust).
281. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 12C-2.006 - 12C-2.0063 (1998).
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for transfers to out-of-state trusts and partnerships which, if complied with,
ensure that such arrangements effectively remove the transferred assets from
Florida for intangibles tax purposes. Although the new rules were
intended to merely restate the Department's existing position with respect to
out-of-state trusts and partnerships, the rules actually create several new
planning complexities that must be addressed when considering transfers to
out-of-state entities. In sum, although the intangibles tax has received
increased scrutiny over the past year, opportunities to reduce or eliminate
liability for the tax are still available to many individuals.
B. Chapter 97-240: Omnibus Trust, Estate, and Guardianship Legislation
In 1997, the Florida Legislature passed chapter 97-240, which effected
284numerous unrelated provisions of the trust, estate, and guardianship laws.
Chapter 97-240 was geared toward closing up what were perceived as
potential problem areas within the statutes relating to estate tax issues, trust
and estate administration issues, includiny fiduciary investments, and, to a
lesser extent, trust attorneys' fees issues.
The first item addressed by chapter 97-240 was the adoption of a
technical amendment to the Florida's Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities
("FSRAP") which is intended to preserve Generation-Skipping Transfer tax
exemption for certain Florida trusts.286 Prior to the amendment, a trust
would lose its Generation-Skipping Transfer tax exemption if the donee of a
special power of appointment in a pre-1986 (grandfathered) trust exercises
the power so as to violate the common law rule against perpetuities by
extending the trust beyond lives in being plus twenty-one years. 287
Accordingly, drafting to allow the maximum period under the FSRAP could
288
result in loss of tax-exempt status. The FSRAP now includes a section,
which provides that language in a trust or other property arrangement, which
would allow the exercise of the power beyond the common law period, is
282. Id.
283. Unfortunately, a detailed analysis of these rules is beyond the scope of this survey.
284. 1997 Fla. Laws ch. 97-240. This survey will only highlight the more significant
changes effected by Chapter 97-240.
285. Id.
286. Ch. 97-240, § 11997 Fla. Laws 4404,4404 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 689.225).
287. Jesse Dukeminier, The Unifonn Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities and the GST
Tax: New Perils for Practitioners and New Opportunities, 30 REAL PROP., PROB. T. J. 185, 189
(1995).
288. d
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inoperative. 289 As most probate lawyers will recall, the Florida Legislature
enacted section 737.111 in 1995 that generally provides that the testamentary
aspects of a trust are invalid unless the trust is executed with the formalities
of a will. The 1995 version of the statute failed to include a
grandfathering provision for those trusts executed prior to its effective date.
Chapter 97-240 added section 737.111(6), which provides that the section
will not apply to trusts executed prior to October 1, 1995.291 Chapter 97-240
also exempts from the execution requirements of the statute trusts
established as part of employee annuity described in section 403 of the
Internal Revenue Code, IRAs, Keogh Plans, and qualified plans under
section 401 of the Internal Revenue Code.292
Chapter 97-240 also helped alleviate the confusion that had arisen in
connection with the amount of fees payable to an attorney who renders
services in connection with the initial administration of a revocable trust
after the death of the settlor. Prior to the amendment, section 737.511(5)
provided that the presumptively reasonable compensation under section
737.2041(3) would not apply when a corporate fiduciary was serving as
trustee or co-trustee of the revocable trust. 3 Instead, the fees were to be
determined under the particular facts and circumstances of the trust.
29 4
Under Chapter 97-240, the language requiring disparate treatment was
removed from section 737.2041.295 Accordingly, the presumptively
reasonable fee is the same regardless of whether the trustee is a corporate
fiduciary or an individual.216 Chapter 97-240 also added a new section,
737.2041(3), which provides that an attorney who is hired to perform limited
or specially defined services is entitled to receive fees per their fee
agreement, or an hourly-based fee under section 737.2041(6).
Section 737.303 of the Florida Statutes was amended to provided that
the trustee's duty to account or provide a statement of accounts, with respect
to a revocable trust, applies only to the grantor or the legal representative of
289. Ch. 97-240, § 1 1997 Fla. Laws 4404,4404 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 689.225).
290. See FLA. STAT. § 737.111 (1997).
291. See Ch. 97-240, § 4, 1997 Fla. Laws 4404, 4407 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
737.111).
292. Id.
293. See FLA. STAT. § 737.2041 (1995).
294. See id.
295. See Ch. 97-240, § 5, 1997 Fla. Laws 4404, 4407 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
737.2041).
296. See id.
297. Id.
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the grantor during the grantor's lifetime.298 In other words, the beneficiary
of a revocable trust no longer has a right to review the trust statements
during the grantor's lifetime. Of particular note, however, is the fact that the
beneficiary may still have a right to receive a complete copy of the trust
agreement and "relevant information about the assets of the trust and the
particulars relating to administration.
299
Another change contained in chapter 97-240 is related to Florida's
Prudent Investor Rule.300 Section 518.112 of the Florida Statutes,
concerning the delegation of investment functions to an investment agent,
was amended to clarify that the fiduciary does not simply give up
responsibility for investments once it chooses to delegate. 301 The new bill
requires that the fiduciary exercise reasonable care, judgment, and caution in
selecting the investment agent, in establishing the scope and specific terms
of the delegation, and in reviewing the agent's actions in order to monitor
overall performance and compliance with the scope and terms of the
302delegation. These new requirements appear to add no real substance to
the duties of a fiduciary as these requirements were arguably always implicit
within the statute.30 3 Chapter 97-240 also adds a new subsection 518.112(c),
which provides that a fiduciary who administers life insurance contracts
(such as the trustee of an irrevocable life insurance trust) is not obligated to
diversify or allocate assets relative to the contract until the contract matures
and the policy proceeds are received.3°4
The legislature clarified two ambiguities in section 738.12 of the
Florida Statutes, Florida's Underproductive Property Statute, in chapter 97-
305240. Section 738.12 generally provides that an income beneficiary is
298. See Ch. 97-240, § 6, 1997 Fla. Laws 4404, 4411 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
737.303).
299. See FLA. STAT. § 737.303(3) (1997).
300. See Ch. 97-240, § 8, 1997 Fla. Laws 4404, 4413 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
518.112).
301. l
302. See id.
303. See generally Lyman W. Welch, How the Prudent Investor Rule May Affect
Trustees, Ta. & EsT., at 18 (Dec. 1991) (noting that a trustee who decides to delegate has a duty
to exercise reasonable care, skill and caution in selecting agents, and in reviewing the agents
actions).
304. Ch. 97-240, § 8, 1997 Fla. Laws 4404, 4413 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
518.112).
305. Ch. 97-240, § 10, 1997 Fla. Laws 4404, 4422 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
738.12).
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entitled to receive at least a three percent return per year.306 If the net
income of the trust is less than three percent, the trustee is required to pay
the income beneficiary the three percent out of principal. °7 Prior to the
amendment, a literal reading of the statute required the trustee to distribute
the three percent in addition to the amounts received by the beneficiary
during the course of the year.30 8 The new amendment clarifies that the
trustee is only required to distribute the difference between three percent and
the income paid to the beneficiary during the course of the year. Chapter
97-240 also adds a new subsection 738.12(1)(c), which makes the statute
applicable only to mandatory income interests in irrevocable trusts.
3 10
Accordingly, a beneficiary who is entitled to receive income at the discretion
of the trustee is not entitled to the benefit of the statute.
Many institutions (and probate practitioners) will be surprised to find
that chapter 97-240 added additional requirements for both the personal
representative and the institution holding a safe-deposit box in the name of a
311decedent. Sections 655.936 and 733.604 of the Florida Statutes were
amended to provide that "[t]he initial opening of any safe-deposit box of the
decedent must be conducted in the presence of an employee of the institution
where the box is located and the personal representative." 312 An inventory of
the contents of the box must be conducted and signed by the employee and
the personal representative. 313 The personal representative has a duty to file
the safe-deposit box inventory within ten days after the box is opened.
314
The final and perhaps most important "problem area" addressed by
chapter 97-240 was section 733.817, Florida's tax apportionment section of
the statute.315  The legislature made wholesale revisions to this statute
effective as of October 1, 1998 intending to effect a more equitable
306. FLA. STAT. § 738.12(1)(a) (1997).
307. Id.
308. See id.
309. Ch. 97-240, § 10, 1997 Fla. Laws 4404, 4422 (to be codified at FIA. STAT. §
738.12).
310. See id.
311. Ch. 97-240, §§ 12, 1997 Fla. Laws 4404, 4423-24 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
655.936).
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Ch. 97-240, § 9, 1997 Fla. Laws 4404, 4415 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
733.817).
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apportionment, including the enactment of a detailed definitions intended to
316
resolve ambiguities.
C. Chapter 97-161: Professional Guardians
Unlike the broad spectrum of changes encompassed within chapter 97-
240, chapter 97-161, also enacted by the legislature in 1997, was directed
specifically to the regulation of professional guardians. 31 7 Section 744.1085
of the Florida Statutes was created to provide that "[e]ach professional
guardian who files a petition for appointment after October 1, 1997, shall
post a blanket fiduciary bond with the clerk of the circuit court in the county
in which the guardian's primary place of business is located. 318 This new
requirement does not apply to attorneys in good standing, financial
institutions, or public guardians. 319 Section 744.1085(3) requires that all
professional guardians, other than an attorney, must receive a minimum of
forty hours of instruction and training by October 1, 1998, or within one year
after becoming a professional guardian, whichever occurs later.320 Chapter
97-161 also amended section 744.3135 of the Florida Statutes to require that
all professional guardians submit to a credit check and a criminal
investigation. Finally, section 744.454 was amended to forbid professional
guardians from borrowing or purchasing property from the ward.
IX. FLORIDA PROBATE AND GUARDIANSHIP RULES
A. Appeals
In 1996, the Supreme Court of Florida amended two rules of procedure
regarding the appeal of orders entered in probate and guardianship
proceedings. Both of these amendments were effective as of January 1,
316. Id. Because a meaningful discussion of these changes is beyond the scope of this
article, the authors suggest that interested practitioners see Pamela 0. Price, Determination of
Beneficiaries and Their Interests, in PRACnCE UNDER FLORIDA PROBATE CODE § 11.40 (1997).
317. 1997 Fla. Laws Ch. 97-161.
318. Ch. 97-161, § 2, 1997 Fla. Laws 3048, 3049 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
744.3135).
319. Id.
320. Id at 3048-49.
321. Ch. 97-161, § 5, 1997 Fla. Laws 3048, 3049 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
744.454).
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1997. 31 2 Rule 9.1 10(a)(2) of the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure was
amended to specifically authorize appeals of "orders entered in probate and
guardianship matters that finally determine a right or obligation of an
interested person as defined in the Florida Probate Code." 323 Prior to this
amendment, jurisdiction for appeals of probate and guardianship matters was
found in Rule 5.100 of the Florida Probate Rules. Probate rule 5.100 was
also amended to delete the majority of its text, leaving the revised rule to
simply read "[a]ll orders and judgments of the court that finally determine a
right or obligation of an interested person may be appealed as provided by
Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.11O(a)(2). 324
The impact of these rule changes is minor, and there are several cases
that provide guidance on this topic to the practitioner. The best overview of
these rules and their recent amendments is provided by Estate of Nolan v.
Swindle.n 5
The prerequisites for appellate jurisdiction of probate and guardianship
matters have not changed under amended rule 9.110(a)(2). For a district
court to have jurisdiction to review an order or judgment relating to probate
or guardianship matters, that order or judgment must finally determine a
326right or obligation of an interested person. The Swindle court stated that
although the prior version of Probate rule 5.100 "did not expressly limit
appeals to final determinations," case law under that rule recognized such a
restriction. 327 The court in Swindle pointed out that "if there is any
difference concerning the need for finality between the current rule and the
former rule, the requirement of finality is stronger under the current rule."
328
329For example, in Larkin v. Pirthauer, the fourth district held that an order
disqualifying counsel in a will contest did not finally determine a right or
obligation of an interested person under rule 9.110(a)(2). 330 However, the
322. See In re Amendments to Fla. R. App. P., 685 So. 2d 773, 792 (Fla. 1996),
superseded by rule as stated in Lynn v. State, 23 Fla. L. Weekly D2199 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
September 23, 1998); In re Amendments to Fla. Prob. R., 683 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 1996).
323. Amendments to Fla. R. App. P., 685 So. 2d at 792.
324. Amendments to Fla. Prob. R., 683 So. 2d at 84.
325. 712 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
326. Id. at 422.
327. Id. (citing Tyler v. Huggins, 175 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1965); In re
Estate of Baker, 327 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 1976); and In re Estate of Bierman, 587 So. 2d 1163 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991)).
328. Swindle, 712 So. 2d at 423.
329. 700 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
330. Id. at 183.
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court noted that orders disqualifying counsel are reviewable by certiorari.331
In addition, at least three appellate courts have held that the amendment to
rule 9.110(a)(2) does not affect prior case law holding that one's right to
appeal does not arise until all judicial labor is complete on the issue
appealed as to the appellant.332
The Swindle court stressed that the finality of an order, for the purpose
of appellate jurisdiction, is specific to the individual seeking the appeal.333
In other words, the court must determine whether the order finally
determines the issue on appeal as to the appellant.334 In Swindle, the court
entered an order which authorized a previously appointed administrator ad
litem to file an action to set aside a will based on the undue influence of the
decedent's caretaker. 335 The caretaker appealed. The court dismissed the
appeal and held that, although the order being appealed may have finally
determined a right or obligation of the administrator ad litem, such as to file
a will contest, it did not do so as to the caretaker.33 6 As to the caretaker, the
order simply allowed the administrator ad litem to bring a lawsuit which may
or may not be adverse to her interests.
337
338Finally, in Pearson v. Cobb, the Fifth District Court of Appeal
addressed the timing of filing an appeal. The Pearson court held that, under
Rule 9.020(h) of the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, a timely motion
for rehearing tolled the time to file a notice of appeal.
339
B. Other Significant Amendments
The following changes were also made to the Florida Probate Rules
effective January 1, 1997:340 1) Rule 5.040. Formal Notice. It is now
331. Id. (citing Hilsenroth v. Burstyn, 432 So. 2d 640 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983)).
332. See Swindle, 712 So. 2d at 423: see also Rehman v. Frye, 692 So. 2d 956, 957 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997); In re Estate of Walters, 700 So. 2d 434,436 n.1 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1997).
333. See Swindle, 712 So. 2d at 423.
334. Id.
335. Id. at 422.
336. Id. at423.
337. Id.
338. 701 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
339. Id. at 650. The court went on to note that Rule 5.020(d) of the Florida Probate
Rules authorizes the filing of a motion for rehearing on any order or judgment entered in a
probate proceeding. Id.
340. See In re Amendments to Fla. Prob. R., 683 So. 2d 78, 79 (Fla. 1996). There were
no changes to the Florida Probate and Guardianship Rules in 1998.
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permissible to serve formal notice by any commercial delivery service which
requires a signed receipt and which is approved by the chief judge of the
judicial circuit in which the proceeding is pending;34' 2) Rule 5.041. Service
of Pleadings and Papers. The probate rules now permit service by facsimile.
Note, however, that service by delivery or facsimile after 4:00 p.m., not 5:00
p.m. as provided in Rule 1.080(b) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, is
deemed to have been made on the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or
legal holiday; 342 3) Rule 5.180. Waiver and Consent. Rule 5.180 was
amended to include specific fee disclosure requirements found in section
733.6171(9) of the Florida Statutes, relating to waivers in connection with
the amount and manner of determining compensation; 343 4) Rule 5.210.
Probate of Wills. Rule 5.210(a)(4) was amended to delete the requirement
that a will be admitted to probate in another state or country in order to have
an authenticated copy of the will admitted in Florida;344 5) Rule 5.240.
Notice of Administration. A trustee of a trust described in section
733.707(3) of the Florida Statutes is now specifically listed as one of the
persons on whom the personal representative is required to serve Notice of
Administration; 345 6) Rule 5.400. Distribution and Discharge. Rule 5.400
was amended to require that the Petition for Discharge disclose the manner
of determining compensation as required by section 733.6171(9) of the
Florida Statutes;346 7) Rule 5.401. Objection to Petition for Discharge or
Final Accounting. Subsection 5.401(d) was amended to clarify that notice of
the hearing must be served with ninety days of filing the objection. The
actual hearing date can occur after the ninety day period;347 8) Rule 5.405.
Proceedings to Determine Homestead Real Property. Rule 5.405(c) was
amended to require that an order on a petition to determine homestead
include (i) the description of the real property which is the subject of the
petition, (ii) a determination of whether the real property is homestead, and
(iii) a definition of the specific interests of the persons entitled to the
homestead real property;3 48 9) Rule 5.470. Ancillary Administration. Rule
5.470(c) no longer requires a will to be "probated" in a foreign jurisdiction
before an authenticated copy can be admitted to probate in Florida. This
341. Id. at 79.
342. Id. at 82.
343. Id. at 85.
344. Id.
345. Amendments to Fla. Prob. R., 683 So. 2d at 87.
346. Id. at 100.
347. Id. at 101.
348. Id. at 102.
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amendment addresses situations in which the will was merely deposited or
filed in a foreign jurisdiction but not offered for probate. Failure to offer the
will for probate in the foreign jurisdiction should not prevent its probate in
Florida;349 and 10) Rule 5.560. Petition for Appointment of Guardian of an
Incapacitated Person: The social security number of the alleged
incapacitated person is no longer required in a Petition for Appointment of a
Guardian. Rule 5.560(b) was also amended to provide that the petition must
be served a reasonable time before the hearing on the petition.
X. CONCLUSION
As evidenced by this survey, lawyers practicing in the area of probate
and trust law must remain current on a wide variety of topics. Hopefully,
this survey will assist practitioners in their efforts to keep abreast of the
latest changes in the law.
349. Id. at 104.
350. Amendnents to Fla. Prob. R., 683 So. 2d. at 106.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Continuing a trend, 1998 included a number of important developments
in the area of professional responsibility law in Florida.' Significant
appellate court decisions, rule changes,2 and disciplinary actions potentially
affect the practices of more than 58,000 members of The Florida Bar.
3
This article reports and summarizes those developments by placing
them in the framework of the various relationships in which lawyers
typically operate.4 Part II looks at decisions affecting what must be viewed
as the central relationship in this context: the relationship between lawyer
and client. Part III examines developments pertaining to what may be the
dominant relationship: the lawyer's relationship with the court and the
* Associate Dean of Information Resources and Technology and Associate
Professor of Law, Florida Coastal School of Law, Jacksonville, Florida. B.S., 1977, Florida
State University; J.D., 1984, University of Texas; M.L.S., 1996, Florida State University.
** Florida Bar Ethics Counsel, Tallahassee, Florida. B.A., 1987, University of
Florida; J.D., 1990, University of Florida. The authors gratefully acknowledge the research
assistance and professionalism of Kelly J. Wright.
1. This article surveys professional responsibility developments in Florida from July
15, 1997, through July 14, 1998.
2. Of primary interest here are changes to the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct
("RPC"), which comprise Chapter 4 of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar.
3. Florida has a unified bar. Therefore, in order to regularly practice law in the state,
lawyers must be admitted to, and thus be members of, The Florida Bar. See RPC 1-3.1;
Petition of Fla. State Bar Ass'n, 40 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1949).
4. Cases and ethics opinions are discussed in the section to which they have the most
significant connection.
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judicial system. Part IV reviews the lawyer's relationship with third parties.
Part V deals with the lawyer's relationship with disciplinary authorities,
particularly The Florida Bar.
I. THE LAWYER'S RELATIONSHIP WITH CLIENTS
The relationship between lawyer and client contains a variety of ethical
dimensions. These include: the 1) establishment of the relationship; 2)
scope of authority and representation; 3) confidentiality; 4) handling of
property relating to clients; 5) conflicts of interest; 6) fees; and 7) legal
duties owed to clients as they relate to professional ethics. Decisions in
1998 addressed these issues.
A lawyer is a client's agent and advocate, but there are ethical limits on
the scope of actions that lawyers may take on behalf of their clients.
Exceeding these limits resulted in the dismissal of an appeal and an
imposition of monetary sanctions on the lawyer in Wood-Cohan v.
Prudential Insurance Co. of America.5 The trial court below granted a
directed verdict to the plaintiff's claims, but the judgment was not final
because the defendants' counterclaim was still pending.6  Nevertheless,
plaintiffs counsel filed a notice of appeal. In error, the trial court signed the
proposed final judgments submitted by the plaintiff.7 Plaintiffs counsel
then filed the judgments with the appellate court.8  When the trial court
rescinded the erroneous judgments, the lawyer failed to properly notify the
appellate court.9 Furthermore the lawyer vigorously opposed defendants'
motion to dismiss the appeal.1° In granting the motion and sanctioning the
lawyer, the Fourth District Court of Appeal declared that he had violated
both RPC 4-3.1 and 4-3.2 of the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct.11
5. 715 So. 2d 999, 1001 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
6. Id. at 1000.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Wood-Cohan, 715 So. 2d at 1001.
11. Id. at 1001. RPC 4-3.1, "MERITORIOUS CLAIMS AND CONTENTIONS,"
provides:
A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an
issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which
includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law. A lawyer for the defendant in a criminal proceeding, or the
respondent in a proceeding that could result in incarceration, may
nevertheless so defend the proceeding as to require that every element of the
case be established.
RPC 4-3.1.
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In the lawyer-client relationship, it is axiomatic that lawyers, as agents,
draw their authority from clients. This principle is reflected in the Florida
Rules of Professional Conduct. The First District Court of Appeal
considered this issue in Davis v. Meeks.13 Meeks sued Davis for injuries
resulting from an auto accident and obtained a judgment of more than $1.8
million. Subsequently, Davis sued her insurer in a Georgia state court for
bad faith. She was represented in the Georgia action, and in a malpractice
claim against her counsel in the original case, by attorney Levin. In the
Georgia proceedings, Levin authorized the insurer's counsel to move for
relief from the $1.8 million judgment. Florida attorneys Henry M. Coxe and
Michael I. Coulson filed the motion. The trial court denied the motion and
Coxe and Coulson filed an appeal of that decision.
1 4
Levin noticed his appearance in the matter and filed a notice of
voluntary dismissal of the appeal. Coxe and Coulson responded by moving
to strike the notice of dismissal and to disqualify Levin. Levin's response
included an affidavit from Davis indicating her wish to have Levin represent
her interests. In denying the motions to strike the notice of voluntary
dismissal and to disqualify Levin, the court reaffirmed the basic principles
that lawyers act through the authorization of their clients and the clients
decide who will represent them:
Under these circumstances, determining who best represents [the
client's] interests in this case is not the province of this court, but
rather of [the client] herself.... The wisdom of her choice is not
RPC 4-3.2, 'EXPEDITING LITIGATION," requires reasonable efforts to expedite
litigation and provides that: "A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation
consistent with the interests of the client." RPC 4-3.2.
12. Subdivisions (a) and (c) of RPC 4-1.2, "SCOPE OF REPRESENTATION,"
provide:
(a) Lawyer to Abide by Client's Decisions. A lawyer shall abide by a
client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation, subject to
subdivisions (c), (d), and (e), and shall consult with the client as to the means
by which they are to be pursued. A lawyer shall abide by a client's decision
whether to make or accept an offer of settlement of a matter. In a criminal
case, the lawyer shall abide by the client's decision, after consultation with
the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial, and whether
the client will testify.
(c) Limitation of Objectives of Representation. A lawyer may limit the
objectives of the representation if the client consents after consultation.
RPC 4-1.2(a), (c).
13. 709 So. 2d 184 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
14. Id. at 184-85.
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for us to decide, and the consequences of that choice present issues
for resolution in another forum on another day.
15
The lawyer-client relationship is a unique one that is grounded on
agency principles, as well as fiduciary and ethical principles. The Supreme
Court of Florida recognized this in Forgione v. Dennis Pirtle Agency, Inc.1
6
In response to a certified question from the Eleventh Circuit, the supreme
court held that a negligence claim by an insured against the insurance agent
(for failure to obtain proper coverage) is assignable. 17 In contrast, Florida
law provides that a legal malpractice claim is not assignable.' 8 The court
explained this contrast by reviewing what it considered to be significant
distinctions between the insured-agent relationship and the lawyer-client
relationship. 19 Unlike the relationship between insured and insurance agent,
the lawyer-client relationship is a confidential relationship, 20 a "fiduciary
15. Id. at 185.
16. 701 So. 2d 557 (Fla. 1997).
17. Id. at 560.
18. Id. at 559.
19. Id. at 559-60.
20. RPC 4-1.6, "CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION," provides:
Consent Required to Reveal Information. A lawyer shall not reveal
information relating to representation of a client except as stated in
subdivisions (b), (c), and (d), unless the client consents after disclosure to the
client.
When Lawyer Must Reveal Information. A lawyer shall reveal such
information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent a client from committing a crime; or
(2) to prevent a death or substantial bodily harm to another.
(c) When Lawyer May Reveal Information. A lawyer may reveal
such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to serve the client's interest unless it is information the client
specifically requires not to be disclosed;
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a
controversy between the lawyer and client;
(3) to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim
against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved;
(4) to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the
lawyer's representation of the client; or
(5) to comply with the Rules of Professional Conduct.
(d) Exhaustion of Appellate Remedies. When required by a tribunal to
reveal such information, a lawyer may first exhaust all appellate remedies.
(e) Limitation on Amount of Disclosure. When disclosure is
mandated or permitted, the lawyer shall disclose no more information than is
required to meet the requirements or accomplish the purposes of this rule.
RPC 4-1.6.
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relation[ship] of the very highest character 21 in which the lawyer owes a
duty of undivided loyalty to the client,22 and under RPC 4-1.9, a personal
relationship. 23
21. Forgione, 701 So. 2d at 560. See FLA. STAT. § 90.502 (1997). Section 90.502 of
the Florida Statutes, "LAWYER-CLIENT PRIVILEGE," provides:
(1) For purposes of this section:
(a) A "lawyer" is a person authorized, or reasonably believed by the client to
be authorized, to practice law in any state or nation.
(b) A "client" is any person, public officer, corporation, association, or other
organization or entity, either public or private, who consults a lawyer with the
purpose of obtaining legal services or who is rendered legal services by a
lawyer.
(c) A communication between lawyer and client is "confidential" if it is not
intended to be disclosed to third persons other than:
1. Those to whom disclosure is in furtherance of the rendition of legal
services to the client.
2. Those reasonably necessary for the transmission of the
communication.
(2) A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent any other
person from disclosing, the contents of confidential communications when
such other person learned of the communications because they were made in
the rendition of legal services to the client.
(3) The privilege may be claimed by:
(a) The client.
(b) A guardian or conservator of the client.
(c) The personal representative of a deceased client.
(d) A successor, assignee, trustee in dissolution, or any similar representative
of an organization, corporation, or association or other entity, either public or
private, whether or not in existence.
(e) The lawyer, but only on behalf of the client. The lawyer's authority to
claim the privilege is presumed in the absence of contrary evidence.
(4) There is no lawyer-client privilege under this section when:
(a) The services of the lawyer were sought or obtained to enable or aid
anyone to commit or plan to commit what the client knew was a crime or
fraud.
(b) A communication is relevant to an issue between parties who claim
through the same deceased client.
(c) A communication is relevant to an issue of breach of duty by the lawyer to
the client or by the client to the lawyer, arising from the lawyer-client
relationship.
(d) A communication is relevant to an issue concerning the intention or
competence of a client executing an attested document to which the lawyer is
an attesting witness, or concerning the execution or attestation of the
document.
167
: Nova Law Review 23, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1998
166 Nova Law Review [Vol. 23:161
(e) A communication is relevant to a matter of common interest between two
or more clients, or their successors in interest, if the communication was
made by any of them to a lawyer retained or consulted in common when
offered in a civil action between the clients or their successors in interest.
(5) Communications made by a person who seeks or receives services from
the Department of Revenue under the child support enforcement program to
the attorney representing the department shall be confidential and privileged
as provided for in this section. Such communications shall not be disclosed
to anyone other than the agency except as provided for in this section. Such
disclosures shall be protected as if there were an attorney-client relationship
between the attorney for the agency and the person who seeks services from
the department.
FLA. STAT. § 90.502 (1997).
22. Forgione, 701 So. 2d at 560. See RPC 4-1.7, "CONFLICT OF INTEREST;
GENERAL RULE," which provides:
(a) Representing Adverse Interests. A lawyer shall not represent a client if
the representation of that client will be directly adverse to the interests of
another client, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not
adversely affect the lawyer's responsibilities to and relationship with the other
client; and
(2) each client consents after consultation.
(b) Duty to Avoid Limitation on Independent Professional Judgment. A
lawyer shall not represent a client if the lawyer's exercise of independent
professional judgment in the representation of that client may be materially
limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third person or
by the lawyer's own interest, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be
adversely affected; and
(2) the client consents after consultation.
(c) Explanation to Clients. When representation of multiple clients in a
single matter is undertaken, the consultation shall include explanation of the
implications of the common representation and the advantages and risks
involved.
(d) upon consent by the client after consultation regarding the relationship.
RPC 4-1.7. See also RPC 4-1.8, "CONFLICT OF INTEREST; PROHIBITED
TRANSACTIONS," which provides: Lawyers Related by Blood or Marriage. A lawyer
related to another lawyer as parent, child, sibling, or spouse shall not represent a client in a
representation directly adverse to a person who the lawyer knows is represented by the other
lawyer except:
(a) Business Transactions With or Acquiring Interest Adverse to Client.
A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or knowingly
acquire an ownership, possessory, security, or other pecuniary interest
adverse to a client, except a lien granted by law to secure a lawyer's fee or
expenses, unless:
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(1) the transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the
interest are fair and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and
transmitted in writing to the client in a manner that can be reasonably
understood by the client;
(2) the client is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice
of independent counsel in the transaction; and
(3) the client consents in writing thereto.
(h) Using Information to Disadvantage of Client. A lawyer shall not use
information relating to representation of a client to the disadvantage of the
client unless the client consents after consultation, except as permitted or
required by rule 4-1.6.
(c) Gifts to Lawyer or Lawyer's Family. A lawyer shall not prepare an
instrument giving the lawyer or a person related to the lawyer as parent, child,
sibling, or spouse any substantial gift from a client, including a testamentary
gift, except where the client is related to the donee.
(d) Acquiring Literary or Media Rights. Prior to the conclusion of
representation of a client, a lawyer shall not make or negotiate an agreement
giving the lawyer literary or media rights to a portrayal or account based in
substantial part on information relating to the representation.
(e) Financial Assistance to Client. A lawyer shall not provide financial
assistance to a client in connection with pending or contemplated litigation,
except that:
(1) a lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of litigation,
the repayment of which may be contingent on the outcome of the matter; and
(2) a lawyer representing an indigent client may pay court costs
and expenses of litigation on behalf of the client.
(f) Compensation by Third Party. A lawyer shall not accept compensation
for representing a client from one other than the client unless:
(1) the client consents after consultation;
(2) there is no interference with the lawyer's independence of
professional judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship; and
(3) information relating to representation of a client is protected as
required by rule 4-1.6.
(g) Settlement of Claims for Multiple Clients. A lawyer who represents 2
or more clients shall not participate in making an aggregate settlement of the
claims of or against the clients, or in a criminal case an aggregated agreement
as to guilty or nolo contendere pleas, unless each client consents after
consultation, including disclosure of the existence and nature of all the claims
or pleas involved and of the participation of each person in the settlement.
(h) Limiting Liability for Malpractice. A lawyer shall not make an
agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer's liability to a client for
malpractice unless permitted by law and the client is independently
represented in making the agreement. A lawyer shall not settle a claim for
such liability with an unrepresented client or former client without first
1998]
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One of the cornerstones of the lawyer-client relationship is the lawyers'
duty of confidentiality concerning all information relating to the
representation of their clients. This duty was discussed by the Supreme
Court of Florida in the disciplinary case of Florida Bar v. Lange.2  The
lawyer represented a defendant in a federal criminal case. The prosecution
listed the lawyer's former client as a witness. The lawyer filed a "Motion to
Notice Actual Potential Conflict of Interest" in which he disclosed
confidential communications previously received from his former client, the
witness. When later charged by The Florida Bar with violating the lawyer-
client confidentiality under RPC 4-1.6,2 the lawyer defended by asserting
that his actions were justified by the "crime-fraud" exception to the
confidentiality rule.26 Rejecting this defense, the court explained the scope
of this portion of the rule."27 While lawyers ordinarily are required to hold in
confidence all "information relating to representation of a client," an
exception to this rule requires disclosure of confidential information to
prevent the client's commission of a crime.28 However, the disclosure by
Lange related to crimes that had already occurred and, thus, was not
authorized by the rule.29 In a footnote, the court noted how the distinction
between the evidenciary lawyer-client privilege and the ethical duty of
advising that person in writing that independent representation is appropriate
in connection therewith.
(i) Acquiring Proprietary Interest in Cause of Action. A lawyer shall not
acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of
litigation the lawyer is conducting for a client, except that the lawyer may:
(1) acquire a lien granted by law to secure the lawyer's fee or
expenses; and
(2) contract with a client for a reasonable contingent fee.
RPC 4-1.8.
23. RPC 4-1.9, "Conflict of Interest; Former Client," provides:
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not
thereafter:
(a) represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter
in which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the
former client unless the former client consents after consultation; or
(b) use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of
the former client except as rule 4-1.6 would permit with respect to a client or
when the information has become generally known.
RPC 4-1.9.
24. 711 So. 2d 518 (Fla. 1998).
25. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
26. Lange, 711 So. 2d at 519.
27. Id. at 519-20.
28. Id. at 519 (quoting RPC 4-1.6).
29. Id. at 520.
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confidentiality related to this case: "Even if respondent believed that no
attorney-client privilege existed under [Florida Statutes section] 90.502, his
actions nevertheless were guided by [RPC] 4-1.6, which forbids attorneys to
disclose client confidences unless disclosure is necessary to prevent a crime
from occurring.
'00
A lawyer's handling of property relating to the representation of a client
can not only implicate the confidentiality rule, but other ethical principles as
well. The disagreements between lawyers and their clients often arise in
connection with a client's request to review or obtain materials from case
files, particularly after the parties terminate the representation. Florida
reported two cases on this subject in 1998.31
The Supreme Court of Florida reviewed the standards relating to a
client's access to file material in Long v. Dillinger.32  Although files
maintained by lawyers on their clients' cases are commonly referred to by
the client's name, the court endorsed the position, previously expressed in
Florida case law33 and ethics opinions,34 that "such referral simply means
that the file relates to a particular client; the file and its contents are the
personal property of the attorney. 35 In Long, a former client of the public
defender's office was represented by the capital collateral representative
("CCR"). The former client sought possession of the public defender's file
on his case. The court concluded that a public defender's file on a client is
the property of the public defender. 6 The court further concluded, however,
that the public defender must allow CCR to view the file and must provide,
"for adequate compensation, copies of all useful information contained in
the file." ,' The supreme court echoed the Fifth District Court of Appeal's
view that "under certain circumstances, an ethical duty may exist to
communicate information regarding a case to a successor counsel. 35
30. Id. at 520 n. 2.
31. See Guetzloe v. Hartley, 710 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998); Marcus
v. Sullivan, 701 So. 2d 660 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
32. 701 So. 2d 1168 (Fla. 1997).
33. See, e.g., Woodson v. Durocher, 588 So. 2d 644 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991);
Dowda & Fields v. Cobb, 452 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
34. See, e.g., Fla. Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 88-11 (1993)
(Reconsideration); Fla. Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 88-11 (1988); Fla. Bar Comm.
on Professional Ethics, Op. 71-57 (1971); Fla. Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 71-57
(1971).
35. Long, 701 So. 2d at 1169 (citing Dowda & Fields v. Cobb, 452 So. 2d 1140, 1142
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1984)).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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Finally, the court noted that any transcripts or records that the public
defender prepared at the public's expense should be surrendered to CCR for
the former client at no charge.
39
This latter proposition was central to the Fifth District Court of
Appeal's decision in McCaskill v. Dees. The former client of a court-
appointed private lawyer sought a writ of mandamus to compel counsel to
furnish him with certain materials from the file, including depositions and
witness statements. The court held that, in this situation, mandamus would
lie to compel the lawyer to furnish the requested documents. 4' In support of
its decision, the court cited two cases deciding that, as an exception to the
42general rule reiterated in Long regarding lawyer ownership of the case file,
documents prepared at public expense must always be furnished by court-
appointed counsel to their clients.43 The court also referred to RPC 4-1.16(d).44
Fees charged by lawyers are often the topic of litigation, and 1998
included its share of cases in this sensitive area. Negotiating a fee agreement
with a client presents a lawyer with a potential, but largely unavoidable,
conflict of interest. Terms favorable to the lawyer may be seen as
unfavorable from the client's point of view. The specific terms of the
agreement may, themselves, create a conflict situation. In Cole v. State,45 the
lawyer-client employment agreement in a felony criminal case provided that
the flat fee paid by the client would include all discovery and investigative
fees, as well as the fee for the lawyer's services. 46 The court noted that an
"inherent conflict" was presented because the arrangement provided that the
out-of-pocket discovery and investigative costs came from the lawyer's
39. Id.
40. 698 So. 2d 628 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
41. Id. at 628.
42. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
43. McCaskill, 698 So. 2d at 628 (citing Bermed v. Tacher, 565 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1990). See also Dubose v. Shelnutt, 566 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1990)).
44. McCaskill, 698 So. 2d at 628. (citing RPC 4-1.16(d)). Subdivision (d) of RPC 4-
1.16, "DECLINING OR TERMINATING REPRESENTATION," provides:
(d) Protection of Client's Interest. Upon termination of representation, a
lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a
client's interest, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time
for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which
the client is entitled, and refunding any advance payment of fee that has not
been earned. The lawyer may retain papers and other property relating to or
belonging to the client to the extent permitted by law.
RPC 4-1.16(d).
45. 700 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
46. Id. at 37.
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pocket rather than from the client's. 47 Although not discussed by the court,
this type of fee agreement, if not structured properly, could also violate the
lawyer trust accounting rules.48
Fee related conflict issues also are presented when a client's fee is paid
by a third party.49 Marcus v. Sullivan50 was a civil case concerning a
promissory note for a client's legal fees executed by the client's girlfriend. 5'
She was not represented by independent counsel in making the note. When
the lawyer sued on the note, the girlfriend defended by asserting that she
signed it under duress. The trial judge agreed, finding that a conflict existed
due to the circumstances and relationships involved and that, as a result, the
lawyer should have advised the client's girlfriend to have independent
counsel regarding signing the promissory note.52 The trial court held that
duress was present and declared the note to be unenforceable.53  The
appellate court reversed, stating that it was "aware of no law that an attorney
need require the payee of a note to secure counsel prior to signing a note to
47. Id. The conflict was particularly pronounced, and deception appeared to be
present, in view of the lawyer's stated "policy" of not conducting discovery in these types of
cases. Id.
48. See Fla. Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 93-2 (1993).
49. Subdivision (f) of RPC 4-1.8, "CONFLICT OF INTEREST; PROHIBITED
TRANSACTIONS," provides:
(f) Compensation by Third Party. A lawyer shall not accept compensation
for representing a client from one other than the client unless:
(1) the client consents after consultation;
(2) there is no interference with the lawyer's independence of
professional judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship; and
(3) information relating to representation of a client is protected as
required by RPC 4-1.6.
RPC 4-1.8(0.
50. 701 So. 2d 660 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
51. Id. at 660.
52. Id. at 662 (citing RPC 4-4.3). RPC 4-4.3, "DEALING WITH
UNREPRESENTED PERSONS," provides:
In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by
counsel, a lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested.
When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the unrepresented
person misunderstands the lawyer's role in the matter, the lawyer shall make
reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding.
RPC 4-4.3.
53. Marcus, 701 So. 2d at 662.
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secure the legal fees of another., 54 The trial court's legal conclusion of
duress was deemed incorrect.55
In addition to maintaining sensitivity to ethical questions of conflicts
and legal issues such as duress in the making of fee contracts, Florida
lawyers must adhere to the specific provisions of the rule that regulate first
party fee agreements and payments. Decisions in the past year continued the
recent trend of requiring strict adherence to these rules in the civil, as well as
in the disciplinary, context.56 Guetzloe v. Hartley57 concerned lawyers who
had defended a client in a replevin action and had filed counterclaims on the
client's behalf for breach of contract, quantum meruit, and several torts
(including assault).5 8 The original lawyer-client fee agreement provided for
payment of an hourly fee plus a percentage of any recovery obtained for the
client. When the client became seriously delinquent in his hourly fee
obligations, the parties renegotiated the fee agreement. The client still did
not pay the fees charged, and the firm sued to collect.
59
One of the defenses raised by the client was the lawyer's alleged
noncompliance with RPC 4-1.5. 60  This rule contains ethical regulations
54. Id. at 663.
55. Id. at 662.
56. See, e.g., Foodtown Inc. v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 483 (11th Cir. 1996)
(holding oral contingent fee agreements that do not comply with ethics rules governing
contingent fee contracts cannot be considered by a court in determining fees recoverable under
the Florida Fee-Shifting Statute); Florida Bar v. Rubin, 709 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 1998) (holding
discipline warranted against lawyer who filed a complaint against another lawyer on alleged
verbal referral fee agreement which did not comply with ethics rules); Chandris, S.A. v.
Yanakakis, 668 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1995) (holding contingent fee agreements that do not comply
with the Code of Professional Responsibility or Rules Regulating The Florida Bar are not
enforceable by an attorney who claims fees based upon a noncomplying agreement). See also
infra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
57. 710 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
58. Id. at 1044.
59. Id. at 1044-45.
60. Subdivision (f) of RPC4-1.5, "FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES," provides:
(f) Contingent Fees. As to contingent fees:
(1) A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for which the
service is rendered, except in a matter in which a contingent fee is prohibited
by paragraph (0(3) or by law. A contingent fee agreement shall be in writing
and shall state the method by which the fee is to be determined, including the
percentage or percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer in the event of
settlement, trial, or appeal, litigation and other expenses to be deducted from
the recovery, and whether such expenses are to be deducted before or after
the contingent fee is calculated. Upon conclusion of a contingent fee matter,
the lawyer shall provide the client with a written statement stating the
outcome of the matter and, if there is a recovery, showing the remittance to
the client and the method of its determination.
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(2) Every lawyer who accepts a retainer or enters into an agreement,
express or implied, for compensation for services rendered or to be rendered
in any action, claim, or proceeding whereby the lawyer's compensation is to
be dependent or contingent in whole or in part upon the successful
prosecution or settlement thereof shall do so only where such fee arrangement
is reduced to a written contract, signed by the client, and by a lawyer for the
lawyer or for the law firm representing the client. No lawyer or firm may
participate in the fee without the consent of the client in writing. Each
participating lawyer or law firm shall sign the contract with the client and
shall agree to assume joint legal responsibility to the client for the
performance of the services in question as if each were partners of the other
lawyer or law firm involved. The client shall be furnished with a copy of the
signed contract and any subsequent notices or consents. All provisions of
this rule shall apply to such fee contracts.
(3) A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect:
(A) any fee in a domestic relations matter, the payment or amount
of which is contingent upon the securing of a divorce or upon the amount of
alimony or support, or property settlement in lieu thereof; or
(B) a contingent fee for representing a defendant in a criminal
case.
(4) A lawyer who enters into an arrangement for, charges, or collects
any fee in an action or claim for personal injury or for property damages or
for death or loss of services resulting from personal injuries based upon
tortious conduct of another, including products liability claims, whereby the
compensation is to be dependent or contingent in whole or in part upon the
successful prosecution or settlement thereof shall do so only under the
following requirements:
(A) The contract shall contain the following provisions:
(i) The undersigned client has, before signing this contract,
received and read the statement of client's rights and understands each of the
rights set forth therein. The undersigned client has signed the statement and
received a signed copy to refer to while being represented by the undersigned
attorney(s).
(ii) This contract may be cancelled by written notification
to the attorney at any time within 3 business days of the date the contract was
signed, as shown below, and if cancelled the client shall not be obligated to
pay any fees to the attorney for the work performed during that time. If the
attorney has advanced funds to others in representation of the client, the
attorney is entitled to be reimbursed for such amounts as the attorney has
reasonably advanced on behalf of the client.
(B) The contract for representation of a client in a matter set forth
in subdivision (0(4) may provide for a contingent fee arrangement as agreed
upon by the client and the lawyer, except as limited by the following
provisions:
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(i) Without prior court approval as specified below, any
contingent fee that exceeds the following standards shall be presumed, unless
rebutted, to be clearly excessive:
a. Before the filing of an answer or the demand for
appointment of arbitrators or, if no answer is filed or no demand for
appointment of arbitrators is made, the expiration of the time period provided
for such action:
1. 33 1/3% of any recovery up to $1 million; plus
2. 30% of any portion of the recovery between $1
million and $2 million; plus
3. 20% of any portion of the recovery exceeding $2
million.
b. After the filing of an answer or the demand for
appointment of arbitrators or, if no answer is filed or no demand for
appointment of arbitrators is made, the expiration of the time period provided
for such action, through the entry of judgment:
1. 40% of any recovery up to $1 million; plus
2. 30% of any portion of the recovery between $1
million and $2 million; plus
3. 20% of any portion of the recovery exceeding $2
million.
c. If all defendants admit liability at the time of filing
their answers and request a trial only on damages:
1. 33 1/3% of any recovery up to $1 million; plus
2. 20% of any portion of the recovery between $1
million and $2 million; plus
3. 15% of any portion of the recovery exceeding $2
million.
d. An additional 5% of any recovery after notice of
appeal is filed or post-judgment relief or action is required for recovery on the
judgment.
(ii) If any client is unable to obtain an attorney of the
client's choice because of the limitations set forth in (f)(4)(B)(i), the client
may petition the circuit court for approval of any fee contract between the
client and an attorney of the client's choosing. Such authorization shall be
given if the court determines the client has a complete understanding of the
client's rights and the terms of the proposed contract. The application for
authorization of such a contract can be filed as a separate proceeding before
suit or simultaneously with the filing of a complaint. Proceedings thereon
may occur before service on the defendant and this aspect of the file may be
sealed. Authorization of such a contract shall not bar subsequent inquiry as
to whether the fee actually claimed or charged is clearly excessive under
subdivisions (a) and (b).
(iii) In cases where the client is to receive a recovery that
will be paid to the client on a future structured or periodic basis, the
contingent fee percentage shall only be calculated on the cost of the
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structured verdict or settlement or, if the cost is unknown, on the present
money value of the structured verdict or settlement, whichever is less. If the
damages and the fee are to be paid out over the long term future schedule,
then this limitation does not apply. No attorney may separately negotiate
with the defendant for that attorney's fee in a structured verdict or settlement
where such separate negotiations would place the attorney in a position of
conflict.
(C) Before a lawyer enters into a contingent fee contract for
representation of a client in a matter set forth in this rule, the lawyer shall
provide the client with a copy of the statement of client's rights and shall
afford the client a full and complete opportunity to understand each of the
rights as set forth therein. A copy of the statement, signed by both the client
and the lawyer, shall be given to the client to retain and the lawyer shall keep
a copy in the client's file. The statement shall be retained by the lawyer with
the written fee contract and closing statement under the same conditions and
requirements as subdivision (0(5).
(D) As to lawyers not in the same firm, a division of any fee
within subdivision (0(4) shall be on the following basis:
(i) To the lawyer assuming primary responsibility for the
legal services on behalf of the client, a minimum of 75% of the total fee.
(ii) To the lawyer assuming secondary responsibility for the
legal services on behalf of the client, a maximum of 25% of the total fee. Any
fee.in excess of 25% shall be presumed to be clearly excessive.
(iii) The 25% limitation shall not apply to those cases in
which 2 or more lawyers or firms accept substantially equal active
participation in the providing of legal services. In such circumstances
counsel shall apply for circuit court authorization of the fee division in excess
of 25%, based upon a sworn petition signed by all counsel that shall disclose
in detail those services to be performed. The application for authorization of
such a contract may be filed as a separate proceeding before suit or
simultaneously with the filing of a complaint. Proceedings thereon may occur
before service of process on any party and this aspect of the file may be
sealed. Authorization of such contract shall not bar subsequent inquiry as to
whether the fee actually claimed or charged is clearly excessive. An
application under this subdivision shall contain a certificate showing service
on the client and The Florida Bar. Counsel may proceed with representation
of the client pending court approval.
(iv) The percentages required by this subdivision shall be
applicable after deduction of any fee payable to separate counsel retained
especially for appellate purposes.
(5) In the event there is a recovery, upon the conclusion of the
representation, the lawyer shall prepare a closing statement reflecting an
itemization of all costs and expenses, together with the amount of fee
received by each participating lawyer or law firm. A copy of the closing
statement shall be executed by all participating lawyers, as well as the client,
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governing all fees charged or collected by lawyers. 61 The rule includes both
provisions generally applicable to contingent fees and additional, detailed
regulations (e.g., a maximum fee schedule, a requirement that attorneys
furnish clients written "Statements of Client's Rights") that apply to
contingent fees for claims involving "personal injury or for property
damages or for death or loss of services resulting from personal injuries
based uon tortious conduct of another, including products liability
claims." The client asserted that the lawyers' failure to provide him with
the "Statement of Client's Rights" violated RPC 4-1.5 and, thus, rendered
the entire fee agreement void and unenforceable. Rejecting this contention,
the Fifth District Court of Appeal noted that the client's tort claims arose in
the context of the replevin case, which was a commercial action. 63 The
comment to RPC 4-1.5 expressly states that the provisions of the rule
governing contingent fees in personal injury type tort cases "should not be
construed to apply to actions or claims seeking property or other damages
arising in the commercial litigation context."
64
The failure to observe the requirements of the ethics rules for fee
divisions, in the referral fee situation, led to the imposition of discipline
in Florida Bar v. Rubin.65 Lawyer Rubin filed a grievance complaint with
The Florida Bar, alleging that another lawyer had acted unethically by
failing to pay him an allegedly agreed upon referral fee in a contingent fee
matter. Rubin sued the other lawyer for the fee. Turning the tables, the Bar
filed disciplinary charges against Rubin. 66 RPC 4-1.5(f)(2) requires that
every lawyer or law firm who participates in a contingent fee sign the
contract with the client.67 Rubin had not signed the contract in the case in
question. The Supreme Court of Florida ordered him publicly reprimanded,
explaining:
and each shall receive a copy. Each participating lawyer shall retain a copy of
the written fee contract and closing statement for 6 years after execution of
the closing statement. Any contingent fee contract and closing statement
shall be available for inspection at reasonable times by the client, by any
other person upon judicial order, or by the appropriate disciplinary agency.
RPC 4-1.5(f).
61. Id. at 4-1.5(f)(4)(B).
62. Id. at 4-1.5(f).
63. Guetzloe, 710 So. 2d at 1045.
64. Id. (RPC 4-1.5(f)).
64. Id. at 4-1.5(f)(4)(B).
64. Id. at 4-1.5(f).
64. Guetzloe, 710 So. 2d at 1045 (quoting RPC 4-1.5 cmt.).
65. 709 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 1998).
66. Id. at 1362.
67. RPC 4-1.5(f(2). See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
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This Court expects strict compliance with this rule and similar rules
requiring a client's written consent to an attorney's fee regardless
of the circumstances involved. These requirements must be
diligently adhered to and enforced in order to avoid the
troublesome situation which arose in this case and, more
importantly, to preserve public confidence in the legal profession.
68
In not complying with the rule requiring a written fee agreement,
negative consequences arose for the lawyer in D.H. Blair & Co. v.
Johnson.69  A National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD")
arbitration panel awarded the claimants damages.70 Moreover, the panel also
awarded attorneys' fees in an amount to be determined by a court of
competent jurisdiction.71 The trial court determined and awarded the amount
72of fees for the work of two lawyers, Tepper and Weissman. On appeal, the
Fourth District Court of Appeal overturned the award of attorneys' fees on
an issue of law.73 Additionally, however, the court concluded that the award
of fees for Weissman's work was improper because he had not signed the fee
agreement with the clients, as required by RPC 4-1.5(f)(2).74 Interestingly,
the court's opinion did not cite Chandris, S.A. v. Yanakakis.75S • 76
Noris v. Silver was a case in which a Florida court cited and discussed
Chandris.7  Client Noris sued lawyer Silver for legal malpractice and
negligent referral. Noris alleged that he was injured while visiting another
state. He contacted Silver, who referred him to lawyer Falk. In the past,
Silver had referred clients to Falk and received a share of Falk's fee. Noris
68. Rubin, 709 So. 2d at 1364 (citing Chandris, S.A. v. Yanakakis, 668 So. 2d 180
(Fla. 1995) (holding that a contingent fee agreement is void if not in compliance with the
rules)). Regarding the import of Chandris, see Timothy P. Chinaris, Professional
Responsibility: 1996 Survey of Florida Law, 21 NovA L. REv. 231, 260-65 (1996)
(hereinafter "Chinaris").
69. 697 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
70. Id. at 913.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. D.H. Blair & Co., 697 So. 2d at 914 (citing RPC 4-1.5(0(2)). See supra note 60
and accompanying text.
75. D.H. Blair & Co., 697 So. 2d at 914 (referring to Chandris, S.A. v. Yanakakis,
668 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1995)). The court, however, did cite Perez v. George, Hartz, Lundeen,
Flagg & Fulmer, 662 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995), which held that a law firm not
entitled to fee where the "client" did not sign contract with firm or agree to formal affiliation
between his counsel and firm. Id.
76. 701 So. 2d 1238 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (opinion on rehearing).
77. Id. at 1240-41.
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retained Falk to handle his injury claim. The Noris-Falk employment
agreement did not mention Silver, and Silver and Falk did not execute a
written fee division agreement. Falk let the statute of limitations lapse
without filing suit. Noris then sued Silver.7 s
The trial court entered an order of summary judgment for Silver on the
legal malpractice claim, and ordered the negligent referral claim dismissed.79
The Third District Court of Appeal reversed the summary judgment order
on the malpractice claim.80 The court concluded that a genuine issue of
material fact existed regarding whether Silver had retained a financial
interest in Noris's case by expressly or impliedly agreeing to divide the legal
fee with Falk. According to the court, this issue was material because
"pursuant to Rules Regulating The Florida Bar 4-1.5(g), if Falk and Silver
agreed to divide the attorney's fee, Silver would be liable for the malpractice
committed by Falk." 2 RPC 4-1.5(g)(2) allows a lawyer to receive what is
commonly called a "referral fee" - that is, a fee that one attorney receives
83for referring a client to another attorney. The fee is "earned" primarily as a
78. Id. at 1239.
79. Id. at 1239-40. Dismissal of the negligent referral claim was affirmed "because
Noris' claim for negligent referral did not allege that Silver had knowledge of any facts that
would indicate that Falk would commit malpractice and because Noris' counsel conceded
during oral argument that Silver had no such knowledge." Id. at 1241.
80. Noris, 701 So. 2d at 1240.
81. Id.
82. Id. (citing to RPC 4-1.5(g)). The court's decision that a fee division agreement,
which apparently did not comply with the relevant ethics rule, thereby creates malpractice
liability because of that rule seems questionable. Furthermore, the Preamble to the RPC states
that breach of the rule "should not give rise to a cause of action nor should it create any
presumption that a legal duty has been breached." RPC preamble. The court acknowledged
the existence of this language, but did not consider it controlling in light of the reasoning
underlying the supreme court's decision in Chandris. Noris, 701 So. 2d at 1240.
83. Subdivision (g) of RPC 4-1.5, "FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES," provides:
(g) Division of Fees Between Lawyers in Different Firms. Subject to the
provisions of subdivision (f)(4)(D), a division of fee between lawyers who are
not in the same firm may be made only if the total fee is reasonable and:
(1) the division is in proportion to the services performed by each
lawyer; or
(2) by written agreement with the client:
(A) each lawyer assumes joint legal responsibility for the
representation and agrees to be available for consultation with the client; and
(B) the agreement fully discloses that a division of fees will be
made and the basis upon which the division of fees will be made.
RPC 4-1.5(g).
Prior to the adoption of the Rules of Professional Conduct (effective Jan. 1, 1987), the
ethics rules did not permit division of fees among attorneys in different firms except on the
basis of work performed. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-107
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result of the referral, rather than from any work performed on the case by the
referring attorney.
The Third District Court of Appeal noted that, pursuant to Chandris,
Silver could not have enforced an oral fee division against Falk. 4
Nevertheless, the court believed that noncompliance with the governing
ethics rule should not be allowed to shield a lawyer from the responsibilities
and liabilities that the court believed the rule imposes.8 5 However, believing
this issue to be one of great public importance, the court certified it to the
Supreme Court of Florida.
86
Another important case in which a Florida court cited Chandris is King
v. Young, Berkman, Berman & Karpf P.A..87 Central to this case was the
applicability of RPC 4-1.5(f)(3)(A), which prohibits lawyers from charging
or collecting a contingent fee "in a domestic relations matter, the payment or
amount of which is contingent upon the securing of a divorce or upon the
amount of alimony or support, or property settlement in lieu thereof." 88 In
King a man retained a law firm to represent him in a dissolution of marriage
case. 9 The written fee agreement provided for a $25,000 nonrefundable
retainer, set hourly rates for the firm's lawyers (ranging from $165 to $325),
and provided for a payment of a "bonus" fee at the conclusion of the case.
(1986). Thus, the rules did not permit referral fees. In adopting the Rules of Professional
Conduct, the Supreme Court of Florida permitted referral fees, subject to certain regulations
(i.e., written agreement signed by all participating attorneys and the client, in which all
attorneys accepted joint legal responsibility for the case and agreed to be available to consult
with the client). The Florida Bar re: Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, 494 So. 2d 977 (Fla.
1986). Effective January 1, 1998, the court amended the rules to restrict the amount of the fee
which the referring attorney court receive in the absence of court approval to 25%. The
Florida Bar re: Amendments to the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, 519 So. 2d 971 (Fla.
1987).
84. Noris, 701 So. 2d at 1240.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1241.
87. 709 So. 2d 572, 574 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
88. Id. at 573. Subdivision (f)(3) of RPC 4-1.5, '"EES FOR LEGAL SERVICES,"
provides:
(3) A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect:
(A) any fee in a domestic relations matter, the payment or amount of
which is contingent upon the securing of a divorce or upon the amount of
alimony or support, or property settlement in lieu thereof; or
(B) a contingent fee for representing a defendant in a criminal case.
RPC 4-1.5(0(3).
89. King, 709 So. 2d at 573.
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This "bonus" fee was to be determined by "taking into consideration the
results achieved and the complexity of the matter."
The client paid the retainer fee and the firm's hourly charges. After the
case was concluded, however, the client refused to pay the $750,000 bonus
fee demanded by the firm. The firm then sued, seeking a bonus fee of
$1,150,000. The client argued, and the Third District Court of Appeal
agreed, that the bonus fee was contingent on the "results obtained."
91
90. Id. at 573 (quoting fee agreement).
91. Id. Subdivision (b) of RPC 4-1.5, "FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES," provides:
(b) Factors to Be Considered in Determining Reasonable Fee. Factors to
be considered as guides in determining a reasonable fee include:
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty, complexity, and difficulty
of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service
properly;
(2) the likelihood that the acceptance of the particular employment will
preclude other employment by the lawyer;
(3) the fee, or rate of fee, customarily charged in the locality for legal
services of a comparable or similar nature;
(4) the significance of, or amount involved in, the subject matter of the
representation, the responsibility involved in the representation, and the
results obtained;
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances
and, as between attorney and client, any additional or special time demands or
requests of the attorney by the client;
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
(7) the experience, reputation, diligence, and ability of the lawyer or
lawyers performing the service and the skill, expertise, or efficiency of effort
reflected in the actual providing of such services; and
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent, and, if fixed as to amount or
rate, then whether the client's ability to pay rested to any significant degree
on the outcome of the representation.
RPC 4-1.5(b) (emphasis added).
It can be argued that a fee based to any significant degree on the "results obtained" for
the client is, in effect, a contingent fee. Regarding the definition of "contingent fee," Florida
case law has stated that "[tihe controlling substantive character of a contingency fee
agreement is the feature that the attorney gets paid in one event and not in another."
Quanstrom v. Standard Guaranty Ins. Co., 519 So. 2d 1135, 1136 n.1 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1988), rev. on other grounds, 555 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 1990). If a "results obtained" fee is indeed
a contingent fee, lawyers may not ethically charge it in most domestic relations cases or in
criminal defense cases. RPC 4-1.5(f(3). Persons who argue that the rules permit "results
obtained" fees in domestic and criminal cases point out that RPC 4-1.5(b) explicitly lists "the
results obtained" as a factor lawyers should consider in setting a reasonable fee. RPC 4-
1.5(b)(4).
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Consequently, the court held that the bonus fee clause called for a prohibited
contingent fee, and thus was unenforceable under the holding in Chandris.92
Another domestic relations case involving a "results obtained" fee is
May v. Sessums & Mason, P.A.. A law firm had represented a client in a
contested dissolution matter, with a fee agreement for hourly billing as well
as a provision stating that, upon conclusion of the case, "an additional
attorney's fee may be requested" based on factors including "results
obtained. 94 The fee contract further stated that this additional fee would be
"subject to discussion and agreement with [the client] prior to such bill being
tendered. ' 95 At the end of the case, and without an agreement by the client,
the law firm billed the client for an additional $1,000,000. The client
refused to pay, the law firm sued to collect, and the firm ultimately obtained
a judgment of $564,500.96
On appeal, the client argued that the "additional fee" provision was an
unethical, unenforceable contingent fee because it was based, at least in part,
on "results obtained."97 The Second District Court of Appeal did not reach
this question.98 Rather, it reversed the lower court's judgment on other
grounds.99 The client had not contracted to pay the additional fee; the
language of the contract only stated that an additional fee might be requested
by the firm.lo0 Regarding the possible effect on the public's perception of
the legal system, however, the court observed:
This is an unfortunate case for the legal profession. Regardless of
the outcome of these proceedings, this case, in all likelihood, will,
justifiably or not, cause some segments of the legal profession to
suffer further disrepute. This is particularly unfortunate because
the disputes at issue could clearly have been avoided by a more
carefully drawn document which the experienced attorneys
involved were fully capable of preparing.
10
'
92. King, 709 So. 2d at 573. After voiding the noncomplying fee agreement, the
court limited the firm's quantum meruit recovery to the amount of fees already received,
$342,989. Id. at 574.
93. 700 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
94. Id. at 23-24.
95. Id. at 24.
96. Id. at 23.
97. Id. at 25.
98. May, 700 So. 2d at 25.
99. Id. at 26.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 28.
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A third case on the subject of "results obtained" fees was Martin L.• • 102
Haines, III, Chartered v. Sophia. A law firm had represented a client in a
family law matter. Throughout the representation the client paid fees
charged on an hourly basis. At the conclusion of the case, the firm sought
additional fees. In the employment contract, the client had agreed that the
parties could determine the amount of fee owed in a summary proceeding to
enforce the firm's charging lien and, consequently, the firm moved to
enforce its charging lien.
ru3
The employment agreement also provided that the firm's final fee, to be
determined at the conclusion of case, would be based on stated criteria,
which were identical to most of the "factors to be considered as guides in
determining a reasonable fee" set out in RPC 4-1.5(b) including the "results
obtained" provision. The Fourth District Court of Appeal construed the
agreement to mean that the "entire fee will be based solely on the hours
billed, unless the client agrees later to an additional amount."105 The court
harmonized this decision with its opinion in Franklin & Marbin, P.A. v.
Mascola, °6 which ruled that the rights and duties of the parties ordinarily are
determined by the fee agreement. 10 7 The court affirmed the trial court's
judgment which held that the client owed no further fees to the law firm.08
As in May, the court did not address whether the "results obtained"
provision ran afoul of the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct.10 9
Other cases have addressed different fee related issues. Hollub v.
Clancy' 0 was an appeal of an attorney's fee award in a commercial
dispute. 1" Appellants argued that the trial court erred by awarding fees for
time charged under an unreasonable unit billing arrangement. The
questionable charges included, for example, twelve instances in which a
lawyer claimed one hour or more to review a one or two page document. As
a result, the Third District Court of Appeal determined the amount of fees
102. 711 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
103. Id. at 209-10.
104. Id. at 209 n.1 (citing RPC 4-1.5(b)). See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
105. Haines, 711 So. 2d at 210.
106. 711 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
107. Id. at 47.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 47 n.1.
110. 706 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
111. Id. at 16.
112. Id. at 19 (citing Browne v. Costales, 579 So. 2d 161, 162 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1991) (stating that "[u]nit billing is a practice where the attorney bills a predetermined number
of minutes for a given task.")). See also Nickerson v. Nickerson, 608 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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awarded to be excessive."13 The court remanded the case with directions for
the trial court to eliminate the unreasonable unit billing amounts." 4
Another Third District Court of Appeal case, Girten v. Andreu,"5
mentioned excessive fees.' 16 The case was a paternity action in which a
major issue of contention was whether the child would bear the surname of
the mother or of the father. Paternity of the child was uncontested. The trial
court ordered the father to pay the mother's attorney fees.' 1 7 The appellate
court affirmed this award. Il Total fees incurred by the parties exceeded
$165,000. The appellate court agreed with the trial court's description of the
total fees incurred in the case as "shocking," but found no abuse of
discretion." 9 A concurring opinion went further, declaring that the adjective
"shocking" "gravely understates the reality.' '* 2 Judge Sorondo thought that
"unconscionable" was a more accurate description. z  A review of the RPC
4-1.5(a)(1), 4-1.5(b)(1) and 4-1.5(b)(4) led him to the conclusion that the
fees generated in the case were "grossly excessive."'
22
Several 1998 cases addressed various aspects of a useful fee collection
tool for lawyers, the charging lien.123 A lawyer's charging lien is perfected
113. Hollub, 706 So. 2d at 19.
114. Id. at 19.
115. 698 So. 2d 886 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
116. Id. at 889.
117. Id. at 888.
118. Id. at 887.
119. Id. at 888-89.
120. Girten, 698 So. 2d at 889 (Sorondo, J., concurring specially).
121. Id.
122. Id. (Jorgenson, J., concurring specially) (citing RPC 4-1.5(a)). Subdivision (a) of
RPC 4-1.5, "FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES," provides:
(a) Illegal, Prohibited, or Clearly Excessive Fees. An attorney shall not
enter into an agreement for, charge, or collect an illegal, prohibited, or clearly
excessive fee or a fee generated by employment that was obtained through
advertising or solicitation not in compliance with the Rules Regulating The
Florida Bar. A fee is clearly excessive when:
(1) after a review of the facts, a lawyer of ordinary prudence would be
left with a definite and firm conviction that the fee exceeds a reasonable fee
for services provided to such a degree as to constitute clear overreaching or
an unconscionable demand by the attorney; or
(2) the fee is sought or secured by the attorney by means of intentional
misrepresentation or fraud upon the client, a nonclient party, or any court, as
to either entitlement to, or amount of, the fee.
RPC 4-1.5(a).
123. See, e.g., Sinclair, Louis, Siegel, Heath, Nussbaum & Zavertnik, P.A. v. Baucom,
428 So. 2d 1383, 1384 (Fla. 1983) ("charging lien is an equitable right to have costs and fees
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by providing timely notice to the affected parties. 124 In Gaebe, Murphy,
Mullen & Antonelli v. Bradt, 25 the court addressed the question of what
constituted timely notice. 126  A law firm withdrew from representing a
plaintiff in a wrongful death action and filed a charging lien. The firm sent a
notice of the charging lien to its former client and to the lawyer for the
defendant, although the defendant's lawyer asserted that he never received it.
The firm apparently did not send a notice to the defendant's insurer. New
counsel took over the plaintiff's case and settled it. When the law firm
attempted to enforce its charging lien, the trial court allowed enforcement
against only the firm's former client, ruling that the defendant's counsel and
insurer had not received notice of the lien. 127 The Fourth District Court of
Appeal reversed, agreeing with the law firm that "the filing of the charging
lien prior to the dismissal of the case and/or entry of judgment constituted
timely notice and, thus, perfected the lien against [defense counsel and the
insurer] .128
Cohen & Cohen, P.A. v. Angrand 29 also addressed the issue of
sufficient notice of a claimed charging lien.' 30  In Angrand, a law firm
represented a client in a case involving three separate lawsuits. Eventually
the client discharged the firm without cause."" The firm then filed a
charging lien, but used the wrong case number. The court clerk noticed the
error and filed the lien in one of the cases, but not in the other. Later, when
the firm sought to enforce its charging lien, a general master ruled that the
typographical error rendered the lien a nullity and denied its claim of fees.
132
Reversing, the appellate court concluded that the lien was enforceable
due an attorney for services in the suit secured to him in the judgment or recovery in that
particular suit"). Id.
124. Id. at 1385.
125. 704 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
126. Id. at 618.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 619.
129. 710 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
130. Id. at 166.
131. Id. at 167. A discharged lawyer's right to a fee for services performed prior to
discharge can differ greatly, depending on whether the discharge was with or without cause.
Compare Rosenberg v. Levin, 409 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 1982) (holding that a lawyer discharged
without cause was entitled to a reasonable value of services performed, limited by a maximum
contract fee), with Searcy, Denney, Scarola, Barnhart & Shipley, P.A. v. Scheller, 629 So. 2d
947 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that a lawyer discharged with cause was entitled to
quantum meruit value of services rendered minus the damages suffered by client as result of
the lawyer's breach of contract). See also Kushner v. Engelberg, Cantor & Leone, P.A., 699
So. 2d 850 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
132. Angrand, 710 So. 2d at 167.
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because the firm's intent was obvious and there was no claim that the firm
misled any of the parties or that any of the parties failed to receive notice.
133
In Kushner v. Engelberg, Cantor & Leone, P.A.,3 the proper method of
calculating the amount of fees due under a claimed charging lien was at
issue.135 In an estate matter, a personal representative discharged his lawyer
with cause. 36 Citing Searcy, Denney, Scarola, Barnhart & Shipley, P.A. v.
Scheller,1 37 the Fourth District Court of Appeal concluded that the
discharged lawyer was entitled to the "quantum meruit value of the services
rendered less any damages which the client incurred due to the attorney's
conduct and discharge."'
Another charging lien case concerning fee calculation was Carbonic
Consultants, Inc. v. Herzfeld & Rubin, Inc.,13 9 in which a law firm
represented a client on a contingent fee basis in an antitrust case.140 The firm
moved to withdraw from the case because the lawyer who actually was
handling the case resigned from the firm. The trial court granted the motion
to withdraw and the firm's motion for a charging lien.14 1 However, the Third
District Court of Appeal reversed the order granting the charging lien.
142
The court recited the rule, established by the Supreme Court of Florida in
Faro v. Romani,143 that a lawyer who voluntarily withdraws from a
contingent fee case before the contingency occurs ordinarily is not entitled to
any fee. 44 An exception to this "no fee rule" occurs when the client's
conduct makes the representation legally impossible or will result in ethical
violations by the lawyer.145
Applying the principles of Faro, the Third District Court of Appeal
held that the trial court erred in granting the charging lien. 46 The firm, not
the client, created the firm's ethical problem of remaining in the case
133. Id.
134. 699 So. 2d 850 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
135. Id. at 851.
136. Id. For the distinction between a discharge with cause and a discharge without
cause for purposes of calculating fees owed, see supra note 130 and accompanying text.
137. 629 So. 2d 947 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
138. Kushner, 699 So. 2d at 851. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
139. 699 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
140. Id. at 322.
141. Id. at 323.
142. Id. at 322.
143. 641 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 1994).
144. Carbonic, 699 So. 2d at 323 (citing Faro v. Romani, 641 So. 2d 69, 71 (Fla.
1994)).
145. Faro, 641 So. 2d at 71.
146. Carbonic, 699 So. 2d at 322.
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without the necessary subject matter expertise. The client had not engaged
in any conduct that would have made the firm's continued representation
unethical. Accordingly, the firm forfeited its right to a fee when it withdrew
from the case.147
At least one charging lien case addressed broader issues relating to fee
agreements between lawyer and client. In Franklin & Marbin, P.A. v.
Mascola, 48 a client in a paternity case hired a law firm and entered into a fee
contract providing, inter alia, that the client would: 1) pay the firm a
"reasonable attorney's fee against which [the firm] will bill [the client] in
accordance with our established hourly rates;" and 2) read all billing
statements and notify the firm in writing within fifteen days of any
objections, with failure to do so presumed to be agreement with the
"correctness, accuracy and fairness" of the bill.149 Prior to conclusion of the
case, the firm withdrew and filed a notice of charging lien. Evidence
adduced by the firm in support of its claim of lien included unobjected to
bills sent to the client totaling more than $19,000. The trial court entered
judgment for the firm, but in the amount of only $6800. 50
The law firm appealed, contending that the trial court erred because the
fee contract, in particular, the provision waiving client objections to the bill
if not presented within fifteen days, was controlling 51 The client, on the
other hand, argued that the court should uphold the judgment because the
law required the court only to award a reasonable fee, as opposed to the fee
the law firm actually billed.
5 2
The Fourth District Court of Appeal's opinion reviewed Florida law
concerning client liability to his or her lawyer under various
circumstances. 53 Relying on cases concluding that the lodestar formula of
Florida Patients Compensation Fund v. Rowe 154 is inapplicable to alawyer's claim for fees directly from the lawyer's client, as well as RPC 4-
147. Id. at 321. The fact that the firm procured an informal advisory opinion from the
staff of The Florida Bar Ethics Department was not, in the court's opinion, determinative. Id.
at 324. Although the Bar staff opinion correctly concluded that the law firm's continued
representation of the client would be unethical under these circumstances, this did not change
the fact that the firm, not the client, created the ethical dilemma. Id. Regarding issuance of
informal advisory opinions, see Florida Bar Procedures for Ruling on Questions of Ethics, 70
FLA. B. J. 684, 864-85 (Sept. 1996).
148. 711 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998). See also supra note 105 and
accompanying text.
149. Franklin, 711 So. 2d at 47-48 (emphasis omitted).
150. Id. at48.
151. Id. at49.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 49-50.
154. 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985).
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1.5(d),155 the court concluded that, under the facts of this case, "[i]n the
absence of a legal determination by the court that the fee contract is illegal,
prohibited or excessive, under a periodic fee agreement for services already
performed the lawyer is entitled to a money judgment for the amount of fees
due under the contract. ' 56
Despite what appeared to be a favorable construction of law, the firm
ended up with a disappointing result. Although it might have prevailed in an
action at law seeking a money judgment, the firm was seeking to recover on
a charging lien theory. A basic tenant of Florida law is that a charging lien
can attach only to funds or property recovered in the case at issue. 57 In this
case, there had been no such recovery to which a lien could attach and, thus,
the court reversed the judgment. 158
Application of the ethics rules prohibiting clearly excessive fees was a
central issue in another charging lien case. In Kerrigan, Estess, Rankin &
McLeod v. State,1 59 lawyers who represented the state in litigation against
tobacco companies attempted to enforce their claimed charging lien. 6° - The
state moved to quash the lien under the doctrine of sovereign immunity and
under other grounds. The trial court ultimately quashed the lien, but on
grounds neither pleaded nor argued by the parties. 61 Relying on the
155. Subdivision (d) of RPC 4-1.5, "ENFORCEABILITY OF FEE CONTRACTS,"
provides:
(d) Enforceability of Fee Contracts. Contracts or agreements for attorney's
fees between attorney and client will ordinarily be enforceable according to
the terms of such contracts or agreements, unless found to be illegal, obtained
through advertising or solicitation not in compliance with the Rules
Regulating The Florida Bar, prohibited by this rule, or clearly excessive as
defined by this rule.
RPC 4-1.5(d).
In prefacing its reference to RPC 4-1.5(d), the court cited Chandris, supra
notes 67 and 81, for the proposition that "fee contracts that do not comply with the
lawyer disciplinary rules are subject to being held void as against public policy."
Franklin, 711 So. 2d at 51 n.8. The court noted that there was "no evidence that the
present agreement was obtained through noncomplying advertising or solicitation."
Id. at 51.
156. Id. at 52 (citing Lugassy v. Independent Fire Ins. Co., 636 So. 2d 1332 (Fla.
1994); Pierce v. Issac, 184 So. 509 (Fla. 1938); Stabinski, Funt & De Oliveira, P.A. v. Law
Offices of Frank H. Alvarez, 490 So. 2d 159 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1986)).
157. See, e.g., Litman v. Fine, Jacobson, Schwartz, Nash, Block & England, P.A., 517
So. 2d 88, 92 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
158. Franklin, 711 So. 2d at 52.
159. 711 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
160. Id. at 1247.
161. Id. at 1249.
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rationale of Chandris,162 the Fourth District Court of Appeal ruled that the
amount of fee claimed by the law firms was violative of the RPC 4-1.5 as
unreasonable and unconscionable.
1 63
The law firms appealed the order, asserting that the court raised the
issue of unconscionability of the claimed fee sua sponte without proper
notice, and that the firms had no opportunity to present evidence or argument
relating to this issue. Holding that the trial court's action denied the law
firms due process, the appellate court reversed the order and remanded the
case for further proceedings.'
64
As seen above, the majority of attorney's lien cases reported in 1998
dealt with charging liens. Florida law recognizes a second type of common
law attorney's lien, called a "retaining lien. 165 Rathbu v. Policastro6 6
involved an interesting application of the retaining lien doctrine. 67 Despite
a lawyer's assertion of a retaining lien, the trial court ordered the lawyer to
disclose during her testimony all statements made to others by her. 68 In
addressing the matter on appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal noted
that, as it stated in a prior decision, "the value of a retaining lien rests
entirely upon the attorney's right to retain possession until the bill is paid"
and that, consequently, "courts may not impair that lien by compelling
disclosure of the paper or items" upon which the attorney asserts the lien. 69-
Although the court had not ordered the lawyer to reveal her file or any items
in it, the appellate court reasoned that the order compelling testimonial
disclosure of the statements in question could result in disclosure of work
product information and thus could "improperly impinge upon [the lawyer]'s
retaining lien, just as forced disclosure of her file's contents could do."' 10
Accordingly, the court quashed the order.'
71
Florida courts addressed a final aspect of the lawyer-client relationship
in cases where that relationship was broken down as a result of the lawyer's
162. 668 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1995). See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
163. Kerrigan, 711 So. 2d at 1249 (citing RPC 4-1.5(a)). See supra note 154 and
accompanying text.
164. Kerrigan, 711 So. 2d at 1249.
165. A retaining lien is a possessory lien, asserted as security for payment of accrued
but unpaid fees or costs, that a lawyer has on papers, funds, and other property of his or her
client that comes into the lawyer's possession in the course of the lawyer's professional
employment. See, e.g, Daniel Mones, P.A. v. Smith, 486 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 1986); Wintter v.
Fabber, 618 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Dowda & Fields, P.A. v. Cobb, 452
So. 2d 1140 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
166. 703 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
167. Id. at 537.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Rathburn, 703 So. 2d at 537.
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alleged legal malpractice. 172 Although the preamble to the Florida Rules of
Professional Conduct states that the violation of a rule "should not give rise
to a cause of action nor should it create any presumption that a legal duty has
been breached,"173 there are instances in which the rules are relevant to
issues of alleged malpractice. 174 Rule 4-1.8(h), for example, sets parameters
within which lawyers who wish to limit their liability to clients for legal
malpractice must operate. 175  176
In Florida Bar v. Jordan, a lawyer had represented a client in a civil
action that the trial court ultimately dismissed. 7 7 The lawyer did not notify
the client of the dismissal. When the client became aware of the dismissal
and confronted the lawyer, the lawyer offered to pay the client for her
damages by entering into a contract with her. The lawyer, however, "never
advised [the client] that she should seek independent representation in
connection with a claim for professional malpractice."17 8  The Supreme
Court of Florida concluded that this conduct violated RPC 4-1.8(h) and, for
this and other violations, suspended the lawyer from practice for one year.
179
Another case, Kozich v. Shahady,rS° discussed the lawyer-client
relationship in the context of a legal malpractice action. 181 A law firm
represented a client in a civil matter. Four days before the jury rendered its
verdict, the client assigned his right to the jury award to his brother.
Unhappy with the amount of the verdict, the client sued the law firm for
malpractice. In its defense, the firm argued that the client was not the real
party in interest because of the assignment that he executed in favor of his
172. See infra notes 173, 177.
173. RPC preamble.
174. Id.
175. Rathburn, 703 So. 2d at 537. Subdivision (h) of RPC 4-1.8, "CONFLICT OF
INTEREST; PROHIBITED TRANSACTIONS," provides:
(h) Limiting Liability for Malpractice. A lawyer shall not make an
agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer's liability to a client for
malpractice unless permitted by law and the client is independently
represented in making the agreement. A lawyer shall not settle a claim for
such liability with an unrepresented client or former client without first
advising that person in writing that independent representation is appropriate
in connection therewith.
RPC 4-1.8(h).
176. 705 So. 2d 1387 (Fla. 1998).
177. Id. at 1389.
178. Id. at 1390.
179. Id.
180. 702 So. 2d 1289 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
181. Id. at 1289.
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brother in the underlying suit. 8 2 If this argument was valid, the firm would
have been insulated from malpractice liability in the case because Florida
law does not recognize assignments of legal malpractice claims.
183
Reversing the summary judgment that the trial court had granted in
favor of the firm, the Fourth District Court of Appeal noted that the client
had assigned only his right to "the jury award," not his entire interest in the
case.1 84 This limited assignment did not constitute an assignment of his
subsequent claim against the firm for malpractice.1 85  "[T]he effect of
assigning only his right to any future award was to retain in [the client] the
ability to control the conduct of the trial, to accept or reject any settlement
offers, and to maintain the attorney-client relationship, with any
corresponding obligations."'' 86 The bar against assigning malpractice claims
arises from the highly personal and confidential nature of the lawyer-client
relationship,187 and, for purposes of the question presented, had not beenS 188
affected by the limited assignment.
Turner v. Anderson189 was an unusual case indicating that clients cannot
evade responsibility for their actions by asserting that they took those actions
at the direction of their lawyers.19° The client had committed perjury,
allegedly on the advice of the law firm that represented him and his
employer in a securities arbitration matter. The matter resulted in an award
against the client and, in a lesser amount, against the employer.' 9' The client
sued the law firm for malpractice and for breach of its fiduciary duty. He
claimed that the firm breached its duty to him by advising him to testify
untruthfully, and that he followed this advice to his detriment. The firm
defended by arguing that the doctrine of in pari delicto'92 barred the claim
and that the client's claims were an impermissible collateral attack on the
award. The trial court granted summary judgment for the firm on both
grounds.1
93
182. Id. at 1290.
183. See, e.g., Washington v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 459 So. 2d 1148 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1984).
184. Kozich, 702 So. 2d at 1290.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Washington, 459 So. 2d at 1149.
188. Kozich, 702 So. 2d at 1291.
189. 704 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
190. Id. at 749.
191. Id.
192. In pari delicto has been defined as "[in] equal fault; equally culpable or criminal;
in a case of equal fault or guilt." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 543 (6th ed. 1991).
193. Turner, 704 So. 2d at 749.
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Reversing without much discussion on the collateral attack ground, the
Fourth District Court of Appeal spent the bulk of its opinion explaining why
it affirmed the lower court on the in pari delicto ground.194 The court began
by noting that the "question of whether a client who does an illegal act on
advice of counsel can sue counsel for damages resulting therefrom" was a
matter of first impression in Florida.' 95 After reviewing authorities from
other jurisdictions, the court ultimately concluded that, under the facts in the
case before it, the client's misconduct precluded him from recovering
damages for the perjury that he allegedly committed on the advice of
counsel.
196
m11. THE LAWYER'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE COURT AND
THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM
One of the most important, yet difficult, relationships that lawyers have
is with the courts, of which they are officers, and with the judicial system.
Cases in 1998 addressed various aspects of this relationship: 1) the
propriety of a lawyer's dual role as advocate and witness in the same matter;
2) the lawyer's obligation of candor toward a tribunal;' 97 3) the lawyer's
withdrawal from a matter in litigation;' 98 4) a lawyer's disqualification from
a litigated matter;' 99 and 5) the appropriateness of a lawyer's trial conduct
particularly in the context of real or perceived professionalism obligations.ia
In the course of representing a client a lawyer can act in many roles,
and this often does not implicate professional responsibility issues. One area
in which the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct specifically addresses
the multiplicity of roles is in the context of a lawyer who wishes to act as
both an advocate and a witness on behalf of a client.2" Rule 4-3.7 ordinarily
precludes the same lawyer from acting in both of these roles at trial.
20 2
194. Id. at 750.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 752.
197. See Conquest v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 23 Fla. L. Weekly D928 (2d Dist. Ct.
App. Apr. 6, 1998).
198. See Garcia v. Manning, 717 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
199. See Billings, Cunningham, Morgan & Boatwright, P.A. v. Isom, 701 So. 2d 1271
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
200. See LM. Lumber, Inc. v. M.L. Builders, Inc., 706 So. 2d 84 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1998).
201. See H.B.A. Management, Inc. v. Estate of Schwartz, 693 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 1997).
202. RPC 4-3.7, "LAWYER AS WITNESS," provides:
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In Conquest v. Auto-Owners Insurance Co., 203 the Second District Court
of Appeal expressed its concern about a lawyer being both an advocate and a
witness.204 The court noted that "neither Conquest nor her attorney" had
testified regarding the willingness of the client, Conquest, to accept an offer
below policy limits 0 5 In a footnote, the court acknowledged that it was
"puzzled by the fact that Conquest's trial counsel became a significant
witness in the trial."2 1 This, stated the court, appeared to be a "clear
violation" of rule 4-3.7.2.7
The purpose of rule 4-3.7 was clearly articulated by the Supreme Court
of Florida in Scott v. State.208 In appealing from the denial of postconviction
relief, a lawyer's former client argued that the trial court had erred by
allowing an assistant state attorney to serve as both prosecutor and as a
witness at the postconviction relief hearing. The lawyer in question
represented the state in that matter, in which his former client called him as a
witness to testify regarding alleged Brady209 violations by the state in the
original trial. In his appeal from the postconviction proceeding, the former
client claimed that the prosecutor's dual role violated ethical and
constitutional considerations. Rejecting this argument, the supreme court
provided some helpful clarification regarding the scope and purpose of rule
4-3.7:
(a) When Lawyer May Testify. A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial
in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness on behalf of the client
except where:
(1) the testimony relates to an uncontested issue;
(2) the testimony will relate solely to a matter of formality and there is
no reason to believe that substantial evidence will be offered in opposition to
the testimony;
(3) the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services
rendered in the case; or
(4) disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on
the client.
(b) Other Members of Law Firm as Witnesses. A lawyer may act as
advocate in a trial in which another lawyer in the lawyer's firm is likely to be
called as a witness unless precluded from doing so by rule 4-1.7 or 4-1.9
[concerning conflicts of interest].
RPC 4-3.7.
203. 23 Fla. L. Weekly D928 (2d Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 6, 1998).
204. Id. at D930.
205. Id. at D929.
206. Id. at D930 n.3.
207. Id.
208. 717 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1998).
209. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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[A] purpose of the rule is to prevent the evils that arise when a
lawyer dons the hats of both an advocate and witness for his or her
own client. Such a dual role can prejudice the opposing side or
create a conflict of interest. These concerns are not implicated in
the present case where the state attorney was called as a witness for
the other side on a Brady claim in a post conviction evidentiary
hearing before a judge. 210
The Fourth District Court of Appeal addressed the scope of RPC 4-3.7
in Larkin v. Pirthauer,21 when a personal representative of an estate sought
certiorari review of an order disqualifying her lawyer.212 The lawyer in
question apparently had been involved in the preparation and execution of
the testator's will. The personal representative for the testator's estate
engaged that lawyer to represent her. It became clear that the lawyer would
be a witness in a will contest in which testamentary capacity and undue
influence were issues. The Fourth District Court of Appeal denied certiorari,
213but in doing so limited the scope of the disqualification order. The court
stated, "[a]lthough the order of disqualification does not so provide, we
interpret it to disqualify counsel only from the litigation, and not from other,,214
matters pertaining to the administration of the estate. The court's view of
the proper scope of a disqualification order founded on RPC 4-3.7 is
consistent with the language of the rule and with the result reached in a
recent First District Court of Appeal case which disqualified a lawyer from
trial representation but not from pretrial or posttrial representation in the
case.
When acting as an advocate, one of the most important obligations that
216
a lawyer has is that of candor to the tribunal. Two 1998 cases specifically
addressed this obligation as it applied to prosecuting attorneys. Garcia v.
217 218Manning was an appeal arising from a civil contempt proceeding. Theappellate court held that the trial judge had improperly applied the law
210. Scott, 717 So. 2d at 908.
211. 700 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
212. Id. at 182.
213. Id. at 183.
214. Id.
215. Fleitman v. McPherson, 691 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997). See
Timothy P. Chinaris & Elizabeth Clark Tarbert, Professional Responsibility: 1997 Survey of
Florida Law, 22 NoVA L. REv. 215, 249 (1997), for a discussion of Fleitman v. McPherson.
216. See, e.g., RPC 4-3.3, "CANDOR TOWARD THE TRIBUNAL."
217. 717 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
218. Id. at 59.
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regarding the contemnor's ability to pay.219  Additionally, however, in a
lengthy footnote, the court criticized the prosecutor's conduct in encouraging
the judge to incarcerate the unrepresented contemnor, despite his apparent
inability to pay. 2 ° Agreeing with the Fourth District Court of Appeal's. . . ... .221
opinion in Dilallo By and Through Dilallo v. Riding Safely, Inc., the court
noted that RPC 4-1.1222 and 4-3.3(3)223 "imply a duty to know and disclose to
the court adverse legal authority" and that it "construe[d] these rules to also
require an attorney to provide full information to the trial court such that the
court has all necessary information to determine the issue presented to it."2 24
This obligation, the court stated, is particularly important when the
22
opposing party is unrepresented . 6
The second case, State v. James,2 6 did not consider silence in the face
of an obligation to speak, but, rather, affirmative misrepresentations by the
prosecutor.227 The prosecutor had represented to the court that the state
228
would call a certain witness, but rested without calling her. When
questioned about this after the defense moved for a mistrial, the prosecutor
stated that he knew when the case began that he would not be calling the
witness. 229 The Third District Court of Appeal court "heartily endorse[d]"
the trial court's expression of "utmost concern" regarding the prosecutor's
"lack of candor and professionalism"f in misleading the court regarding his
230intentions concerning the witness.
Issues relating to a lawyer's withdrawal from a litigated matter were
discussed in several 1997 and 1998 cases. Billings, Cunningham, Morgan &
219. Id.
220. Id. at 60 n.4. The court closed its note by stating that further conduct of the same
type would "require a referral to The Florida Bar for disciplinary action." Id.
221. 687 So. 2d 353, 355 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997). See Chinaris & Tarbert, supra
note 177, at 242-43 for a discussion of Dilallo By and Through Dilallo v. Riding Safely, Inc..
222. RPC 4-1.1, "COMPETENCE," provides that: "A lawyer shall provide
competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge,
skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation." RPC 4-1.1.
223. Subdivision (a)(3) of RPC 4-3.3, "CANDOR TOWARD THE TRIBUNAL,"
provides that:
"A lawyer shall not knowingly... fail to disclose to the tribunal legal
authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly
adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel[.]"
RPC 4-3.3(a)(3).
224. Garcia, 707 So. 2d at 60 n.4 (citing RPC 4-1.1, 3.3(3)).
225. Id.
226. 710 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
227. Id. at 181.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 182 n.4.
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Boatwrixht, P.A. v. Isom231 turned on the trial court's application of RPC 4-
1.16(c), z32 which recognizes the long standing rule that a judge has the
inherent authority to determine whether a law firm will be permitted to
withdraw from litigation, regardless of the existence of ethical elements that
would militate in favor of withdrawal.233 In Isom, a law firm settled a case
for its personal injury client, who signed a release. 4 The client later moved
to set aside the settlement due to allegedly incorrect advice from the firm's
associate regarding the effect of the release. Concluding that there was a
conflict between its interests and those of the client, the firm moved to
withdraw.23  After "analyz[ing] the complex factors in this case," the Fifth
District Court of Appeal ruled that the trial court did not depart from
essential requirements of law by denying the firm's motion to withdraw.3 6
Referencing RPC 4-1.16(c), the court viewed this as a situation in which the
trial court had the authority to order continued representation "even when
potential ethical conflicts are presented. 2 37
An interesting contention regarding a perceived duty to withdraw
appeared in Remeta v. State.23 Capital Collateral Regional Counsel
("CCRC") moved to withdraw as counsel for a death row inmate. The trial
court denied the motion, and CCRC appealed. 239  CCRC alleged that a
conflict existed as a result of statements and questions from members of an
oversight committee, the Commission on the Administration of Justice, in
capital cases regarding the handling of related litigation involving the
client. In affirming the order, the supreme court agreed with the trial judge
that "if the facts as set forth by CCRC constitute conflict, the entire legal
system would collapse because there is not a public defender who does not
231. 701 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
232. Subdivision (c) of RPC 4-1.16, "DECLINING OR TERMINATING
REPRESENTATION," provides that: "When ordered to do so by a tribunal, a lawyer shall
continue representation notwithstanding good cause for terminating the representation." RPC
4-1.16(c).
233. Isom, 701 So. 2d at 1272.
234. Id.
235. Id. In moving to withdraw, the firm stated that it had been advised by The Florida
Bar that its withdrawal was mandatory pursuant to RPC 4-1.16(a). Presumably the firm sought
an informal advisory opinion from the Bar ethics staff. Id.
236. Id.
237. Isom, 701 So. 2d at 1272 (citing RPC 4-1.16(c)).
238. 707 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 1998).
239. Id. at719.
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have the same asserted 'conflict.' 24° Every government official must account
to some governing body as to how it allocates it[s] [sic] resources." 24'
Public defenders see certain recurring issues relating to withdrawal.
One of these issues is the ethically and procedurally proper method of
handling the situation that arises when a criminal defense client wishes to
move to withdraw his or her guilty plea on the basis that counsel advised
improperly or negligently concerning the plea. In two Florida cases, Karg v.
State2 2 and Holifield v. State,243 the First District Court of Appeal reaffirmed
that in this situation counsel is faced with a conflict of interest that requires
the appointment of conflict free counsel for the purpose of representation on
the motion to withdraw the plea.244 The Fourth District Court of Appeal
discussed this procedure, and the rationale supporting it, more fully in
Roberts v. State.
Another recurring withdrawal issue for public defenders relates to the
likelihood that one of their former clients will testify against a current client.
Costa v. State246 arose from a trial court's denial of an assistant public
defender's motion to withdraw. 247 The motion certified the existence of an
irreconcilable conflict between the lawyer's current client and a former
client based on confidential communications with the former client
concerning issues relevant to the present case.24s In quashing the order and
remanding with directions to grant the motion, the Fourth District Court of
Appeal cited authority, including Guzman v. State,249 holding that a public
defender should be permitted to withdraw upon certifying the existence of a
conflict.2
50
Similarly, the denial of an assistant public defender's motion to
withdraw was reversed in Cankur v. State. 25 The public defender's former
client was identified as a prosecution witness. 252 When the public defender
moved to withdraw, the state attempted to eliminate the problem by offering
240. Id.
241. Id. at719-20.
242. 706 So. 2d 124 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
243. 717 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
244. Id.; Karg, 706 So. 2d at 125.
245. 670 So. 2d 1042, 1045 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996); see Chandris, 668 So. 2d
180, 253-54 (Fla. 1995) and supra note 55 and accompanying text.
246. 712 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
247. Id. at 456.
248. Id.
249. 644 So. 2d 996 (Fla. 1994). See also Babb v. Edwards, 412 So. 2d 859 (Fla.
1982).
250. Costa, 712 So. 2d at 456 (citing Guzman v. State, 644 So. 2d 996, 999 (Fla.
1994)).
251. 706 So. 2d 944 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
252. Id. at 944.
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to refrain from calling the witness.25 3 The court then denied the motion.25 4
255 256Citing Guzman2ss as well as other cases, the appellate court reversed,
stating that "under the circumstances of this case, the trial court was required
to grant the motion to withdraw without reweighing the facts considered by
the public defender in determining and certifying that a conflict exists.
' 25 7
• • • 58 • 259
In a concurring opinion, Crowe v. State criticized Guzman. Judge
Dauksch argued that trial judges should have discretion to analyze the nature
of the conflict and the surrounding circumstances in ruling on motions to• 260
withdraw filed by public defenders.
In contrast to cases involving a lawyer's attempted voluntary
withdrawal from a litigated matter, a number of cases deal with the
involuntary removal of a lawyer or law firm from litigation. These cases
include conflicts involving a lawyer's current clients,26l a lawyer's former
262clients, imputed disqualification resulting from the movement of
nonlawyer employees between law firms, 63 and the involvement of lawyers
with former employees of opposing parties.
264
A basic principle of conflicts law is that, in the same litigated matter
one lawyer or law firm may not represent both a plaintiff and a defendant.261
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
256. Cankur, 706 So. 2d at 945 (citing Hope v. State, 654 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1995); Crowe v. State, 701 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 5th Dist Ct. App. 1997)). See also infra
note 151.
257. Cankur, 706 So. 2d at 944-45.
258. 701 So. 2d 431, 431-32 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (Dauksch, J., specially
concurring).
259. Id. at 432.
260. Id. at 431-32.
261. Cardasis v. HP America, Inc., 710 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998);
Henry v. Entertainment Design, Inc., 711 So. 2d 179 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
262. J.M. Lumber, Inc. v. M.L. Builders, Inc., 706 So. 2d 84 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1998); Rodell v. Narson, 706 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998); King v. Byrd, 23 Fla.
L. Weekly Dl 173 (4th Dist. Ct. App. May 13, 1998), withdrawn and superseded on reh'g,
716 So. 2d 831 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
263. City of Apopka v. All Comers, Inc., 701 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1997); Esquire Care, Inc. v. Maguire, 532 So. 2d 740 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Lackow v.
Walter E. Heller & Co. Southeast, 466 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
264. Carnival Corp. v. Romero, 710 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998); H.B.A.
Management, Inc. v. Estate of Schwartz, 693 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 1997); Rentclub, Inc. v.
Transamerica Rental Fin. Corp., 43 F.3d 1439 (11th Cir. 1995).
265. RPC 4-1.7 cmt. (discussing prohibition representing opposing parties in
litigation).
1998]
199
: Nova Law Review 23, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1998
Nova Law Review
In Cardasis v. HP America, Inc.,266 the Third District Court of Appeal ruled
that "the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law" by
denying the defendants' motion to disqualify the plaintiff's lawyers from
also representing one of the defendants in the pending case below. 267 The
matter was remanded with directions to grant the motion and to disqualify
268the lawyers in question from representing any party in the case.
An unusual conflicting scenario was present in Henry v. Entertainment
Design, Inc.a69 A law firm opposed an individual who was represented on
unrelated matters by another office of that law firm. This conflict became
known to the client after rendition of an unfavorable jury verdict in a case
where the firm opposed him. 27  Upon discovery of the conflict, the client
sought relief from the verdict. Clearly this situation presented a conflict of
interest; the trial court faced the question of how to deal with the conflict
problem at the juncture at which it arose in the case.271 The Fourth District
Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's denial of requested relief, holding
that the client was unable to demonstrate actual prejudice as a result of the
conflict.
272
273J.M. Lumber, Inc. v. M.L. Builders, Inc. is a disqualification case
based on conflicts involving a lawyer's former clients.274 The decision in
this case focused on the pro er application of RPC 4-1.9, 275 governing
conflicts with former clients. The plaintiffs lawyer, in post judgment
execution proceedings, formerly represented one of the defendants in various
matters. Defendants moved to disqualify the lawyer. At the evidentiary
hearing on the motion, the trial court found that plaintiffs counsel had not
breached his duty of lawyer-client confidentiality and that the matter in
question was not related to any knowledge gained in representing his former
client.277  The court nevertheless concluded that an appearance of
impropriety existed and disqualified the lawyer, "finding simply that it was
too close in time to the prior representation which had ceased three years
earlier. '
278
266. 710 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
267. Id. at 146.
268. Id.
269. 711 So. 2d 179 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
270. Id. at 180.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 181.
273. 706 So. 2d 84 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
274. Id. at 84-85.
275. See RPC 4-1.9 supra note 23.
276. J.M. Lumber, 706 So. 2d at 85.
277. Id.
278. Id.
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The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the order of
disqualification.279 Referencing RPC 4-1.9, the court stated that the trial
court's order departed from the essential requirements of law because it did
not make a specific finding that the matters involved in the lawyer's
representation of the plaintiff were substantially related to the matters
covered by his previous representation of the defendant.2 0 The court thus
recognized that RPC 4-1.9 contains two independent and distinct tests that
must be examined in a former client conflict situation: 1) whether the
former and current matters are substantially related; and 2) whether,
regardless of any relationship between the matters, there are issues of client
confidentiality present.28
Another case in which RPC 4-1.9 was central did not concern
disqualification, but the propriety of awarding attorney's fees under section
57.105 of the Florida Statutes.282 In Rodell v. Narson,2s3 a party hired a
lawyer who had previously been consulted by another party about certain
property that was the subject of litigation. 4 During the earlier consultation,
confidential information regarding the property was disclosed to the lawyer.
Subsequently, the party who originally consulted the lawyer moved to
disqualify the lawyer based on an alleged violation of RPC 4-1.9. On
appeal, the Third District Court of Appeal ruled that the motion to disqualify
279. Id.
280. Id. (citing RPC 4-1.9).
281. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
282. FLA. STAT. § 57.105 (1997). Section 57.105 of the Florida Statutes provides:
(1) The court shall award a reasonable attorney's fee to be paid to the
prevailing party in equal amounts by the losing party and the losing party's
attorney in any civil action in which the court finds that there was a complete
absence of a justiciable issue of either law or fact raised by the complaint or
defense of the losing party; provided, however, that the losing party's
attorney is not personally responsible if he or she has acted in good faith,
based on the representations of his or her client. If the court finds that there
was a complete absence of a justiciable issue of either law or fact raised by
the defense, the court shall also award prejudgment interest.
(2) If a contract contains a provision allowing attorney's fees to a party
when he or she is required to take any action to enforce the contract, the court
may also allow reasonable attorney's fees to the other party when that party
prevails in any action, whether as plaintiff or defendant, with respect to the
contract. This act shall take effect October 1, 1988, and shall apply to
contracts entered into on said date or thereafter.
FLA. STAT. § 57.105 (1997).
283. 706 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
284. Id. at 393.
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was a "meritorious claim" that was not subject to Florida Statutes section
57.105 award of fees.285
As noted above, the protection of client confidentiality is one of the key
elements of RPC 4-1.9. However, this protection is not absolute. The rule
provides that a lawyer who now opposes a former client may not use
confidential information to the disadvantage of the former client "except as
rule 4-1.6 would permit with respect to a client or when the information has,,286
become generally known. Although some lawyers equate "generally
known" information with information that is a matter of public record, the
district court in King v. Byrd 287 made clear that these two terms are not
synonymous for purposes of conflict of interest analysis. 28 A lawyer
defended a doctor in a medical malpractice action.289 One of the plaintiff's
expert witnesses was a doctor whom the lawyer had represented in an
administrative grievance proceeding filed by a patient. The lawyer
attempted to attack the expert with, inter alia, the existence of this grievance
proceeding. On appeal, the court ruled that it was error to allow this cross-
examination. 20 Replying to the lawyer's contention that this proceeding was
a matter of public record and therefore "generally known" under RPC 4-1.9,
the court commented, "[w]e are not prepared to state that all information
contained in any public document is 'generally known' within the meaning
of the rule. 291  Although not expressly stated in the opinion, the court
implicitly recognized that the real question when analyzing a "generally
known" question is not whether the information is a matter of public record,
but whether, but for the lawyer's prior representation of the client, the
292lawyer would know of the existence and location of that information.
In Carnival Corp. v. Romero, 3 two expert witnesses for the plaintiff
were former employees of the defendant cruise line.294  The defendant
moved to disqualify the experts on the ground that they had information
protected by the attorney-client and work product privileges. Additionally,
285. Id.
286. RPC 4-1.9(b) (emphasis supplied). See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
287. 23 Fla. L. Weekly D1173 (4th Dist. Ct. App. May 13, 1998), withdrawn and
superseded on reh'g, 716 So. 2d 831 (4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
288. Id. atDl175.
289. Id. atD1174.
290. Id. atDl175.
291. Id.
292. See King, 23 Fla. L. Weekly at Dl175. Interestingly, the defendant's lawyer
complained that plaintiff's counsel had unfairly questioned his ethics. Id. at Dl174. The
court, however, expressed "substantial concerns as to the ethics of defense counsel's attacks
on his former client." Id. at D1 175.
293. 710 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
294. Id. at 691.
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the defense moved to disqualify plaintiff's counsel on the basis of allegedly
improper contact with the defendant corporation's former employees and
because of an alleged appearance of impropriety. The trial court denied the
motions, and the Third District Court of Appeal ruled that the trial court did
not depart from the essential requirements of law in denying the motions. 5
Regarding potential disqualification of the plaintiff's counsel, the
appellate court cited the Supreme Court of Florida's decision in H.B.A.
Management, Inc. v. Estate of Schwartz2 96 holding that RPC 4-4.2297 did not
prohibit a lawyer from ex parte contacts with former employees of a
represented corporation. 298 Although in making such contacts a lawyer is not
ethically permitted to inquire into matters subject to attorney-client privilege,
the defendant had not shown that its former employees, the experts, had
299access to any protected communications.
Moreover, the defendant cruise line did not succeed in demonstrating
that the law firm had engaged in the appearance of impropriety. 300 The
defendant relied on Rentclub, Inc. v. Transamerica Rental Finance Corp.,3°'
in which a law firm was disqualified from representing its client in litigation
after the firm hired a former high ranking officer of its represented corporate
295. Id. at 695.
296. 693 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 1997). The Carnival court noted that H.B.A. Management
relied on Florida Bar Professional Ethics Committee Opinion 88-14, (1989) which concluded
that it was not unethical for a lawyer to contact former employees of a represented
organization, provided the lawyer did not inquire into privileged matters. Carnival, 710 So.
2d at 692-93 (citing H.B.A. Management, Inc. v. Estate of Schwartz, 693 So. 2d 541 (Fla.
1997)).
297. Schwartz, 693 So. 2d at 546. See RPC 4-4.2, "COMMUNICATION WITH
PERSON REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL," which provides:
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of
the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by
another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other
lawyer. Notwithstanding the foregoing, an attorney may, without such prior
consent, communicate with another's client in order to meet the requirements
of any statute or contract requiring notice or service of process directly on an
adverse party, in which event the communication shall be strictly restricted to
that required by statute or contract, and a copy shall be provided to the
adverse party's attorney.
RPC 4-4.2.
298. Carnival, 710 So. 2d at 693; see Lackow v. Walter, 466 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1985).
299. Carnival, 710 So. 2d at 693.
300. Id. at 692-93.
301. 43 F.3d 1439 (11th Cir. 1995).
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opponent as a "trial consultant." 302  In rejecting this argument, the court
distinguished Rentclub in several ways: 1) the Supreme Court of Florida
decided H.B.A. Management after the federal court's decision in Rentclub;
2) the experts in the instant case had not been high-level, managerial
employees; and 3) importantly, there was no showing that either had access
to any confidential or privileged information. 30 3  Thus, the court stated,
"[w]e do not think this case is one which requires disqualification based on
the attorney having gained access to an adversary party's privileged
communications or documents, thereby gaining an informational
advantage. ' 3 °"
Disqualification of the experts was not required because it was not
established that either expert had access to privileged information or
305
materials protected by the work product doctrine. The court
acknowledged that the "prospect of paying [one of the experts] for this fact
testimony [relating to information gathered during employment regarding
other, unrelated incidents] could pose a possible violation under [RPC] 4-
3.4," but stated that "anyopayments made in this case are also intertwined
with his expert opinion. 30
City of Apopka v. All Comers, Inc. addressed the question of imputed
disqualification when nonlawyer employees of law firms move from one
employing firm to another. Rule 4-1.10(a) provides that most conflict
problems of one lawyer in a law firm are imputed to the other lawyers in that
firm, but is silent with respect to how these rules apply to nonlawyer firm
employees such as secretaries or paralegals.
30 9
302. Carnival, 710 So. 2d at 693 (citing Rentclub, 43 F.3d at 1439-40).
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 695. Subdivision (b) of RPC 4-3.4, "FAIRNESS OF OPPOSING
PARTY AND COUNSEL," provides that:
A lawyer shall not:
fabricate evidence, counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely, or offer an
inducement to a witness, except a lawyer may pay a witness reasonable
expenses incurred by the witness in attending or testifying at proceedings; a
reasonable, noncontingent fee for the professional services of an expert
witness; and reasonable compensation to reimburse a witness for the loss of
compensation incurred by reason of preparing for, attending, or testifying at
proceedings.
RPC 4-3.4(b).
307. 701 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
308. Id. at 642.
309. Subdivision (a) of RPC 4-1.10, "IMPUTED DISQUALIFICATION;
GENERAL RULE," provides that "[w]hile lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them
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Two earlier Florida cases, as well as an opinion of the Florida Bar
310Professional Ethics Committee, addressed the nonlawyer issue. In Lackow
v. Walter E. Heller & Co.,311 the Third District Court of Appeal disqualified
a law firm that hired a secretary from another law firm that opposed the
hiring firm in a litigated matter.312 While with her former employer, the
secretary clearly had access to confidential information and trial preparation
materials. In fact, she had worked on the case in question. No showing that
313
a breach of confidentiality had occurred was required. However, a
different approach was taken by the Second District Court of Appeal in
Esquire Care, Inc. v. Maguire. There the court declined to adopt a
presumption that confidentiality was breached . 5 Rather, the court required
a hearing to determine "not just whether a potential ethical violation has
occurred, but whether as a result one party has obtained an unfair advantage
over the other which can only be alleviated by removal of the attorney.
'
"
31 6
The Professional Ethics Committee's Opinion 86-5 expressed the view
that the rules governing the movement of lawyers between opposing law
firms did not apply to nonlawyers.3 7 The opinion focused instead on the
ethical obligations of the law firms to advise the moving nonlawyer not to
breach confidentiality and to refrain from seeking any confidential
information from the moving nonlawyer 3 18  After discussing the varied
approaches in Florida case law, the All Corners court stated, "we align
ourselves with the Second District and hold that disqualification is required
only when there is evidence that the law firm obtained confidential
information, thereby gaining an unfair advantage, from its new personnel. 319
Attorneys are often most visible to the public in their role as advocates
at trial. An attorney's behavior at trial is subject to the Rules of Professional
Conduct, rules of court, and case law. Therefore, it is not surprising that the
conduct of attorneys during trial is subject to close scrutiny and criticism.
shall knowingly represent a client when any 1 of them practicing alone would be prohibited
from doing so by rule 4-1.7,4-1.8(c), 4-1.9, or 4-2.2." RPC 4-1.10(a).
310. See supra notes 304, 305; Fla. Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 86-5
(1986).
311. 466 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
312. Id. at 1123.
313. Id.
314. 532 So. 2d 740 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
315. Id. at742.
316. Id. at741.
317. Fla. Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 86-5 (1986).
318. Id. at 1119-20.
319. All Comers, 701 So. 2d at 644.
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There have been many 1998 cases dealing with improper argument, 320 a
frequent circumstance over the years. 321 Courts most often refer to RPC 4-
3.4(e)322 when analyzing improper arguments. 323 Although most appeals
based on improper argument do not succeed due to a failure to properly
preserve the objection on the record, the cases do provide examples of what
does and does not constitute impermissible argument. 324 In Airport Rent-a-
Car v. Lewis,325 the Fourth District Court of Appeal found a counsel's
comments regarding the opposing party's state of mind and reporting the
matter to the IRS to be outside the record, predjudicial, and in violation of
326 327RPC 4-3.4(e). In Cooper v. State, the district court found that a
prosecutor's suggestion in closing that "the defendant suborned perjury or
that a defense witness manufactured evidence" was improper since they had
320. See, e.g., Urbin v. State, 714 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 1998); CAC-Ramsay, Inc. v. Mull,
706 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998); Lewis v. State, 711 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1998); Palazon v. State, 711 So. 2d 1176 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998); Williams v.
State, 707 So. 2d 1204 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
321. In fact, in two cases published this year, the court commented with frustration on
the large number of improper argument cases. In Murphy v. International Robotics Systems,
Inc., 710 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998), Judge Klein stated that "[it seems as
though, in every week in which we sit, we get at least one appeal in which we are asked to
reverse because of improper, but unobjected-to, closing argument of counsel." Id. at 587. In
Palazon v. State, 711 So. 2d 1176 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998), a judge wrote a concurrence
"because of my concern with the number of criminal cases we review that involve improper
argument by the State[,]" and suggested distribution of earlier decisions regarding improper
argument on trial benches and counsel tables in every courtroom. Id.
322. Subdivision (e) of RPC 4-3.4 provides that:
A lawyer shall not:
(e) in trial, allude to any matter that the lawyer does not reasonably believe is
relevant or that will not be supported by admissible evidence, assert personal
knowledge of facts in issue except when testifying as a witness, or state a
personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, the credibility of a witness, the
culpability of a civil litigant, or the guilt or innocence of an accused.
RPC 4-3.4(e).
323. Davis v. South Fla. Water Management Dist., 715 So. 2d 996 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1998); Sawczak v. Goldenberg, 710 So. 2d 996 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998); Airport
Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Lewis, 701 So. 2d 893 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Hooper v. State,
703 So. 2d 1143 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Goutis v. Express Transp. Inc., 699 So. 2d
757 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Murphy v. International Robotics Sys., Inc., 710 So. 2d
587 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
324. Murphy, 710 So. 2d at 587 (discussing the case law requiring contemporaneous
objection to improper argument).
325. 701 So. 2d 893 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
326. Id. at 896-97.
327. 712 So. 2d 1216 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
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no basis in the facts presented.328 The court gave a scathing criticism of the
prosecutor in this case, stating:
The prosecutor's comments here-impugning the defense
witnesses and the defendant without any record basis--were
improper, unethical and unprofessional; we hereby voice our strong
disapproval of them. The trial judge undoubtedly recognized the
impropriety of the comments because he sustained defense
counsel's objection to them. We urge trial courts to supplement
such rulings, in the future, with an admonishment to the offending
attorney, if not disciplinary sanctions.
329
Other examples of improper argument by a prosecutor can be found in
Urbin v. State, 3°an appeal from a capital case. 33 1 The court found that an
invitation for the jury to disregard the law, criticism of the defendant's
mother for failure to show sympathy for the victim's family, and his "show
no mercy" argument about sentencing were all impermissible.332 The court
likewise found counsel's statement in closing to the jury to be an improper
"conscience of the community" argument. 333
In Davis v. South Florida Water Management District,3 34 the appellate
court stated that an attorney improperly "bolstered" credibility and expressed
his own opinion of the evidence when he stated "as a lawyer and an officer
of the court, and an attorney who is proud to represent South Florida Water
Management District and other condemning authorities and private property
owners, I will tell you that $18 million" was overcompensation for a
person's property which was taken in a condemnation action. On the
other hand, the court in Goutis v. Express Transport,336 found that the mere
use of verbal tics such as "I would propose" or "I submit" do not amount to a
comment by the attorney of his or her own opinion.
337
Courts are often critical of trial conduct even if they do not find that it
rises to the level of a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The
Fourth District Court of Appeal rigorously criticized the conduct of two
328. Id. at 1217.
329. Id.
330. 714 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 1998).
331. Id. at411.
332. Id. at 413.
333. Id. at 421.
334. 715 So. 2d 996 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
335. Id. at 998.
336. 699 So. 2d 757 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
337. Id. at 763-64 (emphasis omitted).
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attorneys throughout the course of a medical malpractice trial in Myron v.
Doctors General Hospital.338 The court, after reversing on other grounds,
stated the following regarding the attorneys' behavior:
[W]e feel compelled to comment on the lawyers' conduct in this
trial. The trial lawyers on this case are all highly professional,
skilled lawyers with excellent reputations. Yet, from reading this
entire transcript, we cannot help but cringe at the exchanges
between them and with the court. The argument, both in front of
the jury and at sidebar, reflected a disrespect of each other and
exasperation with the proceedings. Even the trial court commented
several times that things were getting way out of hand. At one
point, after heated argument, the court said "[y]ou know, the public
is here. There are members of the public here who have not been
perhaps associated with this.... Let's keep it a profession, if we
could please." 33
9
The court then admonished the lawyers to behave themselves in the retrial.
340
IV. THE LAWYER'S RELATIONSHIP TO THIRD PARTIES
In addition to their duties to clients and the court, attorneys also have
duties to opposing parties, attorneys, and other third persons. Among the
most important of these duties is that of honesty. Although an attorney is not
required and sometimes not permitted to reveal information,341 an attorney
may not engage in conduct involving dishonesty or misrepresentation.
342
Thus, the Supreme Court of Florida suspended an attorney for ninety
days in a matter in which the attorney stopped payment on a check to a travel
agency.343 The referee found, based on the fact that the attorney immediately
stopped payment on the check, that the attorney intended to deceive the
travel agency, who had already extended the time for payment on a bill of
over $2000 for 120 days. 344 The referee stopped short of finding that the
attorney made misrepresentations to the court by declining to find by the
338. 704 So. 2d 1083 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
339. Id. at 1092-93.
340. Id. at 1093.
341. See RPC 4-1.6. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
342. Subdivision (c) of RPC 4-8.4 provides that "[a] lawyer shall not... engage in
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation[.]" RPC 4-8.4(c).
343. Florida Bar v. Schultz, 712 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 1998).
344. Id. at 388.
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clear and convincing standard that the check stubs presented by the
respondent attorney to prove payment to the travel agency were false.
3 4 5
Probably the most grievous misrepresentation an attorney can make is
to the court.346 In addition to dishonesty, misrepresentations to the court
may impact the fair and impartial administration of justice.347 The Supreme
Court of Florida found just such an impact in Florida Bar v. Vining.348
Vining represented the wife in a marriage dissolution matter and in her
appeal regarding alimony and attorneys' fees. 349 The appeals court reversed
the trial court's denial of alimony and fees, and a hearing was held on
attorneys' fees. In the hearing, Vining did not disclose to the court that he351
had been paid by the client in the dissolution matter. The court awarded a
fee to be deposited into a supersedeas account which was disbursed in a
check made out to both Vining and his client.351 The client refused to sign
the check over to Vining because she had paid him for his services in the
dissolution. 353 The attorney's motion to disburse the funds on his signature
only, filed without notice to the client, was denied.354 Vining then filed an
action against the bank to disburse the funds, without informing the
opposing attorney that the client opposed disbursement of the funds to
Vining.355 The opposing counsel then stipulated to the release of the money
to Vining.356 The client, on discovery that Vining had obtained the funds,
sued, and recovered for theft.357 Oddly, although the court upheld the
referee's finding that Vining engaged in "dishonest, fraudulent, and deceitful
conduct" before the trial judge, Vining was not found to have violated RPC
345. Id. at 387.
346. RPC 4-3.3.
347. See Schultz, 712 So. 2d at 387. Subdivision (d) of RPC 4-8.4 provides that: "A
lawyer shall not.., engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is
prejudicial to the administration of justice." RPC 4-8.4(d).
348. 707 So. 2d 670 (Fla. 1998).
349. Id. at 671.
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. Vining, 707 So. 2d at 671.
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. Id. at 672.
357. Id.
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4-3.3(a) concerning candor to the tribunal.358  Vining was suspended for
three years for violations of RPC 4-8.4(c) and (d).359
However the court did find a violation of RPC 4-3.3 in Florida Bar v.
• 3606..
Hmielewski. Hmielewski represented a client in a Minnesota wrongful
death and medical malpractice matter.361 The client informed Hmielewski
that he had stolen medical records from the facility being sued.362
Hmielewski failed to provide the documents when a discovery request was
made and indicated that all documents in the possession of the client had
already been turned over to the medical facility.363 He also told the court
that an issue in the case was the failure of the facility to properly maintain
their records, and that the facility had lost the records. 6 Opposing counsel
discovered these misrepresentations during a deposition of Hmielewski's
client.365 The court, in sanctioning Hmielewski, found that his "violations
made a mockery of the justice system and flew in the face of [his] ethical
responsibilities as a member of The Florida Bar.' '366  The court suspended
Hmielewski for three years, stating that "[i]f it were not for [the absence of
selfish motive], the extremely strong character evidence, and Hmielewski's
relatively unblemished record (one admonishment for minor misconduct in
twenty-one years of practice), this [c]ourt would have no hesitation in
imposing disbarment." 367
In another case involving candor toward the tribunal an attorney was
suspended for ninety days in Florida Bar v. Corbin.368  The attorney
358. Vining, 707 So. 2d at 673.
359. Id. at 674. Subdivisions (c) and (d) of RPC 4-8.4 prohibit conduct involving
dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, respectively. RPC 4-
8.4(c), (d).
360. 702 So. 2d 218, 220 (Fla. 1997).
361. Id. at 219.
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. Id. at 219-20.
365. Hmielewski, 702 So. 2d at 220.
366. Id.
367. Id. at 221. It is odd that the court found no selfish motive. The referee, as noted
by the court, found that "[t]here was no motive of personal gain behind the respondent's
actions. If anything, the respondent was overzealous in his efforts to promote his client's
interests. The respondent appeared to adopt his client's belief that the Mayo Clinic would
falsify or fabricate medical records regarding his client's father's demise." Id. However, the
case was, in all likelihood, taken on a contingency fee basis. Therefore, the attorney had a
financial interest in the outcome of the case. If the attorney's fee is based on a percentage of
the recovery, the attorney's fee increases proportionately with the size of the award to his
client. If the attorney could establish bad faith on the part of the medical facility, he could
have claimed and received punitive damages.
368. 701 So. 2d 334, 337 (Fla. 1997).
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represented plaintiffs in a civil landlord-tenant dispute. 369 The defendants,
representing themselves, provided the attorney with copies of canceled
checks and told her that some of the rent was paid in cash and some with the
canceled checks. 37  Nevertheless, the attorney filed a motion for summary
judgment, stating that there were no material facts in issue and that the
defendants had paid no rent during the time period covered by the canceled
checks. 371 In recommending suspension of Corbin, the referee noted the
larger issue facing the court involving pro se litigants:
The Referee fully appreciates that attorneys and judges have no
responsibility to pro se litigants to assist them in preparing their
case. At the same time, the [c]ourt and the Bar have a
responsibility not to mislead or undermine the efforts of pro se
litigants to represent themselves. This is a critical issue for the
future of our Bar.
372
Dishonesty can have broad ranging consequences for an attorney. In
373Florida Bar v. Ash, an attorney was denied board certification after a
determination that she made false statements on her application for
certification. 374 The attorney, in answering a question of whether a court had
ever questioned her conduct in writing, listed "N/A." The committee on
certification determined that a court had issued a show cause order for
sanctions in an earlier case of the attorney which indicated that she argued
case law which had been quashed.375 Ash cited case law which was in
conflict with case law in that jurisdiction, and failed to disclose a Supreme
Court of Florida case which was in conflict with the case she argued.376 The
supreme court, in upholding the denial of the certification, indicated that "it
is difficult to conceive of a clearer violation of the oath of truthfulness at the
conclusion of the application" in referring the matter to The Florida Bar for
investigation.377
An attorney also owes duties to other lawyers in some circumstances.
Often, questions of a lawyer's relationship to another lawyer revolve around
the division of attorney fees. The Fifth District Court of Appeal, in Miller v.
369. Id. at 334.
370. Id. at 335.
371. Id.
372. Id.
373. 701 So. 2d 552 (Fla. 1997).
374. Id. at 553-54.
375. Id.
376. Id. at 554.
377. Id.
1998] 209
211
: Nova Law Review 23, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1998
Nova Law Review
Jacobs & Goodman, P.A., found that an employment contract requiring
departing lawyers to pay the attorneys' prior firm 75% of fees earned from
clients taken when they left the firm is valid and enforceable. 378 The case
involved enforcement of an employment contract signed by associates of the
firm. The contract called for the payment of 75% of the fees earned by the
associates in their own private practice after they left the firm for clients who
were initially clients of the law firm. All of the clients involved had
personal injury cases with the firm prior to departing and accepting
representation by the former associates of the firm. The former associates
argued that the employment contract was void against public policy since it
infringed on the client's right to choose her own attorney by placing an
economic disincentive on the attorney. Ordinarily, the former firm would be
entitled to some fee for the value of services performed by the firm prior to
the client's departure. 379 The court declined to find the contract void as to
public policy but overturned the case on other grounds. 380  In doing so, the
court cited two Florida ethics opinions which discuss division of fees
between a departing lawyer and the law firm.381 The court failed to even
mention Florida Ethics Opinion 93-4,382 in which the Florida Bar
Professional Ethics Committee opined that an employment contract which
required payment of 50% of fees generated by a former client of the law firm
383 .384violated RPC 4-5.6, regulating restrictions on the right to practice.
Ironically, shortly before the Miller case was decided, the Supreme Court of
Florida clarified the rule against restrictions against the right to practice by
adding language to the comment discussing law firm employment
378. 699 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
379. An attorney in a contingent fee case who is discharged by the client without cause
prior to a recovery is usually entitled to quantum meruit for the value of services provided
prior to discharge. Rosenberg v. Levin, 409 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 1982).
380. Miller, 699 So. 2d at 732.
381. Id. (citing Fla. Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 94-1 (1994) and Fla. Bar
Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 84-1 (1984, rev. 1993) (concluding that such a division of
fees is a matter of contract, not ethics)).
382. Fla. Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 93-4 (1995).
383. Miller, 699 So. 2d at 732. RPC 4-5.6 provides:
A lawyer shall not participate in offering or making:
(a) a partnership or employment agreement that restricts the rights of a
lawyer to practice after termination of the relationship, except an agreement
concerning benefits upon retirement; or
(b) an agreement in which a restriction on the lawyer's right to practice
is part of the settlement of a controversy between private parties.
RPC 4-5.6.
384. Miller, 699 So. 2d at 732.
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385contracts. The court added the following discussion to comment to theRPC 4-5.6:
This rule is not a per se prohibition against severance agreements
between lawyers and law firms. Severance agreements containing
reasonable and fair compensation provisions designed to avoid
disputes requiring time-consuming quantum meruit analysis are not
prohibited by this rule. Severance agreements, on the other hand,
that contain punitive clauses, the effect of which are to restrict
competition or encroach upon a client's inherent right to select
counsel, are prohibited.386
Following the decision in the Miller case, the Professional Ethics
Committee was asked to review enforcement of a contract, found to be
387 *388
unethical in an earlier ethics opinion, in light of the court decision. The
committee declined to answer the question because it involved past conduct
of the attorney. 389 The inquirer appealed the Professional Ethics Committee
decision to the Florida Bar Board of Governors. The committee declined to
issue an advisory opinion in response to an inquiry regarding enforcement of, 390
a contract involving restrictions on an attorney's right to practice. At its
meeting on April 3, 1998, the Florida Bar Board of Governors reviewed the
decision and voted to overturn the decision of the committee, but declined to
recede from Florida Ethics Opinion 93-4 (approved by the Board of
Governors in February, 1995), notwithstanding the Miller case, as the
inquiry related to a contract regarding hourly fees.
391
385. Florida Bar re: Amendments to Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, 697 So. 2d
115, 130 (Fla. 1997).
386. Id.
387. Fla. Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 93-4 (1995).
388. Florida Bar Professional Ethics Committee Minutes, January 23, 1998, on file at
The Florida Bar.
389. Id. See also Rule 2(d) of the Florida Bar Procedures for Ruling on Questions of
Ethics, which provides:
Ethics counsel shall decline to issue a staff opinion to anyone who either
inquires about another lawyer's conduct or asks a question of law and may
decline to issue a staff opinion when the inquiry raises a question for which
there is no previous precedent or underlying bar policy upon which to base an
opinion. When ethics counsel declines to issue an opinion pursuant to this
rule, ethics counsel shall advise the inquirer of the provisions of rule 3.
Fla. Bar Procedures for Ruling on Questions of Ethics, 2(d)(1998).
390. Minutes of the Florida Bar Board of Governors, (April 3, 1998) (on file at The
Florida Bar).
391. Id.
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The court has continued its efforts in support of the professionalism
movement.392  Although declining to find a violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct, in Florida Bar v. Martocci,393 the Supreme Court of
Florida chided the attorneys for the "patently unprofessional" conduct.
394
The attorney directed epithets at another attorney at a deposition and made
other personal remarks about him. The court stated that these actions did not
rise to the level of discipline, but published details of the exchange to point
out the lack of professionalism involved, opining:
As noted in our opening paragraph we find the conduct of the
lawyers involved in the incident giving rise to these proceedings to
be patently unprofessional. We would be naive if we did not
acknowledge that the conduct involved herein occurs far too often.
We should be and are embarrassed and ashamed for all bar
members that such childish and demeaning conduct takes place in
the justice system. It is our hope that by publishing this opinion
and thereby making public the offending and demeaning exchanges
between these particular attorneys, that the entire bar will benefit
and realize an attorney's obligation to adhere to the highest
professional standards of conduct no matter the location or
circumstances in which an attorney's services are being
rendered.
395
Relationships with the public are often evidenced through the attorney's
conduct at trial. The Second District Court of Appeal affirmed that
misbehavior by an attorney in the course of a trial results in sanctions to the
396
attorney in the case of Elder v. Norton. The court reversed a dismissal
based on misconduct of the attorney during the discovery process, stating
that the client should not suffer for the sins of the attorney, particularly since
there are many sanctions available to the court which directly affect the
attorney.
3 97
Supreme Court of Florida Justice Wells criticized the conduct of both
attorneys and judges through both the trial and the appellate process in his
dissent in Valle v. State.39 Valle involved an appeal of a capital case in
which the defendant, having been convicted of murder, filed an ineffective
392. See supra n. 60 and accompanying text (discussing the court's activities in the
professionalism movement).
393. 699 So. 2d 1357 (Fla. 1997).
394. Id. at 1358.
395. Id. at 1360.
396. 711 So. 2d 586, 587 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
397. Id.
398. 705 So. 2d 1331, 1337 (Fla. 1997) (Wells, J., dissenting).
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assistance of counsel claim. 399 The defendant claimed that his counsel
should have filed for recusal of the sentencing judge who allegedly kissed
the victim's wife and conversed with the victim's friends in front of the
jury.40 0 The court found that the allegations were sufficient to warrant an
evidentiary hearing.40 1 However, most interesting was the dissent by Justice
Wells, which was highly critical of the delay which occurred in the case.
402
Wells stated that "[a]voidance of the delay and the kind of mistake made
here requires only the level of professional competence and attention of
judges and counsel that defendants and the public have a right to expect and
receive in these cases." 40 3 He then pointed out that, although the defendant
was arrested nearly twenty years before, the case has yet to be resolved.
40 4
Wells specifically condemned delay in the capital case, noting that "I do not
believe that a knowing refusal to disclose or failure to have the information
at a hearing are proper tactics. A game of "hide the evidence" has no
appropriate place in these proceedings and should not be tolerated."40 5
However, advocacy is not the only role that attorneys play in the
courtroom. Attorneys, like all qualified citizens, sometimes play the role of
juror. Attorneys are subject, as are all qualified citizens of the State of
Florida, to a summons for jury service.40 6 Unlike most citizens, however,
attorneys may be excused from service by the court.40 7 The Supreme Court408
of Florida, in Hoskins v. State, determined that discretion of the court to
excuse attorneys and others from jury service is not delegable to other court
399. Id. at 1332-33.
400. Id. at 1333.
401. Id.
402. Id. at 1336.
403. Valle, 705 So. 2d at 1336 (Wells, J., dissenting).
404. Id. at 1337.
405. Id.
406. See generally FLA. STAT. § 40.01 (1997).
407. FLA. STAT. § 40.013(5) provides:
A presiding judge may, in his or her discretion, excuse a practicing
attorney, a practicing physician, or a person who is physically infirm from
jury service, except that no person shall be excused from service on a civil
trial jury solely on the basis that the person is deaf or hearing impaired, if that
person wishes to serve, unless the presiding judge makes a finding that
consideration of the evidence to be presented requires auditory discrimination
or that the timely progression of the trial will be considerably affected
thereby. However, nothing in this subsection shall affect a litigant's right to
exercise a peremptory challenge.
FLA. STAT. § 40.013(5) (1997).
408. 702 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 1997).
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personnel. 4°9 The case, which involved an appeal from a capital conviction,
addressed an issue regarding the selection of the jury.41° In that particular
circuit, the chief judge had issued an administrative order which permitted
the clerk to excuse jurors based on the Florida Statutes, including a statute
which gave discretion to the presiding judge to excuse practicing attorneys
from jury service.41' Although the court denied the appeal for failure to raise
the objection to the jury panel in a timely manner, the court was careful to
note that the procedure permitted by the administrative order was• - • 412
impermissible. In so opining, the court stated:
In reaching this decision, however, we emphasize that we are in no
way sanctioning any process whereby a clerk of court is to carry
out statutory mandated judicial responsibilities. We conclude that
trial judges may not delegate their discretionary authority under
section 40.013(5) to clerks of court or any other official.4 13
Justice Anstead, in dissent, would have upheld the appeal on the jury
panel issue because the jury panel was not "selected or drawn according to
law. 414 Justice Anstead pointed out that the clerk excused classes of people
without having the presiding judge hear their request and rationale for
excusal.41s Justice Anstead also noted his concern that the statute excluded
entire groups of people from service merely because of their profession,
"discarding traditional notions of fairness and public duty."
416
Attorneys also have a relationship with the State of Florida. An
attorney has responsibilities, not only as a private citizen, but often also in
the course of his or her conduct as an attorney. For example, attorneys are
the subject of legislation specific to their roles as attorneys. 7 The Supreme
Court of Florida found such a statute unconstitutionally vague in State v.
Mark Marks, P.A. .418 The state charged a law firm and several of its
employees with filing false or incomplete insurance claims. The state
claimed that the attorneys failed to reveal "medical records or statements
409. Id. at 206.
410. Id. at 205.
411. Id.
412. Id. at 206.
413. Hoskins, 702 So. 2d at 206.
414. Id. at 211 (Anstead, J., dissenting) (quoting Rule 3.290 of the Florida Rules of
Criminal Procedure).
415. Id. at 212.
416. Id.
417. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 817.234 (1987).
418. 698 So. 2d 533, 539 (Fla. 1997).
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that were unfavorable to the claim."419 The relevant statute provided that one
who prepares written statements in connection with an insurance claim that
"contains any false, incomplete, or misleading information ... material to
such claim" is guilty of a felony. 420 The statute also provided that an
attorney who assists in such a claim is guilty of a felony as well.421 The
court found use of the term "incomplete" in the statute unconstitutionally
vague as applied to attorneys in the representation of their clients.422 The
court pointed out the special role that attorneys serve and the nature of their
obligations to clients, in stating that "[b]ecause attorneys, pursuant to statute,
case law, procedural rules, and rules of professional regulation, are
customarily required to withhold certain types of information throughout the
representation of a client, the term 'incomplete' without more does not give
attorneys an ascertainable standard of guilt by which to measure their
conduct." 423
The court disagreed with the state's argument that the specific intent
portion of the statute, coupled with the term "incomplete," sufficiently put
attorneys on notice of the behavior penalized by the statute, concluding that
the attorneys "were under no clear duty to disclose the information they
allegedly withheld."424
An attorney may not assist in the unlicensed practice of law.4 s The
Supreme Court of Florida enjoined an individual and his business from the
practice of law where the individual and his business prepared, among other
things, a dissolution complaint without using a form approved by the
supreme court, prepared bankruptcy petitions, gave legal advice reparding
bankruptcy, and put his name in an "Attorney" slot on petitions. The
referee's report, adopted by the Supreme Court, found that preparing the
complaint and drafting a letter for the complainant "would be the unlicensed
practice of law even if an attorney had drafted the complaint as Respondent
Davide would have been the conduit for obtaining and relaying the
419. Id. at 536.
420. Id. at 535-36 n.9 (citing FLA. STAT. § 817.234(1) (1987)).
421. Id. at 536 n.10 (citing FLA. STAT. § 817.43(3) (1987)).
422. Id. at 533.
423. Marks, 698 So. 2d at 537.
424. Id. at 539.
425. RPC 4-5.5(b) provides that: "A lawyer shall not... assist a person who is not a
member of the bar in the performance of activity that constitutes the unlicensed practice of
law." RPC 4-5.5(b).
426. Florida Bar v. Davide, 702 So. 2d 184, 185 (Fla. 1997).
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,,427information, without the client ever having spoken with the attorney.
Most notably, however, the court found that the use of the name "Florida
Law Center, Inc.," and the advertising of that name, constituted the
unlicensed practice of law since "the use of the name is misleading and gives
the public the expectation that Florida Law Center, Inc. [sic] has expertise in
the field of law.' 428 The court then enjoined the respondent from use of the
name or any similar name from which the public could infer that the
business offered legal services. 429
Not only may a lawyer not engage in the unlicensed practice of law, but
a lawyer may not assist in the unlicensed practice of law.430 The court
disbarred an attorney without leave to reapply for five years when he
engaged in the practice of law after resigning from The Florida Bar .4 3 1 The
attorney, after resignation, undertook a two and one-half year litigation in
county court on behalf of his son, who had reached majority and was
432engaged in a dispute with his insurance company over an auto accident.
Although the court noted a lack of selfish motive in the representation,
having received no payment for the representation, the court found that he
"intentionally violated this Court's order granting his resignation from the
Bar... and this misconduct caused injury to the legal system and the
profession.' ' 3  The court therefore found an appropriate sanction to be
434disbarment without leave to reapply for readmission for five years.
V. THE LAWYER'S RELATIONSHIP TO THE FLORIDA BAR AND THE
DISCIPLINARY SYSTEM
This section focuses on attorneys' relationship to The Florida Bar and
the grievance process. The section reports on cases which determine the
effect of the grievance process on other proceedings. Grievance cases that
are not easily defined by the relationships that attorneys have with clients,
the court, or third parties are also analyzed. Finally, this section discusses
427. Id. at 184. See Fla. Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 88-6 (1988) for a
discussion of the ethical considerations involved in having nonlawyer employees gather
information for an attorney.
428. Davide, 702 So. 2d at 184-85.
429. Id. at 185.
430. RPC 4-5.5(a) provides that: "A lawyer shall not.., practice law in a jurisdiction
where doing so violates the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction." RPC 4-
5.5(a).
431. Florida Bar v. Weisser, 23 Fla. L. Weekly S269, S271 (May 14, 1998).
432. Id. at S269.
433. Id. at S270.
434. Id. at S271.
216 [Vol. 23:161
218
Nova Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [1998], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol23/iss1/1
Chinaris / Tarbert
significant changes to the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar and the'Rules of
the Florida Board of Bar Examiners.
The Supreme Court of Florida decided that a complainant in a
grievance proceeding enjoys absolute immunity from a defamation claim by
the respondent attorney for all statements made privately within the
435 436grievance process. In Tobkin v. Jarboe, the Jarboes, clients of a Florida
attorney, filed complaints about his conduct.4 37 The Florida Bar Grievance
Committee unanimously found no probable cause for the complaint and
dismissed it.438 The attorney then filed a defamation claim against the
Jarboes which was based upon their complaint to the Bar.439 The trial court
dismissed the claim, and under a theory of absolute immunity, the Fourth
District Court of Appeal affirmed.440 The Supreme Court of Florida upheld
the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal, finding that "Bar
complainants are protected by an absolute privilege in so far as the
complainant makes no public announcement of the complaint outside of the
grievance process, thus allowing the grievance procedure to run its natural
course. ' 441 The court dismissed Tobkin's argument that, in opening up the
grievance process to the public in 1990, the court also afforded a
complainant qualified immunity as opposed to the absolute immunity442
previously enjoyed by complainants. The court recognized public policy
against the "chilling" effect on complainants if they did not have absolute
immunity in filing a complaint.443 Justice Wells dissented, noting that the
Florida Bar Disciplinary Review Commission that recommended opening up
the grievance process also recommended only qualified immunity from
defamation claims. 444 In his argument for qualified immunity, Justice Wells
noted the following:
[Mialicious grievance filings are actually a fact of the present
practice of law. Such filings can be and have been used as tactical
weapons against attorneys to accomplish purposes that have
nothing to do with violation of the rules of professional conduct.
Attorneys should not be defenseless against this tactic nor should
435. Tobkin v. Jarboe, 710 So. 2d 975, 978 (Fla. 1998).
436. Id. at 975.
437. Id. at 976.
438. Id.
439. Id.
440. Tobkin, 710 So. 2d at 976.
441. Id.
442. Id. at 976-77.
443. Id. at 977.
444. Id. at 978 (Wells, J., dissenting).
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the grievance process be freely available to those who employ this
F445tactic.
Justice Wells also noted that the "public exoneration" that the majority
found to be a "suitable remedy for any negative effects created" by a
baseless complaint "ignores the reality" of the effect a complaint can have
on the life and career of the lawyer complained about. 446
An attorney also has certain rights during the grievance process. The
Third District Court of Appeal found in State v. Spiegel"7 that an attorney's
statements during the course of a Florida Bar investigation did not waive his
Fifth Amendment privilege during a subsequent criminal prosecution.
448
During the course of their divorce, the attorney's wife, also a lawyer, filed a
bar complaint against him.449 A member of the Florida Bar Grievance
Committee interviewed Spiegel. At the time of the interview, both the
Grievance Committee member and Spiegel believed that the Rules of the
Florida Bar compelled Spiegel to answer the questions posed.45° The wife
filed for a domestic violence injunction against Spiegel, and later accused
him of violating the injunction. 45 The Grievance Committee then held a
hearing, at which Spiegel asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege. Spiegel
then sought the suppression of his earlier statements made to the Grievance
Committee member in his criminal case.452 The court granted the motion to
suppress and certified the question to the Third District Court of Appeal.453
Citing to the public interest, the Third District Court of Appeal found that
not invoking the privilege in a grievance proceeding did not waive the
privilege for the purpose of other proceedings in Spiegel's case:
Primarily, we are concerned that a ruling allowing such statements
to be admissible would interfere with the Bar's truth-seeking and
disciplinary functions. Bar Grievance proceedings play an
important role in protecting the public from improper professional
conduct by attorneys. In order to carry out this important function,
grievance committee members must be able to conduct meaningful
investigations to ascertain all facts relating to the grievance.
Requiring an attorney to plead the Fifth as soon as possible in order
445. Tobkin, 710 So. 2d at 978.
446. Id.
447. 710 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
448. Id. at 18.
449. Id. at 15.
450. Id. at 18.
451. Id. at 15.
452. Spiegel, 710 So. 2d at 15.
453. Id. at 16.
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to preserve the privilege would directly conflict with the Bar
Grievance committee's truth-seeking function.45
Since the results can be so severe, it is appropriate to safeguard
attorneys' constitutional rights within the grievance process. The Supreme
Court of Florida disbarred an attorney for a felony conviction in Florida Bar
v. Grief.455 The attorney was convicted in federal court of filing documents
in immigration cases that the attorney knew to be false.4 56 The referee
recommended a three-year suspension due to mitigation established during
the hearing.4 57 The court, in disbarring the attorney, affirmed its sposition
that a felony conviction does not automatically lead to disbarment.45 In this
instance, however, the court found a pattern of misconduct in the filing of
false documents, which warranted disbarment.4 59
Not only may an attorney not violate the law, an attorney may not
violate a court order. In Florida Bar v. Gersten,40 the Supreme Court of
Florida suspended an attorney indefinitely for refusing to comply with a
court order that he answer questions of the state attorney's office. 46 1 The
state granted the attorney immunity from testifying regarding the reported
theft of his car.462 When the attorney refused to testify, the trial court
entered a civil contempt order.463 The attorney exhausted the appellate
process and maintained his silence.464 When the trial court ordered him
jailed, the attorney refused to report and went to Australia.465  Gersten
claimed that refusal to testify is permitted under RPC 4-3.4(c), which
provides that "[a] lawyer shall not knowingly disobey an obligation under
the rules of a tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion that
no valid obligation exists." 6 The Supreme Court of Florida concluded that,
under such a reading of the rule, any attorney could evade discipline for
violating a court order "indefinitely by asserting a subjective belief that no
valid obligation exists. Such a result invites disrespect for the judicial
454. Id. at 17.
455. 701 So. 2d 555, 557 (Fla. 1997).
456. Id. at 555.
457. Id.
458. Id. at 556-57.
459. Id.
460. 707 So. 2d 711 (Fla. 1998).
461. Id. at714.
462. Id. at 712.
463. Id.
464. Id.
465. Gersten, 707 So. 2d at 712.
466. Id. (quoting RPC 4-3.4(c)).
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system." 467 The court then suspended Gersten indefinitely until he testified
under the court order and for one year following his compliance with the
court order.
468
The supreme court disciplined several attorneys for trust accounts
469
violations during the year. The court suspended an attorney for one year
for misappropriating client funds in the settlement of a claim.470  The
attorney settled a claim in a products liability matter, which would be
divided between the client, the attorney, and the client's health care
providers.47' The attorney deposited the settlement check and wrote a check
to the client on the agreed upon amount, without sending a closing
statement.472 The attorney kept money to pay the health care providers, but
used the money for his own purposes instead. The client filed a complaint
after being contacted by the health care providers for payment.473 In another
case, the court suspended an attorney for ninety days for having fifty-nine474
checks returned for insufficient funds. The attorney indicated that he was
currently being treated for a substance abuse problem and had ceased the
practice of law. The court placed the attorney on probation for three years
with the conditions that the attorney hire a certified public accountant to
report to The Florida Bar on the attorney's trust and operating accounts, that
he be subject to random drug testing, and that he remain on under contract to
467. Id. at 713.
468. Id. at 714.
469. See, e.g., The Florida Bar v. Krasnove, 697 So. 2d 1208 (Fla. 1997).
470. Id. at 1209-10.
471. Id. at 1209.
472. Id. See subdivision (0(5) of RPC 4-1.5, which provides:
In the event there is a recovery, upon the conclusion of the
representation, the lawyer shall prepare a closing statement reflecting an
itemization of all costs and expenses, together with the amount of fee
received by each participating lawyer or law firm. A copy of the closing
statement shall be executed by all participating lawyers, as well as the client,
and each shall receive a copy. Each participating lawyer shall retain a copy of
the written fee contract and closing statement for 6 years after execution of
the closing statement. Any contingent fee contract and closing statement
shall be available for inspection at reasonable times by the client, by any
other person upon judicial order, or by the appropriate disciplinary agency.
RPC 4-1.5(0(5).
473. Krasnove, 697 So. 2d at 1209. Subdivision (a) of RPC 4-1.15 provides that "[a]
lawyer shall hold in trust, separate from the lawyer's own property, funds and property of
clients or third persons that are in a lawyer's possession in connection with a
representation." RPC 4-1.15(a). Subdivision (a) of RPC 5-1.1 provides that "[m]oney or
other property entrusted to an attorney for a specific purpose, including advances for costs and
expenses, is held in trust and must be applied only to that purpose." RPC 5-1.1(a).
474. Florida Bar v. Valladares, 698 So. 2d 823, 824-25 (Fla. 1997).
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Florida Lawyer's Assistance, Inc.475 Finally, the court suspended another
attorney for ninety days for trust account violations which were similar to
those for which the attorney was previously placed on probation.476 The
attorney was found to have collected into and disbursed from his trust
account during his period of suspension and to have commingled client
funds with personal funds.477
Often, complaints filed against attorneys alleging trust account
violations also contain other allegations as well. In Florida Bar v.
Pelligrini,478 The Florida Bar accused an attorney of charging an excessive
fee as well as misappropriating client funds.479 Pelligrini represented a client
in a personal injury matter and filed a complaint a week after the settlement480
check was mailed (one day before the client signed the release). An
answer was never filed.481 Nevertheless, Pelligrini collected 40% of the fee,
in violation of RPC 4-1.5(f)(4)(B)(i)(a)(1). 482 After upholding the referee's
findings of the trust account and excessive fee violations, the court
483
suspended Pelligrini for three years.
As is usual, attorneys were disciplined this year for neglect of their
clients' matters. The Supreme Court of Florida suspended an attorney for
thirty days for lack of diligence when the attorney requested three extensions484
of time in a criminal appeal and then failed to file a brief. In Florida Bar
v. Kassier,485 the court suspended an attorney for one year and placed him on
probation for three years for violations including neglect and trust account
486
violations. The attorney accepted a retainer from a client to represent her
in a contract matter, did nothing on her case, did not return her retainer, and
487 488did not refer her to another lawyer. Finally, in Florida Bar v. Nowacki,
the court suspended an attorney for ninety-one days in a neglect case in
475. Id. at 825.
476. Florida Bar v. Pipkins, 708 So. 2d 953, 954 (Fla. 1998).
477. Id. at 954.
478. 714 So. 2d 448 (Fla. 1998).
479. Id. at 450.
480. Id.
481. Id.
482. Id. See also RPC 4-1.5(f)(4)(B)(i)(a)(1), which provides for 33 1/3% of a
recovery up to $1 million which is made prior to the filing of an answer by the defendant.
483. Pelligrini, 714 So. 2d at 453.
484. Florida Bar v. Nesmith, 707 So. 2d 331, 332-33 (Fla. 1998). See RPC 4-1.3,
which requires that an attorney act with diligence relating to client matters. RPC 4-1.3.
485. 711 So. 2d 515 (Fla. 1998).
486. Id. at 517.
487. Id. at 516.
488. 697 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 1997).
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which the court also found the attorney guilty of dishonesty489 and failure to
supervise an associate of her firm.49 In addition to chiding the attorney's
neglect of client matters, the court condemned her "wholesale delegation of
her caseload to a new associate., 491 The court, in suspending the attorney
for ninety-one days, noted that "[t]his case involves a persistent pattern of
client neglect and mismanagement by the respondent." 3
Competence is another area in which courts may discipline attorneys.
An attorney who repeatedly failed to follow the Florida Rules of Civil
Procedure and the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure received a ninety-
one day suspension in Florida Bar v. Solomon.494 The Supreme Court of
Florida affirmed The Florida Bar's arument that "actual harm or prejudice is
not an element of incompetence or lack of diligence under the Rules
Regulating The Florida Bar," although they noted that Solomon's numerous
errors in his cases must have affected the clients. 495 The supreme court also
disciplined an attorney for incompetence, among other violations, in the case
of Florida Bar v. Boland.4 96  A client hired the attorney to obtain a
restraining order against the client's husband and to transfer a custody case
to Florida. The client stated that, after the court awarded the husband
custody in the other jurisdiction and the court ordered the client to turn the
children over to the sheriff, attorney Boland advised the client to remove the
children from the jurisdiction while Boland dealt with the matter.497 He also
advised others to deny knowledge of the whereabouts of the children. The
court stated that "[u]pon becoming her lawyer, Boland was charged with
representing his client competently, which would include informing his
client of the legal consequences of her behavior, notifying her of the various
proceedings in the case, and giving her competent legal advice. 4 98
An attorney must also avoid representations involving conflicts of
interest. The court found a clear conflict of interest in Florida Bar v.
Wilson.499 Wilson represented a couple in a declaratory action to share
lottery winnings of the wife.500 He then represented them in additional
489. Id. at 833. See RPC 4-8.4(c).
490. Nowacki, 697 So. 2d at 831. See RPC 4-5.1(b).
491. Nowacki, 697 So. 2d at 831.
492. Id. at 833.
493. RPC 4-1.1 mandates that: "A lawyer provide.., competent representation to a
client." RPC 4-1.1.
494. 711 So. 2d 1141, 1143-47 (Fla. 1998).
495. Id. at 1146 (citing Florida Bar v. Littman, 612 So. 2d 582 (Fla. 1993)).
496. 702 So. 2d 229, 232 (Fla. 1997).
497. Id. at 229.
498. Id. at 232.
499. 714 So. 2d 381, 383 (Fla. 1998).
500. Id. at 382.
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matters involving their home.50' Some time later, the husband requested that
Wilson represent him in a dissolution matter, which Wilson declined.50 2 The
husband filed a dissolution action with the representation of another
lawyer. 3 Wilson then represented the wife in the dissolution matter and in
an action to set aside the declaratory judgment regarding the lottery
winnings. 4 After the court disqualified him in an oral hearing, Wilson then
filed a motion to recuse the judge, as well as a motion for rehearing on the
disqualification. In addition to agreeing with the referee's finding of a
"clear conflict of interest in violation of rule 4-1.9,"0 6 the court also found
that Wilson had violated RPC 4-8.4(d),507 since he continued the
representation by filing the motion to recuse after the court disqualified him
508from the representation, and suspended him for one year.
Violation of the attorney advertising rules may also result in discipline,
as evidenced by Florida Bar v. Greenspan.59 The attorney failed to file a
yellow page advertisement for review with The Florida Bar.5 10 Not only did
the attorney refuse to file the advertisement, but he also failed to respond to
the Bar's inquiries regarding both the filing and the investigation of the
501. Id.
502. Id.
503. Id.
504. Wilson, 714 So. 2d at 382.
505. Id.
506. Id. See RPC 4-1.9, which provides:
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not
thereafter
(a) represent another person in the same or a substantially related
matter in which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests
of the former client unless the former client consents after consultation; or
(b) use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of
the former client except as rule 4-1.6 would permit with respect to a client or
when the information has become generally known.
RPC 4-1.9.
507. Wilson, 714 So. 2d at 382-83. Subdivision (d) of RPC 4-8.4 provides, in
pertinent part, that "A lawyer shall not.., engage in conduct in connection with the practice
of law that is prejudicial to the administration of justice." RPC 4-8.4(d).
508. Wilson, 714 So. 2d at 384.
509. 708 So. 2d 926 (Fla. 1998).
510. Id. at 926-27. See Subdivision (b) of RPC 4-7.5 which requires that an attorney
file any nonexempt advertisement for review with the standing committee on advertising. RPC
4-7.5(b).
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complaint filed by the Bar.51' The Supreme Court of Florida 5ublicly
reprimanded the attorney and placed him on probation for one year.
The Supreme Court of Florida's authority over attorneys goes beyond
discipline. The supreme court affirmed its ability to place an attorney on the
inactive list over the attorney's objections in Florida Bar v. Arthur.' 3 The
Florida Bar requested that the attorney undergo an evaluation by Florida
Lawyers Assistance, Inc., regarding her competency after she was
involuntarily hospitalized and medicated for "expressing paranoid
ideations. 5  After the attorney refused the request, the Grievance
Committee held a hearing, determined that she was incompetent to practice,
and directed the Bar to request that the court place the attorney on the
inactive list.515 The court appointed a referee, who ordered the attorney to
undergo a mental evaluation. When she refused, the court placed her on
the inactive list.5 17 Relying on RPC 3-7.13, 518 the court found that although
there was no proof of any misconduct of the attorney, her refusal to undergo
psychiatric evaluation ordered by the referee warranted her placement on the
inactive list.519
Attorneys and judges have an obligation under the Rules of
Professional Conduct to report the violations of the rules by others. 52 In 5-
511. Greenspan, 708 So. 2d at 927.
512. Id. at 928.
513. 22 Fla. L. Weekly S551, S551-52 (Sept. 4, 1997).
514. Id. at S551.
515. Id.
516. Id.
517. Id.
518. Section (a) of RPC 3-7.13 permits an attorney who has been found incompetent to
practice law to be placed on the inactive list even without proof of misconduct. RPC 3-
7.13(a).
519. Arthur, 22 Fla. L. Weekly at S552.
520. RPC 4-8.3 provides:
(a) Reporting Misconduct of Other Lawyers. A lawyer having
knowledge that another lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's
honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects shall inform
the appropriate professional authority.
(b) Reporting Misconduct of Judges. A lawyer having knowledge that
a judge has committed a violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct that
raises a substantial question as to the judge's fitness for office shall inform
the appropriate authority.
(c) Confidences Preserved. This rule does not require disclosure of
information otherwise protected by rule 4-1.6.
RPC 4-8.3.
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H Corp. v. Padovano,521 the supreme court held that reporting professional
misconduct does not give cause to disqualify a judge. The First District
Court of Appeal reported an attorney for using expletives and specious
argument in a motion for rehearing. 28 The complaint was dismissed for no
probable cause.524 The attorney then came before the court in a related
appeal, and moved for disqualification because of the prior referral to The
Florida Bar.52 The supreme court found that Florida judges have a duty to
report unprofessional conduct under RPC 4-8.3, and ruled that the discharge
of that obligation did not give rise to good grounds for disqualification. 526 A
finding of good cause for disqualification would invite attorneys to forum
shop by misbehaving in court, then disqualify judges who reported the
conduct to the Bar.
52
The Supreme Court of Florida also regulates the activities of The
Florida Bar as an organization. In Florida Bar v. Schwarz,528 the supreme
court affirmed that The Florida Bar's activity regarding lobbying is
restricted. 29 A member of The Florida Bar sought to enjoin it from lobbying
in association with the Florida Lawyers Association for the Maintenance of
Excellence, Inc. ("FLAME").530 Schwarz claimed that employees of the Bar
organize and work for FLAME in violation of case law and rules which
restrict the Bar's activity regarding legislative action. 31 The court found
that although the Bar enters contracts with FLAME to provide administrative
services, and that employees of the Bar act as agents to hold money
contributed to FLAME, such activity does not constitute impermissible
532lobbying activity. In so deciding, the court pointed out that contributions
to FLAME are voluntary, unlike mandatory membership fees to the Bar, and
that the Bar has no control over actions taken by FLAME. 33
521. 708 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 1997).
522. Id. at 246-47.
523. Id. at 245.
524. Id.
525. Id.
526. 5-H Corp., 708 So. 2d at 246.
527. Id. at 247.
528. 708 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 1998).
529. Id.
530. Id.
531. Id. (citing The Florida Bar re Schwarz, 552 So. 2d 109 (Fla. 1989) and RPC 2-9.3
(containing provisions for a Florida Bar member to receive a refund after timely objection to a
legislative position taken by the Bar)).
532. Id. at 589-90.
533. Schwarz, 708 So. 2d at 589.
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In addition to its responsibilities in discipline, the Supreme Court of
Florida also made several changes to the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar.
Among the most important is a change to RPC 1-3.8, dealing with inventory
attorneys. An inventory attorney reviews the files of an attorney who is
suspended, disbarred, or otherwise incapacitated to practice law, and
protects the clients of that attorney.534 The court clarified the role of the
inventory attorney, by adding subsection (c) to rule 1-3.8, which provides
that "[n]othing herein creates an attorney and client, fiduciary, or other
relationship between the inventory attorney and the subject attorney. 535 The
court also indicated that "[t]he purpose of appointing an inventory attorney
,,536is to avoid prejudice to clients of the subject attorney. The supreme court
also approved a change to the rules which permits resolution of problems
between attorneys and clients without resort to grievance proceedings.
537
The Florida Bar proposed removal of certain cases from discipline to a
mediation process to resolve client complaints.538 Such removal would
occur only if "the public interest is satisfied by the resolution of the private
rights of the parties to the mediation., 539 The court approved the mediation
program, stating that:
The mediation program should benefit the public by providing an
alternative means to promptly and efficiently resolve grievances
filed against members of the Bar. This Court commends The
Florida Bar Board of Governors for their efforts in encouraging
alternative dispute resolution methods as a means to enhance the
efficacy of the grievance process.
540
The Supreme Court of Florida also made changes to the rules regulating
admissions to The Florida Bar, mainly codifying existing policy of the
Florida Board of Bar Examiners.5 41 However, the changes also include
shortening the time period for response to a Board inquiry from 120 to
ninety days and "raising the passing score on the [Multistate Professional
534. RPC 1-3.8.
535. Florida Bar re: Amendments to Rules Regulating The Florida Bar., 697 So. 2d
115, 119-20 (Fla. 1997).
536. Id. at 120.
537. Amendments to Rules Regulating The Florida Bar - Florida Bar Grievance
Mediation Program, 717 So. 2d 498,498 (Fla. 1998).
538. Id.
539. Id. (quoting RPC 3-8.1(d)).
540. Id. at 499.
541. Amendments to the Rules of the Supreme Court Relating to Admissions to the
Bar, 712 So. 2d 766 (Fla. 1998).
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Responsibility Examination]. '*542 Notably, the court did not amend RPC 4-
13 to allow law students to take the Multistate Professional Responsibility
Examination, since the matter is under review by The Florida Supreme Court
Commission on Professionalism.
5 43
VI. CONCLUSION
Florida authorities addressed a wide range of professional responsibility
issues in 1998. Practicing lawyers can look to civil cases, criminal cases,
ethics opinions, and amendments to rules in order to understand the
changing scope of their obligations toward each other, clients, third parties,
and the judicial system of which they are an integral part. With such a wide
range of sources generating important decisions that affect the practice of
law, it can truly be said that we have moved beyond a concern for only the
black letter rules into an arena where activities of bar members are governed
by the wider, more encompassing "law of lawyering."
542. Id. at 766.
543. Id. at 767.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In this survey, we have discussed those judicial decisions and
legislation produced between July 1, 1997 and June 30, 1998 that we
believed would be of particular interest to Florida real estate practitioners
and others interested in Florida real estate law. Not every case or statutory
change could be included. As in past years, the volume was significant.
Real property law continued to evolve in interesting ways. Our goal was to
inform the reader, but on occasion we have felt called upon to voice
disagreement.
I. ATTORNEYS' FEES
A. Attorneys' Fees in General
Cuervo v. West Lake Village II Condominium Ass'n.1 A new board of
directors was elected and took control of the Association's books and
accounts. The Association, however, contested the election. It filed a non-
binding arbitration pursuant to section 718.1255 of the Florida Statutes and
also filed suit for injunctive relief and damages. 2 The Association won the
arbitration, and the court ordered the books and accounts returned. The new
board then filed an answer and affirmative defenses. It also filed a coun-
terclaim. Up until this point, the Association had been represented by the
Siegfried firm. However, the counterclaim against the board stimulated the
involvement of the Association's insurance carrier who brought in its own
lawyers, the Pyska firm, to defend against the counterclaim. The Associ-
ation won a partial summary judgment and successfully moved for attorneys'
fees.4 The amount of the attorneys' fees was at issue in this appeal .
1. 709 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
2. Id at 598; see FLA. STAT. § 718.1255 (1993).
3. Cuervo, 709 So. 2d at 599.
4. Id.
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The essence of the argument was that having different firms handle the
claim and the counterclaim produced a duplication of efforts. Therefore,
they should not have to pay two law firms to do what could have been done
by one. The court agreed, finding that "the gravamen of both the main action
and counterclaim action centered around the issue of the validity of the ap-
pellants' election as directors of the association and their actions of taking
control of the association's funds and records." 6 On remand, the trial court
would have to determine the attorneys' fees based on the reasonable efforts
of one law firm, which was to be calculated by reducing the amount awarded
to the Siegfried firm by the value of the services performed by the Pyska
firm.
7
Jarvis v. Papineau. A real estate broker sued for a commission or, in
the alternative, for unjust enrichment. Following a nonjury trial, the court
found for the plaintiff and awarded $5000 plus interest and attorneys' fees.9
On appeal, the Second District Court of Appeal reversed the attorneys' fees
award.' 0 The court recited the familiar rule that "[a]ttorney's fees cannot be
taxed in any cause unless authorized by contract or statute," but there was
nothing in the record to suggest either basis for awarding fees in this case."
The following cases are organized in reference to that rule. The next section
covers attorneys' fees agreements, and the sections that follow focus on
particular statutes under which attorneys' fees may be awarded.
B. Attorneys' Fees Recoverable by Agreement
Careers USA, Inc. v. Sanctuary of Boca, Inc. 2 This case involved a
lease. A dispute arose over the meaning of the rent provision. The tenant
filed suit for declaratory judgment and reformation. The trial court found
the lease to be unambiguous and awarded summary judgment to the
landlord.' 3 The landlord then filed a motion for attorney's fees under the
lease provision that stated: "[in any litigation between the parties hereto to
enforce the terms and conditions of this Lease, the prevailing party shall be
entitled to recover all costs incurred in such action, including attorneys'
fees." 4  Following the lead of the Third and Fifth District Courts of
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 600.
8. 708 So. 2d 1035 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
9. Id. at 1035.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. 705 So. 2d 1362 (Fla. 1998).
13. Id. at 1362-63.
14. Id. (quoting the lease agreement).
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Appeal, 15 the trial court denied the motion on the theory that the declaratory
judgment action was an action to interpret rather than to enforce the terms of
the lease, but the Fourth District reversed.
16
The Supreme Court of Florida approved in an unanimous opinion
written by Senior Justice Grimes.17 He reasoned that the landlord needed to
defend against the declaratory judgment action in order to enforce the terms
18of the lease. Consequently, whether the landlord should recover the costs
should not be decided by the form of action chosen.' 9 The court rejected the
policy argument that litigants should be encouraged to utilize declaratory
judgment proceedings rather than have one party sue claiming the other had
already breached. 20 The court went on to acknowledge that the numerous
possible wordings of an attorneys' fees clause makes scrutinizing the
language used critical.2 ' It is, however, disappointing that the court did not
pursue that point; it could have emphasized this was a matter of contract
interpretation and the tools of contract interpretation should have been
brought to bear.
Hollub v. Clancy.22 The buyer successfully sued the seller of a
warehouse for failing to disclose that the warehouse would have to be
connected to the municipal sewer system within ninety days at considerable
expense. The buyer then filed a motion for attorneys' fees pursuant to the
attorneys' fees clause in the contract. This appeal challenged the amount of
attorneys' fees awarded2 3
The buyer had paid its attorneys a $20,000 nonrefundable fee and
entered into a contingent fee agreement with its attorneys providing, to the
extent the recovery exceeded $50,000, buyer's attorneys would get forty
percent in addition to the original $20,000, but if the recovery were less than
$50,000, the attorneys would have to be satisfied with $20,000. Later, the
agreement was amended to provide that the buyer's attorney would get the
greater of a reasonable attorneys' fee as awarded by the trial court or the
contingent fee described above.24  The trial court awarded reasonableattorneys' fees in excess of forty percent of the recovery. The sellers argued
15. Martin L. Robbins, M.D., P.A. v. I.R.E. Real Estate Fund, Ltd., 608 So. 2d 844
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Ocala Warehouse Inv., Ltd. v. Bison Co., 416 So. 2d 1269 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
16. Careers, 705 So. 2d at 1363.
17. Id. at 1362, 1364.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Careers, 705 So. 2d at 1364.
22. 706 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
23. Id. at 17.
24. Id. at 18 (citing the agreement).
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this required them to ay buyer's attorneys more than the buyer had been
obligated to pay them. The district court rejected this argument because it
was indistinguishable from a fee arrangement upheld by the Supreme Court
of Florida in Kaufman v. MacDonald.2t -
Sellers were, however, successful with their second point on appeal.
They argued that the buyer had hired too many lawyers and could not collect
reasonable attorneys' fees for all their work.27 The case was factually
simple, but buyers had hired both a sole practitioner and a small law firm.
The seller's expert had testified that a single lawyer would have sufficed
during the pretrial stages, but admitted that an additional lawyer would not
be impermissible for the trial. The court rejected any claim that additional
lawyers were needed due to the fact that the general partners of the buyer
brought the action on its behalf; the record did not reveal any hint of conflict
of interest between the partners, among themselves, or between them and the
partnership.2 The court concluded that there was simply no need for more
than one lawyer at hearings, depositions, or to work on the pleadings.29
However, there is something odd about the losing sellers arguing that the
buyer could have won the case against them with less time and effort. After
all, if their case were so weak, why did they go to trial? Nonetheless, the
case was remanded to limit a reasonable attorneys' fee to one lawyer in the
pretrial stages. °
In addition, some of the billing seemed to be based on units of one hour
or more. In twelve instances, the sole practitioner billed for an hour or more
to review a one- or two-page order or pleading. The court found this
unacceptable and it ordered that bills based on unreasonable billing units be
eliminated on remand.3'
C. Attorneys' Fees Recoverable under Section 5 7.105 of the Florida
Statutes
Kelly v. Tworoger.32 Two years after the closing, the buyer of a
condominium unit sued the sellers based on the claim that roof leaks were
latent defects that the sellers had failed to disclose. Eventually, the buyer
took a voluntary dismissal, and the sellers moved for attorneys' fees. The
contract provided: "[in connection with any arbitration or litigation arising
25. Id.
26. Id. (citing Kaufman v. MacDonald, 557 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1990)).
27. Hollub, 706 So. 2d at 18.
28. Id. at 18-19.
29. Id. at 19.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. 705 So. 2d 670 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
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out of this Contract, the prevailing party ... shall be entitled to recover all
costs incurred including attorney's fees."33 Concluding that the provision
applied, the trial court granted the motion, and the Fourth District Court of
Appeal affirmed.
34
The court, in an opinion written by Judge Gross, reasoned that the
nature of this action was for breach of the duty to disclose that is implied by
law into the contract based on Johnson v. Davis.35  Consequently, this
litigation did arise out of the contract as contemplated by the attorneys' fees
provision.36 It was not like an action for fraud in the inducement which
would be based on the inducer's fraudulent conduct rather than the
contract.37
Attorneys' fees could not, however, be assessed under the contractual
provision against a person who had unsuccessfully sought to be joined as a
plaintiff in this action because the dismissal with prejudice of his joinder
petition established that he was not a party to the contract. That did not
mean attorneys' fees could not be recovered. Because this claim was
frivolous, they could be assessed under Florida statute.39 The case was
remanded for specific findings as to the number of hours involved in dealing
with each unsuccessful plaintiff and the reasonable hourly rate for the
attorneys.40
The court also offered some interesting dicta on the fraud in the
inducement situation.4' It suggested that it was time to reject the denial of
attorneys' fees where the contract has been rescinded due to fraud in the
inducement based upon Katz v. Van Der Noord. Such a change might be
emotionally satisfying, based upon a vague claim of doing justice, but it
would be illogical and expand contractual liability for fees beyond what
might have been reasonably expected by the parties. This author43 hopes that
no court will take that leap. If such a change is appropriate, then the
legislature should decide prospectively that it is time to expand the right to
33. Id. at 671 (quoting the contract).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 672 (citing Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1985)).
36. Id.
37. Kelly, 705 So. 2d at 672 (distinguishing the fraudulent inducement cases such
as, Location 100, Inc. v. Gould S.E.L. Computer Sys., Inc. 517 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1987) and Dickson v. Dunn, 399 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1981)).
38. Id. at 673.
39. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 57.105(1) (1995).
40. Kelly, 705 So. 2d at 673.
41. Id. at 672-73.
42. Id. at 672 (citing Katz v. Van Der Noord, 546 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. 1989)).
43. Professor Ronald Benton Brown.
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recover attorneys' fees to a situation where there is no contract and the
defense was not frivolous.
Judge Klein specially concurred.44 He noted that an appellate court can
only review the trial court's judgment on attorneys' fees by means of
common law certiorari if the case were voluntarily dismissed.45 The
standard of review under common law certiorari is higher than for matters
that are reviewed on appeal. Judge Klein expressed the opinion that there
did not appear to be a good reason for the different treatment, so he hoped
that the Appellate Rules Committee would consider the incongruity
produced and recommend that the supreme court amend the rules to produce
a uniform standard of review regarding the grant of attorneys' fees.
46
Shahan v. Listle.47 The Johnsons sought to have a city ordinance
invalidated. In such cases, section 163.3215 of the Florida Statutes required
that the complainants file a verified copy of the complaint with the city no
later than thirty days after the conduct that was the basis of the
complaint. The city had thirty days to respond and, the complainants had
to institute their action in court no later than thirty days after the end of the
city's thirty-day response time. The Johnsons filed a copy of the complaint
with the city, but it was not verified. The city did not respond, so the
Johnsons filed for administrative review by the Department of Community
Affairs, which ruled in the Johnsons' favor. 4 9 Then the Johnsons filed a pro
50se complaint for a temporary injunction.
After receiving a motion for summary judgment and a request for
attorneys' fees, the Johnsons retained a lawyer, John Shahan. Based on the
Johnsons' failure to file the verified complaint with the city as reuired by
the statute, the trial court granted summary judgment against them. It also
awarded attorneys' fees under section 57.105 of the Florida Statutes and
divided the payment obliation between the Johnsons and Shahan, their
lawyer. Shahan appealed.
The Second District Court of Appeal reversed. It reasoned that the
action was not frivolous because the Johnsons' failure to comply with the
statutory condition precedent to filing their action could have been waived
44. Kelly, 705 So. 2d at 673 (Klein, J., concurring).
45. Id. at 673.
46. Id. at 673-74.
47. 703 So. 2d 1090 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
48. Id. at 1091; see FLA. STAT. § 163.3215 (1995).
49. Shahan, 703 So. 2d at 1091.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 57.105 (1995).
53. Shahan, 703 So. 2d at 1092.
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by the defendants.54 If it had been waived, then the Johnsons might have
won. After all, they did have standing and they had won the administrative
hearing. This seems far-fetched. If the point of the statute is to eliminate
litigation that should not have been brought, it seems counterproductive to
encourage litigation that is based upon the hope that the defendants will be
incompetent enough to waive a valid and obvious defense, but this decision
55is consistent with earlier district court cases.
Whitehead v. Dreyer.56 This is another case where the court mandated
the imposition of attorneys' fees against asplaintiff and his attorney based
upon section 57.105 of the Florida Statutes.
D. Attorneys' Fees Under the Construction Lien Act
58
Hollub Construction Company v. Narula. When a dispute arose
during the building of a home, the owner stopped paying the contractor. The
contractor filed a construction lien, filed a suit to enforce its lien, and made a
demand for arbitration. The homeowner filed counterclaims in the
arbitration. The arbitration award provided $192,000 for the contractor
against the owner and $150,000 for the owner against the contractor. The
contractor was ordered to pay forty percent of the arbitration costs and the
owner sixty percent. However, the arbitration award did not specifically
proclaim either to be the prevailing party or specify what part of the award
was interest. When the parties went back to court, each claimed attorneys'
fees under the construction lien statute as the prevailing party. 59 The trial
court declared it could not determine who was the prevailing party and
denied attorneys' fees to both.6° The Third District Court of Appeal
reversed. 61 It held that the award of attorneys' fees was mandatory under the
statute, so the court was required to determine who prevailed. The owners
had not filed their counterclaim in the suit to enforce the construction lien;
they had only filed it in the arbitration. Consequently, in the construction
lien suit, the contractor had prevailed on the only significant issue, its claim
54. Id. at 1091-92.
55. Id. at 1092. See Solimando v. Aloha Med. Ctr., 594 So. 2d 850 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1992); see also Piancone v. Engineering Design, Inc., 534 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 1988).
56. 698 So. 2d 1278 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
57. Id. This case is discussed in detail in the section on brokerage agreements and
commissions. See discussion infra Part III.B.
58. 704 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
59. Id. at 690; see FLA. STAT. § 713.29 (1995).
60. Narula, 704 So. 2d at 690.
61. Id. at 691.
62. Id. at 690.
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against the owner. Under the statute, that made the contractor entitled to
attorneys' fees.
63
E. Attorneys' Fees in Eminent Domain Proceedings
Pierpont v. Lee County.64 The Supreme Court of Florida reviewed three
65district court decisions together. In each case, the condemning authority
did a quick take, i.e., opted to take possession of the property prior to thefia jde66final judgment in the condemnation case. Under the orocedure provided by
statute,6 the authority must have an appraisal done.8 Then the authority
must make a good faith estimate based upon the appraisal.6 9 If the quick take
petition is approved by the court, the authority must deposit the amount of
70the good faith estimate into the registry of the court. In each case,
following the deposit, the condemning authority made a written offer that
was significantly greater than the good faith estimate. When it came time to
calculate the attorneys' fees due to the landowners' lawyers, the question
arose how those figures should be used in the calculation.
The statute provided that attorneys' fees were to be calculated based
upon the benefits the attorneys achieved for their clients.72 The statute
defined the benefit as the difference between the first written offer made by
the condemning authority and the final condemnation judgment or settlement
amount.73 Here, the landowners' attorneys claimed that the betterment
should be calculated using the good faith estimate as the first written offer.74
The Supreme Court of Florida rejected that argument.75 The unanimous
opinion pointed out the difference between an offer and an estimate.76 The
63. Id. at 691; see FLA. STAT. § 713.29 (1995).
64. 710 So. 2d 958 (Fla. 1998).
65. Id.; Lee County v. Pierpont, 693 So. 2d 994 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Lee
County v. A & G Invs., 693 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Lee County v. Barnett
Banks, Inc., 711 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997). See Ronald Benton Brown and
Joseph M. Grohman, Property Law: 1997 Survey of Florida Law, 22 NOVA L. REv. 269, 275-
77 (1997).
66. Pierpoint, 710 So. 2d at 959.
67. FLA. STAT. § 74.031 (1993).
68. Pierpoint, 710 So. 2d at 960; see FLA. STAT. § 74.031 (1993).
69. Pierpoint, 710 So. 2d at 960; see FLA. STAT. § 74.031 (1993).
70. Pierpoint, 710 So. 2d at 960; see FLA. STAT. § 74.031 (1993).
71. Pierpoint, 710 So. 2d at 959-60.
72. Id. at 960-61; see FLA. STAT. § 73.092 (Supp. 1994).
73. Pierpoint, 710 So. 2d at 960-61.
74. Id. at 960.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 960-61.
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court reasoned that the legislature also knew the difference. 77 Critically,
nothing in the statutes gave the landowner the power to accept the good faith
estimate.
Moreover, there was no constitutional mandate to use the good faith
estimate in calculating attorneys' fees.7 9 The Florida Constitution requires
the payment of "full compensation" to a person whose private property has
been taken for public use,80 but the Justices saw no denial of "full
compensation" in these situations. 81 The rule is that the legislature has the
power to enact reasonable attorneys' fees provisions, and there was nothing
inherently unreasonable about calculating attorneys' fees on the first written
offer rather than the good faith estimate. The court pointed out, however,
that this does not allow the condemning authority to minimize or avoid
payment of attorneys' fees by failing to make a timely written offer.83 Such
84
conduct might result in the statute being unconstitutional as applied .
Justice Wells wrote a brief concurrence.85 He urged the legislature to
amend the statute to allow calculation of attorneys' fees based on the good
86faith estimate. It would be bad policy to allow the authority to make a
good faith estimate and then deviate from it in making an offer to settle the87
case. That position had been argued by Judge Blue in his district court
dissent,88 which also pointed out that there was nothing in the statute to
prevent the landowner from accepting the good faith estimate as an offer.89
Boulis v. Department of Transportation.9 The condemnee claimed
prejudgment interest on the costs expended in preparing for trial. His theory
was that if he did not receive interest, he would be deprived of his property
without due process of law. The Fifth District Court of Appeal rejected the
claim because there was no legal precedent for it.91 However, noting that the
claim for prejudgment interest seemed supported by logic and fair play, the
77. Id.
78. Pierpoint, 710 So. 2d at 961.
79. Id. at 960.
80. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6.
81. Pierpoint, 710 So. 2d at 960.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. See also Pierpoint, 710 So. 2d at 961.
85. Pierpoint, 710 So. 2d at 961 (Wells, J., concurring).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Lee County v. Pierpont, 693 So. 2d 994, 997-98 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997)
(Blue, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 998.
90. 709 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 5th Dist Ct. App. 1998).
91. Id. at 206-07.
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court certified the q uestion to the supreme court "as being one of great
public importance."9
Department of Transportation, State of Florida v. Robbins and
Robbins, Inc.93 The parties settled the eminent domain action following
mediation. The problem was in the calculation of the attorneys' fees. The
expert testified that the reasonable hourly rate for the landowners' attorneys
should be higher than what they actually billed. Then the expert used those
rates to establish the lodestar figure. The trial judge then doubled the
lodestar, using the risk multiplier to reflect the complexity of the case.94 The
district court reversed because it considered this procedure as an "improper
'double-decker' award. 95  The proper procedure would be to establish a
reasonable hourly rate which did not exceed what the attorneys requested in
their testimony. That should be applied to the hours worked to reach the
lodestar. Then, the benefit obtained by the attorneys for their client could be
used to adjust the fee.
The trial court had made two other errors. It "improperly included the
paralegal hours as part of the attorneys' hours to get a 'blended' effective
hourly rate."96  The attorneys' fees should include hours expended by
paralegals and legal assistants, but those hours should be billed at a
reasonable rate.97 As the court noted, "it is not logical to use a paralegal to
help on a client's case because it is cheaper for the client, then seek to
recoup the paralegal time at an attorney rate from the condemning
authority." 98 Moreover, the trial court should not have awarded attorneys'
fees for time preparing for the attorneys' fees hearing.99 The condemning
authority is obligated only to pay the condemnee's reasonable attorneys' fees
and not attorneys' fees incurred by the attorneys in collecting those fees.
1°°
State Department of Transportation v. Hall.0 1 In this quick taking, the
department filed a good faith estimate of $20,000 and deposited that amount
in the registry of the court. The landowner objected because the estimate did
not include business damages. The department later presented an offer of
judgment for $126,400 to "settle all claims including business
damages. 102 The parties eventually settled for $147,500. However, in
92. Id. at 207.
93. 700 So. 2d 782 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
94. Id. at 784.
95. Id. at 784-85.
96. Id. at 785.
97. Id.
98. Robbins, 700 So. 2d at 785.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. 707 So. 2d 1163 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
102. Id. at 1164 (quoting department's offer).
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calculating attorneys' fees, the question was the betterment achieved by the
landowner's attorney. The trial court calculated attorneys' fees based on the
betterment of $127,500 that the landowner's attorney had achieved, i.e., the
difference between the good faith estimate and the eventual settlement. 10 3
The court refused to base betterment on the difference between the
settlement price and the offer of judgment because it found the offer of
judgment to be defective for failing to provide an itemization, including
specifying what portion was attributable to business damages."14  The
department appealed and the First District Court of Appeal reversed.1 5
Offers of judgment in eminent domain actions were covered in section
73.032(1)(a) of the Florida Statutes.1°6 It did not require the offer of
judgment to itemize the damages. It required that the offer settle all pending
claims summarize relevant conditions, and state the total amount of the
offer.167 This offer of judgment satisfied the statute, and it was not
ambiguous. 108 It contained no defect that would have prevented the court
from concluding the case, including calculating the attorneys' fee."'
9
Consequently, the attorneys' fee should have been calculated from the
betterment achieved above this offer."
0
State Department of Transportation v. Interstate Hotels Corp."' The
trial court awarded prejudgment interest on an award of attorneys' fees in an
eminent domain case, but the Third District Court of Appeal reversed." 2
The only district court precedent was from the second district," 3 so the trial
court was bound to follow it and committed reversible error by not doing
so. 11 While not similarly bound to follow another district, the third district
panel decided to do so, expressing their entire agreement with the earlier
• • 115
opinion.
State Department of Transportation v. Labelle Phoenix
Corporation."6 After the Department of Transportation's offer was refused,
103. Id. at 1163.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1164.
106. Hall, 707 So. 2d at 1164; see FLA. STAT. § 73.032(1)(a) (1993).
107. Hall, 707 So. 2d at 1164.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. 709 So. 2d 1387 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
112. Id. at 1387.
113. Id. (citing State Dep't of Transp. v. Brouwer's Flowers, Inc., 600 So. 2d 1260
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992)).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. 696 So. 2d 947 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
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the Department utilized the quick take procedure.' 7 Finally, the parties
stipulated to the worth of the property, and a judgment was entered
accordingly.1 8 Then it was time to award attorneys' fees. Because a quick
take appears in Chapter74 of the Florida Statutes, which is entitled
"PROCEEDINGS SUPPLEMENTAL TO EMINENT DOMAIN," the trial
court utilized section 73.092(2) reasoning that it expressly applied to "other
supplemental proceedings."' 19 Under subsection (2), which used the lodestar
method of calculating attorneys' fees, the court awarded $3,672.50 even
though the stipulated price was only $3,800 above what the Department had
originally offered. 20  The Department appealed, arguing that section
73.092(1), which calculated attorneys' fees based upon the benefits achieved
for the client, should have been used. 12  The Second District Court of
Appeal agreed.
122
The fact that the quick take chapter was entitled a "supplemental
proceeding" was not the controlling factor.12 Section 73.092(1) was
intended for cases in which a monetary award was the object.124 In contrast,
section 73.092(2) was intended for use in such cases as defeating an order of
taking or proceedings to determine the parties' respective rights.125
Therefore, it was inappropriate to use the latter subsection method in this
case which produced a monetary award. 126 Accordingly, the attorney's fee
was reduced to one-third of the benefit, $1,254.127
F. Attorneys' Fees in Landlord-Tenant Litigation
Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Morse.128
The tenant vacated at the end of the lease period. Based on the claim that
the tenant had breached the lease by leaving the premises in an "extensively
damaged condition," the landlord successfully sued for property damage and
117. Id. at 948.
118. Id.
119. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 73.092(2) (1995).
120. Labelle, 696 So. 2d at 948; see FLA. STAT. § 73.092(2) (1995).
121. Labelle, 696 So. 2d at 948; see FLA. STAT. § 73.092(1) (1995).
122. Labelle, 696 So. 2d at 948.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Labelle, 696 So. 2d at 948.
128. 708 So. 2d 640 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
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lost rent. 129 The trial court also awarded attorneys' fees to the landlord
although the lease did not have any provision for attorneys' fees.'
30
The landlord had argued that it was entitled to attorneys' fees under
section 82.231 of the Florida Statutes.13' However, the district court pointed
out that this section only authorizes the court to award attorneys' fees in an
action by the landlord for possession where attorneys' fees are authorized by
law. 132 Consequently, the attorneys' fees award in this case was wrong on
two counts. First, the action here was not an action for possession of the
premises. 33 Secondly, even in actions to which it applies, section 83.231 is
not an independent basis for awarding attorneys' fees. 134  It merely
authorizes the award of those fees in that procedural setting when there is an
independent basis for the award.' 35 In this case, there was no contractual
basis for awarding attorneys' fees, and there had been no finding of fact
below that would justify awarding attorneys' fees based on section 57.105(1)
of the Florida Statutes on the theory that the losing party had failed to raise a
"justiciable issue of law or fact." 36 Therefore, the attorneys' fees award was
reversed.1
37
III. BROKERS
A. Discipline and Licensing
Arias v. State Department of Business & Professional Regulation.'38 A
couple was interested in leasing a house shown to them by the licensee. The
licensee called the owner to finalize the deal, but the owner asked her, "[a]re
they Black?" The licensee answered, "[y]es." The owner then refused to
approve the lease, even though the licensee told her that she was not
supposed to discriminate. After talking with her broker, the licensee
explained the situation to the prospective tenants and suggested they hire a
lawyer. A complaint was filed with the Department of Housing and Urban
Development ("HUD"), and the owner was ordered to pay a $10,000 civil
fine and $35,000 compensatory damages to each of the prospective
129. Id. at 641.
130. Id.
131. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 82.231 (1995).
132. Morse, 708 So. 2d at 641; see FLA. STAT. § 82.231 (1995).
133. Morse, 708 So. 2d at 641.
134. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 82.231 (1995).
135. Morse, 708 So. 2d at 641-42; see FLA. STAT. § 82.231 (1995).
136. Morse, 708 So. 2d at 642; see FLA. STAT. § 57.105(1) (1995).
137. Morse, 708 So. 2d at 642.
138. 710 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
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renters. 139 The licensee was also found to have violated the law, fined $100,
and ordered to attend fair housing training. 40
Then the Department of Business and Professional Regulation filed an
administrative complaint against the licensee. 141 Based on the same facts,
which the licensee did not dispute, the Florida Real Estate Commission
("FREC") fined her $1,000, suspended her license for two years, and
sentenced her to one year of probation.1 42 She brought this appeal, and the
Third District Court of Appeal reversed. 143
A licensee can be disciplined for violating a duty imposed on her by
law.' 44 However, the board is required by statute to adopt disciplinary
guidelines that "specify a meaningful range of designated penalties based
upon the severity and repetition of specific offenses." FREC had failed to
adopt guidelines for violation of duties imposed by law. Lack of guidelines
"left the licensee in a predicament ripe for arbitrary and erratic enforcement,
and obviously provided no standards sufficiently governed by the legislature
as to constitute a judicially reviewable discretion. '"1 46
[T]he legislature could not have intended section 475.25(l)(b) to
be a carte blanche for the Commission to suspend real estate
professionals [sic] license for the violation of any legal duty
without meaningful notice of likely penalties and without a
mechanism in place to ensure that such penalties would be
consistently applied by the Commission.
147
The gross discrepancy between the penalty imposed by HUD and the penalty
imposed by FREC illustrated the problem with lack of standards. Of course,
communicating information to the owner about race was improper, but
absent appropriate guidelines, so was FREC's disciplinary order.
Milliken v. Department of Business and Professional Regulation.
Milliken was convicted of criminal possession of cocaine with the intent to
distribute. 149 The FREC held an informal hearing, found him guilty of
139. Id. at 656.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 657.
142. Id.
143. Arias, 710 So. 2d at 661.
144. Id. at 657; see FLA. STAT. § 475.25(l)(a) (1997).
145. Arias, 710 So. 2d at 658 (citing FLA. STAT. § 455.2273 (1997)).
146. Id. at 659.
147. Id.
148. 709 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
149. Id. at 597.
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violating section 475.25(1)(f) of the Florida Statutes,'50 and suspended his
real estate license.'5  Milliken raised five points on appeal. 52 Three merit
discussion here.
First, section 475.25(1)(f) of the Florida Statutes provided for
suspension or revocation of the real estate license where the licensee had
been convicted or found guilty of a crime relating to brokerage activities or
involving moral turpitude or fraudulent or dishonest dealings.153 Milliken
claimed that the cocaine possession conviction did not fit any of these
categories. The district court found otherwise. 54 "We have no problem
with concluding [cocaine possession with the intent to sell] is a crime
involving moral turpitude."'
Milliken challenged the use of an informal hearing, but the district court
found that Milliken had never objected to the informal procedure. 56
Milliken also challenged the panel's decision because no testimony or
documentation had been presented at the hearing. 157 However, Milliken had
asked for permission to speak to the FREC panel. When asked if there were
anything he wanted to tell the panel, he had freely admitted being convicted' 58
of the crime. Consequently, the panel had an adequate basis for its
decision.
159
Finally, FREC suspended his license until his criminal probation ended,
and he paid FREC's investigative costs.' Suspensions under section
475.25(1) may not exceed ten years, so a suspension order should not be
written in a way that the period might possibly exceed that period.
161
Consequently, the matter was remanded to FREC so that the suspension
period would explicitly be prevented from exceeding the ten-year period.
162
150. He was also found to have violated section 475.25(1)(n) of the Florida Statutes
which states: "confined in any county jail, postadjudication... confined in any state or
federal prison." Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 475.25(1)(n) (1997). However, that subsection is not
addressed in this opinion. Milliken, 709 So. 2d at 597.
151. Milliken, 709 So. 2d at 596.
152. Id. at 596-97.
153. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 475.25(1)(f) (1997).
154. Milliken, 709 So. 2d at 596.
155. Id. at 597.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Milliken, 709 So. 2d. at 597-98.
160. Id. at 596.
161. Id. at 597.
162. Id. at 597-98. On remand, the order was also to be corrected to reflect that it
was to last for his period on parole rather than on probation. Id.
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Nelson v. Department of Business and Professional Regulation.163 A
licensed real estate broker allegedly set off a smoke bomb in a public office
as an act of political protest. Adjudication was withheld when he pled nolo
contendere to charges of battery and criminal mischief, but he was placed on
eighteen months of probation.'6 Then, the Department of Business and
Professional Regulation brought disciplinary proceedings against him. The
department fined him and placed him on probation for ninety days because it
concluded that he had been found guilty of "a crime which directly relates to
the activities of a licensed real estate salesperson or involves moral turpitude
or fraudulent or dishonest dealings., 165 The broker appealed.1
66
The Fifth District Court of Appeal focused on the question of moral
turpitude because this crime obviously did not involve brokerage activities,
"or a fraudulent or dishonest dealing." 167 Examples it found of moral
turpitude included a physician selling bogus diplomas, bookmaking, and
manslaughter by criminal negligence."' It held that reversal was required
because this crime "d[id] not show a 'baseness or depravity' that [would]
impugn his ability to deal fairly with the public to the extent that suspension
of his broker's license is warranted."
1 69
Judge Sharp concurred specially.17° She agreed that reversal was
required, but challenged the legislature to spell out what categories of crimes
warranted sanctions under this category because the term "moral turpitude"
was essentially meaningless and its application might lead to capricious
results.1 Furthermore, it might be constitutionally infirm, as it is a term
that fails to provide sufficient warning as to what activities are proscribed. 
1 72
Walker v. Florida Department of Business and Professional
Regulation.' 3 A real estate salesperson needed to complete fourteen hours
of classroom instruction in order to renew her license. To satisfy this
requirement, she took a correspondence course. 174 At the end of the course,
163. 707 So. 2d 378 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
164. Id. at 378.
165. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 475.25(l)(f) (1993). Note that this subsection allows the
licensee to be disciplined if he has "been convicted or found guilty of, or entered a plea of
nolo contendere to, regardless of adjudication, a crime." FLA. STAT. § 475.25(1)(f) (1993).
166. Nelson, 707 So. 2d at 378.
167. Id. at 379.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 379 (Sharp, J., concurring specially).
171. Nelson, 707 So. 2d at 380.
172. Id. at 379-80.
173. 705 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
174. How a correspondence course qualified as hours of classroom instruction was
not addressed by the court.
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she did not submit the examination answer sheet for grading, but she
represented on her license renewal application that she had completed the
educational requirement. The FREC sent her application back because it
lacked evidence that she had completed the educational requirement. Then
she sent in the examination answer sheet to be graded. She passed the exam
and submitted the scored sheet, but the irregularities in the application were
noticed, and an investigation was begun. FREC held an informal hearing.
Despite the licensee's uncontradicted testimony that she thought she had sent
in the exam sheet at the end of the course and that her failing to submit the
exam sheet was an explainable oversight caused by distracting events in her
personal life, 175 her license was revoked. 176
On appeal, the licensee challenged the use of an informal hearing.'77
The district court found no irregularity because the licensee had specifically
requested an informal hearing and had never requested that the informal
hearing be terminated and a formal hearing begun in its place.
178 Thus, she
had waived her right to a formal hearing.1
7
The licensee also claimed that the license revocation was too severe a
penalty for the conduct involved, but the district court concluded that this
would not be a valid basis for relief.180 In reviewing agency action, the court
is expressly prohibited from substituting its own judgment on matters that
are within the agency's discretion. 18' FREC is specifically empowered by
statute to revoke a license that was obtained by "fraud, misrepresentation, or
concealment."'
82
The case really turned on whether there was sufficient evidence that the
license renewal had been obtained by "fraud, misrepresentation, or
concealment." FREC had the burden of proving intent. The majority, after
reviewing the record, concluded that there was sufficient circumstantial
evidence of intent to satisfy the competent substantial evidence standard.1
83
To emphasize that point, Judge Dauksch wrote a special concurrence.184 The
agency panel saw and heard the witnesses, so it had the job of judging
credibility. 185 It had the prerogative of believing or disbelieving any witness,
175. Walker had stated that the distracting events in her life were that her father had
died and she had changed jobs. Walker, 705 So. 2d at 655 (Sharp, J., dissenting).
176. Id. at 653.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 653-54.
179. Id. at 654.
180. Walker, 705 So. 2d at 654.
181. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 120.68(12) (1995).
182. Walker, 705 So. 2d at 654; see FLA. STAT. § 475.25(1) (1995).
183. Walker, 705 So. 2d at 654.
184. Id. at 655 (Dauksch, J., concurring specially).
185. Id.
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even one who was uncontradicted.1 Judge Sharp disagreed.187  In herdissent, she asserted that the clear and convincing evidence standard had not
been met by FREC because the licensee had given an uncontradicted and
credible explanation of her conduct in submitting the inaccurate
application. Is s
B. Brokerage Agreements and Commissions
The Florida Legislature has now made it possible for a broker to have
two of his salespeople act as sole agents for different parties to a real estate
transaction. 89 The broker can designate the salespersons assigned to each
party. 190 Designated salespersons are allowed only when the property
involved is nonresidential 91 and only where the parties have assets
exceeding one million dollars.192 The parties must sign disclosure statements
indicating that their assets are sufficient and requesting designated
salespersons to act as their agents. 193 The act provides language to be
included in the disclosure form, including the warning that the salesperson is
allowed to tell the broker confidential information; but, the broker cannot
reveal it to the other party or use it to the detriment of the confidante.1
94
This may be acceptable in a commercial setting where the parties are likely
to be sophisticated and represented by legal counsel, but it may well prove
impossible to keep confidences from being violated in most brokerages,
where the emphasis is on completing the transaction. Worse, it may be
impossible to allay public fears that confidences are being violated. The
benefits brokers get from this act may not justify the suspicions generated.
Century 21 Real Estate of South Florida, Inc. v. Braun & May Realty,
Inc.195  Braun & May was a franchisee of Century 21. The franchise
186. Id.
187. Id. at 655 (Sharp, J., dissenting).
188. Walker, 705 So. 2d at 655.
189. Brokerage Relationship Disclosure Act, ch. 98-250, §10, 1998 Fla. Laws 2199,
2199 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 475.2755).
190. Id.
191. Nonresidential property is property that is not residential as defined in section
475.276 (1)(a) of the Florida Statutes as "improved residential property of four units or
fewer.., unimproved residential property intended for [the] use of four units or fewer, or the
sale of agricultural property of 10 acres or fewer." FLA. STAT. § 475.276(l)(a) (1997)
(citations omitted).
192. Brokerage Relationship Disclosure Act, ch. 98-250, §10, 1998 Fla. Laws 2199,
2199 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 475.2755).
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. 706 So. 2d 878 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
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agreement provided that it would last for a specific duration and, if not
renewed, would be "deemed to be operating on a month-to-month basis. '96
The original term ended, and it was not renewed. Braun & May continued to
operate as a Century 21 franchisee for some time before it gave notice of its
intent to discontinue the relationship. This dispute arose over what
commissions Century 21 was entitled to under the franchise agreement.'
97
Paragraph eighteen of the agreement provided that Century 21 was
entitled to commissions on: 1) revenues from transactions in process on the
date of termination; 2) revenues produced by referrals from other Century 21
offices prior to termination; and 3) revenues produced by listings procured
while a Century 21 franchisee.'98 The critical phrase was "termination.' 99
Braun & May argued that the agreement had never been "terminated.,, 2°° It
had simply not been renewed, so no commissions were due under paragraph• 201
eighteen. Convinced by this argument, the trial court granted summary
judgment, but the district court reversed.20 2
Judge Shevin's opinion concluded that a month to month franchise
203agreement operates like a month to month tenancy. It automatically
renews until terminated by one of the parties.204 Braun & May's notice that
it intended to discontinue the franchise relationship was such a termination
205
notice. That termination triggered application of paragraph eighteen
regarding commissions. 20 6
Easton-Babcock & Associates, Inc. v. Fernandez.0 7 The broker had a
listing for a building owned by Fernandez. The broker showed the property
to Noriega in 1992, and the parties reached an agreement in principle that
was memorialized in the confirmation letter of October 28, 1992.20 Then
Fernandez informed the broker that he would be unable to go through with
the sale because a foreclosure was pending. In fact, a foreclosure action had
been brought against the property, but it had already been resolved and
voluntarily dismissed. Believing Fernandez's statement that the threatened
foreclosure prevented the sale, the broker did not insist on its commission
196. Id.
197. Id.at878-79.
198. Id. (citing paragraph 18 of the franchise agreement).
199. Id. at 879.
200. Century 21,706 So. 2d at 879.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Century 21, 706 So. 2d at 879.
206. Id.
207. 706 So. 2d 916 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
208. Id. at 917.
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and let the matter drop until it discovered that the sale had been
consummated eleven months later based on identical terms. Then, the
broker demanded a commission, and, when Fernandez refused, he brought
this suit.209
The jury rendered a verdict in favor of the broker.210 When the trial
judge granted the seller's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict,
the broker appealed.211 The trial judge apparently relied upon the Supreme
Court of Florida's opinion in Richland Grove & Cattle Co. v. Easterling
212
for the proposition that it was a question of law whether the broker had
abandoned the listing contract.2 This reliance on Easterling was
misplaced. That case dealt with a listing contract that did not have an
214expiration date. The supreme court had decided that whether the
reasonable time implied into such contracts had expired was a question of
law. 2
15
The case at bar, however, turned on the question of whether the seller
had intentionally excluded the broker from the negotiations that produced
216the sale. Under the listing contract, the broker was entitled to a
commission if it was the procuring cause of the sale. To be the procuring
cause, the broker must have brought the buyer and seller together and
effectuated the sale through continuous negotiations that the broker initiated
unless the broker has been intentionally excluded from the negotiations.
217
The evidence in the record was susceptible to a reasonable inference that this
broker had been intentionally excluded, so it was error for the trial judge to
substitute his conclusion for that of the jury.2
Mays v. Hadden.1 The owner of a radio station entered into a listing
agreement with a broker that provided for a commission if: 1) the station
were sold during the term of the agreement; 2) the broker presented an offer
for the asking price which the owner rejected; or 3) a contract of sale were
entered into within twelve months after the listing agreement was
terminated. The listing agreement did not have a specific duration, but
provided it would last at least 180 days. However, after two months the
owner entered into a lease management agreement with a third party and
209. ld. at 917-18.
210. Id. at 918.
211. Id.
212. 526 So. 2d 685 (Fla. 1988).
213. Fernandez, 706 So. 2d at 918.
214. Easterling, 526 So. 2d at 686.
215. Id. at 687-88.
216. Fernandez, 706 So. 2d at 919.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 919-20.
219. 709 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
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canceled the listing.22° The broker sued. Apparently accepting the argument
that a lease management agreement is generally the first step in the eventual
sale of a radio station, the trial court awarded him the brokerage
221 222
commission. On appeal the district court reversed.
The court held that there was both competent and substantial evidence
that the contract had been breached by the owner's premature
223cancellation, but the contract explicitly provided only three situations in
which the broker would be entitled to a commission and premature
cancellation was not one of them.224 The contract had been drafted by the
225broker who was experienced in this type of sale. The court seemed to
have been invoking the rule that a contract should be interpreted against the
drafter who had the opportunity to choose the wording most in his own
226favor. Furthermore, the court seemed to have been suggesting that there
was no reason to find an agreement to pay a commission implied in favor of
a broker with this level of expertise. He should have anticipated this
possible outcome and made sure that the agreement expressly provided for a
commission in these circumstances if that is what the parties agreed upon.
The majority concluded that the broker's damages in breach of this contract
were limited to his out of pocket expenses.2 7  228
Judge Dauksch carried this logic one step further in his dissent. He
reasoned that the lease management agreement was reasonably foreseeable
and not a breach of the contract because the broker could still have produced
229
a buyer and earned his commission. Unfortunately, the dissent does not
mention the owner's having canceled the listing agreement. The majority
opinion seems to focus on that as the breach, while the dissent does not
explain why the owner's unilateral cancellation would not be a breach
entitling the broker to damages.
Whitehead v. Dreyer.23 A real estate broker and a ranch owner entered
into a written brokerage contract that provided a commission would be paid
"if the ranch [were] sold to either the State of Florida, The Trust for Public
220. Id. at 133.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 134.
223. Id.
224. Mays, 709 So. 2d at 134.
225. Id. at 133.
226. Id. at 134.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 134 (Dauksch, J., dissenting).
229. Mays, 709 So. 2d at 134.
230. Id.
231. 698 So. 2d 1278 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
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Lands, the CARL Program or the St. Johns Management District.",232 None
of these bought the land and the agreement was canceled. Eighteen months
later, an officer of the Audubon Society informed the Walt Disney World
Company that the ranch was available for wetlands mitigation purposes.
Disney pursued the lead and bought the ranch. The broker then brought this
action claiming a brokerage contract.z 3  The broker claimed to be the
procuring cause because he had first suggested the strategy of finding a
corporate buyer who could use the land for mitigation. The trial court,
finding the complaint to be without merit, granted summary judgment
against the broker and then assessed attorneys' fees against both the broker
and his attorneys. z 4
The Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed.235 To be the procuring
cause, the broker "must bring the parties together and effect a sale through
continuous negotiations inaugurated by him.'' 36 There was no allegation in
the complaint that this broker had introduced the parties or inaugurated
negotiations between them. Nor was there any allegation that would qualify
the broker for the exception to that rule, i.e., that the parties had
"intentionally excluded" him from negotiations after he had introduced
them.237 The broker's having suggested what turned out to be a successful
marketing strategy would not be a sufficient basis for claiming a commission
in the absence of an express contract to the contrary.
IV. CONDOMINIUMS
Graves v. Ciega Verge Condominium Ass'n.238 Nancy Graves, the
"personal representative" to Fred Graves' estate, appealed the trial court's
non-final order vacating an amended final judgment of foreclosure and
canceling judicial sale against Ciega Verde Condominium Association and
its unit owners in this foreclosure and construction lien action. 39
Decedent Fred Graves, as a general contractor, performed repair work
to the condominium pursuant to a contract. The association later refused to
pay Graves for his services and denied Graves access to the property.24°
Graves served both a claim of lien and a contractor's affidavit. Subse-
quently, Graves filed an amended complaint which sought to "foreclose the
232. Id. at 1279 (citing brokerage contract).
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 1280.
236. Whitehead, 698 So. 2d at 1280.
237. Id.
238. 703 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
239. Id. at 1110.
240. Id.
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mechanic's lien against the unit owners and... sought recovery of damages
for breach of contract against Ciega Verde. ' 241 Graves sued unit owners as a
defendant class with the association as class representative. The association,
in its individual capacity and as representative of the class, answered the
amended complaint. 42
"[T]he contract portion of the [complaint] was set for binding
arbitration" 243 where Graves was the prevailing party.244 "Graves served...
Ciega Verde [with] a motion to confirm the arbitration award and to set
cause for trial on the foreclosure action against the unit owners .,245 The trial
court entered final judgment in March 1996 and set judicial sale for May
1996.2
46
"[C]ounsel for the unit owners filed a motion to set aside the amended
final judment" claiming the court did not have jurisdiction over the unit
owners. Ultimately, the trial court, at hearing, granted the unit owners'
motion to dismiss and dismissed the unit owners from the action because
Graves failed to serve such unit owners within the 120 day period starting
from the date of filing the complaint as per Florida Rules of Civil
Procedure.
248
The appellate court recognized that the trial court erred in vacating the
amended final judgment of foreclosure.249 The trial court had jurisdiction
over the unit owners because they constituted a class with a common interest
based on membership in the Ciega Verde Condominium Association.250
Ciega Verde's Declaration of Condominium stated that each unit owner
was a member of the condominium association while he owned the unit.2'
When the association authorized work to be performed on the common
grounds, it was understood that the unit owners consented to that
252
authorization. As such, Graves' lien attached to each condo unit and
could be foreclosed.253
Each unit owner was not required to receive individual notice. It was
the condominium's board of directors' fiduciary and statutory obligation to
241. Id.
242. Id. at 1111.
243. Graves, 703 So. 2d at 1111.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Graves, 703 So. 2d at I 111; see FLA. R. Crv. P. 1.070(i).
249. Graves, 703 So. 2d at 111 I; see FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.070(i).
250. Graves, 703 So. 2d at 1112; see FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.221.
251. Graves, 703 So. 2d at 1111-12.
252. Id. at 1112.
253. Id.
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give unit owners notice of a lawsuit.25 4 Graves' service upon the association,
the class representative, was sufficient and if the court wanted to require
notice to the individual members, it should have provided Graves adequate
time to do so.2ss
Perlow v. Goldberg. 2 6  This court affirmed the order dismissing
owner's claims because the facts show that the "directors cannot be held
liable in their individual capacity."257 Perlow sought personal judgments for
breach of fiduciary duty against Goldberg and Leb, directors of the
condominium association, for failure to properly administer insurance
258proceeds.
Condominium association directors are immune from individual
liability absent fraud, self-dealing, or criminal activity.25 9 The court below
relied on a fourth district case which furthered this rule.260 This court agreed
with that holding and stated the directors here were neither unjustly
261enriched, nor did they commit fraud or a crime. At the most, the directors
were negligent by failing to properly administer insurance proceeds from
262Hurricane Andrew. This negligence is not enough to create personal
liability for the condominium directors.263
The court also recognized that owner's reliance on B & J Holding
Group v. Weiss was unwarranted because the directors in that case
2656deliberately engaged in self-dealing.265 That was not the situation here.266
Ruffin v. Kingswood E. Condominium Ass 'n.267  "Kingswood E.
Condominium Association, Inc., brought an arbitration proceeding under
section 718.1255 [of the] Florida Statutes,2 68 against unit owner Mary Ruffin
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. 700 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
257. Id. at 149.
258. Id.
259. Id. See FLA. STAT. § 718.111(2) (1995); see also FLA. STAT. §§ 607, 617
(1995).
260. Perlow, 700 So. 2d at 150 (citing Munder v. Circle One Condominium, Inc.,
596 So. 2d 144 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992)).
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. 353 So. 2d 141 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
265. Perlow, 700 So. 2d at 150 (citing B & J Holding Group v. Weiss, 353 So. 2d
141 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997)).
266. Id.
267. 23 Fla. L. Weekly Dl178 (4th Dist. Ct. App. May 13, 1998), opinion withdrawn
and superseded on reh'g by No. 97-1683, 1998 WL 689766 (4th Dist. Ct. App. Oct. 7, 1998).
268. FLA. STAT. § 718.1255 (1997).
254
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,,269
and her son, appellant Paul Ruffin. The reason for the arbitration was
that the association alleged that Mary Ruffin and the appellant were in
violation of the condominium declarations.2 70  "The Association [wanted]
the Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominium and Mobile Homes of the
Department of Business Regulation to issue an order requiring appellant as
tenant to vacate the premises and restraining him from further entry."271 Mr.
Ruffin "inform[ed] the arbitrator that his mother had moved.., therefore the
matter was moot.,, 27 2 However, the association wanted future protection.
So, the arbitrator issued an order that "Mr. Ruffin should remain away and
off the condominium property. 273
Mr. Ruffin filed a complaint for a "trial de novo" in circuit court and
the Association moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the case
was moot.2 74 The circuit court entered the summary judgment and reserved
jurisdiction to assess attorneys' fees. 275
The appellate court, "sua sponte," considered the subject matter
276jurisdiction of the arbitrator to have heard this action. It looked at section
277718.1255(1) of the Florida Statutes and found that the arbitrator had no
subject matter jurisdiction, since the arbitrator may only hear disputes within
its statutory authority and disputes that include disagreements involving
eviction or other removal are not within the arbitrator's statutory author-
ity.278 Further, the appellant was not the owner of the unit and, therefore,
section 718.1255 did not cover disputes with the appellant.
279
Since the arbitrator lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the trial de novo
was not moot. If the appellant had not challenged the matter, the arbitrator's
order would have become final. Therefore, this court reversed the final
judgment and directed the trial court to "enter an order vacating the
arbitrator's final order.,
280
Legislative changes to section 718 include, but are not limited to, the
following:
269. Ruffin, 1998 WL 689766, at *1.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Ruffin, 1998 WL 689766, at *1.
275. Id. at *1-2.
276. Id. at *1.
277. FLA.STAT. § 718.1255(1) (1997).
278. Ruffin, 1998 WL 689766, at *2.
279. Id. at *2; see Carlandia Corp. v. Obemauer, 695 So. 2d 408, 410 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1997).
280. Ruffin, 1998 WL 689766, at *2.
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Section 718.111(11) of the Florida Statutes now includes subparagraph
(d) which provides for the association to maintain adequate insurance or
fidelity bonding for all persons who control or disburse funds for the
association.281
Section 718.112(d)8 of the Florida Statutes provides that, unless the
bylaws provide otherwise, any vacancy on the Board of Directors of the
association prior to the expiration of a term may be filled by a majority vote
of the remaining directors even though they may constitute less than a
quorum or by the sole remaining director. Alternatively, however, the
board may hold an election to fill the vacancy.
28 3
Section 718.503(2)(a) of the Florida Statutes has been amended to
require that a unit owner who is not a developer shall include a copy of the
financial information required by section 718.111 of the Florida Statutes in
the disclosure information presented to a prospective purchaser.28 4
Likewise, a prospectus or offering circular, per section 718.504 of the
Florida Statutes, requires the same information to be included.28 5
V. CONSTRUCTION
City of Miami v. Tarafa Construction, Inc.2 6 The contractor sued based
on construction delays it alleged were attributable to the city. The case was
reversed and remanded due to overly long delay in getting the trial
completed and problems with the final judgment, but the court ruled that two
claims had to be eliminated because they were not for work under the
contract. 28 7 Since the defendant was the city, it was protected by the
doctrine of "sovereign immunity." 288 While the city could be held liable for
breaching the express or implied terms of a contract, it could not be held
liable for expenses incurred before the contract was awarded or outside the
scope of the construction work.28 9 Thus, two of the claims cannot stand: 1)
the claim for "value engineering damages, ' 29 which was based on the cost
of engineering work in preparing the bid; and 2) the claim for "claim
281. FLA. STAT. § 718.111(11)(d) (1997).
282. FLA. STAT. § 718.112(d)8 (Supp. 1998).
283. Id.
284. Id. § 718.111.
285. Id. § 718.504.
286. 696 So. 2d 1275 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
287. Id. at 1277.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id.
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preparation damages, 291 which the court characterized as pre-litigation
costs.
29 2
Temple Emanu-El v. Tremarco Industries, Inc.293  The contract
provided that the contractor would provide a new roof and that the price
would include a three year "[g]uarantee against leaks" and a manufacturer'sJ94
twelve year warranty. Based on allegations that the roof was leaking, the
owner filed suit against the roofing contractor, the manufacturer, and others
involved with the roofing job. The manufacturer, relying on an arbitration
clause in its warranty form, moved to require arbitration. The owner did
not resist. The roofing contractor also moved to require arbitration based
296upon the arbitration clause in the manufacturer's warranty. Despite the
owner's objections, the trial court ordered that claim to arbitration as
well. 29 7 However, the fourth district reversed.
298
The arbitration code puts the burden on the one claiming arbitration to
299prove an agreement to arbitrate. The contract between the roofing
contractor and the owner did not contain an arbitration clause.300 The claim
for arbitration was based on the argument that the arbitration clause in the
manufacturer's warranty had been incorporated by reference into that
contract. °1 In order for a term to be incorporated by reference, the
incorporation document must contain an expression of the parties' intent to
be bound by the incorporated term.302 A mere reference to another document
is not enough to effectuate an incorporation by reference. 303 Here, the fact
that the contract required the roofing contractor to provide a manufacturer's
warranty was simply not enough to incorporate the terms of that warranty
into the roofing contract.3°
291. Tarafa, 696 So. 2d at 1277.
292. Id.
293. 705 So. 2d 983 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
294. Id. at 983 (citing contract).
295. Id. at 984.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Tremarco, 705 So. 2d at 984.
299. FLA. STAT. § 682.03 (1997).
300. Tremarco, 705 So. 2d at 984.
301. See id.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id.
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VI. COOPERATIVES
Current legislative changes to section 719 include, but are not limited
to, the following:
Section 719.103 of the Florida Statutes has added additional definitions
including those for "buyers," "common areas," and "conspicuous type.' 305 A
"buyer" is one who purchases a cooperative and the words "purchaser" and
"buyer" may be used interchangeably within the act.30 6 "Common areas"
now include, among other things, cooperative property which is not included
within the units. 'Conspicuous type means type in capital letters no
smaller than the largest type on the page on which it appears. 308 Also, there
are additional definitions for "division, " "limited common areas," "rental
agreement," and "residential cooperative.
30 9
Section 719.1035 of the Florida Statutes has been amended to require
that, upon creating a cooperative, the developer or association shall file the
recording information with the division within thirty working days on a form
310prescribed by the division.
Section 719.104 of the Florida Statutes now has a new subpart (10)
requiring the board to notify the division before taking any action to dissolve
or merge the cooperative association.31
Section 719.502(1)(a) of the Florida Statutes has added a provision that
a developer shall not close on any contract for sale or contract for a lease of
more than five years until the developer prepares and files with the division,
documents complying with both the requirements of chapter 719 and the
rules promulgated by the division, and until the division notifies the
developer that the filing is proper.312 Further, the developer shall not close
on any contract for sale or contract for lease period of more than five years
until the developer prepares and delivers all documents to the prospective
purchaser as required by Florida Statutes section 719.503(1)(b). 13
Section 719.503(1)(b) of the Florida Statutes has an added provision
requiring that the developer not close for fifteen days following the
execution of the agreement and delivery of documents to the buyer as
evidenced by a receipt for the documents signed by the buyer, unless the
buyer is informed in a fifteen day voidability period and agrees to close prior
305. FLA. STAT. § 719.103 (Supp. 1998).
306. Id. § 719.103(4).
307. Id. § 719.103(8).
308. Id. § 719.103(1 1).
309. Id.
310. FLA. STAT. § 719.1035 (Supp. 1998).
311. Id. § 719.104(10).
312. Id. § 719.502(1)(a).
313. Id. § 719.503(1)(b).
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314
to the expiration of fifteen days. The developer must keep in its records a
separate signed agreement as proof of the buyer's agreement to close prior to
the expiration of the voidability period.315
VII. DEEDS
Mora v. Karr.316 The court affirmed the trial court and denied the
temporary injunction to the Moras regarding a violation of deed
restrictions. 31 Karr wished to purchase a home and rebuild it to contain a
three car garage and a twenty-five foot setback. 31 8  However, deed
restrictions only allowed a two car garage and required a thirty-five foot
setback.319 Karr secured a waiver to those restrictions from the developer
and from adjacent property owners prior to the purchase.320
After closing, Mr. Mora, an adjacent property owner and attorney,
wrote Karr a letter that he would sue over the deed restrictions he waived.
Karr continued with construction and Mora sued.321 The trial court and the
fourth district court both denied injunctive relief to Mora.32 The most
compelling evidence was the fact that Mora waived the deed restrictions
prior to the construction and that Karr relied on that waiver in making the
323purchase.
VIII. EASEMENTS
Citgo Petroleum Corp. v. Florida East Coast Railway Co.32 4 The trial
court entered "final judgment quieting title to certain property in favor of
Florida East Coast Railway Company." 325  The appellate court reversed,
finding that "Citgo was granted an express easement to construct and
maintain a pipeline on the.., property [and that] ... Citgo's failure to
314. Id.
315. FLA. STAT. § 719.503(1)(b) (Supp. 1998).
316. 697 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997), replacing original opinion, 22
Fla. L. Weekly D781 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App., Mar. 21, 1997).
317. Id. at 888.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Mora, 697 So. 2d at 888.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. 706 So. 2d 383 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
325. Id. at 384.
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record this easement [did] not render it ineffectual against [Florida East
Coast ("FEC")], since [FEC] was on inquiry notice of its existence., 32
6
The events giving rise to this dispute involved the expansion of the Ft.
Lauderdale Airport and the resulting relocation of various utilities. 327 "Citgo
had a licensing agreement with FEC under which Citgo had the 'right and
privilege' of operating a pipeline under FEC's main track, across FEC's
railroad right-of-way." 28 The right of way and Citgo's pipeline had to be
relocated when the airport was expanded. Citgo "reached an agreement"
with Florida's Department of Transportation ("Department") to "relocate the
pipeline. 3 29  The agreement recognized "that Citgo owne[d] various
property rights along the original pipeline, and provid[ed] for the transfer of
those property rights to the [Department] in exchange for allowing Citgo to
relocate and operate the pipeline on other property" acquired by the
Department.
Citgo informed FEC that the pipeline was to be relocated across the
proposed relocation of FEC's right of way. 331  FEC sent Citgo the
appropriate engineering specifications, as well as an application for a new
licensing agreement. FEC remained adamant that, until it reached an
agreement with Broward County to relocate its right of way, it could not
.332
consider granting Citgo a utility crossing permit.
FEC and Broward County reached an agreement to relocate the railroad
track.333 That agreement provided that FEC would convey to Broward
County its existing right of way in exchange for a replacement right of
way. The parcels of land comprising the new right of way were conveyed
to FEC which promptly recorded the quitclaim deed. Citgo had no
easements on record relating to this property.335
"[T]he new right-of-way property was to be conveyed to FEC 'free and
clear of all encumbrances. '3 36  However, FEC was required "to grant
easements, licenses, and permits to various utility companies... to allow
storm sewers, fuel lines, and other appurtenances to cross the new right-of-
way."337 No mention was made of the relocated Citgo pipeline.
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Citgo, 706 So. 2d at 384.
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Citgo, 706 So. 2d at 384.
335. Id.
336. Id. (quoting the agreement).
337. Id.
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FEC sent Citgo another application for a licensing agreement. As
before, this agreement was never executed. After the railroad tracks and
pipeline were fully completed, it was evident that FEC's railroad track was
built between two of the pipeline's protruding vents. So, FEC brought suit
to quiet title.338
Citgo argued that it had an express easement due to the earlier
agreement with the department. After the proceedings were well underway,
"Citgo recorded a Notice of Easement."339 After the court "conclude[d] that
FEC was not on inquiry notice of any 'potential unrecorded easement,' ...
that... Citgo was never granted an easement, ' 34 and that Citgo's Notice of
Easement was "null and void," Citgo appealed.34'
Under de novo review, the appellate court was convinced that the 1983
agreement granted Citgo an express easement to operate and maintain the
relocated pipeline.342 "An easement is 'the right in one other than the owner
of the land to use land for some particular purpose or purposes. ,, 343 To
determine whether the "[a]greement grant[ed] Citgo an easement, the
applicable rule is that 'no particular form and language are necessary to
create an easement; rather, any words clearly showing the intention of the
parties to create a servitude on a sufficiently identifiable estate is
sufficient.'"044
There was no provision in the 1983 agreement which affirmatively
established that an easement was not intended. In fact, the court found the
other provisions in the agreement manifested an intent by the department to
grant Citgo an easement.
The court also rejected "FEC's argument that Cit o's failure to record
its easement render[ed] it ineffectual against FEC." 46 In Florida, the
recording act subjects "FEC [to] Citgo's preexisting, unrecorded easement
unless FEC was 'without notice' of it."'34 "If the circumstances known to
FEC when it acquired the subject property were 'such as should reasonably
suggest inquiry' into Citgo's property rights, then FEC is deemed to be on
'inquiry notice' of - and bound by - those encumbrances which would
338. Id. at 385.
339. Citgo, 706 So. 2d at 385.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id. (quoting Dean v. Mod Properties, Ltd., 528 So. 2d 432, 433 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 1988)).
344. Citgo, 706 So. 2d at 385 (quoting Hynes v. City of Lakeland, 451 So. 2d 505,
511 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1984)).
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 695.01(2) (1995).
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have been discovered upon a reasonable inquiry."3 48 The district court
concluded that Citgo's actual, open, and obvious possession by construction
of a conspicuous pipeline placed FEC on inquiry notice of Citgo's
easement.
H & F Land, Inc. v. Panama City - Bay County Airport & Industrial
District.350 The issue before the court was whether the Marketable Record
Title Act,351 operated "to extinguish an otherwise valid claim of an easement
by necessity, when such a claim has not been asserted within 30 years," as
required by the Act.
352
The appellate court recognized the general rule "that a landowner has a
right to access his land. 353 However, it disagreed with H & F, the owner of
a land-locked estate, that its claim deserves different treatment from any
other claim of an interest in land which does not fall within an exception to
the Act and which has not been timely asserted.5 4
The Marketable Record Title Act was "designed to simplify
conveyances of real property, stabilize titles, and give certainty to land
ownership." 355 A party only can blame himself if he fails to provide proper
notice. 6 The legislature intended to afford a means to preserve old claims
and interests and to give a reasonable time period to take steps to accomplish
357the purpose.
Since the policies underlying the Marketable Record Title Act "conflict
with the public policy that 'lands should not be rendered unfit for occupancy
or cultivation,"' the appellate court certified the following question as one of
great public importance:
DOES THE MARKETABLE RECORD TITLE ACT, CHAPTER
712, FLORIDA STATUTES, OPERATE TO EXTINGUISH AN
OTHERWISE VALID CLAIM OF A COMMON LAW WAY OF
348. Citgo, 706 So. 2d at 386; see Chatlos v. McPherson, 95 So. 2d 506, 509 (Fla.
1957).
349. Citgo, 706 So. 2d at 386.
350. 706 So. 2d 327 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
351. FLA. STAT. § 712 (1997).
352. H & F Land, 706 So. 2d at 327.
353. Id.; see Roy v. Euro-Holland Vastgoed, 404 So. 2d 410 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1981).
354. H & F Land, 706 So. 2d at 328.
355. Id. (citing City of Miami v. Saint Joe Paper Co., 364 So. 2d 439, 444 (Fla.
1978)).
356. Id.
357. Id.
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NECESSITY WHEN SUCH CLAIM WAS NOT ASSERTED
WITHIN 30 YEARS?
358
Highland Construction, Inc. v. Paquette.35 9 This court affirmed final
judgment granting Paquette an implied easement over Highland's360
property. Paquette sued Highland requesting an implied easement be
granted over Vickers Street. Once Vickers Street was abandoned, ownership
reverted to Highland.
36 1
With regard to determining the existence of an implied easement,
"Florida has adopted the 'beneficial or complete enjoyment rule."' 362 This
rule states that the "grantee receives the right to all streets in the plat
beneficial to him.' 363 If the grantee can show he will suffer injury differing
in degree and kind from everyone else, "he is entitled to receive an implied
easement.
' 364
Paquette satisfied the beneficial enjoyment rule. Since he operates two
automobile businesses on the property and Vickers Street was the only
viable entrance to these establishments, the loss of this access would impair
36536the business. Therefore, the implied easement was granted.3 66
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Franchise Finance Corp. of America.367 This
court reversed a final summary judgment that declared a condition in a
nonexclusive easement unenforceable and void.
368
Sears owns real property where it operates a retail store, and Bradenton
Mall Associates ("Developer") owns a retail shopping center adjacent to
369Sears' parcel. Sears and Developer, having adjacent parcels and parking
lots that were connected, "operated their respective parcels under a joint
Operating Agreement. Southern Homes Park, Inc. (Southern), a corporate
affiliate of the Developer, owned an 'outparcel' adjacent to the (others] but
not... accessible except through the Sears... parking area. '37  In 1987,
Southern sold its "outparcel" to Suncoast Rax, Inc. on the condition that
Southern acquire an ingress and egress easement to the outparcel over a
358. Id.
359. 697 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 5th Dist Ct. App. 1997).
360. Id. at 236.
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. Highland, 697 So. 2d at 236.
365. Id. at 237.
366. Id.
367. 711 So. 2d 1189 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
368. Id. at 1190.
369. Id.
370. Id.
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portion of the Sears parking lot.3 7 1  Suncoast, at the same time, was
contracting to sell the "outparcel" and easement, if acquired, to the appellee,
Franchise Finance Corporation of America ("F.F.C.A."). However, F.F.C.A.
agreed to lease the property back to Suncoast. Developer and Sears agreed
that Sears would grant the easement to Suncoast and that Developer in return
would sweep both the developer parking area and the Sears entire parking
area. The easement provided:
The rights granted herein shall be perpetual, but shall expire in
the event that:
(iii) Developer,... shall fail to sweep that portion of Grantor's
parcel devoted to customer parking and which includes the
Easement Parcel ("Parking Parcel") as shown in yellow on
Exhibit C hereto. Grantor, its employees, agents or contractors
shall upon written notice to both Developer and Grantee, have the
right, at its cost and expense, to sweep the Parking Parcel. In the
event that after notice Developer and/or Grantee fails to or refuses
to cure, Grantor shall have the right to terminate the easements
granted herein by filing a Notice of Termination of Easement in the
Public Records of Manatee County, Florida, thirty (30) days, after
written notice to both Grantee and Bradenton.
372
In 1990, Suncoast went out of business and F.F.C.A. terminated the
lease. In November, 1992, "Developer sent F.F.C.A. an invoice for... the
annual cost of 'sweeping' the Sears Parcel parking area."373 Developer
represented "that if this invoice was not paid, Developer would no longer
'sweep' the Sears Parcel parking area."3 14 F.F.C.A. declined to pay the
invoice and, fearing that Sears may want to terminate the easement, brought
its declaratory action to have the sweeping condition declared void and
unenforceable. The trial court declared the forfeiture provision
unenforceable under Florida Statutes section 689.18375 because section
689.18 provides that "reverter or forfeiture provisions ... in the conveyance
of real estate or any interest therein in the state constitute unreasonable
restraint on alienation and are contrary to the public policy of the state." 376
371. Id.
372. Sears, 711 So. 2d at 1190 (citing easement).
373. Id.
374. Id. at 1191.
375. FLA. STAT. § 689.18 (1987).
376. Sears, 711 So. 2d at1191; seeFLA. STAT. § 689.18 (1987).
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The appellate court rejected this argument "[b]ecause a grant of
easement is not a conveyance of a proprietary interest in real property."
377
An easement only grants the right to use property for some particular
purpose, and does not convey title to land or dispossess the owner of the
land subject to easement. Therefore, the district court concluded "that a
specified condition to the continuance of an easement agreed upon by the
parties is not an encumbrance to the marketability of title to real estate"
meant to be protected by section 689.18. 37 9 Easements that end upon the
happening of a clearly defined condition have been recognized in the past.
380
Furthermore, the district court found that the trial court erred in
applying section 689.18 and that even if section 689.18 did apply, the
forfeiture provision would not be void for twenty-one years after the
granting of the easement, since 689.18 (3) and (4) provide that the provisions
do not become void until twenty-one years after the conveyance has
passed.3 38
Shiner v. Baita. The appellant, Shiner wanted to end the real
property rights reserved by the ap~ellee, Baita, in a deed given by Baita to
Shiner's predecessor in interest. 3 "Baita, the original grantor of the
property, laced a reservation in the deed to Shiner's predecessor" thatprovided:.8
Grantors reserve to themselves, their heirs and assigns the right to a
hook-up to septic tank located on the land herein conveyed, said
septic tank being located to the Southeast of the acre being retained
by the Grantors herein with the understanding that responsibility of
maintaining said septic tank shall remain with the Grantors, their
heirs and assigns, and for purposes of maintenance the Grantors,
their heirs and assigns, shall have the right to ingress and egress to
maintain said septic tank. It is understood this reservation of use of
the septic tank is to continue indefinitely but that should Grantee,
his successors or assigns determine later that connection to septic
tank interferes with use of property herein conveyed, Grantee, his
successors or assigns shall have the right to pay expenses necessary
to construct a septic tank on the premises which are herein reserved
377. Sears, 711 So. 2d at 1191.
378. Id.; see Easton v. Appler, 548 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Dean v.
MOD Properties, Ltd., 528 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 5th Dist Ct. App. 1988).
379. Sears, 711 So. 2d at 1191.
380. Id.; see Dotson v. Wolfe, 391 So. 2d 757, 759 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
381. Sears, 711 So. 2d at 1192.
382. 710 So. 2d 711 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
383. Id. at 711.
384. Id.
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by the Grantors, and then in that event, this right of hook-up to
septic tank shall cease and be of no further force and effect. 385
Shiner elected to construct a septic tank on the property still held by
Baita because she believed that she had the right to do so after aquiring the
property. Shiner felt that this action would end the reserved right for Baita's
septic tank hookup. Baita, who intended to develop a mobile home park,
disputed Shiner's view. 386
The lower court found that the restrictive covenant was ambiguous and
that Shiner's septic tank would deprive Baita of using her property.
Therefore, the lower court held that Shiner could not take any action
regarding the septic tank that would deprive Baita from using and enjoying
her property.387
The appellate court reversed the lower court's decision.8 8 First, the
court found that a restrictive covenant did not exist.389 Rather, a reservation
existed and that the deed created an easement, not a restrictive covenant.
390
Although an easement is often permanent, "an easement does not have to be
permanent, [and] may end upon the happening of a condition."
391
When there is a grant of easement, the intent is determined by a fair
interpretation of the language.392 When the language is unambiguous, the
court must look at the plain meaning. 393 This court found that there was no
ambiguity in the language of the deed and that it clearly shows that, if the
grantees determine that the septic tank interferes with their use of the
property, they may construct a septic tank on the property, and the hookup
septic tank shall cease.394 Therefore, because "the easement holder cannot
expand the easement beyond what was contemplated at the time it was
385. Id. at 711-12.
386. Id. at 712.
387. Shiner, 710 So. 2d at 712.
388. Id. at 713.
389. Id. at 712.
390. Id. (citing Homer v. Dadeland Shopping Ctr., Inc., 229 So. 2d 834, 836 (Fla.
1969)).
391. Id. (citing Datson v. Wolfe, 391 So. 2d 757, 759 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980)).
392. Shiner, 710 So. 2d at 712 (citing Walters v. McCall, 450 So. 2d 1139, 1142
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1984)).
393. Id. (citing Richardson v. Deerwood Club, Inc., 589 So. 2d 937, 939 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1991)).
394. Id.
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granted, 395 the appellate court held that the appellant is entitled to enforce
the unambiguous provisions and reversed the lower court's order.
396
IX. EMINENT DOMAIN
A. Condemnation
Basic Energy Corp. v. Department of Corrections.397  The
condemnation was initiated by the city which planned to give the land to the
Department of Corrections ("Department") for the construction of a prison.
The city utilized the quick taking procedure, took possession, and gave
possession to the Department. While the Department was constructing the
prison, the landowner appealed and won because the court held the stated
municipal purpose for the taking was invalid.398 Title reverted to the
landowner, but a prison now stood on the land. The Department began its
own eminent domain procedure to gain title to the prison it had built.399 The
issue on appeal was the appropriate time as of which to figure the
compensation. The landowner asserted it should be when the Department
acquired title under its condemnation procedure. The Department claimed
compensation should be calculated as of the time when the Department took
possession under the city's quick take.4°
Section 73.041 of the Florida Statutes provided that when title had been
acquired or perfected after appropriation, the compensation was to be
determined as of the date of appropriation. 4 1 However, the statute did not
define "appropriation" and there was no case law interpreting the term as
used in this situation. The First District Court of Appeal utilized the plain
meaning approach to determine that appropriation was not intended to be
402synonymous with the time of acquiring title. Review of the statutory
history supported the trial court's conclusion that "appropriation" meant the
time when the condemning authority took possession. Moreover, the court
noted that this situation was similar to an inverse condemnation situation
when calculating damages. 4° Consequently, the court affirmed the circuit
395. Id. (citing Walters v. McCall, 450 So. 2d 1139, 1142 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1984); Fields v. Nichols, 482 So. 2d 410,414 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985)).
396. Id. at 713.
397. 709 So. 2d 124 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
398. Id. at 125.
399. Id.
400. Id.
401. FLA. STAT. § 73.031 (1993).
402. Basic Energy, 709 So. 2d at 126.
403. Id. at 127.
404. Id. at 128.
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court's decision to calculate compensation as of the time when the
Department first took possession.
City National Bank. v. Dade County. ° The landowner appealed a jury
verdict denying it severance damages on the condemnation of a comer of its
land for a road widening project. The problem was that the land had not
yet been developed and was, at the time of the condemnation, being used as
an overflow parking lot for a nearby stadium. Years earlier, the landowner
had a conceptual site plan prepared showing a retail strip shopping center
with out-parcels. The county had rezoned the land from residential use to
commercial use, consistent with the site plan.408 However, the landowner
never proceeded past that point. The landowner had never sought approval
for the site plan and had not taken any further steps to implement the plan.
At trial, the landowner sought to introduce the site plan into evidence to
prove that the condemnation interfered with the plan by reducing the number
of out-parcels from four to three or reduce the size of the out-parcels to
smaller than normal size, reducing the business value of the mall.40 9 The
trial court excluded the conceptual site plan and the Third District Court of
Appeal affirmed.41°
The rule is that the amount of damages awarded to a property owner in
an eminent domain case is determined by the uses to which the property is
then being put or to those which it could reasonably be put.411 "'It is not
proper to speculate on what could be done to the land or what might be done
to it to make it more valuable and then solicit evidence on what it might be
worth with such speculative improvements at some unannounced future
date.' ' 412 The trial court correctly applied the rule.413 The landowner could
not have reasonably relied upon the approval of this site plan.414 Whether
this conceptual site plan would ever be approved or implemented was merely
speculation. 41 5 It would not have been proper to base the award on such
speculation.1 6
Moreover, the fact that the appraiser's report mentioned the conceptual
site plan did not open the door to the plan's introduction into evidence. He
405. Id. at 126-28.
406. 715 So. 2d 350 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
407. Id. at 351.
408. Id.
409. Id.
410. Id. at 352.
411. City Nat'l Bank, 715 So. 2d at 352.
412. Id. (quoting Yoder v. Sarasota County, 81 So. 2d 219, 220-21 (Fla. 1955)).
413. Id.
414. Id.
415. Id.
416. City Nat'l Bank, 715 So. 2d at 353.
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did not base his appraisal on the conceptual site plan.417 He merely reported
the facts that he had a meeting with the landowner and had analyzed the
landowner's concerns which included how the condemnation would affect
the plans which the landowner had for the future.
418
Department of Transportation v. Rogers.419  The Department con-
demned the entire property. At the time of the condemnation, the property
was leased to the operator of a restaurant.42° The jury fixed compensation at
$705,000. One of the landowner's appraisers, a self-styled "business
appraiser," based his opinion on a residual methodology.421 This focused on
the sales at the restaurant, and projections of future income, which were
significantly above average for the region. The appraiser attributed that to
422the location. The department appealed based on the admission of this
testimony and on the theory that the evidence did not support the award.
423The district court agreed with the department on both points and reversed.
Business damages are not part of the full compensation mandated by the
Florida Constitution.424 Business damages are provided by statute in the
case of a partial taking.425 Such statutes granting legislative largess are
strictly construed in favor of the state. Since the entire progerty was taken
here, the landowner was not entitled to business damages. The district
court concluded that the appraisal testimony based on projected sales was, in
effect, a calculation of business damages. In substance, it was testimony
about the value of the business and reflected the degree to which location
affected the business's value. The testimony was not about the value of the
property itself, so it should not have been admitted.
428
As to the final award, the court noted that five appraisers testified at
trial.429 The Department's appraisers valued the property at approximately
$314,000. The landowner's appraisers valued the lot at $450,000 and a new
building, to replace the thirty year old building taken, at $181,000. That
total of $631,000 is far below the $705,000 the jury awarded. 436 "None of
417. Id.
418. Id.
419. 705 So. 2d 584 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
420. Id. at 586.
421. Id.
422. Id. at 587.
423. Id. at 586.
424. Rogers, 705 So. 2d at 587.
425. FLA. STAT. § 73.071(3)(b) (1995).
426. Rogers, 705 So. 2d at 587-88.
427. Id. at 588.
428. Id.
429. Id.
430. Id. at 588-89.
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these figures [alone or] in any combination support[ed] the amount awar-
ded."43'
Pol v. Pol.432 As part of the property division in a divorce, the husband
agreed to buy the wife's interest in a hotel they owned, but the agreement
provided that the wife would receive fifty percent of the profits if the
husband sold or transferred ownership within five years.433 When the hotel
was taken in a condemnation action, the wife sought a share of the
condemnation proceeds. The trial court held that the husband was not a
willing seller and, therefore, reasoned that no sale or transfer had occurred to
trigger her right to participate in the profits.434 The Third District Court of
Appeal disagreed and reversed.435
Neither "sale" nor "transfer" was necessarily limited to a voluntary
transaction. That either could be involuntary was evidenced by the familiar
term, "forced sale." 436 The rule is that "a court cannot rewrite the clear and
unambiguous terms of a voluntary contract. 437 Under the unambiguous
terms of this contract the wife was entitled to share in this condemnation
award.
438
Taylor v. Department of Transportation.439 The landowner's tract was
bisected by a river. Part of his land was taken, so he sought severance
damages. He proffered testimony by experts that his remaining land would
be devalued by the roadway and bridge that the Department of Transpor-
tation was planning to build upstream because the design was flawed.440 The
general rule is that severance damages are allowed to attach to the remaining
property due to use of or activity on the part of the land that has been
taken.4"n However, his land was to be used only as a mitigation area. The
roadway and bridge were to be built upstream on land that had been taken
from others. Invoking the rule, the Department objected to the proffered
testimony and the circuit court granted the department's motion in limine to
deny severance damages. 442 The second district, however, reversed.
443
431. Rogers, 705 So. 2d at 589.
432. 705 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
433. Id. at 52.
434. Id.
435. Id. at 53.
436. Id.
437. Pol, 705 So. 2d at 53.
438. Id.
439. 701 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
440. Id. at 611.
441. Id.
442. Id.
443. Id. at 612.
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The general rule is subject to an exception "where the use of the land
taken constitutes an integral and inseparable part of a single use to which the
land taken and other adjoining land is put." 444 In this case, the land was
being taken as part of one road and bridge project. Even though the roadway
and bridge were not to be located on the land taken from him, the alleged
negative effect of the project, according to the proffered testimony, would
decrease the value of the parcels the landowner still owned. 445
Conseuently, it was error to exclude that testimony and grant the motion inM16 • 147
limine. A new trial was ordered and the case remanded.
Night Flight, Inc. v. Tampa-Hillsborough County Expressway Auth.
448
Night Flight operated a club on leased premises. Under the terms of the
lease, Night Flight had the right to use an adjacent parking lot during certain
hours every day. The Authority took the entire building in which the club
was located.449 Business damages are recoverable by statute in cases where
there has been a partial taking.45  Night Flight claimed this was a partial
taking because it conducted activities like a theme party, a fund raising car
wash, an Easter egg hunt, Fourth of July celebrations, a volleyball game, and
a birthday party in the adjacent parking lot.451 The trial judge granted
452
summary judgment against Night Flight, but the district court reversed.
Under the statute,453 recoverable business damages are limited to
reasonable damages to an established business located on the unappropriated
land.454 Night Flight would have to establish that the activities in the parking
lot were authorized by the lease. The most that Night Flight could recover
would be lost profits from the activities in the parking lot. Moreover, it
would have to prove that its activities in the parking lot were an established
and continuing business for a period of at least five years before the taking.
However, the record did not preclude recovery in front of a jury, so summary
judgment was inappropriate.
444. Taylor, 701 So. 2d at 611 (quoting Lee County v. Exchange Nat'l Bank of
Tampa, 417 So. 2d 268, 269 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1982)).
445. Id.
446. Id. at 612.
447. Id.
448. 702 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
449. Id. at 538.
450. Id. at 539. See FLA. STAT. § 73.017(3)(b) (1991).
451. Night Flight, 702 So. 2d at 539.
452. Id. at 540.
453. FLA. STAT. § 73.071(3)(b) (1991).
454. Id.
455. Night Flight, 702 So. 2d at 540.
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B. Inverse Condemnation
Associates of Meadow Lake, Inc. v. City of Edgewater.45 6 When the
city built a new park, it lacked a properly functioning storm water
management system. Until the problem was corrected, flooding occurred in
a residential subdivision. The developer brought this suit for inverse
condemnation based on a temporary taking.457 The trial court granted
summary judgment on the theory that Florida does not provide compensation
for temporary takings.458 However, the Fifth District Court of Appeal
disagreed and vacated the order below.459 The court concluded that since the
United States Supreme Court decided First Evangelical Lutheran Church of
Glendale v. County of Los Angeles,460 a cause of action for a temporary
regulatory taking has been recognized under the United States
Constitution.461 Following suit, the Supreme Court of Florida held that the
improper seizure of a truck for a period of two years was compensable as a
temporary taking under the Florida Constitution. Consequently, "[i]f
substantial periodic flooding occurred and was expected to recur and such
flooding denied Associates any reasonable use of its property because
Edgewater defectively constructed its project, a cause of action for inverse
condemnation does lie."'
463
Coastal Petroleum v. Chiles. 464 In 1941, the state signed an oil
exploration contract and option to lease. Coastal Petroleum succeeded to the
rights of the optionee/lessee in 1947. A dispute arose concerning those
rights and the parties reached a settlement in 1976. One part of the
settlement was that Coastal would retain a residual royalty for all gas and oil
produced from a certain area until the year 2016. However, in 1990, the
Governor and Cabinet, sitting as the Board of Trustees of the Internal
Development Trust Fund, adopted a policy prohibiting drilling and oil and
gas production in the sovereign waters of the state. Likewise, the Florida
Legislature passed a statute prohibiting oil and gas leases on Florida's west
coast north of latitude twenty-six degrees. Coastal's residual royalty area
456. 706 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
457. Id. at 50.
458. Hillsborough County v. Gutierrex, 433 So. 2d 1337 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1983).
459. Edgewater, 706 So. 2d at 52.
460. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
461. Edgewater, 706 So. 2d at 52.
462. In re Forfeiture of 1976 Kenworth Tractor Trailer Truck, 576 So. 2d 261 (Fla.
1990).
463. Edgewater, 706 So. 2d at 52 (citations omitted).
464. 701 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
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465land was in the area covered by the statute. Since that had the effect of
guaranteeing that there would be no oil and gas production from which
Coastal could receive royalties, Coastal sued on the theory of inverse
condemnation.466
After trial without a jury, the circuit court denied recovery and the first
467district affirmed. Not every interest obtained from the state rises to the
468level of a protectable property interest under eminent domain law. The
petitioner here had a right to share in the royalties produced under
nonexistent oil and gas leases. Nothing in the settlement agreement
explicitly obligated the state to enter into such leases. Any implied covenant
of fair dealing which might have been found in a similar agreement between
private parties would have to be balanced by the state's obligations under the
public trust doctrine to act only in the public interest and the state's
469obligation to exercise police powers for the public good. The state's
conduct here was to protect the public interest rather than to defeat Coastal's
rights to royalties. Nor was there any evidence that the land involved had
any potential to produce any oil and gas before the agreement would
expire. 47 Under the circumstances, Coastal's rights were simply too specu-
lative to require compensation under inverse condemnation doctrine.
471
Gardens Country Club, Inc. v. Palm Beach County.472 When plaintiff
bought the land, the county was in the process of actively considering a new
comprehensive land use plan. Under the old plan, use was limited to one
dwelling per 2.5 acres or one dwelling per two acres in a planned unit
development. Under the proposed plan, the area was to be down-zoned to
one dwelling per twenty acres. Plaintiff formally applied for certification as
a Planned Unit Development ("PUD") under the old plan, but the county
commission had directed its staff not to certify any applications for
certification that did not comply with the plan then under consideration.473
Plaintiff sued over this denial and eventually won in the district court
because the old plan, not yet having been replaced by the enactment of the
new one, was still in effect.474
465. Id. at 622-23.
466. Id. at 623.
467. Id.
468. Id. at 625.
469. Coastal Petroleum, 701 So. 2d at 624.
470. Id. at 625.
471. Id.
472. 712 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
473. Id. at 400.
474. Gardens Country Club, Inc. v. Palm Beach County, 590 So. 2d 488 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (referred to as "Gardens I" by the court to distinguish it from this appeal
which the court labled "Gardens II").
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Before the case could be heard on remand, the plaintiff succeeded in
having the land annexed by the City of Palm Beach Gardens. The city
approved the plaintiff's development plan which the county had refused to
consider. Plaintiff then filed a supplemental complaint against the county
seeking damages for a temporary taking and violation of the plaintiff's civil
rights. 5
The district court found that the takings claim was ripe for review even
though plaintiff had never attempted to get its plan approved under the new
comprehensive plan.476 The ripeness doctrine has a futility exception and the
court concluded this case fit squarely within it.477 Any attempt to get
approval of one residential unit per two acres under a plan calling for one
residential unit per twenty acres would have been futile. 47 However, there
was competent substantial evidence to support the trial court's findings that
under the new plan the land still had a significant value at $3000 per
acre.479 While this was less than the $8000 per acre that it would have had
under the old plan, the plaintiff had not established that it constituted a
taking in light of a reasonable investment backed expectation. 480
The district court also rejected the civil rights claim under Title 42
section 1983 of the United States Code.481 Such a claim must satisfy a two-
prong test: 1) there must be a deprivation of a constitutionally protected
interest; and 2) the deprivation must be the result of arbitrary and
unreasonable government action.482 The right to have its application for
certification of its PUD which complied with the existing comprehensive
plan was a property right subject to due process protection. However, the
county's act was not arbitrary and unreasonable under the circumstances.483
The county was actively considering the new comprehensive plan and it was
not unreasonable to avoid approving plans that would be inconsistent with
the new plan, even though that proved to be prohibited by the law.4 4 8
Intracoastal North Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. Palm Beach County.485
The condominium association owned land fronting the Intracoastal
Waterway.486 At this location, the association operated and owned wooden
475. Gardens, 712 So. 2d at 400-01.
476. Id. at 401.
477. Id.
478. Id.
479. Id.
480. Gardens, 712 So. 2d at 402.
481. Id. at 403.
482. Id. at 403 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1997)).
483. Gardens, 712 So. 2d at 403.
484. Id. at 403-04.
485. 698 So. 2d 384 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
486. Intracoastal, 698 So. 2d at 384.
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docks that were used by recreational boaters.487 Directly to the north was a
bridge over the river. When the new bridge was built, the channel was
widened to make navigation safer on the intracoastal. 489 However, the chan-
nel widening increased the tidal currents along the associations's frontage
except during the periods when the tide changed.490 These slack periods
occurred four times a day and lasted for one-half hour.491 Only during the
slack periods could a recreational boater safely dock or moor at the
association's wooden docks. The association claimed that this diminution in
its ability to use its docks was a taking for which compensation must be paid.
The trial court, however, disagreed and the district court affirmed.492
The district court found itself faced with a case of first impression. It
concluded that an increase in the speed at which water flowed past riparian
land did not constitute a physical invasion or an appropriation of property
rights because a riparian landowner's rights to use the water are inherently• , .• •494
servient to the public's right to navigation and commerce on the water.
The court noted that this was not a case in which the landowner could claim
that the governmental action had rendered the land useless, nor was it a case
in which the riparian landowner's access to the water was denied or even
substantially diminished. 95 Consequently, the inverse condemnation action
failed.496
Lee County v. Kiesel.497 The landowner bought land on the riverbank
and built an expensive home. Later, the county built a bridge that extended
at an angle from the adjacent lot across the river so as to obstruct the
landowner's view. The bridge was not on any of the landowner's property,
and none of the landowner's property was condemned for the bridge
construction, but the landowner presented expert testimony that the location
of the bridge caused a substantial drop in the value of the property. The trial
court granted final judgment to the landowner on the issue of inverse
498
condemnation and the county appealed.
The district court rejected the county's claim that the appropriate test
was the one used for regulatory takings, i.e., whether "the bridge
487. Id.
488. Id.
489. Id.
490. Id.
491. Intracoastal, 698 So. 2d at 384.
492. Id.
493. Id. at 385.
494. Id.
495. Id.
496. Intracoastal, 698 So. 2d at 386.
497. 705 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
498. Id. at 1014.
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construction substantially ousted them from or deprived them of
substantially all beneficial use of their property. 499  This was not a
regulatory takings case. The owner of shore land along navigable water has
"common law riparian rights."5 Florida has long recognized that one of
those riparian rights "is the right to an unobstructed view over the water to
the channel." 501 Because navigable waters have irregular paths, no geome-
tric formula governs precisely when activity interferes with that right. The
question, to be decided on a case by case basis, is whether the activity, in
this case the building of the bridge, "substantially and materially obstruct[s]
the land owner's view to the channel. 50 2 The evidence included testimony
by one expert witness that "eightger cent [sic] of [the] view to the channel
was obstructed by [this] bridge." That satisfied the test. Consequently,
the district court affirmed the holding that a taking had occurred.50
VLX Properties, Inc. v. Southern States Utilities, Inc.505 Of particular
interest in this case was the fact that the mortgagee had made an inverse
condemnation claim against the utility that allegedly misused an easement
and misused a commonly owned pond. The circuit court held the mortgagee
did not have standing, and the mortgagee appealed.5 6 The district court
affirmed because in Florida a mortgagee has only a lien on the property and,
therefore, is not the landowner. Under the Florida Constitution,
compensation is due to only the owner when private property is taken for
public use.
5 °8
This analysis understates the matter. Under the circumstances, this
mortgagee was not deprived of any property rights. However, it is
conceivable that a mortgagee might be deprived of its security by
governmental action so as to have standing to bring an inverse condemnation
suit, even though that did not occur in this case.
X. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Jacksonville v. American Environmental Services, Inc.509 The court
addressed the lower court "judge's declaratory statement concerning the
499. Id. at 1015.
500. Id.
501. Id.
502. Kiesel, 705 So. 2d at 1016.
503. Id.
504. Id.
505. 701 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
506. Id. at 393.
507. Id. at 395.
508. Id. (citing FLA CONsT. art. X, § 6).
509. 699 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
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applicability and validity of the local certificate of need application
ordinances." 5'0  This court affirmed the lower court and held American
Environmental Services "could not properly be required to obtain a local
certificate of need from the City of Jacksonville."
51
'
"Jacksonville's CON [Certificate of Need] ordinances, as applied to
[American Environmental Services Inc.'s] proposed hazardous waste
transfer station... conflict[ed] with chapter 403 of the Florida
Statutes. ' 2 "The Jacksonville ordinances require a determination of local
need, and impose a condition that the waste only be of a type generated in
Duval County."
513
In comparison, chapter 403 of the Florida Statutes documents "a
statewide need for hazardous waste facilities ... and contemplate[s]
regional... facilities for the transfer, storage and treatment of hazardous
waste." 514  The City of Jacksonville cannot prevent the facility by
determining lack of local need, even though statutes refer to local
assessments of hazardous waste management. Local assessments have the
purpose of compiling information for an assessment of need in the state.
515
Local governments cannot enact an ordinance pertaining to the subject
of hazardous waste regulation that is more stringent than chapter 403
rules.5 16 As per chapter 403, local governments can control the zoning of
such hazardous waste and "impose necessary conditions to protect the
health, safety, and welfare of their citizens ... but may not impose an
additional obligation to satisfy a test for local need."
517
Secret Oaks Owner's Ass'n v. Department of Environmental
Protection. 8 "[F]inal order of the... Department of Environmental
Protection... den[ied] the Association the right to apply for. a permit to
construct a dock on sovereignty land." 519 The Fifth District Court of Appeal
concluded that the association had a "sufficient title interest" in the uplands
for the purpose of seeking permission to construct a dock and thus, the court
reversed the final order.
510. Id. at 256.
511. Id.
512. Id.
513. Id.
514. American Envtl., 699 So. 2d at 256; see FLA. STAT. § 403.7225(8) (1995); FLA.
STAT. § 403.7225(7) (1995); FLA. STAT. §. 403.723 (1995).
515. American Envd., 699 So. 2d at 256; see also FLA. STAT. §. 403.7225 (1995).
516. American Envtl., 699 So. 2d at 256; see also FLA. STAT. §. 403.7225(10) (1995).
517. American Envtl., 699 So. 2d at 257 (citing Escambia County v. Trans Pac., 584
So. 2d 603, 605 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991)).
518. 704 So. 2d 702 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
519. Id. at 703.
520. Id. (citing FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 18-21.004(3)(b) (1996)).
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This was the third appeal involving the Association and the
521Parlatos. This discussion pertains solely to the last appeal. The
association through Environmental Services, Inc. filed an application with
the Department of Environmental Protection ("DEP") for the pernmits needed
to construct the dock.522 This was the issue of the prior appeal. The
application sought a dredge fill permit and permission from the State, as
owner of the submerged lands, to construct such dock. Almost a year later,
the DEP denied the application and stated that the holder of an easement
does not have sufficient title interest to make an application for activities
pertaining to submerged lands. 523
In return, Secret Oaks requested a formal hearing. "[T]he hearing
officer concluded that there were no material issues of fact and ordered the
case back to the agency for an informal hearing."5 24 At the informal hearing,
the Director stated the issue as "whether the Association, as the holder of an
easement, is among the class of persons who may file an application to
conduct activities on state-owned sovereign submerged lands." 5  The
Director issued a lengthy order regarding such issue. The DEP framed the
issue as follows:
[W]hether the Association, as the holder of recorded contractual
rights to construct, maintain and use all docks on lot 10, and,
concomitantly, to limit the rights of any owner or lessee of lot 10,
is precluded from applying for a permit to construct a dock because
the rule requirement of "sufficient title interest in uplands for the
intended purpose" means the appellant must have a possessory
interest in the upland property.
In this case, the Owners' Agreement and the recorded easement on lot
ten provided that lot owners in the Secret Oaks Subdivision were granted
pedestrian access to the St. John's River and to any dock that is situated or
may later be situated thereon. 527 The association was obligated to improve,
repair, or maintain the easement.528
The DEP relies on the definition of "title interest" as set forth "in
Black's Law Dictionary: Title is defined as, 'the means whereby the owner
of lands has the just possession of his property. The union of all the
521. Id.
522. Id. at 704.
523. Secret Oaks, 704 So. 2d at 704.
524. Id. at 705.
525. Id.
526. Id. at 706.
527. Id.
528. Secret Oaks, 704 So. 2d at 706.
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elements which constitute ownership. Full independent and fee ownership.
The right to or ownership in land."'9 Just because title can be the means to
receive right of possession, that does not dictate that all possessory interests
are title interests.5 30 This case clearly shows "that the Association has
recorded contractual rights in lot 10 sufficient to grant it the right to build
the dock.' 531 If the language "sufficient title interest in the uplands" meant
only "right of possession," the agency would have said so.:
32
In addition, the DEP "offers no reason why a possessory interest is the
only possible 'title interest' ... [or] why a 'possessory' interest would be the
minimum 'sufficient title interest' for dock-building permit application
purposes.533 This court viewed the "[A]gency's interpretation [as] illogical
and unreasonable. 534  To interpret "title interest" as meaning "right of
possession" creates irrational distinctions. 35
XI. HOMEOWNERS' ASSOCIATIONS
Legislative changes to chapter 617 of the Florida Statutes include, but
are not limited to, the following:
Section 617.303 of the Florida Statutes has a new subsection (8).536
This provides that "[a]ll association funds held by a developer shall be
maintained separately in the association's name. There shall be no
538comingling of reserve and operating funds prior to turnover. However,
"the association may jointly invest reserve funds; [even though the] invested
funds must be accounted for separately.5539
Section 617.307 of the Florida Statutes has a new subsection (3).540
This subsection is designed to provide for transition of homeowners'
association control in a community.5 41 Under this subsection, such shall
occur when "[m]embers other than the developer are entitled to elect at least
529. Id. at 707 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1331 (5th ed. 1979)).
530. Id.
531. Id.
532. Id.
533. Secret Oaks, 704 So. 2d at 707.
534. Id. at 708.
535. Id. at 707.
536. Act of May 27, 1998, ch. 98-261, §1, 1998 Fla. Laws 2277, 2278 (to be codified
at FLA. STAT. § 617.303(8)).
537. Id.
538. Id.
539. Id.
540. Act of May 27, 1998, ch. 98-261, §2, 1998 Fla. Laws 2278, 2278 (to be codified
at FLA. STAT. § 617.307(3)).
541. Id.
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a majority of the board of directors of the homeowners' association." 542
"The developer shall, at the developer's expense, within no more than 90
days deliver the [prescribed] documents to the board." 543
Section 617.3075 of the Florida Statutes has been enacted to create a
list of prohibitive clauses to be found in homeowners' association
documents.544 Subsection (1) and its subparts prohibit provisions to the
effect that the developer has the unilateral ability and right to make changes
in the homeowners' association documents after the transition of the
homeowners' association control in a community to the nondeveloper
members; that the association is restricted from filing a lawsuit against the
developer; and that the developer is entitled to cast votes in amount that
exceeds one vote per residential lot after the transition to the association.545
Subparagraph (2) declares the prohibited position stated above as
unenforceable as a matter of public policy where those clauses were created
on or after the effective date of that section, October 1, 1998.546
XII. INSURANCE
Fassi v. American Fire & Casualty Co.547 The Fifth District Court of
Appeal affirmed the final judgment denying Fassi's claim for fireda 548 •
damages. Fassi's home was destroyed by fire and he filed a claim for
damages under his homeowners' policy.549 American Fire and Casualty was
suspicious as to the cause of the fire and wanted Fassi to submit to
examination under oath and provide a sworn claim of loss. The examination
was never conducted since Fassi failed to contact the attorneys involved. In
addition, Fassi still failed to respond after American Fire and Casualty
followed up with a letter. The law firm scheduled the examination on behalf
of American. In return, Fassi refused to submit to the sworn examination
because of the threat of criminal proceedings. 550
A claimant cannot recover fire losses under an insurance policy and
refuse to comply with policy requirements to submit to sworn examination
because criminal charges related to the cause of fire may be pending against
542. Id.
543. Act of May 27, 1998, ch. 98-261, §2, 1998 Fla. Laws 2278, 2278 (to be codified
at FLA. STAT. § 617.307(3)).
544. FLA. STAT. § 617.3075 (1997).
545. Id. § 617.3075(1).
546. Id. § 617.3075(2).
547. 700 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
548. Id. at 52.
549. Id.
550. Id.
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him. 551 So, the examination was again rescheduled and, once again, Fassi
failed to appear or respond. 2 Three months later, Fassi wished to have the
examination conducted but American responded that it was too late. The
trial court granted summary judgment after Fassi filed suit on the policy.553
The appellate court agreed with American's contentions. 4 Fassi was
given one last chance to explain the refusal to cooperate, and failure to
respond would lead to denial of the claim.555 Since Fassi did not explain, no
further notice was required on American Fire's behalf. The final letter to
Fassi was only an opportunity to explain, not a chance to participate. The
court concluded that five opportunities to participate were enough.
XII. LANDLORD AND TENANT
Bell v. Kornblatt.557 The circuit court, sitting as an appellate court, had
affirmed the county court's final judgment of eviction based upon failure to
pay the rent.55 8 The tenant sought certiorari review in the Fourth District
Court of Appeal on the theory that the county court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction because the three-day notice the tenant received did not comply
with the statute.55 9 A number of county and circuit court decisions supported
that argument,56° but the district court rejected it concluding that compliance
with the statute was merely a condition precedent to eviction.561 The court
reasoned that under earlier versions of the statute, the tenant could waive its
right to a three-day notice, and such ability to waive would be inconsistent
551. Id.
552. Fassi, 700 So. 2d at 52.
553. Id. at 53.
554. Id.
555. Id.
556. Id.
557. 705 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
558. Id. at 113-14.
559. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 83.56(3) (1995)).
560. Id. (citing Cook v. Arrowhead Mobile Home Community, 50 Fla. Supp. 2d 26
(3d Cir. Ct. 1991); Johnson v. Kallioinen, 16 Fla. Supp. 2d 86 (15th Cir. Ct. 1986); Archer v.
Jackson, 2 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 225 (Broward Cty. Ct. 1994); Shapiro v. Puche, 1 Fla. L.
Weekly Supp. 409 (Broward Cty. Ct. 1993); Pearson v. Sims, I Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 408
(Broward Cty. Ct. 1993); Pappas v. Kartub, 2 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 59 (Broward Cty. Ct.
1993); Broward Gardens Assocs., Ltd. v. Walker, I Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 155 (Broward Cty.
Ct. 1992); Marcrum Management Co. v. Phillips, 40 Fla. Supp. 2d 198 (Broward Cty. Ct.
1990); Garcia v. Ruiz, 50 Fla. Supp. 2d 176 (Dade Cty. Ct. 1991); Labrada v. Barrios, 44 Fla.
Supp. 2d 140 (Dade Cty. Ct. 1990); Metropolitan Dade County v. Dansey, 43 Fla. Supp. 2d
169 (Dade Cty. Ct. 1990); and Kosta v. Bernstein, 4 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 480 (Sarasota Cty.
Ct. 1996)).
561. Bell, 705 So. 2d at 114.
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with the court being deprived of subject matter jurisdiction. 562  As this
appears to be the only district court decision in the state, it is binding
throughout the state and has the effect, at least for the time being, of
overruling all inconsistent circuit and county court decisions.
Charlemagne v. Francis.563 Injured by a fall allegedly caused by a
defective carpet, the roommate of the tenant sued the landlord.564 The tenant
testified that she had repeatedly notified the landlord about the problems
with the carpet. However, the apartment manager testified that he had not
been notified. Moreover, he testified that he never saw any problems with
the carpet.565 The person who cleaned the carpet before the tenancy began
also testified that the carpet had no defects.5 6 The landlord, thereafter,
conjectured that any defects in the carpet, if they existed at all, might have
been caused by the tenant's furniture movers. Over the tenant's objection,
the landlord got a jury instruction that, inter alia, "the landlord [is] not
responsible to the tenant.., for [defects] created or caused by... person on
the premises with the tenant's consent."567 The jury returned a verdict for
the landlord and the tenant appealed. 8
The fourth district reversed, finding the instruction improper on two
grounds.569 First, the instruction about the landlord's responsibility to the
tenant under section 83.51 of the Florida Statutes relates to the statutory
warranty of the premises by the landlord to the tenant. It has no
applicability to an action for common law negligence.5 71 The only defense
would be comparative negligence of the defendant or the superseding
negligence of others. Second, there was no testimony that the defect
might have been caused by third parties such as furniture movers. 573
Comptech International, Inc. v. Milam Commerce Park, Ltd.574 This
involved a commercial lease. Pursuant to an agreement to lease additional
space, the parties agreed that the landlord would build offices in part of the
562. Id.
563. 700 So. 2d 157 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
564. Id. at 158.
565. Id. at 158-59.
566. Id. at 159.
567. Id. at 158.
568. Charlemagne, 700 So. 2d at 158.
569. Id. at 159.
570. Id. at 160.
571. Id.
572. Id.
573. Charlemagne, 700 So. 2d at 160.
574. 711 So. 2d 1255 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998), replacing original opinion, 22
Fla. L. Weekly D2192 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App., Sep. 17, 1997).
1998]
282
Nova Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [1998], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol23/iss1/1
Nova Law Review
original space.575 The tenant, claiming its office space and computers were
damaged by the unworkmanlike and untimely construction of the landlord's
office space, brought suit against the landlord based on the following
theories: 1) negligent construction; 2) violation of the building code; 3) rent
had been illegally collected; and 4) negligence in the selection of
contractors. The first three were dismissed with prejudice and the court
granted summary judgment for the landlord on the last.516 The tenant
brought this appeal, which turned on the question of whether the tenant's
recovery on the tort theories was barred by the economic loss rule.
577
The economic loss rule draws the line between recovery in tort and in
contract. It provides that tort recovery is prohibited "when a product
damages itself, causing economic injury, but does not cause personal injury
or damage to any property other than itself."5 78 Thus, if the defective product
damages other property, the economic loss rule does not bar recovery.
However, the first question here was whether the tenant's office space and
computers were "'other' property." The majority, in an extensive opinion
written by Judge Gersten, thought not.579  Judge Cope, in an equally
extensive dissent, reached the contrary conclusion.5 80 It is a close call.
Eventually it will have to be resolved by the Supreme Court of Florida, but
until that time, tenants would be well advised to provide by contract for
protection from this type of harm. 81
The majority and the dissent also disagreed on the indemnity clause. s
It provided that the tenant would indemnify the landlord for all claims of
every kind arising from the use or occupancy of the premises. The majority
found this language supported its conclusion that the tenant should be
limited to contract damages because the parties negotiated the allocation of
risk and agreed to place it on the tenant. In contrast, the dissent focused
on the omission of specific language of an intent to indemnify the landlord• • • 583
against its own negligence. Such language would be necessary to
overcome the distaste for agreements that protect a party from its own
584 585wrongful conduct. Thus, it should not protect this landlord.
575. Id. at 1256-57.
576. Id. at 1257.
577. Id.
578. Casa Clara Condominium Ass'n. v. Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc., 620 So. 2d
1244, 1246 (Fla. 1993).
579. Comptech Int'l, 711 So. 2d at 1256-63.
580. Id. at 1263-68 (Cope, J., dissenting).
581. Id. at 1261, 1265.
582. Id. at 1261.
583. Id. at 1265. (Cope, J., dissenting).
584. Comptech Int'l, 711 So. 2d at 1265.
585. Id.
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There was also disagreement as to whether the economic loss rule bared
586recovery for the building code violations. Section 553.84 of the Florida
Statutes provides: "Notwithstanding any other remedies available, any
person or party... damaged as a result of a violation [of the Florida
Building Codes Act] has a cause of action [in any court of competent
jurisdiction] against the [person or] party who committed the violation. 587
The dissent interpreted the phrase, "[n]otwithstanding any other
remedies" available as creating an exception to the economic loss rule
because the rule turns on the available of the contract remedy.588 The
majority, however, pointed out that the economic loss rule has been applied
to bar statutory tort actions in the same way that it bars common law tort
actions. 9  Unfortunately, the statutory phrase is capable of both
interpretations, and only a trip to the supreme court or legislative
clarification will settle the question.
Markell v. Mi Casa, Ltd.51° The tenant sued after being injured when
she tripped on the rubber weather stripping on the threshold of her
apartment's front door.5 9' Unfortunately, the building had been sold only
two weeks before the 'accident. 92 In response to the present and former
landlords' motions for summary judgment, she produced the affidavit of an
expert in risk analysis. He stated that: 1) the weather stripping was
improperly designed, installed and maintained; 2) it constituted a "hidden
trap" to someone using that doorway; 3) it would not necessarily have been
visible to a person entering or leaving the apartment; 4) it would have been
easily noticed by a "minimally experienced maintenance or repair individual
during the normal course of inspection at any time after the initial
installation;" and 5) the weather stripping area was not regularly
inspected. 3 The trial court granted summary judgment against the tenant.
She appealed, and the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed. 95
Two rules were applicable regarding the landlord's duty in the absence
of a tenant waiver. First, "'the owner of a residential dwelling unit, who
leases it to a tenant for residential purposes, has a duty to reasonably inspect
the premises before allowing the tenant to take possession, and to make
therepairs necessary to transfer a reasonably safe dwelling unit to the
586. Id. at 1257, 66-68.
587. Id. at 1266 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 553.84 (1989)).
588. Id.
589. Comptech Int'l, 711 So. 2d at 1258.
590. 711 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
591. Id. at 584.
592. Id.
593. Id. at 585.
594. Id. at 584.
595. Markell, 711 So. 2d at 586.
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tenant.'596 Secondly, once notified of a dangerous defect, the landlord has a
continuing duty to exercise reasonable care to make repairs.597 The expert's
affidavit left questions of fact as to how these rules should apply to this
case. Was the property in an unreasonably dangerous condition? Had it
been delivered that way, or had it become dangerous after delivery? Was the
prior or new landlord on constructive notice because it should have known?
Was the tenant also negligent? If so, how would the parties' negligence be
assessed for comparative negligence analysis purposes? In light of the
unanswered questions, summary judgment should not have been granted.598
Chief Judge Stone, however, dissented.5 99 He saw no evidence that the
landlords had notice of the dangerous condition or that they might have been
on constructive notice.60 Without notice, they could not be held liable under
the above rules.
60
'
Morris Investment Partnership v. Figueroa.602 The tenant leased space
for an automobile repair shop. Unfortunately, the space did not have enough
off-street parking to satisfy the zoning ordinance, so the tenant could not get
an occupational license. That did not stop the tenant from opening for
business while the landlord tried to solve the zoning problem. After the
landlord's efforts failed, the tenant vacated the premises. The landlord sued
for unpaid rent from the period tenant was in possession, accelerated rent,
and compensation for the expenses incurred in the zoning dispute. The trial
court, following a nonjury trial, granted judgment for the tenant on all counts
and declared the lease to be null and void.6° The district court reversed. 6°
The district court reasoned that declaring the lease to be null and void
605
was inappropriate because the tenant had never sought rescission.
Furthermore, tenant's remaining in possession and opening for business
would have been a bar to rescission anyway, and remaining in possession
would have prevented tenant from raising constructive eviction as a defense
to the rent suit.606 Therefore, the landlord was entitled to rent for the period
when the tenant was in possession of the premises. 607 But why only for the
time tenant was in possession?
596. Id. at 585 (quoting Mansur v. Eubanks, 401 So. 2d 1328, 1329-30 (Fla. 1981)).
597. Id.
598. Id. at 586.
599. Id. (Stone, J., dissenting).
600. Markell, 711 So. 2d at 586.
601. Id.
602. 698 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
603. Id. at 290.
604. Id.
605. Id.
606. Id.
607. Figueroa, 698 So. 2d at 290-91.
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Taking the court's reasoning to its logical conclusion, the landlord
should have recovered the accelerated rent. The lease had a rent acceleration
clause. The lease had not been rescinded. The tenant vacated while the lease
was still in effect, so the landlord could exercise the acceleration clause.
When the tenant later vacated, it was too late because the accelerated rent
was already due; so the tenant could not raise constructive eviction as a
defense to a suit for accelerated rent. However, the court failed to explain
why the landlord did not win on this point as well.
Allowing rent only until the tenant vacated is consistent with an
application of the construction eviction defense, i.e., the landlord was
entitled to rent only until the tenant was evicted, constructively, by the
landlord and not thereafter. However, that is inconsistent with what the
court said. Perhaps the court was basing its conclusion on failure of
consideration or on the doctrine of commercial frustration. Perhaps the court
was basing its opinion on an application of the doctrine of mitigation of
damages. Perhaps the court was granting the landlord compensation for the
use and occupancy of the land, a form of restitution damages, but that would
only make sense if the court granted rescission or found the lease to be void
ab initio. Perhaps ...
Rodriguez v. Brutus. On the lot in question were a house and a
shed.6 10 The tenants had an oral lease for the house that specifically
excluded the shed. The tenants were specifically warned that the shed
contained a working power saw and that they were not to enter. In turn, the
tenants specifically warned their daughter that she was forbidden from
entering the shed. There was no problem until the daughter took a wood
shop class. Although she had been warned about the dangers of this type of
saw by her teacher, she decided to try out the saw in the shed. As there was
no door, she had no trouble entering. The experiment went badly, and she
lost part of her thumb.6 1' The jury held the landlord eighty percent negligent
and it entered a final judgment of $300,000 for the tenants. On appeal, the
Third District Court of Appeal reversed. 1 3
The critical point was that the shed was not part of the leased
premises.6 14  Consequently, the daughter was in the shed as either an
uninvited licensee or as a trespasser. If she was an uninvited licensee, the
landlord's duty to her was to refrain from wanton negligence or willful
608. Id. at 290.
609. 702 So. 2d 1302 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
610. Id. at 1303.
611. Id.
612. Id.
613. Id.
614. Rodriguez, 702 So. 2d at 1303.
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615
misconduct. If she were a trespasser, the landlords' only duty to her was
to refrain from committing willful or wanton injury so long as the attractive
616
nuisance doctrine does not apply. Unfortunately, the court failed to reveal
why the saw was not an attractive nuisance. However, the daughter had
been warned of the danger and admittedly was well aware of it, so the
landlord had not breached this duty to her. Consequently, they could not be
held liable.
617
Schroeder v. Johnson.6 18 The lease provided the tenant with the right
"to extend this lease for successive five (5) year periods," but the lease was
silent on how many renewals would be allowed.6 19 The trial judge, after
hearing parol evidence, interpreted this to mean that the tenant had the right
to renew as long as she wished. 62  The district court reversed.621 It
acknowledged that the use of the plural word "periods" indicated more than
one renewal, but that was tempered by the policy against perpetual
leases. 622 The traditional rule is that a court should not find a lease to be
perpetual in the absence of unambiguous language indicating that intent, and
that language was missing from this lease. Therefore, the district court
concluded that the lease gave the tenant the fewest possible number of plural
renewals; i.e., two renewals.
623
Judge W. Sharp strongly dissented.62 In this case, the lease provision
was not clear. 62 The trial judge heard the parol evidence, and evidence in
the record supported his conclusions as to the parties' intent.626 The policy
against perpetual renewals is an ancient one that has produced strained
constructions. It has outlived its original purpose and should not be used to
trump the intent of the parties, particularly because interpreting the lease to
provide a human tenant with the right to renew during her life would be far
less than perpetual.
Serchay v. NTS Fort Lauderdale Office Joint Venture.627 The office
space was leased to Lane, P.A. and Serchay, P.A. Lane, P.A. was the law
firm of Paul Lane. Serchay, P.A. was the accounting firm of Alan Serchay.
615. Id.
616. Id. at 1304.
617. Id. at 1303-04.
618. 696 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
619. Id.
620. Id. at 499.
621. Id.
622. Id. at 500.
623. Schroeder, 696 So. 2d at 499.
624. Id. at 500-03 (Sharp, J., dissenting).
625. Id. at 503.
626. Id.
627. 707 So. 2d 958 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
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Lane, P.A. subleased space to Coven, P.A. Both corporate entities were
dissolved for failure to file annual reports. Later, Coven and Lane formed a
new firm, Coven & Lane, P.A., and Alan Serchay formed a new accounting
firm, A. Serchay Accounting Services, P.A.
62
After the tenants vacated the premises and stopped paying rent, the
landlord brought this action for unpaid rent. The tenants reinstated the
defunct corporations to defend on the theory of constructive eviction.
Following trial, the jury rendered a verdict in favor of the landlord against
the defendants, including Coven & Lane, P.A. and A. Serchay Accounting
Services, P.A.629 The district court affirmed the judgment against A.
Serchay Accounting Services, P.A., but reversed the decision against Coven
& Lane.
630
Since these corporations were not parties to the written lease, they
could be held liable for the unpaid rent only if they were successor entities
or if they had de facto merged with the tenant entities. 63, A successor entity
"'is merely a continuation or reincarnation of the earlier entity under a
different name"' or in a different form.632 The key element is "'common
identity of officers, directors and stockholders"' between the original and
successor entity.633 Similarly, to find a defacto merger requires "'continuity
of the selling corporation evidenced by the same management, personnel,
assets... physical location... stockholders, accomplished by paying for the
acquired corporation with shares of stock; a dissolution of the selling
corporation; and assumption of the liabilities."'
' 634
As to the accounting firm, there appeared to be no question that the
essentials of the earlier and later firms were the same. However, there was
insufficient evidence that the new law firm, consisting of two lawyers, was a
successor to the earlier solo practice of one partner, or that there was a de
facto merger of the earlier solo practice into the new partnership. Although
there was evidence that the new firm used the space of the earlier solo
practice and some of the equipment and personnel, it was not enough in that
the new firm had a new officer and shareholder, Coven, and there was no
evidence that it had acquired the assets and liabilities of the solo practice.
635
628. Id. at 959.
629. Id. at 959.
630. Id. at 960.
631. Id.
632. Serchay, 707 So. 2d at 960 (quoting Munim v. Azar, 648 So. 2d 145, 154 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994)).
633. Id. (quoting Munim v. Azar, 648 So. 2d 145, 154 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1994)).
634. Id. (quoting Munim v. Azar, 648 So. 2d 145, 153-54 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1994)).
635. Id.
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Siegel v. Deerwood Place Corp.636 The tenants brought suit for injuries
one suffered from a fall down the stairs. They produced the affidavit of an
expert that construction staples were found in the area where the victim
allegedly tripped on the stairway carpeting. They claimed that such staples
led to the inference that the carpet was improperly installed or repaired and
that there was a presumption that the landlord knew of the defect. The trial
court, however, granted summaY63T udgrent to the landlord, and the Third
District Court of Appeal affirmed.
The rule is that, absent a waiver, the landlord has a "'continuing duty to
exercise reasonable care to repair dangerous defective conditions"' of which
he has notice.638 The mere existence of the construction staples alone was
not enough to establish that the landlord was on notice of the defect or had
attempted to conceal it. There was no evidence to establish when the staples
were installed, who installed them, or how long they were installed before
the accident. Consequently, the district court affirmed the trial court's
granting of summary judgment.639
XIV. LIENS
Morse Diesel International v. 2000 Island Boulevard, Inc.640 The Third
District Court of Appeal reversed a peremptory writ of mandamus
authorizing release of a cash bond in favor of 2000 Williams Island
("Williams"), owner and developer of a 280 unit highrise condominium
project.641 The court remanded with directions that Williams redeposit
disbursed proceeds from the cash bond pending further orders.
642
Morse Diesel sued Williams Island "for money due under a
construction contract." 643  The parties entered into an agreement that
provided Morse Diesel with a lien on a pool of twenty condo units to secure
the claim. Morse agreed to release its lien rights as to the other units.
644
"Williams ... posted a bond on a prorated basis as to five of the units."
645
Morse asserted additional claims when another dispute arose between the
parties. Williams later "filed an emergency motion for the clerk to transfer
636. 701 So. 2d 1190 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
637. Id. atll91.
638. Id. (quoting Mansur v. Eubanks, 401 So. 2d 1328, 1330 (Fla. 1981)).
639. Id. at 1192.
640. 698 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
641. Id. at 310.
642. Id. at 313.
643. Id. at 310.
644. Id. at 311.
645. Morse Diesel, 698 So. 2d at 311.
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all of the [existing] liens to its cash bond and to reduce Morse Diesel's
amended claim of lien ... when certain subcontractors were paid."6
46
The trial court allowed the lien transfer to a cash bond but denied
Williams' request for reduction of the bond.647 Since Williams failed to
receive the bond reduction, it filed for a writ of mandamus directing the
clerk to disburse the cash bond as per section 713.24(4) of the Florida
Statutes. The lower court directed the clerk to release the cash bond.649On appeal, the court concluded the following:
the lower court abused its discretion in granting the writ of
mandamus where (1) the record did not disclose Williams Island's
clear legal right to the same in that a genuine dispute existed as to
whether Morse Diesel's claim of lien had expired by operation of
law; (2) Williams Island had another adequate legal remedy to
procure the release of these funds; and (3) Morse Diesel was an
interested party to the mandamus proceeding who had not been
brought before the court.
650
To receive a writ of mandamus, "petitioner must demonstrate a clear
legalright to the performance of a ministerial duty by the respondent and that
no other adequate remedy exists., 651 The court found that "Williams Island
did not establish a clear legal right to [a] mandamus where the clerk's
answer.., and defenses created a genuine issue of fact about whether
Morse['s] ... claim of lien had expired and/or been satisfied. 652 Moreover,
"Williams did not allege in its complaint that it had no adequate remedy at
law. ' 65 3 Just because Williams was unsuccessful in getting the bond reduced
did not signify such remedies were inadequate.
654
The court also held that the writ should not have been entered when
"Morse Diesel was an interested party ... but was given no notice and
opportunity to-be heard on the issues."655 In addition, it was an abuse of
discretion to grant the writ to release the cash bond when the funds were in
646. Id.
647. Id.
648. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 713.24(4) (1997)).
649. Id. at 312.
650. Morse Diesel, 698 So. 2d at 312.
651. Id. See also Pino v. District Court of Appeal, 604 So. 2d 1232, 1233 (Fla.
1992).
652. Morse Diesel, 698 So. 2d at 312.
653. Id.
654. Id.
655. Id.
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656dispute between the parties in another pending action. The lower court
should have required Williams Island to redeposit disbursed proceeds of the
cash bond.657
Robinson v. Sterling Door & Window Co.658 The issue before the court
was "whether the trial court erred when applying section 55.10(1) Florida
Statutes to Appellee [Sterling's] judgment lien on Appellant [Robinson's]
realty.
, , 59
The trial court determined that Sterling Door had a valid lien on
Robinson's property. 66  Robinson claimed the lien was defective because
Sterling's address was lacking as required per section 55.10(1) of the
Florida Statutes.6 6 1 The trial court held the statute was satisfied since the
names of the attorneys involved were included in the judgment lien. 662
Section 55.10 of the Florida Statutes specifically recognized: "'[a]
judgment, order, or decree does not become a lien on real estate unless the
address of the person who has a lien as a result of such judgment... is
contained in the judgment.' ' '663 Since courts must give effect to statutory
language, the appellee's address must be on the judgment lien. 664 Without
the address, there was no lien on Robinson's real estate.
Wolf v. Spariosu.665 This court reversed final summary judgment of
foreclosure which declared the Wolf Group's lien to be superior to the
interests of all appellees except Maysonet Landscape Company's claim of
lien.6 66 The court agreed with Wolf Group that its mortgage gained priority
over Maysonet through the doctrine of equitable subrogation or conventional
subrogation.667
Maysonet and Spariosu entered into a contract for landscaping materials
and services for the property. 668 Maysonet filed and duly recorded a claim of
lien. At that time, two existing mortgages were recorded on the property.
669
A few months later, Spariosu executed a note and mortgage to City First
656. Id.at 313.
657. Morse Diesel, 698 So. 2d at 313.
658. 698 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
659. Id. at 571.
660. Id.
661. Id. See also FLA. STAT. § 55.10 (1997).
662. Id.
663. Robinson, 698 So. 2d at 571 (emphasis omitted) (quoting FLA. STAT. § 55.10
(1997)).
664. Id.
665. 706 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
666. Id. at 882.
667. Id.
668. Id. at 882.
669. Id.
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Mortgage Corp. Two prerequisites existed for the loan to Spariosu. First,
the proceeds from City First's loan "were to be used.., for the purpose of
satisfying the two previously recorded mortgages." 670 Second, "City First's
mortgage would be substituted in the place of [the] two prior mortgages." 671
City's mortgage was later assigned to the Wolf Group.
"Maysonet sued the borrowers... and recorded its notice of lis
pendens." 672 When the borrowers defaulted on City's loan, Wolf Group
sought to foreclose the mortgage, and Maysonet was later named as a
defendant in the complaint. "The lower court.., entered a final judgment of
mortgage foreclosure finding the Wolf Group's interest... superior to the
interests of all defendants except Maysonet." 6Y3 Subrogation is defined as:
"substitution of one person to the position of another with reference
to a legal claim or right .... Th[is] doctrine is generally invoked
when one person has satisfied the obligations of another and equity
compels that the person discharging the debt stand in the shoes of
the person whose claim has been discharged, thereby succeeding to
the rights and priorities of the original creditor."674
This court found that "under the doctrine of conventional subrogation,
the Wolf Group's lien should have been.., superior to Maysonet's lien."
675
Evidence showed that "the borrowers had an agreement with... City First
for City First's mortgaze to be substituted in the place of the two prior...
satisfied mortgages." 6  "Conventional subrogation" is defined by the
following:
"'[It] arises by virtue of an agreement, express or implied, that a
third person or one having no previous interest in the matter
involved shall, upon discharging an obligation or paying a debt, be
substituted in the place of the creditor with respect to such rights,
remedies, or securities as [the creditor] may have against the
debtor."'
677
670. Wolf, 706 So. 2d at 882.
671. Id.
672. Id.
673. Id. at 883.
674. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Eastern Nat'l Bank v. Glendale Fed. Says. &
Loan Ass'n, 508 So. 2d 1323, 1324 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1987)).
675. Wolf, 706 So. 2d at 884.
676. Id. at 884.
677. Id. at 883 (quoting Forman v. First Nat'l Bank, 79 So. 742 (1918) (quoting Kent
v. Bailey, 164 N.W. 852, 853 (Iowa 1917))).
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The court concluded that the Wolf Group's lien was entitled topriority
over Maysonet's lien under the doctrine of conventional subrogation.
67/
Zalay v. Ace Cabinets of Clearwater, Inc.679 The court affirmed final
judgment in a construction lien action filed by subcontractors and
materialmen. 68 Evidence supported the trial court's decision that all but one
of the claims were valid and timely and created liens against the property.681
In 1992, Zalay contracted with Charles Walker Corporation to build a
home for $360,000. Eventually, Zalay had to make only one final payment
in the amount of $45,267.07. Although most of the work was completed on
the home "[s]everal of the subcontractors and materialmen remained
unpaid."68  Three lienors recorded claims totaling about $31,000 and
"Artistic Surfaces ... presented an untimely claim for $2,600. ' 683
The issue before the court was "whether the language of section 713.06
[of the Florida Statutes] permits the attorneys' fees and costs ultimately
awarded under section 713.29 to become a lien against the property. ' 684 The
court concluded "that the limitation in section 713.06(3)(h) is intended to
define the extent of the lien for the lienor's materials or services prior to
litigation, and is not intended to preclude a lien for costs and attorneys' fees
in a lien foreclosure action. ' 685 The court found it important to examine
section 713.06(1). 686 This statute provides:
A materialman or laborer, either of whom is not in privity with the
owner, or a subcontractor... who complies with the provisions of
this part and is subject to the limitations thereof, has a lien on the
real property improved for any money that is owed to him for
labor.
687
There is nothing in this statute that expressly provides a lien for attorneys'
fees and costs.
6 8
Construction lien statutes should not be liberally construed in favor of
any person.689 "[A]ttorneys' fees awarded under section 713.29 are not an
678. Id. at 884.
679. 700 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
680. Id. at 16.
681. Id.
682. Id.
683. Id. at 17.
684. Zalay, 700 So. 2d at 17.
685. Id.
686. Id.
687. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 713.06(1) (1993)).
688. Id.
689. Zalay, 700 So. 2d at 17.
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element of damages, but are 'taxed as part of... costs. ' 690 The court saw
"no reason why the costs involved in a construction lien action should not be
included within the lien.
691
Legislative changes to Chapter255 of the Florida Statutes include, but
are not limited to, the following:
With respect to public lands and property, section 255.05(2)(a) now
provides that where a claimant is no longer furnishing labor on a project, "a
contractor, or [its] agent or attorney may elect to shorten the prescribed
time.., within which an action to enforce any claim against a payment
bond" may be made. 69  This may be done by filing a "NOTICE OF
CONTEST OF CLAIM AGAINST PAYMENT BOND."693 The form and
procedure for such are set out in the above referenced statute.694
Legislative changes to Chapter 713 of the Florida Statutes include, but
are not limited to, the following:
Section 713.01(12) is amended to include in the definition of
"[i]mprove" a provision for solid waste collection or disposal on the site of
the improvement. 695  Likewise, the definitions for "[i]mprovement",
"[s]ubcontractor," and "[s]ub-subcontractor" have been amended to reflect
the same.
696
Section 713.23(1)(e) has been amended to provide a shortening of time
697for a contractor to claim against a payment bond. This statute provides for
a form for filing a "NOTICE OF CONTEST OF CLAIM AGAINST
PAYMENT BOND." 69 8 Comparatively, section 713.235(1) provides for a
form for a "[w]aiver of right... against the payment bond."6 9
690. Id. at 18 (quoting Ceco Corp. v. Goldberg, 219 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1969)).
691. Id.
692. Act of May 22, 1998, ch. 98-135, § 1, 1998 Fla. Laws 913, 914 (to be codified
at FLA. STAT. § 255.05(2)(a)1).
693. Id.
694. Id.
695. Act of May 22, 1998, ch. 98-135, § 2, 1998 Fla. Laws 917, 917 (amending FLA.
STAT. § 713.01(12)).
696. Act of May 22, 1998, ch. 98-135, § 2, 1998 Fla. Laws 917, 917 (amending FLA.
STAT. § 713.01(13), (26), (27)).
697. Act of May 22, 1998, ch. 98-135, § 6, 1998 Fla. Laws 920, 921 (amending FLA.
STAT. § 713.23(l)(e)).
698. Id.
699. Act of May 22, 1998, ch. 98-135, § 7, 1998 Fla. Laws 921, 921 (to be codified
at FLA. STAT. § 713.235).
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XV. MORTGAGES
Alafaya Square Ass'n. v Great Western Bank .700 The court granted
appellee's motion for rehearing of the opinion dated February 7, 1997.0
This opinion was entered in place of the previous one. 02 The court reversed
the trial court's order appointing a receiver because "there was no showing
that Alafaya wasted or impaired the.., real property. 70 3 Alafaya owned a
shopping center "encumbered by a mortgage in favor of the appellee, WHC-
One."7  If there was a default on the mortgage, Alafaya agreed to have a
receiver appointed. After the loan matured, Alafaya did in fact default on
payment, and WJHC-One ("WHC") sued to foreclose and requested the
appointment of a receiver.
°70
The trial court granted WHC's motion to sequester the rents received
from the shopping center's tenants.7°  All rent collected was placed in
escrow, and Alafaya could not expend funds from the account without the
court's approval. Alafaya requested use of escrow funds from WHC to do
repairs, but after Alafaya received no response, it requested permission from
the trial court to expend the funds.70 7 Alafaya later requested WHC's
consent to withdraw escrow funds for payment of real estate taxes. 708 WHC
again failed to answer. In response to Alafaya's request for funds to repair,
"WHC filed a motion for appointment of receiver alleging an 'apparent
waste to the property."'
7°9
The trial court granted WHC's motion for the appointment of a
receiver, and Alafaya appealed arguing that evidence failed to show Alafaya
wasted or impaired the property. 10 "The appointment of a receiver in a
foreclosure action is not a matter of right.., it is an extraordinary
remedy.71' The receiver's role "is to preserve the value of the secured
property. ' 12 The trial court can appoint a receiver, but it can only do so if
700. 700 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
701. Id. at 39.
702. Id.
703. Id.
704. Id.
705. Alafaya Square, 700 So. 2d at 39.
706. Id.
707. Id.
708. Id.
709. Id.
710. Alafaya Square, 700 So. 2d at 40.
711. Id. (citing Barnett Bank of Alachua County v. Steinberg, 632 So. 2d 233, 234
(Fla. 1st Dist, Ct. App. 1994)).
712. Id. (citing Barnett Bank of Alachua County v. Steinberg, 632 So. 2d 233, 235
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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evidence suggests the secured property was being wasted or subject to
serious risk of loss*713
The appellate court agreed that "the evidence... [did] not constitute
waste or impairment."714 The only waste could be "the disrepair to the
parking lot and the exterior paint."715 Alafaya took timely action to get
WHC to release the funds. As such, there could be no waste since the failure
to repair was due to WHC's refusal to release the funds.7 16 The court
717
reversed because the facts did not justify the remedy of receivership.
Beach v. Ocwen Federal Bank.718 In 1986, the appellants, the Beaches,
"refinanced their Florida house in 1986 with a loan from Great Western
Bank."71 9 In 1991, the appellants stopped making their mortgage payment,
and in 1992 Great Western began this foreclosure proceeding. The
appellants "acknowledged their default but raised affirmative defenses,
alleging... that the bank's failure to make disclosures required by the Truth
in Lending Act gave them the right under 15 U.S.C. § 1635 to rescind the
mortgage agreement. 72' The appellee, Ocwen, argued that the right to
rescind expired since Section 1635(f) of the United States Code provides
that the right of rescission shall expire three years after the closing of the
722loan. However, the appellants argued the three years provision only
pertains to the actual affirmative right of rescission and that there is no
statute of limitations or expiration of permitting rescission by a recoupment
defense.723 The trial court, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, and the
Supreme Court of Florida rejected that defense, holding that the right to
rescind expired' in three years under the plain language of section
7241635(f). The United States Supreme Court affirmed the decision made by
all of the courts below.
725
The purpose of the Act is "'to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit
terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various
713. Id. (citing Atco Constr. & Dev. Corp. v. Beneficial Say. Bank, 523 So. 2d 747,
750 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1988)).
714. Id.
715. Alafaya Square, 700 So. 2d at 40.
716. Id.
717. Id. at 41.
718. 118 S. Ct. 1408 (1998).
719. Id. at 1408.
720. Id.
721. Id.
722. Id.
723. Ocwen, 118 S. Ct. at 1409.
724. Beach v. Great W. Bank, 692 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 1997); Beach v. Great W. Bank,
670 So. 2d 986 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996); see 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f) (1994).
725. Ocwen, 118 S. Ct. at 1411.
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credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit, and to
protect the consumer against inaccurate and unfair credit billing and credit
card practices.' ''726 The Act gives the borrower a right to rescind without
being liable for any finance or other charge; however, this right expires three
years "'after the date of consummation of the transaction or upon the sale of
the property, whichever occurs first.' ',727 The Supreme Court held that the
Act does not give the borrower a right of rescission as an affirmative defense
after this three-year period.728
The Court stated the question to decide was "whether [section] 1635(f)
is a statute of limitation, that is, 'whether [it] operates, with the lapse of
time, to extinguish the right which is the foundation for the claim' or 'merely
to bar the remedy for its enforcement.' ' ,729 The Court held that "the answer
is apparent from the plain language of [section] 1635(f). 73° The Court
stated that section 1635(f) states nothing about the time period in bringing an
action, but instead speaks only to when the right of rescission terminates;
therefore, the Supreme Court held the right was meant to be limited,731 and it
732
affirmed the judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida.
Blatchley v. Boatman's National Mortgage, Inc.733 The appellate court
affirmed an order denying Blatchley's motion to vacate the foreclosure sale
of his home. 3  The summary final judgment in foreclosure stated the sale
date was January 9, 1997. Boatman's moved for an order changing the
sale date to January 7, because the ninth was a "scrivener's error" and
because the published notice of foreclosure sale contained the correct date of
736 737January 7, 1997.  The court granted the date change.
However, Blatchley failed to get notice of the new sale date until a day
after the actual sale took place.738 In addition, Blatchley only got Boatman's
motion to change the date on January 10, 1997.739 Blatchley sought to
726. Id. at 1409-10 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (1994)); see Mourning v. Family
Publications Serv., 411 U.S. 356, 363-68 (1973).
727. Beach, 118 S. Ct. at 1410 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1635(0 (1994)).
728. Id.
729. Id. at 1412 (quoting Midstate Horticultural Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 320 U.S.
356, 358-59 & n.4 (1943)).
730. Id. at 1412. See Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402, 409 (1993).
731. Beach, 118 S. Ct. at 1412.
732. Id. at 1413.
733. 706 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
734. Id. at 317.
735. Id.
736. Id.
737. Id.
738. Blatchley, 706 So. 2d at 317.
739. Id.
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vacate the sale, since he never got proper notice of the correct sale date. As
such, he could not exercise his right of redemption or reinstatement and
could not participate in the sale or protect his property interest. 740 "The trial
court denied the motion to vacate the sale," but gave Blatchley fifteen days
from the order date to pay the judgment amount.741 Instead of taking
advantage of the increased redemption period that was offered, Blatchley
filed a notice of appeal. 742
Section 45.031 of the Florida Statutes requires that a "final judgment of
foreclosure specify a day for the sale and that the notice of the sale be
published for two weeks, the second of which publication 'shall be at least 5
days before the sale." 743 This statute was not satisfied. However, even
though Blatchley did not receive proper notice, the court remedied the error
by extending the redemption period.744 "Foreclosure suits are governed by
equitable principles." 745- The trial court "did equity" by extending the
redemption period.746 "[N]othing [would] be accomplished by reversing for
a new judgment and sale date."
74
Clearman v. Dalton.748 Clearman recovered a judgment for $150,000
against Dalton. Dalton filed for bankruptcy and revealed two secured
mortgages against his homestead. The first was in favor of his son in the
amount of $15,000, and the second was in favor of Monticello Bank for
$50,000.749 The mortgage in favor of the son was never recorded, and the
bank's mortgage was recorded but not delivered.75o "The trustee...
obtained an order from the Bankruptcy Court avoiding the mortgages, thus,~ ,751
preserving the avoided obligations 'for the benefit of the estate."' 51 The
trustee assigned the mortgages to the Clearmans who recorded the
assignment and judenents avoiding the mortgages and preserving the
avoided obligations.
The trial court denied the foreclosure petition filed by Clearman.753 The
appellate court agreed with the trial court that section 544 of chapterll of
740. Id. at 318.
741. Id. at 317-18.
742. Id. at 318.
743. Blatchley, 706 So. 2d at 318 (quoting FLA. STAT. 45.031 (1997)).
744. Id.
745. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 702.01 (1995)).
746. Id.
747. Id.
748. 708 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
749. Id. at 325.
750. Id.
751. Id.
752. Id.
753. Clearman, 708 So. 2d at 325.
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the United States Code did "not place the Trustee (or the Trustee's
assignees) in the place of the former mortgagees with the power to
foreclose. ' 754 The court believed the bankruptcy estate had an assignable
interest in the mortgage subject to Dalton's homestead claim.755
The assignees could assert their interest and require Dalton to establish
"fact of homestead. 756 Filing of judgments entered by the Bankruptcy Court
did not constitute slander of title. 57 When the Daltons "filed their
bankruptcy petition and submitted their property, subject to provable
exemptions," they could not complain "if the assignee of the estate's interest
requires that they prove entitlement to the homestead exemption."
758
Crane v. Barnett Bank.759 The court affirmed an amended final
judgment as to the terms of rescission of the mortgage agreement, except as
to the effective date the rate of interest charged to the borrower should
run. 76  The court reversed the denial of the borrower's motion for partial
summary judgment on liability and vacated the provision for foreclosure of
the subject mortgage if the borrower failed to satisfy the conditions for
rescission within 45 days.
76
'
"The bank sued for foreclosure when a construction loan matured and
the borrower's wife refused to sign a modification of [their] mortgage
agreement., '762 The borrower "had not defaulted under the construction loan
phase of the agreement" since the borrower's payments had been refused,
thus "preventing [such] borrower from performing under the agreement. ' 763
The borrower's bank had no written agreement that required the wife's
signature on the mortgage.7 4 In addition, the bank's allegations of liability
against the borrower did not include the wife's refusal to sign a mortgage
modification.765
On appeal, borrower claimed the trial judge erred in denying his motion
for summary judgment because the borrower had offered to make payments
but was refused.766 "The trial court should have granted the borrower's
754. Id.
755. Id.
756. Id.
757. Id.
758. Clearman, 708 So. 2d at 325.
759. 698 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
760. Id. at 905.
761. Id. at 905-06.
762. Id. at 903.
763. Id.
764. Crane, 698 So. 2d at 903.
765. Id.
766. Id. at 904.
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motion for partial summary judgment. 767 "[T]he bank's complaint... did
not include allegations that the borrower defaulted by failing to have his wife
sign the mortgage modification.[768 "IT]he sole basis for default was the
borrower's failure to pay the mortgage. ' 769 As such, no material issue of fact
on the question of liability for foreclosure existed.
The second issue on appeal was "whether the trial court's order
allowing rescission 'ab initio' of the parties' mortgage agreement properly
restored each party to status quo." 770 "[Tihe trial court erred in assessing two
different rates of interest as a condition for rescission of the parties'
agreement 'ab initio."' 77
1
[Since] there was only one integrated mortgage agreement... and
its nullification is "ab initio," the borrower should not be penalized
with a higher rate of interest if it was the bank's own refusal to
accept payments that led to recission, simply because the mortgage
agreement provided for two phases of the loan.772
The appellate court found no error in the imposition of a "costs of
funds" rate of interest and payment required by the borrower as a cost of
rescission.773 It had "no record establishing the basis for foreclosure within
45 days if the borrower fails to make rescission as required in the amended
final judgment."774
Since the trial court "erred in denying the borrower's motion for partial
summary judgment on the bank's action for foreclosure," the bank had "no
basis for foreclosure under the mortgage agreement of the parties even if the
borrower [could not] restore the bank to status quo in 45 days. ' 775
"'[F]oreclosure on an accelerated basis may be denied where.., payment
was not made due to... excusable neglect, coupled with some conduct of
the mortgagee which in a measure contributed to the failure to pay when
due."' 776  Acceleration of the balance and foreclosure of the mortgage
agreement was declared premature on this record.777
767. Id.
768. Id.
769. Crane, 698 So. 2d at 904.
770. Id.
771. Id.
772. Id. at 904.
773. Id. at 904-05.
774. Crane, 698 So. 2d at 904.
775. Id. at 905.
776. Id. (quoting Campbell v. Werner, 232 So. 2d 252, 256-57 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1970) (citing Lunn Woods v. Lowery, 577 So. 2d 705 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991))).
777. Id.
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778Culpepper v. Inland Mortgage Corp. The issue on appeal was
"whether a mortgage lender's payment of a 'yield spread premium' to a
mortgage broker violates the antikickback provision of the Real Estate
Settlement Procedures Act" ("RESPA"). 779  780
Inland gave Culpepper a federally insured home mortgage loan
However, rather than dealing direct with Inland, Culpepper dealt only with
the mortgage broker, Premiere Mortgage Company.7 "On December 7,
1995, Premiere received a rate sheet from Inland and informed the
Culpeppers that a 30-year loan was available at a 7.5% interest rate. 782
Culpepper accepted the rate. However, Culpepper did not know that the rate
"was higher than Inland's par rate on [the] 30-year loans and carried a yield
spread premium of 1.675% of the loan amount. 783 Also, Culpepper did not
know that, as a result of the spread, Inland would be paying Premiere the
premium for the higher rate, even though Culpepper paid Premiere a loan
origination fee for its assisting them in obtaining and closing their loan.
Once having discovered this, Culpepper challenged "the legitimacy of
Inland's yield spread premium payment under RESPA. 784
Noting that no federal circuit court has addressed this issue and the
federal district courts that have addressed it are divided, the Eleventh Circuit
785Court of Appeals presented its own analysis. In so doing, it determined
that the yield spread premium under these facts was a nonexempt referral fee
violating RESPA section 2607(a).786
The court's analysis began with the statutory prohibitions and
787
exemptions. Chapter 12, section 2607(a) of the United States Code
prohibits kickbacks and referral fees pursuant to an agreement regarding
788federally related mortgages. Section 2607(c) exempts from that
prohibition payment for goods or services actually performed.*
The first question was whether the payment to Premiere was a referral
fee. The court noted that it would constitute such if "(1) a payment of a
thing of value is (2) made pursuant to an agreement to refer settlement
778. 132 F.3d 692 (1 lth Cir. 1998).
779. Id. at 694 (citation omitted); see also 12 U.S.C. § 2601 (1994).
780. Culpepper, 132 F.3d at 694.
781. Id.
782. Id.
783. Id.
784. Id.
785. Culpepper, 132 F.3d at 695; see 12 U.S.C. § 2607(a) (1994).
786. Culpepper, 132 F.3d at 696.
787. Id.
788. 12 U.S.C. § 2607(a) (1994)
789. Culpepper, 132 F.3d at 696 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 2607(c) (1994)).
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business and (3) a referral actually occurs. '79° Here, Inland gave Premiere
value by paying the spread premium. The payment was pursuant to an
agreement to refer settlement business because the premium was to be paid
for Premiere's registering loans with Inland which funded the loans. There
was an actual referral when Premiere registered the loan with Inland.791
The next question was whether section 2607(c) exempted the
transaction as a payment for goods or services. As to whether there was a
payment for goods, the appellate court noted this was not satisfied since
Inland funded the loan from the beginning. 792 It was not one owned by
Premiere and subsequently sold to Inland, as might be done with loans sold
in the permitted secondary mortgage market sales. The court noted that even
if Premiere were selling to Inland its right to direct the loan's disposition to a
number of wholesale lenders, such would not be an exempt sale of goods,
because 7aying a referral fee for "directing" the business violates
RESPA.7 9 Therefore, the premium did not fit the sale of goods
. 794
exemption.
As to whether the premium was paid for Premiere's services, the
appellate court first looked at the services Premiere provided Culpepper,
obtaining and closing the loan.795 It found that the facts clearly showed
796Culpepper had already paid Premiere for these services. It also identified
logically that the premium for Premiere's generating a higher loan rate was
not a service to Culpepper.797 So, the premium could not be for a service to
Culpepper.
798
Next, the court examined whether the premium was for a service to
Inland.799 However, there was no additional service to Inland. The premium
was based solely on the higher interest rate. s°° Because Premiere provided
no additional service to Inland over what it would have provided with a loan
of a lower rate, the payment did not fit the sale of services exemption.01
Having found the transaction violated RESPA's prohibitions, the court
reversed and remanded to the district court noting that the market value test
utilized by the trial court was inappropriate, since that test applies only to
790. Id. at 695-96.
791. Id. at 696.
792. Id.
793. Id.
794. Culpepper, 132 F.3d at 697.
795. Id. at 696-97.
796. Id. at 696.
797. Id. at 697.
798. Id.
799. Culpepper, 132 F.3d at 697.
800. Id.
801. Id.
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facially permissible transactions, and it directed the trial court to consider ab
initio Culpepper's motion for class certification.
80 2
Dove v. McCormick80 3 This court affirmed the trial court's order
granting final summary judgment in favor of McCormick.804 Dove executed
a mortgage in favor of The First, F.A. that encumbered Orange County real
property. 05  The transaction was subject to Truth in Lending Act
requirements. Later on, The First was declared "troubled," and the
Resolution Trust Corporation ("RTC") was appointed receiver to liquidate• , 806 ,,
The First's assets. RTC assigned Dove's mortgage to Blazer Financial
Services," which later assigned the mortgage to John McCormick.8°7 Since
Dove failed to make monthly payments, McCormick sued to foreclose.08
"The trial court entered final summary judgment [in McCormick's
favor], concluding that Dove's [posed] defenses pertaining to rescission and
recoupment were barred by the statute of limitations." 809 "Dove sought to
assert her statutory right to rescission based upon alleged violations of
[Truth in Lending Act] and Regulation Z."810  Dove also argued for
recoupment under section 1640(e)." The appellate court affirmed the trial
court's ruling in denying Dove's claim of recission because "'under Florida
law, an action for statutory right of rescission pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1635
may not be revived as a defense in recoupment beyond the three-year
expiration period contained in section 1635(f).' 8 12
Section 1635(f) provides "when the right and the remedy are created by
the same statute, the limitations of the remedy are treated as limitations of
the right. '8 13 Dove may not seek the remedy of recission under the guise of
an affirmative defense of recoupment as a means of getting around the three
year statute of limitations. 14
Floyd v. Federal National Mortgage Ass'n. 15  Floyd "appeal[ed] a
post-judgment final order denying [the] 'Motion to Vacate Final Judgment
802. Id. at 697.
803. 698 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
804. Id. at 586.
805. Id.
806. Id.
807. Id.
808. Dove, 698 So. 2d at 586.
809. Id.
810. Id. at 587.
811. Id.
812. Id. at 588 (quoting Beach v. Great W. Bank, 692 So. 2d 146, 153 (Fla. 1997)).
813. Dove, 698 So. 2d at 588.; see Beach, 692 So. 2d at 152 (quoting Bowery v.
Babbit, 128 So. 801, 806 (Fla. 1930)).
814. Dove, 698 So. 2d at 588; Culpepper, 132 F.3d at 695-96.
815. 704 So. 2d I 110 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
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and Set Aside Foreclosure Sale."' 816 Federal National filed a complaint
seeking to foreclose upon a first mortgage against Pamela Johnson. 1 The
mortgage encumbering the home was executed by Pamela and her then
husband, Vernon Floyd, in the original principal amount of $11,000. After
their divorce and Pamela's subsequent death, Vernon resided within the
home with the children, and the mortgage went into default with the
remaining balance of $3,045.96.818
Personal service of the complaint could not be made "because the
sheriff's process server could not locate the property." 81 9 The death of
Pamela was never confirmed. Federal National filed an amended complaint
naming Pamela Johnson or her heirs as defendant. Afterwards, Federal
National filed an Affidavit of Constructive Service alleging that the heirs
could not be found after diligent search. 820
After a second letter was sent to Vernon "specifying the amount
necessary to reinstate the mortgage," the trial court entered final summary
821judgment in favor of Federal National. Vernon was notified to vacate the
premises after the foreclosure sale. The trial court denied Vernon's motion
to set aside the sale.822 The appellate court agreed with Vernon that Federal
National failed to conduct a diligent search.
82Y
Prior to constructive notice, a plaintiff must first file an affidavit
showing "that a diligent search has been made to discover the names and
addresses of the defendants." 82 4 In this case, Federal National's affidavit
stated that the Social Security Administration database was searched for
probate records and vital statistics without success. 825 The records did
826
confirm that Pamela Johnson was deceased. Federal National did not
locate the property, inquire into those in possession of the property, or talk
with neighbors, relatives, or friends.
827
Federal National's failure to pursue Vernon after his previous inquiries
about reinstating the mortgage shows that Federal National never
816. Id. at 1111.
817. Id.
818. Id.
819. Id.
820. Floyd, 704 So. 2d at 1111.
821. Id.
822. Id. at 1111-12.
823. Id. at 1112.
824. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. §§ 49.03(1), .041(1), .071 (1995)).
825. Floyd, 704 So. 2d at 1112.
826. Id.
827. Id.
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"reasonably employ[ed] the knowledge at [its] command. 828  Federal
National failed to conduct a diligent search and inquiry as required by the
constructive notice statute by completely ignoring the parties in possession
829of the premises. ,3
"Strict compliance with constructive service statutes is required. 830
The record showed a diligent effort to find the information needed in order
to accomplish personal service on those in possession of the property was
not made. 831 The appellate court believed Federal National "would have
learned additional facts necessary to accomplish personal service if someone
had found" the property and went there to see who had possession.832• • 833
Kirkland v. Miller. Kirkland appealed Final Judgment of Ejectment
awarded in favor of Sportsmen's, the "original owner of the subject real
,,834property. The trial court stated Kirkland only had "a beneficial interest
in an Illinois land trust. '835 Thus, ejectment was a proper remedy. The trial
court determined there was only a personal propert% interest, and foreclosure
836 8was unnecessary. The appellate court reversed.
Miller was a trustee with legal and equitable title to the property
identified in the trust. Sportsmen's and Mary Shearer, the principals, only
had a beneficial interest. Miller went about explaining the documents for
closing to Kirkland, which included a contract showing Sportsmen's sale of
the beneficial interest to Kirkland for $40,000.838  Kirkland executed a
security agreement which assigned the beneficial interest back to Miller as
security for the $40,000 debt recognized as a "'Purchase Money Mortgage'
and include[ed] a charge for 'State Documentary Stamps on Deed. ' 9
Kirkland was to make monthly payments for twenty years, and if default
occurred, there would be an "automatic assignment" of the entire beneficial
interest to Sportsmen's. 840  After default, Miller was to sell the trust
property, and after costs and fees were paid out, the balance of the sale
828. Id. (quoting Batchin v. Barnett Bank, 647 So. 2d 211, 213 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1994) (quoting Canzoniero v. Canzoniero, 305 So. 2d 801, 803 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1975))).
829. Id.
830. Floyd, 704 So. 2d at 1112.
831. Id.
832. Id. at 1113.
833. 702 So. 2d 620 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
834. Id. at 620.
835. Id.
836. Id.
837. Id.
838. Kirkland, 702 So. 2d at 620.
839. Id. at 621.
840. Id.
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proceeds was to be delivered to Kirkland. Kirkland believed that a mortgage
was created. s41
Pursuant to section 697.01 of the Florida Statutes, an instrument is said
to be a mortgage if, "when taken alone or in conjunction with surrounding
facts, it a pears to have been given for the purpose of securing payment of
money."8  "Whenever property belonging to one person is held by another
843
as security for [a debt], the transaction is considered a mortgage.
The transaction in this case "was not a valid Illinois land trust; it was a
mortgage securing indebtedness.'' If there were default, Kirkland's
interest in the property reverted to Sportsmen's. 8 45 As such the transaction
was deemed "a mortgage subject to the rules of foreclosure."
Najera v. Nationsbank Trust Co. 84 7 Najera "apeal[ed] from a final
summary judgment of foreclosure by NationsBank." The appellate court
reversed because it believed "issues of material fact" remained on the record
"which should not [be] disposed of by summary judgment."8 49
Najera's deposition showed that he requested a copy of the property
appraisal but never obtained it. General Development Corporation said it
would take care of the appraisal because "'no bank would loan out more
money on a loan.., than the value of the property."'850 Najera paid a fee for
the appraisal, with the understanding that it "was being done to verify the
property would provide the lending institution with sufficient collateral for
the loan." '851
The appellate court believed "the allegations and [the] record creat[ed]
issues of fact concerning whether the Najeras relied upon the existence of a
professional appraisal to support the loan values, and whether they would
have entered into this transaction had those representations not been
made. 8 52 The record here established far more than the assertion of inflated
values.
841. Id.
842. Id. (quoting Hialeah, Inc. v. Dade County, 490 So. 2d 998 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1986) (citing Cinque v. Buschlen, 442 So. 2d 1034 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983))); see
FLA. STAT. § 697.01 (1985).
843. Kirkland, 702 So. 2d at 621.
844. Id.
845. Id.
846. Id. at 622.
847. 707 So. 2d 1153 (Fla 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
848. Id. at 1154.
849. Id.
850. Id. (quoting deposition).
851. Id.
852. Najera, 707 So. 2d at 1155.
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G[eneral] D[evelopment] C[orporation] and GDV [Financial
Corporation] collectively misrepresented the value of the lot the
Najeras already owned, the value of the condo for which they were
induced to swap the lot, the fact that they were to have
conventional financing (at least a 25% equity-to-loan ratio), that
the rental market in the area was sufficiently strong to cover their
mortgage payments, that the resale market for GDC properties was
strong at the false sales prices, and that there existed and would be
provided a professional appraisal to back up the value of the
property provided to them.
The appellate court recognized that "[i]f the alleged course of
fraudulent conduct on the part of GDC and GDV [were] established at trial,
and if it is shown was reasonably relied upon by the Najeras, these proofs
could provide them with a defense to this foreclosure action. 854  855
Southeast & Associates, Inc. v. Fox Run Homeowners Ass'n. The
issue before the court was "whether the owners may set aside a foreclosure
sale [where constructive service was] based on affidavits of diligent search
and inquiry which were facially sufficient and complied with the statutory
requirements . 856
On July 1, 1995, an association assessment for semiannual maintenance
became due. Albert and Rose Love received a notice of delinquency from
the association. The notice stated that the association could file a lien
857against the home and foreclose at a later date. When the Loves failed to
pay the assessment, a lien was filed against the property. A partial payment
was made which the association returned with a notice stating that if full
.... 858
payment were not made, a foreclosure suit would be initiated.
When the association planned to foreclose, it hired a process server to
serve the Loves. The server failed to recognize that the Loves were at their
New York address and attempted numerous times to serve them at their Fox
Run address and at another Florida address said to be attributed to them.859
Since personal service was not able to be made, the association served by
publication after filing an affidavit of diligent search and an affidavit of
constructive service. Final summary judgment of foreclosure was filed
853. Id.
854. Id.
855. 704 So. 2d 694 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
856. Id. at 695.
857. Id.
858. Id.
859. Id.
860. Fox Run, 704 So. 2d at 695.
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861
against the Loves. Southeast and Associates, the successful bidder at the
foreclosure sale, received a certificate of title. In return, the Loves made a
motion "to set aside the sale based on an insufficient service of process."
862
"The trial court entered an order finding lack of diligent search and inquiry
by Fox Run Association, and [set] aside the foreclosure sale."8 63
Section 49.041 of the Florida Statutes provides that:
a person may be served by publication upon verified statement
showing on its face that [a] "diligent search and inquiry have been
made to discover the name and residence" of the [individual] being
served. If the court finds that the verified statement is defective, or
the diligent search is deficient, the court must [decide] "whether the
trial court's judgment of foreclosure would be void or voidable." 864
If voidable, a foreclosure sale resulting from constructive service cannot be
set aside as against a bona fide purchaser.
8 65
The plaintiff here followed the favored approach. It "filed a detailed
affidavit listing the [many] attempts [to deliver] personal service, the contact
with the neighbors, the two skip traces, and the trip to a retail establishment
where the process server learned that the lessee had moved out in the middle
of the night.8 66
Also, "'where one of two innocent parties must suffer a loss as the
result of the default of another, the loss shall fall on the party who is best
able to avert the loss and is the least innocent.' '' 867 The Loves did not make
the requisite maintenance payment and could have told the Association of
their move to New York. In addition, someone on the Loves' behalf kept
869signing the certified letters and made partial payments.
United Companies Lending Corp. v. Abercrombie.870 The issue
presented was whether "the circuit court abused its discretion when it
declined to set aside a mortgage foreclosure sale of real property. 8 71 The
861. Id. at 695.
862. Id. at 696.
863. Id.
864. Id. (quoting Batchin v. Barnett Bank, 647 So. 2d 211, 213 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1994)).
865. Fox Run, 704 So. 2d at 696.
866. Id.
867. Id. at 697 (quoting Jones v. Lally, 511 So. 2d 1014, 1016 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1987)).
868. Id.
869. Id.
870. 713 So. 2d 1017 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
871. Id. at 1018.
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appellate court held that the circuit court was mistaken in its view of what its
scope of discretion is in such a matter.
872
United Companies Lending Corporation sued to foreclose its mortgage
on a residence owned by the appellee. "The circuit court entered a final
judgment... and scheduled a foreclosure sale to be held at the Sarasota
County Courthouse." 873 United's counsel agreed to attend the sale, but due
to an illness in the attorney's family, United sent another attorney to
appear. That attorney arrived early for the foreclosure sale at the wrong
courthouse, and only five minutes before the sale, the clerk informed him
that the sale was to be held in Sarasota. The clerk in Sarasota declined to
delay the bidding. By the time another attorney arrived, the property had
been sold to Darrell Crane for $1,000.874
United filed an objection to the sale and a motion to have the sale set
aside on the grounds that there was a "gross inadequacy of price and the
mistaken failure of its agent to attend.' 8 " Evidence at the hearing proved
that the property was worth over $125,000.00 and that United was going to
876bid as high as $181,898.82. Crane testified that he would have bid up to
$115,000.00.877
The circuit court found that the price paid for the property at the sale
878
was grossly disproportionate. However, it denied United's motion
because the court found that the "inadequate price resulted from the
unilateral mistake of United's [counsel], and not from any mistake,
misconduct or irregularity on the part of ... anyone else who participated in
the sale."876 The circuit court cited Wells Fargo Credit Corp. v. Martin
880
881 882
and Sulkowski v. Sulkowski  for authority. The appellate court decided
the circuit court mistakenly believed that this appellate court, unlike the third
and fourth districts, determined that the mistake cannot be a unilateral
mistake by the complaining party. 83 However, the law of this appellate
district does not differ from the other districts and follows the holding in Arlt
v. Buchanan.884 In Arlt, the general rule that came about was
872. Id.
873. Id.
874. Id
875. Abercrombie, 713 So. 2d at 1018.
876. Id.
877. Id.
878. Id.
879. Id.
880. 605 So. 2d 531 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
881. 561 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
882. Abercrombie, 713 So. 2d at 1018.
883. Id. at 1018-19.
884. Id. (citing Arlt v. Buchanan, 190 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 1966)).
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that standing alone mere inadequacy of price is not a ground for
setting aside a judicial sale. But where the inadequacy is gross and
is shown to result from any mistake, accident, surprise, fraud,
misconduct, or irregularity upon the part of either the purchaser or
other person connected with the sale, with resulting injustice to. the
complaining party, equity will act to prevent the wrong result. 885-
This court did not construe "person connected with the sale" to mean that it
had to be a person who was physically present at the sale."' So, the circuit
court mistakenly read this court's past opinions to the contrary. 887
Whether the complaining party has made the showing necessary to set
aside a foreclosure sale is a discretionary decision that may be reversed only
when the court has grossly abused its discretion. The court found that in
the present case, the circuit court's discretion was restricted by a mistaken
understanding of the law in this district and reversed and remanded for
reconsideration.889 The court stated no opinion as to the balance of equities
in this case, but stated that, in one set of circumstances, "the fact that the
inadequate sale price was caused by the complaining party's own mistake
might tip the balance of equities in favor of the successful bidder; in another
case, it might not.' 8 °
XVI. OPTIONS AND RIGHTS OF FIRST REFUSAL
Holloway v. Gutman. 89  The evidence presented was that the parties
had a three-year lease with a purchase option. When that lease was about to
expire, they negotiated a renewal. The landlord tendered a copy of the
original with the term "whited-out." 892 They never did expressly agree to a
particular length. The tenant testified that he thought it would be for another
three years, but the landlord testified that the tenant had said that he simply
did not care; so they never reached an exact length. Because the option
lacked an essential term so it was not complete, there was no meeting of the
minds. There was no contract, oral or written.893
885. ArIt v. Buchanan, 190 So. 2d 575, 577 (Fla. 1966) (citations omitted).
886. Abercrombie, 713 So. 2d at 1019.
887. Id. at 1018.
888. Id.; see RSR Investments, Inc. v. Barnett Bank, 647 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1994).
889. Abercrombie, 713 So. 2d at 1019-20.
890. Id. at 1019.
891. 707 So. 2d 356 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
892. Id. at 358.
893. Id.
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894Pomares v. J. Krantz Enterprises, Inc. The purchase option for a
business included the building and land where it was located. The price was
to be the fair market value. If the parties could not agree on the value, then it
would be set by a licensed appraiser. If the parties could not agree on an
appraiser, then each was to select a licensed appraiser, and their appraisals
were to be averaged. The trial court found this option to be enforceable and
the seller appealed. 89' The Third District Court of Appeal reversed. 896 It
apparently had no difficulty with the price, but held that the option was
unenforceably vague and indefinite because it failed to specify the terms or
time of payment.
8 7
XVII. RIPARIAN RIGHTS
Lee v. Williams.898  This court resolved the issue of whether the
appellant had a "right to construct a boatlift" by looking at which neighbor
"owns the nonnavigable tidelands of Florida."899
[The two neighbors'] lots are contiguous. The westerly boundary
of the Williams' lot [Lot 13,] is defined as the centerline of
Butler's Branch, a small waterway shown on the plat of Butler's
Replat. [The] northern boundary of [the Lees' lot, Lot 12,] is
Julington Creek, a navigable body of water. The waters of Butler's
Branch and Julington Creek join at the northwest end of the Lees'
property-9°
In 1960, the owner of Lot 13 excavated a navigable canal to run through
and across Lot 13, and through and across the conflux of Butler's Branch
and Julington Creek and into Julington Creek.9°' In 1961, when the
Williams purchased Lot 13, the canal had been excavated. In 1961, if the
boatlift had been erected "where it is today, it would have been o[ver] dry
,,902land. Over the years, the canal bank eroded toward the common
boundary line, and in the 1980's, the owner of Lot 12 constructed a bulkhead
along the then existing bank of the canal. Surveys show that a great portion
894. 711 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
895. Id. at 616.
896. Id.
897. Id.
898. 711 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
899. Id. at 57.
900. Id. at 57-58.
901. Id. at 58.
902. Id.
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903
of this bulkhead was built on Lot 13. In 1993, the Lees purchased Lot 12
and, without the Williams' knowledge, sometime in 1994 constructed a boat
lift "in the canal adjoining the previously constructed bulkhead. The boat
lift is located entirely within Lot 13" and the Williams, upon, discovering
this, protested its construction.9m
The issue that this court looked at was "whether the canal, which
traverses nonnavigable tidelands within the Williams' lot, is privately owned
by [the Williams] or whether it is sovereignty land available for public
use."905 The trial court found that Clement v. Watson
9 6 was dispositive.907
In Clement, the court found that Watson was able to exclude Clement from
fishin& privileges in a cove surrounded by property owned by Watson's
wife.9 The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the basis of the decision in
Clement when it defined navigable waters and emphasized that waters are
not navigable merely because they are affected by the tides.
909
The court distinguished between sovereignty and privately owned lands
as follows:
The shore of navigable waters which the sovereign holds .for public
uses is the land that borders on navigable waters and lies between
ordinary high and ordinary low water mark. This does not include
lands that do not immediately border on the navigable waters, and
that are covered by water not capable of navigation for useful
public purposes, such as mud flats, shallow inlets, and lowlands
covered more or less by water permanently or at intervals, where
the waters thereon are not in their ordinary state useful for public
navigation. Lands not covered by navigable waters and not
included in the shore space between ordinary high and low water
marks immediately bordering on navigable waters are the subjects
of private ownership, at least when the public rights of navigation,
etc., are not thereby unlawfully impaired. 910
The court concluded in Clement that the majority of states, including
Florida, base their determination on whether the water is navigable, and not
upon whether waters are tidal.91  The appellants, however, argued that
903. Lee, 711 So. 2d at 58.
904. Id.
905. Id.
906. 58 So. 25 (Fla. 1912).
907. Lee, 711 So. 2d at 58.
908. Clement, 58 So. at 27.
909. Lee, 711 So. 2d at 58 (citing Clement v. Watson, 58 So. 25 (Fla 1912)).
910. Id. at 59.
911. Clement, 58 So. at 26 (emphasis omitted).
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reliance on Clement was an error and that the 1988 decision by the United
Sts S e .. M912
States Supreme Court in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. ississippi,
governed. Therefore, the appellants concluded that all of Florida's tide-
lands are sovereignty lands of the state.914 In Phillips Petroleum, the United
States Supreme Court held that "Iit]he states, upon entry into the Union,
received ownership of all lands under waters subject to the ebb and flow of
the tide."915 However, the Court also held that the states "have the authority
to define the limits of the lands held in public trust and to recognize private
rights in such lands as they see fit.
916
This court looked to see how Florida law "defined the limits of lands
held in public trust and what private rights in tidelands" Florida
recognizes. 917 No Supreme Court of Florida case has overruled Clement, nor
has any case held that "a nonnavigable tideland [is a] sovereignty land. 918
Therefore, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision that the land
is not to be sovereignty land.
919
XVm. SALES
Whitehurst v. Camp. 92 An agreement for deed provided for "'interest
at the rate of 10 per centum (10%) per annum payable on the whole sum
remaining from time to time unpaid."' 921 The buyers defaulted and sellers
brought a successful foreclosure action, but sellers appealed, in part, because
the court applied a lower postjudgment interest based on section 55.03(1) of922
the Florida Statutes. The statute established a statutory rate for judgments
but provided that it did not displace a rate of interest established by a written
923contract. At issue, therefore, was whether the language in this agreement
for deed applied the ten percent interest rate postjudgment as well as
prejudgment. The Supreme Court of Florida ruled that the contract
912. 484 U.S. 469 (1988).
913. Lee, 711 So. 2d at 59.
914. Id.
915. Id. at 60 (citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 481
(1988)).
916. Id. (citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 475 (1988)).
917. Id.
918. Lee, 711 So. 2d at 62.
919. Id. at 64.
920. 699 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 1997).
921. Id. at 680 (quoting Whitehurst v. Camp, 677 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1996)).
922. Id.; FLA. STAT. § 55.03(1) (1995).
923. FLA. STAT. § 55.03(1) (1995).
924. Whitehurst, 699 So. 2d at 681.
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language did not apply postjudgment.925 To do so would require explicit
language. Otherwise, the terms of the contract are extinguished by a
judgment in a manner similar to the contract merging into the deed in a real
estate sale. In both situations, the contractual term can survive only if the
intent of the parties is made clear.926
Gilchrist Timber Co. v. IT Rayonier, Inc.92 7 The seller of a 22,000
acre tract provided the buyers with a year old appraisal. Unfortunately, the
zoning shown on the tract was inaccurate. After unsuccessfully trying to get
the zoning changed, the buyers filed suit in federal court seeking
damages. 9m The jury found for the plaintiffs, but the trial judge granted a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict.929 The case was appealed to the
eleventh circuit, which certified the following question to the Supreme Court
of Florida:
WHETHER A PARTY TO A TRANSACTION WHO
TRANSMITS FALSE INFORMATION WHICH THAT PARTY
DID NOT KNOW WAS FALSE, MAY BE HELD LIABLE FOR
NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION WHEN THE
RECIPIENT OF THE INFORMATION RELIED ON THE
INFORMATION'S TRUTHFULNESS, DESPITE THE FACT
THAT AN INVESTIGATION BY THE RECIPIENT WOULD
HAVE REVEALED THE FALSITY OF THE INFORMATION.930
The Supreme Court of Florida answered the question with a qualified "yes,"
adopting the position of section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
but subject to Florida's doctrine of comparative negligence.931 A party who
negligently misinforms another may be held liable if the other party
reasonably relies on that information to its detriment.
932
The eleventh circuit would then have to apply that answer in reviewing
the judgment notwithstanding the verdict.933 The jury had been instructed
that the buyers had no affirmative duty to investigate the truthfulness of
statements made by the seller.934 However, the buyers could have been
negligent in not investigating the facts on their own. That presented a
925. Id. at 684.
926. Id.
927. 696 So. 2d 334 (Fla. 1997).
928. Id. at 336.
929. Id.
930. Id. at 335.
931. Id. at 339.
932. Gilchrist Timber, 696 So. 2d at 337.
933. Id. at 336.
934. Id.
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question of fact, and reversal would be necessary so that the issue of
comparative negligence could be presented to the jury.935
The seller lost on its other points. Most importantly, handing over the
appraisal was a representation of the facts contained therein. The zoning
was represented incorrectly. 936 To establish that this constituted negligent
misrepresentation, it would only be necessary to show that the
misrepresented fact was material to the buyers. However, that did not
require the buyers to have communicated to the sellers that such a fact would
938affect their decision to purchase. What was required was only that it
would have made a difference in their decision.939
Kehle v. Modansky.940 Kehle and Peralta signed a purchase contract
which required a $120,000 deposit. Kehle wrote out the check and delivered
it to the seller. Due to insufficient funds, the check was "dishonored.,,9 4' It
had not been made good by the time of the closing, so the closing never
occurred. Seller then brought this suit for breach of contract and for
statutory damages for tendering a worthless check.942  The trial court
granted summary judgment for seller on both counts, $120,000 for liquidated
damages and $360,000 (treble damages) for the worthless check. The
defendants appealed, primarily on their defense that they lacked knowledge
that the check was worthless, but the district court affirmed. 9" Lack of
knowledge simply was not a defense. 945 The court also rejected the defenses
of "waiver" and "conditional delivery" to the statutory damages claim.
946
These had not been properly raised as affirmative defenses, but the court
noted that these would not have been defenses under the worthless check
statute anyway. 947
Nelson v. Wiggs. Buyers saw a "For Sale By Owner" sign in rural
west Dade County. They bought the property because they wanted a place to
plant trees and raise animals. 949 They "requested no inspections of the
935. Id.
936. Id. at 339.
937. Gilchrist Timber, 696 So. 2d at 339.
938. Id.
939. Id.
940. 696 So. 2d 493 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
941. Id. at 494.
942. Id.
943. Id.
944. Id.
945. Kehle, 696 So. 2d at 494.
946. Id.
947. Id.
948. 699 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
949. Id. at 259.
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property and did not [ask any questions of] the neighbors. 'g0 What they
missed was that the land, except for the buildings which were built on high
ground, flooded every rainy season. While they could still live in the house,
it became an island on which animals also sought to escape the waters. It
was a very difficult situation. The trial court found that the buyers did not
ask about flooding and the seller did not volunteer the information. 951 The
critical question was whether the seller was under a duty to disclose the
seasonal flooding to the buyers under Johnson v. Davis.952 The majority of
this panel answered the question in the negative.953
Under Johnson v. Davis, the seller is required to disclose "facts
materially affecting the value of the property which are not readily observ-
able and are not known to the buyer."954 The buyers should have known that
Florida's rainy season might make low lying land near the Everglades
subject to flooding. Moreover, the buyer-husband was a contractor who had
visited the county building department to review permits and the like.955
Judge Sorondo dissented vigorously.9 6 He characterized the buyers as
very "simple people" and noted there was nothing in the record to indicate
that there were visible signs of flooding of the nearby levee.957  The
transaction took place during the "dry season." The usual inspections would
not have revealed that flooding was a problem. Nor was there any obligation
to question neighbors about unseen problems. Moreover, the seller had been
informed of the buyers' intended use of the land and she must have known
that the flooding would make that difficult. The conclusion is that
"'elementary fair conduct' demanded full disclosure in this case." 958
Ni v. Deltona Corp.959 The buyer was purchasing three undeveloped
lots in a subdivision under three separate contracts. Each required the seller
to refund part of the money paid9-in the event buyer defaulted after having
paid fifteen percent of the principal. Buyer defaulted after having paid in
excess of fifteen percent of the principal. Having received no refund, buyer
sued. The seller defended that it was protected by the two-year statute of
950. Id. at 260.
951. Id.
952. 480 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1985).
953. Nelson, 699 So. 2d at 260.
954. 480 So. 2d at 629.
955. Nelson, 699 So. 2d at 261.
956. Id. at 261 (Sorondo, J., dissenting).
957. Id. at 263.
958. Id. at 265.
959. 701 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997):
960. Id. at 889. The seller would have to refund the lesser of either a) the amount the
buyer had paid in excess of the 15%; or b) the amount the buyer paid in excess of the seller's
actual damages. Id.
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repose found in the federal Land Sales Act.961 It argued that the statute of
repose was applicable because the refund provision was mandated by the
Act. The district court rejected that argument and reversed.962
The statute provided that a buyer could rescind a contract that did not
include a provision for refunding the payments when the buyer had paid
more than fifteen percent of the price.963 The two-year statute of repose gave
buyer only two years from the date of contracting to rescind the contract.
However, the buyer in this case did not seek rescission; this buyer brought
an action for a refund based on the provision in the contract. The federal
statute of repose did not apply to such an action.
965
Ribak v. Centex Real Estate Corp.966 The residential development was
adjacent to a plant that treated both fresh water and wastewater. Twenty-two
residential home buyers alleged that they were told that it was a fresh water
treatment plant, but not that it treated wastewater. They sued for, inter alia,
fraud, conspiracy, negligent supervision, breach of duty to disclose,
negligent misrepresentation, and violation of the Florida Land Sales
Practices Act.967 The trial court granted partial summary judgment because
the plant was not located on the land sold, and the buyers appealed. 968 The
district court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of the defendants,
e.g., the developer, who had not made the representations, but it reversed and
remanded as to the others.969 The Fourth District Court of Appeal concluded
that the critical question was whether the existence of a wastewater
treatment plant nearby was a material fact.970 If that fact would have
affected the decision to purchase the property, then it was material; and
materiality was a question of fact that would have to be decided by the
jury.9 7 1
A later decision from the fourth district seems to contradict Ribak in
972 973
regard to the definition of materiality. In Billian v. Mobil Corp., buyersof a condominium unit sued for damages or, in the alternative, rescission
961. 15 U.S.C. § 1703(d)(3) (1994).
962. Ni, 701 So. 2d at 889.
963. 15 U.S.C. § 1703(d)(3) (1994).
964. Id.
965. Ni, 701 So. 2d at 889.
966. 702 So. 2d 1316 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
967. Id. at 1316; see FLA. STAT. §§ 498.001-.063 (1997).
968. Ribak, 702 So. 2d at 1317.
969. Id. at 1318.
970. Id. at 1317.
971. Ribak, 702 So. 2d at 1317-18.
972. Billian v. Mobil Corp., 710 So. 2d 984 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
973. 710 So. 2d 984 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.1998).
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based on the developer's nondisclosure of construction defects. 974 The case
turned on whether the defects were material. The trial court refused to give
the standard jury instruction for a material fact in regard to a fraudulent
misrepresentation because it was, "one that is of such importance that [the
buyers] either would not have entered into the transaction or would not have
paid the same price for the unit."975  The jury's verdict was for the
developer/seller; the buyers appealed, and the fourth district affirmed.976
The court noted that Johnson v. Davis, 977 the seminal case on the duty
to disclose, required disclosure of "facts materially affecting the value of the
property," not facts materially affecting the value of the property to the
buyers. That eliminates the subjective value of the property to the
buyers. It makes the test an objective one. The court admitted that this was
a narrower test than the one traditionally used for fraudulent misrepre-
sentation. 979 Hopefully the Supreme Court of Florida will clarify whether a
different standard is appropriate or merely the product of a missing phrase.
The district court also pointed out that the traditional subjective
standard should be applied in a rescission action that was not based on
Johnson v. Davis type nondisclosure.9 80 Consequently, the fact that the jury
found the defendants not liable for nondisclosure under Johnson v. Davis
would not necessarily preclude the court from granting rescission based on
facts that had been concealed.981 The critical factor would be whether those
facts, if known to the buyers, would have led to their not making the
purchase.982
Stroud v. Crosby.983 The record contained evidence that the seller had
owned lots 690 and 691. When he sold 690, a portion of 691 was included.
Later, he listed 691 for sale. He advised the listing broker that he did not
own all of lot 691 and gave the broker a copy of the survey that correctly
showed what part of 691 he did own. The Multiple Listing Service ("MLS")
properly portrayed the dimensions of lot 691 as reduced by the earlier sale.
Buyers saw the property. They never requested or obtained any addi-
tional evidence, but proceeded to make an offer which the seller accepted.
985
974. Id. at 986.
975. Id. at 987.
976. Id. at 986.
977. 480 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1985).
978. Billian, 710 So. 2d at 987.
979. Id. at 988-89.
980. Id. at 992.
981. Id.
982. Id.
983. 712 So. 2d 434 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
984. Id. at 435.
985. Id. at 436.
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The contract described the property by its street address and as lot 691, but
did not include a legal description. Buyers then had a survey made by their
own surveyor, but that survey did not reveal that the seller only owned part
of lot 691. At the closing, seller gave buyers a copy of his survey showing
the proper dimensions. Buyers then realized their mistake but went through
with the closing anyway. The deed had the proper legal description for only
part of lot 691.987
Some time after the closing, the buyers realized the magnitude of their
mistake. The lot was too small for the home they planned to build, so they
brought this action for rescission. The trial court entered a final judgment in
favor of the buyers on the theory of fraudulent misrepresentation, but the
district court reversed.988
Reversal is warranted where the appellate court does not find competent
substantial evidence to support the trial court's findings of fact.989 The trial
judge failed to identify what fraudulent misrepresentations the seller had
made, and the district court judges could not find any evidence of fraudulent
misrepresentation in the record.990 Buyers had incorrectly assumed they
were buyinf the entire lot; that alone was not a sufficient basis for
rescission.
Sunbank v. Retirement Facility at Palm-Aire, Ltd.9 92 Buyers sued for
damages and specific performance based on an alleged breach of contract.
The legal claims were tried to a jury, which delivered a verdict for the
buyers. 93 After the verdict, the buyers filed notices for a nonjury trial of
their specific performance claims, but the judge granted the seller's motion994
for a directed verdict denying specific performance. The buyers appealed
and the district court reversed.9
The seller's motion for the directed verdict was based on the buyers'
having failed to introduce sufficient evidence to support their claim for
specific performance.996  However, that ignored the fact that specificperformance is equitable relief. There is a right to have legal claims decided
986. Id.
987. Id. at 435-36.
988. Stroud, 712 So. 2d at 435-36.
989. Id. at 436. See generally Clegg v. Chipola Aviation, 458 So. 2d 1186, 1187
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
990. Stroud, 712 So. 2d at 436.
991. Id.
992. 698 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
993. Id. at 392.
994. Id. at 392-93.
995. Id. at 392. The damages award to the plaintiff-buyers was, however, affirmed.
Sunbank, 698 So. 2d at 392.
996. Id.
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by a jury, and a claim for jury trial was made in this case.997 Equitable
claims are decided by the judge. When claims of legal and equitable relief
are made in the same case, the legal claims are usually tried to the jury first
with the judge later hearing such additional evidence as might be needed to
resolve the equitable claims. In difficult cases, the judge might hold what
amounts to two separate trials or might require all evidence be presented
before the jury to expedite matters. In this case, however, there was nothing
in the record to indicate that the judge had ordered the buyers to present their
specific performance evidence at the same time as they presented damages
998
evidence. Thus, the buyers could have anticipated the opportunity to
present more evidence on that claim. To grant the seller's motion for a
directed verdict at that point was premature and reversible error.
999
XIX. SLANDER OF TITLE
Clearman v. Dalton.l°°  This opinion resulted from a motion for
rehearing or clarification.' °  The Clearmans sought rehearing of the court's
unpublished order granting attorneys' fees to the Clearmans. This court
withdrew the previous opinion and the order awarding the Clearmans
appellate fees.'M2
The Clearmans recovered a judgment of $150,000 against the Daltons.
The Daltons filed for bankruptcy and stated there were two secured
mortgages against their homestead. The first mortgage in favor of the
Daltons' son was never recorded, and the second mortgage to Monticello
Bank was recorded but never delivered. The Daltons never amended their
bankruptcy petition to correct the "error.
' 1°°3
The trustee in bankruptcy elected to avoid the liens and obtained an
order from the bankruptcy court avoiding the morages and preserving the
avoided obligations "for the benefit of the estate." The mortgages were
assigned to the Clearmans. After they recorded the assignments and the
judgments avoiding the mortgages, the Clearmans "attempted to foreclose on
997. Id. at 393.
998. To secure equitable relief, the buyers would have to prove that the remedy at law
was inadequate and that the equities balanced in their favor. Sunbank, 698 So. 2d at 392.
These are not part of the damages action. Id.
999. Sunbank, 698 So. 2d at 393.
1000. 708 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998), replacing original opinion, 22
Fla. L. Weekly D2022a.
1001. Id.
1002. Id. at 325.
1003. Id.
1004. Id.
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the interest acquired from thet]rustee."'' 10 5 Dalton counterclaimed "to quiet
title and for slander of title. ' 6 The trial court denied foreclosure but found
against the Clearmans on Dalton's counterclaim for slander of title and
awarded Dalton attorneys' fees. 007
The appellate court agreed with the trial court. 008 Although the
obligations evidenced by avoiding the mortgages were preserved for the
estate, section 544, chapter 11 of the United States Code "does not place the
[t]rustee (or the [t]rustee's assignees) in the place of the former mortgaees
with the power to foreclose and avoid... Dalton's homestead claim." 9
The bankruptcy estate had an assignable interest in the mortgages subject to
Dalton's claim of homestead.'0 10 The assignees paid a fair price for the
assignment and could assert that interest. 1011 The Daltons could be required
to establish the fact of homestead.
10 12
"[F]iling of judgments [does not] constitute slander of title, even if the
assignment of the estate's interest was in the nature of a quit claim [sic]
deed."'0 13 The Daltons willingly filed their bankruptcy petition and
submitted their property to bankruptcy. 10 1 4  Therefore, they could not
subsequently "complain if the assignee of the estate's interest requires that
they prove their entitlement to the homestead exemption."'
0 15
XX. SUBMERGED LANDS
City of West Palm Beach v. Board of Trustees of Internal Improvement
Trust Fund.1016 The court reversed final summary judgment entered in favor
of the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund that granted
fee simple ownership of submerged lands in the Board. 10 17 The Board was to
issue a disclaimer to the City for the land beneath the four piers. 1°Is
1005. Clearman, 708 So. 2d. at 325.
1006. Id.
1007. Id.
1008. Id.
1009. Id.
1010. Clearman, 708 So. 2d at 325.
1011. Id.
1012. Id.
1013. Id.
1014. Id.
1015. Clearman, 708 So. 2d at 325.
1016. 22 Fla. L. Weekly D2028 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. Aug, 27, 1997), opinion
withdrawn and superceded on reh'g by 714 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
1017. Id.
1018. Id.
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The City claimed ownership of submerged land known as Palm Harbor
Marina in a suit to quiet title. The trial court stated that the City was entitled
only to a disclaimer as to the land immediately beneath the four piers it
constructed before the repeal of the Butler Act. The Butler Act was
repealed in 1957 and was later replaced by section 253.12 of the Florida
Statutes that stated "[t]itle to all lands heretofore filled or developed is
herewith confirmed in the upland owners and the trustees shall on request
issue a disclaimer to each owner."10 20
The question was whether the improvements made by the City fell
within the parameters of the Butler Act. Specifically, the issues before the
court were:
[w]hether all the activities of the city in constructing a municipal
marina or boat basin including four substantial piers in 1947 and
1948, and the dredging of the boat basins in between and
surrounding the piers resulted in a permanent improvement so that
title vested in accordance with the Butler Act.1 2
1
The court relied on the third district's opinions in Internal Improvement
Trust Fund v. Key West Conch Harbor, Inc. 022 and Jacksonville Shipyards,
Inc. v. Department of Natural Resources.1023 In Key West, the court stated
the issue as not whether the dredging alone was a sufficient improvement to
convey title under the Butler Act, since moorings and a dock were
involved. 1 24 That court also looked to the other activities involved in the
construction of the marina. The court in this case reasoned that the Key West
case applied because the piers would be useless without the incidental
dredging for the piers to be utilized as part of the basin.' 025 As with Key
West, this case also does not deal with dredging that was done for the sole
purpose of filling other land.
1021
The court here adopted the third district's view that the issue of whether
a dredging constituted an improvement should be decided on a case by case
1019. Id. at D2029.
1020. Id. (citing Act of June 11, 1957, ch. 57-362, §1, 1957 Fla. Laws (codified as
amended at FLA. STAT. § 253.12)).
1021. Board of Trustees, 22 Fla. L. Weekly at D2029.
1022. 683 So. 2d 144 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
1023. Id.; see Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. v. Department of Natural Resources, 466
So. 2d 389 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
1024. Board of Trustees, 22 Fla. L. Weekly at D2029; see Key West, 683 So. 2d at
145.
1025. Board of Trustees, 22 Fla. L. Weekly at D2029.
1026. Id.
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basis. 10 27 The piers would be useless as part of the marina without the
dredged area surrounding and in between.1°  As such, the trial court erred
in determining that the title to submerged lands was vested in the Board. 1029
XXI. TAXATION
Kuro, Inc. v. Department of Revenue.' °3° Kuro, Inc. ("Kuro"), appealed
a final order which assessed an additional documentary stamp tax,
collectively, on conveyances of eight unencumbered condominium
units. 1 31 Stock issued by Kuro in exchange for the condominiums was
concluded in the final order to constitute consideration and, pursuant to the
applicable statutes and rules, this consideration was equal to the fair market
value of the condominiums. 1°32 The documentary stamp tax was based on
the fair market value. This court reversed, finding that levying the additional
tax was error. 
33
The condominiums were owned by a father and son team in 1991. In
1994, the father and son incorporated Kuro. Then, they transferred the titles
of the units to the corporation to avoid the potential liability for managing
the eight rental units. The father and son transferred each condominium unit
to Kuro by warranty deed. Each deed recited nominal consideration of ten
dollars and Kuro paid the minimum documentary stamp tax on each
transaction. °34 The Department of Revenue ("DOR") determined that
additional documentary stamp taxes were due. The administrative law judge
recommended the assessment of additional documentary stamp taxes, and
the DOR entered a final order adopting these recommendations.
The appellate court first looked at section 201.02(1), of the Florida
Statutes, which states "that a purchaser of real estate is required to pay a
documentary stamp tax of $0.70 on each $100 of consideration paid for the
property.' 1 36 It further states that when consideration is given in exchange
for real property or any interest therein is other than money, it is presumed
that the consideration is equal to the fair market value of the real
property.1
0 37
1027. Id.
1028. Id.
1029. Id.
1030. 713 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
1031. Id.
1032. Id. at 1021-22.
1033. Id. at 1022.
1034. Id.
1035. Kuro, 713 So. 2d at 1022.
1036. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 201.02(1) (1993)).
1037. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 201.02(1) (1993).
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The court found that Kuro was not a purchaser within the meaning of
section 210.02(1).1038 Therefore, no additional taxes were due. Section
210.02(1) applies to transfers of real estate for consideration to a purchaser,
which has been defined by the Supreme Court of Florida as "one who
obtains or acquires property by paying an equivalent in money or other
exchange in value."'  The DOR's rule that deals with stock as
consideration merely creates a rebuttable presumption.'= In this situation,
Kuro successfully rebutted the presumption.1
04 1
The appellate court found the conveyances were for the benefit of the
father and son, who were availing themselves of the advantages of
incorporation and that the father and son still were the beneficial owners
although not the legal owners.' 042 At the time the deeds were recorded, the
father and son owned all of the real estate and Kuro's stock.104 3 The father
and son did not receive anything that they did not already have.1
044
Therefore, all that occurred were book transactions and not sales to a
purchaser.105 The court reversed the DOR's final order.'1
S & W Air Vac Systems, Inc. v. Department of Revenue. °47 The
appellate court affirmed the final administrative decision which held S & W
liable to the Department of Revenue for use taxes as the licensee of real
property, pursuant to section 212.031 of the Florida Statutes.1048
S & W owned coin-operated air vac machines used to vacuum cars and
add air to tires. Store owners having these machines received monthly
compensation in the form of a percentage of the units' gross receipts. S &
W had the responsibility to collect money from the machines, make repairs,
and pay licensing fees and taxes on them.1049 S & W described this
agreement as a "revenue sharing arrangement." 10 50  The hearing officer
found that payment was based on the right to place the machine in these
stores, and store owners should not be gaining compensation when the
1038. Kuro, 713 So. 2d at 1022.
1039. Id. (citing Florida Dep't of Revenue v. De Maria, 338 So. 2d 838, 840 (Fla.
1976)).
1040. Id.
1041. Id.
1042. Id.
1043. Kuro, 713 So. 2d at 1023.
1044. Id.
1045. Id. (citing State ex rel. Palmer-Florida Corp. v. Green, 88 So. 2d 493 (Fla.
1956)).
1046. Id.
1047. 697 So. 2d 1313 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
1048. Id. at 1314; see FLA. STAT. 212.031 (1995).
1049. S & WAir Vac, 697 So. 2d at 1314-15.
1050. Id. at 1315.
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machines are removed.'05' The hearing officer concluded that S & W had
been granted licenses for the use of real property. Section 212.031 of the
Florida Statutes dictated that use taxes were owed to the Department.'
0 52
First, the facts showed that the air-vac machines were not the subject of
a bailment. A "bailment" is a contractual relationship among parties in
which the subject matter of the relationship is delivered temporarily to and
accepted by one other than the owner.
1053
Next, the arrangement with the store owners could not constitute joint
ventures. To establish a joint venture, five elements must be established in
addition to those required to form a basic contract. These elements
include: 1) a community of interest in the performance of the common
purpose; 2) joint control or right of control; 3) joint proprietary interest in
the subject matter; 4) a right to share in the profits; and 5) a duty to share in
any losses which may be sustained.10 4 Althouh theirst element was met,
the court recognized that the others were 
not. 05
S & W also questioned whether convenience stores and gas stations met
the use requirement of section 212.031 of the Florida Statutes.I° 5 6 The
statute states, "[i]t is declared to be the legislative intent that every person is
exercising a taxable privilege who engages in the business of renting,
leasing, letting, or granting a license for the use of any real property"
105
The hearing officer and the Department of Revenue concluded the
transactions between S & W and store owners were taxable under section
212.031.105' That statute defines "business" as "any activity engaged in by
any person, or caused to be engaged in by him, with the object of private or
public gain, benefit, or advantage."
' 10 59
In this situation, "the licensors operated a commercial premises
designed to attract customers for revenue-generating purposes."' 60  The
ventures included income derived from a range of premises activity. So, it
was not a clearly erroneous interpretation to determine that store owners
1051. Id.
1052. Id.
1053. Id.; see 5 FLA. JUR. 2D Bailments § 1 (1978).
1054. S & WAir Vac, 697 So. 2d at 1315; see Conklin Shows, Inc. v. Department of
Revenue, 684 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996); see also Kislak v. Kreedian, 95 So.
2d 510, 515 (Fla. 1957).
1055. S & WAir Vac, 697 So. 2d at 1315.
1056. Id. at 1316; see FLA. STAT. § 212.031 (1995).
1057. S & WAir Vac, 697 So. 2d at 1316 (citing FLA. STAT. § 212.031 (1995)).
1058. Id.
1059. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 212.02(2) (1989)).
1060. ld. at 1317.
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were in the business of granting a license under section 212.02 of the
Florida Statutes.'° 1
Smith v. Welton.1°62 The issue this court heard on appeal was whether
section 193.155(8)(a) of the Florida Statutes is facially unconstitutional in
light of Article VII, Section (4)(c) of the Florida Constitution."3 Article
VII, Section (4)(c) provides:
Taxation; assessments.-By general law regulations shall
be prescribed which shall secure a just valuation of all property for
ad valorem taxation, provided:
(c) All persons entitled to a homestead exemption under
Section 6 of this Article shall have their homestead assessed at just
value as of January 1, [1994]. This assessment shall change only as
provided herein.
1. Assessments subject to this provision shall be changed
annually on January 1st of each year; but those changes in
assessments shall not exceed the lower of the following:
(A) three percent (3%) of the assessment for the prior year.
(B) the percent change in the Consumer Price Index for all
urban consumers, U.S. City Average, all items 1967=100, or
successor reports for the preceding calendar year as initially
reported by the United States Department of Labor, Bureau of
Labor Statistics.
2. No assessment shall exceed just value.
3. After any change of ownership, as provided by general
law, homestead property shall be assessed at just value as of
January 1 of the following year. Thereafter, the homestead shall be
assessed as provided therein.
4. New homestead property shall be assessed at just value
as of January 1st of the year following the establishment of the
homestead. That assessment shall only change as provided herein.
5. Changes, additions, reductions or improvements to
homestead property shall be assessed as provided for by general
1061. Id.
1062. 710 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
1063. Id. at 136; see FLA. STAT. § 193.155(8)(a) (1995); see also FLA. CONST. art VII,
§ 4(c).
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law; provided, however, after the adjustment for any change,
addition, reduction or improvement, the property shall be assessed
as provided herein.
6. In the event of a termination of homestead status, the
property shall be assessed as provided by general law.
1064
However, section 193.155(8)(a) of the Florida Statutes provides:
(8) Erroneous assessments of homestead property assessed
under this section may be corrected in the following manner:
(a) If errors are made in arriving at any annual assessment
under this section due to material mistake of fact concerning an
essential characteristic of the profperty, the assessment must be
recalculated for every such year.
The trial court found that section 193.155(8)(a) is unconstitutional
because the constitution states clearly that the assessment of just value shall
only change as provided by the statute, and section 193.155(8)(a)?permits
changes to the assessment that are not found in the constitution. This
court found that subsection (8)(a) of section 193.155 of the Florida Statutes
is facially unconstitutional, because the purported exception to the three
percent rule contained in section 193.155(8)(a) is not one provided for in the
constitution.'°67
The Supreme Court of Florida has held that provisions of the
constitution "cannot be altered, contracted or enlarged" by the
legislation. °r It determined the statute in question would defeat the purpose
of Article VII, Section (4)(c) by allowing constant reassessments of
homesteads when the purpose of section (4)(c) of Article VII is to encourage
the preservation of homestead property in the face of increasing real estate
development and rising property values and assessments. 10 69
The district court found no merit to Appellant's argument that without
section 193.155(8)(a), there would be inequitable taxation since the
constitution expressly mandates the special or inequitable taxation.' °70 Only
the homestead property receives the three percent cap, and, therefore, non-
homestead property, commercial, agricultural, and noncommercial
1064. Smith, 710 So. 2d at 136-37 (quoting FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4(c)).
1065. Id. at 137 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 193.155(8)(a) (1997)).
1066. Id. at 136.
1067. Id. at 137.
1068. Id. at 138 (citing Ostemdorf v. Turner, 426 So. 2d 539, 544 (Fla. 1982)).
1069. Smith, 710 So. 2d at 138.
1070. Id. at 137.
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recreational land are excluded from the three percent cap.1°71 Furthermore,
the constitution provides that assessments will not exceed just value, but
does not imply that assessments will be below just value. 12 Therefore, this
court held that the trial court correctly granted summary judgment. 0 73
Legislative changes to chapter 98 include, but are not limited to, the
following:
The Florida Legislature enacted chapter 98-185 to be retroactive to
January 1, 1998 and to be effective until it expires July 1, 1999.1074 This
chapter provides for a partial abatement of ad valorem taxation where
property has been destroyed or damaged by tornados.1 75 The application for
such abatement "must be filed by the owner with the property appraiser
before March 1, following the tax year in which the destruction or damage
occurred."' 0 76 Chapter 98-185 has the details and criteria to be included in
the application and what events will occur if the property appraiser
determines the applicant to be entitled to such partial abatement.'
Legislative changes to chapter 196 include, but are not limited to, the
following:
Section 196.197 of the Florida Statutes and its subparts were created to
qualify the continuing care facility established under chapter 651 of the
Florida Statutes, for exemption under section 196.1975 of the Florida
Statutes. Continuing care facilities shall have a $25,000 homestead
exemption from the assessed valuation of the property for each apartment
occupied on January first of the year for which exemption from ad valorem
taxation is requested.') 79 These provisions shall take affect January 1, 1999,
and shall affect the 1999 tax rolls in each subsequent year's tax rolls. 080
XX. TIMESHARES
Effective April 30, 1998, amendments to chapter 721 became
effective. Those changes include, but are not limited to, the following:
1071. Id.
1072. Id. at 137-38 (citing Florida League of Cities v. Smith, 607 So. 2d 397 (Fla.
1992)).
1073. Id. at 138.
1074. Act of May 23, 1998, ch. 98-185, §2, 1998 Fla. Laws 1617, 1617.
1075. Id., §1, 1998 Fla. Laws at 1617.
1076. Id., §1, 1998 Fla. Laws at 1616.
1077. Id., §1, 1998 Fla. Laws at 1616-17.
1078. FLA. STAT. § 196.197 (1997).
1079. Id. § 196.1975(9)(a) (1997).
1080. Act of May 22, 1998, ch. 98-177, §3, 1998 Fla. Laws 1597, 1598 (codified as
amended at FLA. STAT.§ 196.197).
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To section 721.05 of the Florida Statutes, the legislature added a
definition of "regulated short term product."' 81  That term is defined to
mean a contractual right, offered by the seller, to use accommodations of a
timeshare plan, provided that the agreement is executed in Florida on the
same day the purchaser received an offer to acquire an interest in a timeshare
plan and does not execute a purchase contract, after attending a sales
presentation. The acquisition of the right to use includes an agreement that
all or a portion of the consideration the prospective purchaser paid for the
right to use will be applied to or credited against the price the purchaser will
pay in the future for a timeshare interest, or the future purchase price of a
timeshare interest will be locked in.1
082
It is interesting to note that the legislature deleted section 721.075(4) of
the 1997 Florida Statutes when creating the 1998 supplement.1 83 That
paragraph required the developer to file an irrevocable letter of credit, surety
bond, or other assurance acceptable to the director of the division where the
aggregate represented value of all incidental benefits offered by a developer
to a purchaser exceeded five percent of the purchase price paid by that
purchaser is no longer a part of the statutory scheme.
84
To section 721.09 of the Florida Statutes the legislature added sub
paragraph (c).' ° 5 This new provision provides for the seller's ability to
immediately cancel all outstanding reservation agreements, refunding all
escrow funds to perspective purchasers, and discontinuing accepting
reservation deposits or advertising availability of reservation agreements,
where the time share plan subject to the reservation agreement had not been
filed with the division as required by Florida law within ninety days after the
date the division approved the reservation agreement filing.1
86
Subparagraph (d) was also added.1 87 This paragraph permits the seller
who has filed a reservation agreement and escrow agreement as required by
statute to advertise the reservation agreement providing the material meets
the criteria prescribed by the subsections to subparagraph (d).1
0 88
To section 721.11 of the Florida Statutes the legislature added
subparagraph (6) and its subparts.1 89 These provisions provide that failing
to provide cancellation rights or disclosures required in connection with the
sale of a regulated short-term product automatically constitutes a
1081. FLA. STAT. § 721.05(27) (Supp. 1998).
1082. Id.
1083. Id. § 721.075(4).
1084. Id.
1085. Id. § 721.09(c).
1086. FLA. STAT. § 721.09(c) (Supp. 1998).
1087. Id. § 721.09(d).
1088. Id.
1089. Id. § 721.11(6).
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misrepresentation in accordance with section 721.11(4)(a)."" Section
721.11(6)(a) requires the filing within ten days prior to use of a standard
form of any agreement relating to the sale of a regulated short term
product.1°91 Subparagraph (b) of that statute establishes the right of a
purchaser of a regulated short term product to cancel the agreement until
midnight of the tenth calendar day following the execution date of the
agreement. 0 92 It also provides that the right of cancellation may not be
waived by the prospective purchaser or anyone on its behalf.
10 93
Subparagraph (c) and its subparts with respect to this same statute provide
for statements that must be included in an agreement for purchase of a
regulated short term product. 1094 Further, subparagraph (d) of the same
statute provides for a series of statements in conspicuous type that must be
included in an agreement for the purchase of a regulated short term
product.10
95
Subparagraph (e) of the foregoing statute also provides for an
exemption from the requirements of paragraphs (b), (c), and (d).I09 Where
the seller provides the purchaser with the right to cancel the purchase of a
regulated short term product for any time up to seven days before the
purchaser has reserved use of the accommodations, but certainly in no event
less than ten days, and if the seller refunds the total amount of all payments
made by the purchaser, although reduced by the proportion of any benefits
the purchaser has actually received prior to the effective date of the
cancellation, the specific value of which has been agreed to by the purchaser
and seller, the short term product offer is exempt from the requirements of
the aforementioned paragraphs.
10 97
To section 721.15 of the Florida Statutes the legislature added
subparagraph (1)(b). 108 This section provides for allocating total common
expenses for a condominium or cooperative timeshare plan and allowing
such to vary on a reasonable basis if there is any interest in a common
element attributable to each time share parcel or time share cooperative
parcel ec9uals to share the total common expenses allocatable to that
parcel.'09
1090. Id. § 721.11(4)(a).
1091. FLA. STAT. § 721.11(6)(a) (Supp. 1998).
1092. Id. § 721.11(6)(b).
1093. Id.
1094. Id. § 721.11(6)(c).
1095. Id. § 721.11(6)(d).
1096. FLA. STAT. § 721.11(6)(e) (Supp. 1998).
1097. Id.
1098. Id. § 721.15(1)(b).
1099. Id.
19981
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To chapter 721 the legislature added Part IlI entitled "Foreclosure of
Liens on Timeshare Estates."1 1 Section 721.80 of the Florida Statutes
provides that Part I may be cited as the "Timeshare Lien Foreclosure
Act."" 0 ' This part consists of sections 721.80 through 721.86 and should be
read in detail to become familiar with the rights and procedures involved.'12
Furthermore, the legislature added Part IV to the chapter.1 °3 This
consists of establishing a Commissioner of Deeds to take acknowledgments,
proofs of execution, and oaths outside the United States in connection with
the execution of any instruments relating to or being used in connection with
a time share estate."0 4 This gart consists of sections 721.96 through 721.98
and should be read in detail.' 
5
XXIII. TITLE INSURANCE
Security Union Title Insurance Co. v. Citibank N.A. 11 6 The First
District Court of Appeal was asked to review a jury verdict finding the title
insurance underwriter vicariously liable for fraud committed by its agent, an
attorney, when he made fraudulent representation to the lender to obtain
loans, some of which benefited him personally and others of which benefited
his clients. Noting that the agent was expressly authorized only to issue title
insurance commitments and policies, and that the losses did not occur from
his acting in such a capacity, the appellate court found no vicarious liability
under that authority." 0
Next, it considered whether there might be vicarious liability arising
from the agent's acting within his apparent authority1 08 In doing so, the
appellate court noted that at least one element needed for this liability is that
there must have been some representation by the principal. 10 9 Here the facts
showed only that the principal made representations that the agent had the
authority to issue title commitments and policies. The fraudulent acts
involved the agent's representations made to obtain loans. There were no
representations by the underwriter that the agent had any authority to make
1100. Id. § 721.80.
1101. FLA. STAT. § 721.80-.86 (Supp. 1998).
1102. Id.
1103. Id. § 721.96.
1104. Id. §721.97.
1105. Id. §§ 721.96-.98.
1106. 715 So. 2d 973 (1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
1107. Id. at 974.
1108. Id.
1109. Id. at 975. Presumably this representation must be one that would lead the
claimant to have relied reasonably on the appearance that the agent had the authority to
commit the act that caused the harm.
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statements as a closing agent to obtain loans. Also, it was clear that the
loans were for his personal benefit and his clients' benefit. Therefore, the
appellate court reversed and remanded with instructions to enter a judgment
in favor of the underwriter. 110
XXIV. ZONING AND PUBLIC LAND USE CONTROLS
Villas of Lake Jackson, Ltd. v. Leon County..... The current
landowners, or their predecessors in title, acquired a large tract of land on
the shore of a lake. Most of it had been developed with apartment
complexes when the county, concerned about the impact of overdevelopment
on the lake, rezoned the area to single family housing. The landowners sued
in federal court. The United States district court dismissed the Takings
Clause claim on ripeness grounds, and they also refused to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the inverse condemnation claim based on
Florida law; these rulings were not appealed.' 
112
The focus of the appeal was the summary judgment against the
landowners on their due process and equal protection claims. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the due process
decision because there was "undisputed evidence of the County's interest in
protecting the water qlality at the lake," and the down zoning bore a rational
relation to that goal. Similarly, denial of the equal protection claim was
affirmed because of "the undisputed evidence of the unique aspects of the
tract as contrasted to other assertedly similarly situated properties and the
lack of evidence of invidious discrimination."' 1 4 The court devoted most of
its energies to explaining why it affirmed the denial of the due process taking
claim."- s In brief, the court concluded that there was no such cause of
action under the United States Constitution.' 16 A concise review of United
States Supreme Court decisions involving regulatory takings clearly
established that the plaintiffs in this case, claiming a violation of federal
rights that had vested under an earlier zoning regulation, were limited to
actions based on violations of substantive due process, procedural due
process, and the Takings Clause.'
7
1110. Id. at 976.
1111. 121F.3d 610 (1lth Cir. 1997).
1112. Id. at 611.
1113. Id. at 614.
1114. Id. at 615.
1115. Id. at 612-14.
1116. Villas, 121 F.3d at 615.
1117. Id.
1998]
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Ammons v. Okeechobee County.1118 Plaintiffs bought land on which to
live and start a construction business. A county zoning officer had advised
them that the land could be used for these purposes. 1 9 They applied for and
received an occupational license at that address and began the business.
Later, they applied for a building permit for the house which had space to
receive business deliveries. 1 20 Fifteen months later, the county realized that
the business was prohibited by the zoning. The county attorney sent
plaintiffs a letter informing them of the error and ordering them to stop
business activities at that location.
21
Plaintiffs brought this suit to enjoin the county from revoking their
occupational license and for damages on a variety of theories. Summary
judgment was granted against the plaintiffs, so they brought this apeal.12
. ... "123
The district court affirmed as to the estoppel and due process claims. The
basis for the injunction claim was that the county should be equitably
estopped due to the representations of zoning officials. Landowners are on
constructive notice of zoning laws and the limited powers of zoning
officials. The zoning officials had no power to permit, either intentionally or
through error, a landowner to violate the zoning ordinance. Relief in equity
would be inappropriate because "[i]t would not serve public policy well to
permit such mistakes to persist when they affect public welfare, like
planning and zoning decisions do," nor could the plaintiffs recover damages
under section 1983, chapter 42 of the United States Code for a denial of due
process of law. 124 An occupational license, being merely a privilege and not
involving a fundamental right, may be constitutionally rescinded where
procedural due process is observed.'l 25 Plaintiffs here received a hearing on
the revocation.
City of Dania v. Florida Power & Light1127 and City of Jacksonville
Beach v. Marisol Land Development, Inc.l1 28 In the City of Dania case,
Florida Power and Light ("FPL") filed an application for a special exception
so it could build an electrical substation in an area where that was not
1118. 710 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
1119. Id. at 642.
1120. Id. at 642-43.
1121. Id. at 643.
1122. Id.
1123. Ammons, 710 So. 2d at 643. The summary judgment on the equal protection
count was reversed because the county had not filed any affidavits as to that claim. Id.
Consequently, summary judgment should not have been granted. Id.
1124. Id. at 645.
1125. Id.
1126. Ammons, 710 So. 2d at 645.
1127. 23 Fla. L. Weekly D271 (4th Dist. Ct. App. Jan. 21, 1998).
1128. 706 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
[Vol. 23:229
333
: Nova Law Review 23, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1998
Brown / Grohman
otherwise allowed. Under the City Code, special exceptions "shall be
permitted" based upon compliance with seven requirements, two of which
were: the use would not cause substantial injury to other property in the
neighborhood; and the use would be compatible with adjoining development
and the intended purpose of the district.n 29 The Commission held a public
hearing. Testimony was presented by members of the public, a property
appraiser, and a certified land planner. Then, following the recommendation
of the City Planning and Zoning Board, the city commission denied the
exception.
The circuit court granted FPL's petition for certiorari, so the City
sought certiorari review in the district court of appeal. 1 31 The district court
reversed for two reasons.' 132 First, the circuit court had ruled that the City
had an especially heavy burden of proof to sustain a denial of the application
because the exception was being sought to provide for essential services, i.e.,
electric power. The district court could find nothing in the case law or
the city code to support that ruling."34 Imposing the wrong burden of proof
was a departure from the essential requirements of the law necessitating
reversal. Second, the fourth district concluded that the circuit court had
departed from the essential requirements of the law by substituting its own
view of the evidence for that of the city commission.'13 6 When reviewing
local administrative action on a certiorari petition under rule 9.030(c)(3) of
the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, the circuit court acts as an
appellate court.1 13 7 As such, it could not reweigh the evidence. 1138 Its role
regarding the weight of the evidence was only to determine if the fact finder
had substantial competent evidence on which to base its decision." 39 Here,
the record revealed the fact finder's opinion was supported by the
presentations of factual evidence by members of the public and testimony
from two experts.' The circuit court's order did not explain why this was
1129. Florida Power & Light, 23 Fla. L. Weekly at D272; see DANiA CrrY CODE §
6.40 (1998).
1130. Florida Power & Light, 23 Fla. L. Weekly at D271.
1131. Id.
1132. Id. atD272-73.
1133. Id. at D272.
1134. Id.
1135. Florida Power & Light, 23 Fla. L. Weekly at D273.
1136. Id.
1137. Id. at D272; see FLA. R. App. P. 9.030(c)(3).
1138. Florida Power & Light, 23 Fla. L. Weekly at D272.
1139. Id.
1140. Id.
1998]
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not substantial competent evidence and the district court could not see any
reason to agree with that conclusion."
141
The trial court had made the same mistake in City of Jacksonville Beach
v. Marisol Land Development, Inc.1142 The rezoning petition had been
rejected by the city council after a full hearing. Twelve citizens had spoken
in opposition to the rezoning, and the city's planning staff's comments,
recommending against the rezoning, had been read into the record. The city
council concluded that rezoning would be inconsistent with its
comprehensive plan. The circuit court had disagreed and overturned the city
council's decision.1143 That was, the first district ruled, essentially de novo
review in which the circuit court substituted its own weighing of the
evidence for that of the city council.' 144 That is not the circuit court's role in
certiorari review of administrative action and in doing so, the circuit court
applied incorrect law requiring reversal.
City of Miami Beach v. Robbins" 46 and Bird-Kendall Homeowners
Ass'n v. County Board of County Commissioners. 147 These third district
cases involved opposite sides of spot zoning. Both reached the district court
via certiorari review of a circuit court decision. In City of Miami Beach, we
have reverse spot zoning. The City Commission upzoned the landowner's
land and the two adjacent blocks to RM-1 based upon an architectural study
and proposed amendments to the comprehensive plan. On review, the court
characterized the results as a "veritable island of RM-1 zoning" in "a vast
sea of RM-2 and other types of zoning."' 48 This was characterized as
"reverse spot zoning" because it subjects this property to restrictions from
which virtually all the neighbors are free. 49 It was invalid because it was
confiscatory.' However, the court offered the observation that if
circumstances were to change, such as the proposed amendments to the
comprehensive plan being adopted and other areas also being rezoned, then
the decision might not prevent the City from successfully rezoning this land
to RMv-1.1151
1141. Id.
1142. 706 So. 2d 354, 355 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
1143. Id.
1144. Id. at 356.
1145. Id.
1146. 702 So. 2d 1329 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
1147. 695 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997), rev. denied by Garcia v. Bird-
Kendall Homeowners Ass'n, 701 So. 2d 867 (Fla. 1997).
1148. Robbins, 702 So. 2d at 1330.
1149. Id.
1150. Id.
1151. Id. at 1330-31.
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In Bird-Kendall, the county commissioners downzoned "a tiny, 0.23
acre tract," an area the size of a typical subdivision house lot, to allow the
landowner to operate a feed store when that was prohibited in the
surrounding area."1 52 This was characterized as spot zoning "to the nth
degree."'1 153- In fact, Chief Judge Schwartz wrote, "[t]he extent of the
violation of this principal is so pronounced in this case that the term 'spot
zoning' does not do it justice. Perhaps 'melanoma zoning' or, for short,
'melazoning' would be more appropriate." 1154
G.B.V. International, Ltd. v. Broward County.155 The developer sought
site plan approval for a mixed use development. Initially, the plan had been
rejected by the city because it had too many units per acre.1 56 However, the
city's and county's comprehensive plans allowed for "flex units," a form of
transferred development rights under which the number of units can be
transferred from other areas within the borders of that government.
1 57
S1158
Utilizing flex units, the developer got approval by the city. However,
getting approval from the county was another matter. Although it was only
reviewing the plan for compatibility with the county's comprehensive plan,
the County Commissioners denied site plan approval, expressly disapproving
of the city's use of the flex units, even though the city was within its
authority in using them.1 159 The developer filed a petition for certiorari
review by the circuit court. It denied relief based on estoppel. 160 The
Fourth District Court of Appeal granted common law certiorari and quashed
the circuit court's order.
The standard for such review is whether there has been a miscarriage of
justice due to a violation of a clearly established principle of the law.1162
The district court found that it had occurred when the circuit court went
beyond the evidence that had been before the County Commissioners and
relied on a ground not considered by the Commissioners.' 163 Moreover, site
plan approval is a quasi-judicial function in which the Commissioners apply
policy rather than set it. Site plan approval should be granted to all who
1152. Bird-Kendall, 695 So. 2d at 909.
1153. Id.
1154. Id. at 909 n.1.
1155. 709 So. 2d 155 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
1156. Id. at 155-56.
1157. Id. at 156.
1158. Id.
1159. Id.
1160. G.B.V., 709 So. 2d at 155.
1161. Id.
1162. Id.
1163. Id.
1164. Id. at 156.
1998]
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meet the requirements of the law." 65  In this case, the developer had
submitted a plan that complied with the law, so site plan approval was a
ministerial function. 1166 Broward County was ordered to approve the site
plan."167  68
Poulos v. Martin County" and Florida Rock Properties v.
Keyser.16 9 These two cases dealt with challenges to government action
under section 163.3215 of the Florida Statutes.l 7° In Poulos, a developer
obtained a development order from the Martin County Commission. The
redevelopment order was challenged under this section by a third person. As
required, the challengers filed a verified complaint with the county to give it
a chance to rectify the alleged inconsistency with the county's
comprehensive plan.' 17 1 Martin County Commission refused to set aside the
development order. Following the statutory procedure, the challengers then
filed the complaint in the circuit court, commencing this action for
declaratory and injunctive relief."172 The question was whether the circuit
court should then act as a reviewing court exercising certiorari jurisdiction or
grant a trial de novo. 1173 The circuit court chose review as under a certiorari
petition, but the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed.' 
174
Section 163.3215 of the Florida Statutes provided that the verified
complaint must be filed with the local government no later than thirty days
after it had taken an action inconsistent with the comVrehensive plan.
Then the local government had thirty days to respond. 11 6 If dissatisfied with
the response, the aggrieved person had to file the action in circuit court
within thirty days. In sum, the action in circuit court could be filed as
much as ninety days after the complained of action of the local1178 1179
government. However, under the rules, a petition for certiorari, themeans by which a unsuccessful applicant for approval of a development
1165. G.B.V., 709 So. 2d at 156.
1166. Id.
1167. Id.
1168. 700 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
1169. 709 So. 2d 175 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
1170. FLA. STAT. § 163.3215 (1995).
1171. Poulos, 700 So. 2dat 163.
1172. Id.
1173. Id. at 164.
1174. Id. at 163.
1175. FLA. STAT. § 163.3215 (1997).
1176. Id.
1177. Id.
1178. Id.
1179. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.100(c)(1).
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order obtains review,,must be filed within thirty days. °80 By the process of
deduction, section 163.3215 of the Florida Statutes proceeding could not be
certiorari. Therefore, it must be a statutory procedure in the form of an
original de novo action.1 81
The issue in Florida Rock was standing under this statute.1 8 2 At the
request of the landowner, the County rezoned Florida Rock's 509 acres from
agricultural to mining." 8 3 The challenger had a record as a lifelong activist
in environmental and wildlife matters, and he was the owner of land
approximately ten miles away." 84 He was also an environmental and land
use lav'yer practicing in the county.18 5 He claimed that the comprehensive
plan required that twenty-five percent be set aside to preserve native
vegetation. Florida Rock and the County disagreed, arguing that the set-
aside was inapplicable. " 6 The challenger filed a verified complaint seeking
declaratory relief under the statute.
The statute provided that "[a]ny aggrieved or adversely affected party
may maintain an action for injunctive or other relief against any local
government to prevent such local government from taking any action on a
development order... that is not consistent with the comprehensive
plan.''n 87 It further defined "aggrieved or adversely affected party" as one
who "will suffer an adverse effect to an interest protected or furthered by the
local government comprehensive plan.""' 88 The statute did not specify the
degree to which a protected interest must be affected, other than to provide
that "[t]he alleged adverse interest.., shall exceed in degree the general
interest in community good shared by all persons." ' 189 The court concluded
that the challenger here had not demonstrated a specific injury." 9° Being a
property owner in the county was not enough. Owning a business or even a
law practice in the county was not enough. In sum, the challenger here had
only proved that he was a citizen with an interest in the environment, and
that was not enough to establish standing."
9
'
Judge Sharp provided a written dissent, pointing out that the statute did
not require a challenger to have a property interest injured by the
1180. Id.
1181. Poulos, 700 So. 2d at 165-66.
1182. Florida Rock, 709 So. 2d at 176.
1183. Id. at 176.
1184. Id.
1185. Id.
1186. Id.
1187. Florida Rock, 709 So. 2d at 176-77; see FLA. STAT. § 163.3215(1) (1995).
1188. Florida Rock, 709 So. 2d at 177; see FLA. STAT. § 163.3215(2) (1995).
1189. Florida Rock, 709 So. 2d at 177.
1190. Id.
1191. Id.
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governmental action, but that seemed to be the way the majority was reading
the statute." 92 The challenger had taken an active part in the process by
attending Planning Commission hearings, appealing the Planning
Commission's decision to the County Commission, arguing the appeal
before the Commission, and bringing this case." 93 He had moved to the
county because of the wildlife habitat that would be affected by the rezoning
decision and had a clear record of defending the environment."1 9 ' If he did
not have standing under the statute, then standing under it was reduced to
those who could show monetary harm.'
1 95
XXV. CONCLUSION
The foregoing survey presents selected materials of significance to
those involved in real estate. There seems to be no consistent pattern to the
case law and legislative development, but there were also few surprises. The
law has continued to evolve in interesting ways, and we hope that this survey
proves useful in following that evolution.
1192. Id. at 178-79 (Sharp, J., dissenting).
1193. Id.
1194. Florida Rock, 709 So. 2d at 178.
1195. Id. at179.
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Using a "Brief Case Plan" Method to Reconcile Kinship
Rights and the Best Interests of the Child When an Unwed
Father Contests a Mother's Decision to Place an Infant For
Adoption
The Florida Senate Committee on the Judiciary proposed Senate Bill 550
regarding adoption for consideration in the 1998 legislative session. The bill
failed in committee in the House of Representatives, but has been pre-filed as
Senate Bill 0002 for 1999. This article examines one of the areas of concern
addressed by the bill and proposes an alternative approach to the issue.
Cheryl Ryon Eisen
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................. 340
A. "Victimization" of the Child .................................................. 342
B. Kinship Rights and the Best Interests of the Child ................ 343
C. Callfor Reform ...................................................................... 344
D. Evaluation of Performance .................................................... 345
]I. CHAPTERS 39 AND 63: AN ABBREVIATED OVERVIEW
OF CURRENT FLORIDA STATUTES RELATING TO ADOPTION ........ 346
A. Florida Statutes Chapter 39 ("Proceedings Relating
to Children") .......................................................................... 346
B. Florida Statutes Chapter 63 ("Adoption") ............................ 348
C. A Needfor Change ................................................................. 350
* Cheryl Ryon Eisen was admitted to the Florida Bar in 1974, and is Secretary of its
Family Law Section's Adoption, Juvenile Law and Special Needs of Children Committee.
She is an adoptee and the adoptive mother of two teenaged sons. She attended the University
of Florida for both undergraduate and law school (B.A. 1970, J.D. 1974), and was on the
faculties of Nova University Law School, 1975-1983, and St. Thomas University Law School,
1989-1991. In 1995, along with Sally B. Oken, a Florida licensed clinical social worker, Ms.
Eisen organized Adoption Advisory Associates ("AAA") as the social work arm of her Boca
Raton law practice. Ms. Eisen and Ms. Oken brought AAA to Florida licensed child-placing
agency status in 1996. Ms. Eisen supervises agency administrative functions. Her law firm,
Cheryl R. Eisen, P.A., performs all agency legal services, and concentrates in the areas of
adoption, child dependency, and child custody.
The author wishes to thank Ryan E. Willits, Debra L. Frankel, and Joan Roses for their
kind assistance.
340
Nova Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [1998], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol23/iss1/1
340 Nova Law Review [Vol. 23:339
III. UNWED FATHERS' RIGHTS AS ADDRESSED BY SENATE
B ILL 550 ........................................................................................ 351
A. An Irrebuttable Presumption of Fitness to Parent ................ 354
B . Children at Risk ..................................................................... 356
C. When and Where to Protect the Child ............... 358
D. Equal Protection of the Laws ................................................. 359
IV. A "BRIEF CASE PLAN" APPROACH TO
ADOPTION CONTESTS BY UNWED FATHERS ................ 363
V. OUTLINE FOR PROPOSED LEGISLATION ........................................ 366
VI. CONCLUSION ....................................... 382
APPENDIX A ...................................... 384
APPENDIX B ...................................... 385
APPENDIX C ...................................... 387
APPENDIX D ...................................... 388
APPENDIX E ...................................... 390
APPENDIX F 397
APPENDIX G ...................................... 399
APPENDIX H ...................................... 401
APPENDIX I ....................................... 402
APPENDIX J ....................................... 403
I. INTRODUCTION
In most infant adoption cases contested by an unwed biological father,
the child remains in the physical custody of the prospective adoptive
parents,' with no visitation with the birth mother or birth father,2 during legal
1. While awaiting termination of their biological parents' rights, prospective
adoptive children may be placed in foster care or in a prospective adoptive home. Placement
in a prospective adoptive home prior to termination of parental rights creates a "legal risk"
situation. Especially in the case of infant adoptions, however, an emphasis on "bonding"
drives legal risk placements. See generally DOROTHY W. SMITH & LAURIE NEHLS SHERWEN,
MOTHERS AND THEIR ADOPTED CHILDREN: THE BONDING PROCESS (2d ed. 1988). Adoption
practitioners are best advised to require prospective adoptive parents to sign a "legal risk
acknowledgement" at the time of placement. Such an acknowledgement is required by
administrative rule in agency adoptions. FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 65C-15.002(5), (6). See form
infra Appendix A. (Unless otherwise indicated, the forms appearing as appendices to this
article are the original work of the author for use by Adoption Advisory Associates and Cheryl
R. Eisen, P.A., in agency adoptions. Readers are welcome to adapt and use these forms for
their own practices, but no express or implied warranty is made as to their sufficiency or
advisability, legal or otherwise.)
2. Technically speaking, one's "birth father," synonymous with the term "natural
father," is one's biological father, whether known or unknown, whether married to one's
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proceedings which typically last for years. 3 Thus, the child lives, during a
critical period of his or her life, in a home and in a family from which he or
she ultimately may be removed by court order. If removed, the child goes to
the custody of a parent or parents with whom the child has no relationship,
save a biological link that has become remote for the child by disconnection
and the passage of considerable time. The extent of psychological damage,
caused to the child by the emotional uprooting attendant upon such a change
in physical custody, can only be hypothesized by the experts.
5
biological mother or not, whether one is adopted or not. The terms "birth father, .... birth
mother," and "birth parents" are typically used, however, to distinguish an adoptee's
biological parents from his or her adoptive parents. See generally ARTHUR D. SOROSKY, ET
AL., THE ADOPTION TRIANGLE 49-50 (1978).
3. See In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239 (Iowa 1992) [hereinafter "Baby Jessica"]. In
Iowa's Baby Jessica case, the child was born in February, 1991. Id. at 240. Rehearing on the
Iowa Supreme Court's decision, affirming an intermediate appellate court's decision to reverse
a juvenile court's termination of parental rights, was denied in November, 1992. Id. at 239.
The total time elapsed from birth to denial of rehearing (and remand) was twenty-two and one-
half months. Id. at 239-40.
See also In re Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181 (Ill. 1994) [hereinafter "Baby Richardf]. In
Illinois' Baby Richard case, the child was born in March, 1991, and placed with an adoptive
family shortly thereafter. In re Doe, 627 N.E.2d 648, 650 (111. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993). The
United States Supreme Court's order, denying certiorari to the Illinois Supreme Court on its
judgment reversing the trial court's ruling that the father's consent to the adoption was
unnecessary, was entered in November, 1994. Doe v. Kirchner, 513 U.S. 994, 994 (1994).
The total time that elapsed from birth to denial of certiorari was forty-four months. Id.
In Arkansas' "Baby Sam" case, a procedurally complicated matter involving five
separate trial court actions and three appeals in two states (one is still pending), the child, a
newborn when litigation began, is over two years old at the time of this writing. Telephone
conversation with Anthony R. Marchese, Florida attorney for Mark and Tracy Johnson,
petitioners for adoption in the Juvenile Court of Tuscaloosa County, Ala., case no. JU 97-
534.01 (July 24, 1998). The court granted custody of Baby Sam to the adoptive parents on
April 28, 1998. See also Vitry v. Goronski, no. 96-2908 FD-14 (Fla. 6th Cir. Ct., Apr. 10,
1996) (related paternity action).
See also G.W.B. v. J.S.W., 658 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 1995) [hereinafter "Baby Emily"], and
infra note 9 and accompanying text. In Florida's Baby Emily case, the child was born in
August, 1992. G.W.B. v. J.S.W., 647 So. 2d 918, 943 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994). The
Supreme Court of Florida's decision, approving an intermediate appellate court's order
affirming the trial court's final judgment of adoption, was handed down in July, 1995. Id. at
961. Total time elapsed from birth to final decision: thirty-five months. Id.
4. Under current Florida law, the child may in fact be put in the custody of another
relative or in foster care if the contesting parent or parents cannot or should not have custody
of the child. See FLA. STAT. § 39.811(1) (Supp. 1998).
5. Professor Suellyn Scarnecchia, of the Child Advocacy Law Clinic at the
University of Michigan Law School, refers to this as "transfer trauma," borrowing the term
from O'Bannon v. Town Ct. Nursing Ctr., 447 U.S. 773, 802-03 (1980), where it "was used to
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A. "Victimization" of the Child
In Florida's 1995 Baby Emily case,6 Supreme Court of Florida Justice
Gerald Kogan, writing a separate opinion,7 characterized the child, whose
unwed birth father contested her adoption, as "the most victimized party" in
8the case. Baby Emily was not removed from her adoptive home, and thus
was not subjected to the psychological trauma referred to above.9 Rather,
describe the harm a patient was likely to suffer if moved from one nursing home to another."
Suellyn Scarnecchia, A Child's Right to Protection from Transfer Trauma in a Contested
Adoption Case, 2 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 41, 47 n.22 (1995). See also Madelyn Simring
Milchman, Ph.D., Bonding Trauma in Termination of Parental Rights Cases, 175 N.J. LAW.
29 (1996). Non-adoptive foster care during the pendency of a protracted adoption contest
compounds the risk to the child, assuring that he or she will suffer at least one psychologically
wrenching resettlement no matter who "wins" the lawsuit.
6. G.W.B. v. J.S.W., 658 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 1995). See supra note 3 and
accompanying text.
7. Id. at 971-79 (Kogan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
8. Id. at 979.
9. G.W.B. v. J.S.W., 647 So. 2d 918, 944 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (Appendix:
original panel majority opinion). In Baby Emily, the child was placed for adoption by her
birth mother at birth through a Florida attorney/intermediary. Id. at 943. The trial court
initally found that there was insufficient evidence that the birth father had abandoned the birth
mother during her pregnancy, and thus the child was not free for adoption. Id. at 944. Upon
rehearing, however, the trial judge found that there was clear and convincing evidence that the
birth father had financially and/or emotionally abandoned the birth mother during her
pregnancy. Id. at 945. The court found that the birth mother was "on her own emotionally
during the pregnancy" and that the birth father had resumed a sexual relationship with a
former girlfriend while the birth mother was pregnant. Id. at 922. A three-judge panel of the
Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's finding of abandonment. G.W.B.,
647 So. 2d at 920. Upon rehearing en banc, the district court reversed the panel decision and
found that "for the final three months of her pregnancy, there was no financial support, no
physical assistance in obtaining medical care, including pre-natal care, or for any of her other
daily living requirements (and thus, as well, those of the unborn infant) and any emotional
factor contributed by the father was a negative influence ... the totality of the circumstances
here are... in support of a finding of abandonment." Id. at 924 (emphasis the court's).
The Supreme Court of Florida held that "[t]he determination of abandonment is fact
specific and, absent direction from the Legislature," it could not "dictate to trial courts
precisely how to evaluate the factors that go into making this decision." G.W.B., 658 So. 2d at
966. The supreme court ruled that section 63.032(14) of the Florida Statutes allowed a trial
court to consider emotional support in making its determination of abandonment and that the
record revealed that once the birth mother had moved out of the home, the birth father
provided no financial or emotional support. Id. at 966 (citing FLA. STAT. § 63.032(14) (Supp.
1992)). The supreme court noted the trial court's observation that the evidence suggested that
the birth father might have continued his passive stance toward the birth mother and the child
had the attorney/intermediary not contacted him regarding the adoption. Id. at 965. Even
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the impossibility of returning the three-year-old, a newborn when the
litigation began, to her status quo ante, to allow a dignified, timely, and
uncompromised resolution of her future, whatever the outcome, appears to
be what the Justice saw as insult to the child. Justice Kogan asked, "Where
does the fault lie?"' for the victimization of Baby Emily, and answered:
It rests on inadequate laws, procedural rules incapable of
recognizing the needs of a small growing child, state agencies too
unmindful of the biological father's rights, parties too eager to
litigate, judges and lawyers who let the child's fate bog down in a
quagmire of legal technicality. We all have failed Baby Emily.
B. Kinship Rights and the Best Interests of the Child
Proceeding from a discussion of the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Lehr v. Robertson,12 Justice Kogan suggested that the "two
competing standards" of one, birth parents' biological kinship rights to the
child and two, the best interests of the child, "both may actually have some
then, the record showed that the birth father still did not make any move to provide financial
or emotional support to the birth mother or the unborn child. Id. The Supreme Court of
Florida approved the district court's decision affirming the trial court's finding of
abandonment. Id. at 967.
In her specially concurring opinion, then district court judge, now Supreme Court of
Florida Justice Pariente, commented that a majority of the members of the Fourth District
Court of Appeal were concerned about the conduct of attorney/intermediary Charlotte H.
Danciu during the adoption proceedings. G.W.B., 647 So. 2d at 930-31 (Pariente, J.,
concurring specially). However, upon a complaint to the Florida Bar by the birth father,
Danciu was exonerated of any unethical conduct. Letter from David M. Bamovitz, Branch
Staff Counsel, The Florida Bar, to Steven M. Pesso, Esq. (May 3, 1995) (on file with Nova
Law Review). See infra Appendix B for the text of the letter.
10. G.W.B., 658 So. 2d at 979 (Kogan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
11. Id.
12. 463 U.S. 248 (1983). In Lehr, the United States Supreme Court decided the
question of whether a New York putative father's due process and equal protection rights
under the Constitution gave him an absolute right to notice and an opportunity to be heard
before his child could be adopted. Id. at 249-50. Answering in the affirmative, the Court
nevertheless held that the putative father's due process rights were not violated because the
New York statutory scheme adequately protected his inchoate interest in assuming a
responsible role in the future of his child in that the right to receive notice was completely
within the putative father's control (by filing in a putative father registry). Id. at 256-65. Nor
was the putative father's right to equal protection violated by the law, though it accorded
different rights to the custodial parent and one who had either abandoned or never established
a parental relationship with the child. Id. at 265-68.
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relevance" to the resolution of unwed father cases. 13 He referred to the Lehr
Court as finding that unwed putative fathers possess only what may be called
an "opportunity interest" in establishing legal fatherhood, which "matures
into a due process right if '[they accept] some measure of responsibility for
the child's future.' ,14 Justice Kogan then observed that "[t]he Lehr Court
regrettably was silent as to how we should balance 'best interests' against
,,15kinship rights when the two are in irreconcilable conflict ....
C. Callfor Reform
Seeking to solve this "legal conundrum," and seeing "no solution that is
free of tragedy,"' 6 Justice Kogan entreated the Family Law Rules
Committee of The Florida Bar, and the Florida Legislature, to study methods
of expediting contested adoption cases, 17 and noted that "[1]awsuits of this
type cry out for at least four broad reforms: (1) expedited review in the trial
court; (2) expedited appeal; (3) swift and certain finality of court decisions;
13. G.W.B., 658 So. 2d at 973 (Kogan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
14. Id. at 974 (emphasis added). See also, Roe v. Doe, 524 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1988), wherein a Florida District Court certified the following question to the
Supreme Court of Florida:
CAN THE FAILURE OF A PUTATIVE UNMARRIED FATHER TO
ASSUME SUPPORT RESPONSIBILITIES AND MEDICAL EXPENSES
FOR THE NATURAL MOTHER WHEN SHE REQUIRES SUCH
ASSISTANCE AND HE IS AWARE OF HER NEEDS, BE A BASIS FOR A
TRIAL COURT TO EXCUSE HIS CONSENT TO THE ADOPTION OF
THE CHILD, ON THE GROUNDS OF ABANDONMENT OR ESTOPPEL,
PURSUANT TO SECTION 63.072(1), FLORIDA STATUTES (1985).
Id. at 1044. In answering the certified question, the Supreme Court of Florida held that "an
unwed father's prebirth conduct in providing or failing to provide support ... and medical
expenses for the natural mother [was] relevant to the issue of abandonment under section
63.072(1) [of the Florida Statutes]." In the Matter of the Adoption of Doe, 543 So. 2d 741,
746 (Fla. 1989). The court went on to say:
[T]he failure of [a putative] father to provide prebirth assistance to [a]
pregnant mother, when he was able and assistance was needed, vested [the]
natural mother with the sole parental authority to consent to the adoption of
the child and removed from the natural father the privilege of vetoing the
adoption by refusing to give [his] consent.
Id. at 749. The holding was subsequently codified within the chapter 63 definition of
"abandonment." See FLA. STAT. § 63.032(14) (1997).
15. G.W.B., 658 So. 2d at 974 (Kogan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
16. Id. at 979.
17. Id.
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and (4) reasonable mechanisms to minimize psychological harm to the child
during the legal process." 18
The first three of Justice Kogan's requested reforms are well within the
legislative and judicial branches' ability to provide. However, what Justice
Kogan observed as the silence of the Lehr Court as to how to balance "best
interests" against kinship rights, resounds in the law's failure, to date, to
meet Justice Kogan's fourth request, for mechanisms to minimize
psychological harm to the child.
D. Evaluation of Performance
To protect the interests of both birth parents and children, Justice
Kogan suggested a fixed period during which a contesting unwed putative
father's "performance" vis-d-vis his newborn (up to six months old) child
could be evaluated by the state. 19 Most birth fathers likely would dispute
whether the state has the power to so impose upon their parental rights.
However, as Justice Kogan reminded: "It deserves emphasis here that the
unwed biological father's constitutional interest over the child is not fully
formed at this stage and therefore can be subjected to ... reasonable
restrictions or limitations." 20
The performance approach to unwed father cases proposed by Justice
Kogan is of the nature of what is known in child welfare and juvenile law
circles as a "case plan" method. 21 The case plan, a social service model for
working through issues of social welfare, is already recognized in chapter 39
of the Florida Statutes as a hallmark of child dependency cases.22 As will be
seen, this method is particularly well-suited to assist courts in balancing the
bests interests of children and the kinship rights of their birth parents in
contested adoption cases.23
18. Id. at 979 n.21.
19. Id. at 976.
20. G.W.B., 658 So. 2d at 976.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 23-28. "Case plan" is defined in the Florida
Administrative Code as "the goal-oriented, time limited individualized program of action for a
child." FLA. ADMIN. CODE 65C-15.001(13).
22. See generally FLA. STAT. § 39.601 (Supp. 1998).
23. See infra text accompanying notes 97-138.
1998]
346
Nova Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [1998], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol23/iss1/1
Nova Law Review
II. CHAPTERS 39 AND 63: AN ABBREVIATED OVERVIEW OF CURRENT
FLORIDA STATUTES RELATING TO ADOPTION
For the reader unfamiliar with the nature and scope of chapters 39 and
63 of the Florida Statutes, a brief summary will be helpful in understanding
the issues addressed in this article.
A. Florida Statutes Chapter 39 ("Proceedings Relating to Children")
Chapter 39 embraces "status" issues of child welfare. It provides the
framework for disposition of cases involving allegations of child dependency
due to abuse, neglect, or abandonment. In any dependency case, the parent
or parents of the child are entitled to a case plan which includes goals for
remediation, means to effectuate those goals, and methods to assess
outcomes. The purpose of the case plan is to assist the family to remain
intact or, where the child has been removed from the home, to reunify if and
when the plan's goals are met.24 A dependency not otherwise resolved ends
in an involuntary termination of parental rights25 and commitment of the
child to the Florida Department of Children & Family Services ("the
Department"), or to a Florida licensed child-placing agency ("licensed
,,26agency"). A chapter 39 proceeding for termination of parental rights is
also initiated when a child is voluntarily "surrendered" for adoption to the
Department or a licensed agency.27 In the case of a voluntary surrender, the
case plan goal is termination of parental rights rather than reunification of
the family.
28
The procedures established in chapter 39 for termination of parental
rights assure parents of constitutional protection against unreasonable
government interference with their liberty interest in rearing their
children.29 For example, parents must be afforded the right to counsel,
including court-appointed counsel if indigent, at every stage of the
termination proceedings. 30  Both the Department and otherwise "private"
24. See generally FLA. STAT. § 39.601(6) (Supp. 1998).
25. Id.
26. The Department is authorized to license agencies and promulgate rules for their
operation. FLA. STAT. § 409.175(3)(a), (4)(a) (1997).
27. See FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(a) (Supp. 1998).
28. Id. § 39.806(3).
29. "[A child's] natural parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the care,
custody, and management of their children." G.W.B., 658 So. 2d at 966 (citing Santosky v.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,753 (1982)).
30. FLA. STAT. § 39.807(1)(a) (Supp. 1998).
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licensed agencies are subject to chapter 39 due process requirements. 31
Presumably, licensed agencies are included in chapter 39 because they are
licensed by the state for the purpose of providing services generally
performed by the state itself, i.e., foster care and placement of children for
adoption, thus functioning quasi-publicly as state "actors" for due process
purposes.
32
31. See generally FLA. STAT. ch. 39.
32. SeeIn re R. J. C., 300 So. 2d 54,58 (Fla. lst Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
The [Children's] Home Society [a licensed agency] contends that... [it] is
not a 'foster home or agency of the state' and that the Order of Permanent
Commitment [of the child to Children's Home Society] was not based on the
inability or unfitness of the parents, but, rather, on the voluntary surrender of
the child for subsequent adoption. We find these distinctions to be without
merit.... [I]t is our interpretation... that the Home Society should be
considered a temporary foster home or, at the very least, an 'agency of the
state.'
Id. at 58. See also Swayne v. L.D.S. Soc. Servs., 795 P.2d 637, 640 (Utah 1990) (holding
private adoption agency was a "state actor" for due process purposes where termination of
parental rights statute provided for automatic termination of unwed father's rights unless he
had previously filed an acknowledgment of paternity). In Swayne, one member of the court
did not agree that the self-executing statute rendered the private agency a state actor merely by
its participation in the chain of events that rendered the father's rights terminated by operation
of law. Swayne, 795 P.2d at 645 (Howe, Assoc. C.J., concurring and dissenting).
Simply because the legislature has provided ... that the placement of an
illegitimate child by his mother with an adoption agency terminates the
opportunity for the father to register his claim of paternity does not, without
more, turn every adoption agency into a "state actor."... It is undisputed that
[the agency] receives no state funding and the state has no control over the
agency's internal affairs. The cases simply do not support the theory that
when a private person exercises a right or privilege granted by state law (such
as to receive children for adoption), that person becomes a state actor. If that
were so, every person licensed by the state in the various trades, occupations,
and professions would become state actors.
Id. at 645 (emphasis added). In Florida, however, private agencies are not only licensed by
the state, but their programs are closely regulated in many details. See generally
FLA. STAT. § 409.175 (1997) (licensure of child-placing agencies); FLA. ADMiN. CODE, ch.
65C-15 (child-placing agencies); and FLA. ADMIN. CODE, Ch. 10M-6 (foster home licensing by
child-placing agencies).
Florida's Second District Court of Appeal, in determining that due process
considerations required court-appointed counsel for an indigent father in a stepparent
adoption, recently stated that "[u]ndoubtedly, state action is ... an essential aspect of a
contested adoption proceeding under chapter 63.... Although such litigation is between
private parties, the power to terminate the rights of the nonconsenting parent is vested solely
in the judicial branch of the state government." O.A.H. v. R.L.A., 712 So. 2d 4, 6
(1998). Accord In re K.L.J., 813 P.2d 276 (Alaska 1991); In re Jay [R.], 150 Cal. App. 3d
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Though a child whose parents' rights have been terminated in a chapter
39 proceeding is committed to the custody of the Department or a licensed
agency for subsequent adoption,33 chapter 39 does not address the initiation,
processing, and finalization of an adoption of the child. These matters are
addressed in chapter 63. 4
B. Florida Statutes Chapter 63 ("Adoption")
Chapter 63 performs two functions in regulating adoption that are
relevant to matters addressed in this article.35 First, it establishes the basic
requirements for adoption in Florida, including, inter alia, who may be
adopted, 36 who may adopt, 37 who must consent, 38 jurisdiction,39 and
venue.40 Second, chapter 63 limits, and imposes limitations upon, the
entities, other than the Department and Florida licensed agencies, permitted
to perform adoption placement4' activities in Florida.42
251, 197 Cal. Rptr. 672 (1983); D.S. v. T.D.K., 499 N.W.2d 558 (N.D. 1993). The second
district's opinion thus emphasized the nature of the right at issue, and the element of judicial
participation in the process to extinguish that right, rather than the nature of the facilitator of
the adoption (state agency, private agency, or private attorney) as determinative of the
question of whether due process protections apply in proceedings wherein parental rights will
be terminated. O.A.H., 712 So. 2d at 6-7. Query: Even where the termination of a parent's
rights is consensual, is the right to counsel at least a waiveable right of the consenting parent,
the absence of such waiver requiring court appointed-counsel if the parent is indigent?
33. FLA. STAT. § 39.811(2), (4) (Supp. 1998). After termination of parental rights
under chapter 39, the Department or licensed agency having custody of the child is the only
party who must consent to the child's subsequent adoption. Id. § 39.812(1).
34. See FLA. STAT. ch. 63 (1997).
35. Chapter 63 also regulates surrogate parent contracts. See FLA. STAT. §§
63.212(1)(i)(1-6) (1997).
36. Id. § 63.042(1).
37. Id. § 63.042(2), (3), (4).
38. Id. §§ 63.062, .072.
39. Id. §§ 63.102(2), .207(1).
40. FLA. STAT. §§ 63.102(2), (4).
41. Florida Statutes section 63.032(9) defines "to place" or "placement" as "the
process of a person giving a child up for adoption and the prospective parents receiving and
adopting the child, and includes all actions by any person or agency participating in the
process."
42. Limitations imposed on other entities making adoptive placements include the
regulation of fees and expenses under section 63.097, and of out-of-state placements under
section 63.207. FLA. STAT. §§ 63.097, .207 (1997).
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Chapter 63 permits adoptive placements not only by the Department
and Florida licensed agencies, but also by "intermediaries. 43  An
intermediary is a Florida licensed attorney or physician, or an out-of-state
agency that has been qualified by the Department to place in Florida.44 As
explained above,45 the Department and Florida licensed agencies may make
adoptive placements upon either an involuntary or voluntary chapter 39
termination of parental rights. Intermediaries facilitate voluntary placements
only, though such adoptions are occasionally contested,46 thus causing the
proceedings to take on an involuntary aspect. Placements by intermediaries
are not subject to chapter 39 termination proceedings, but are governed
exclusively by the provisions of chapter 63.
In intermediary adoptions, a birth parent "consents" to the adoption of
his or her child by either a specific named person or persons, or by a person
or persons whose identity is known only to an intermediary.47 The form for
consent to adoption, created by the Department for use by intermediaries as
48directed by statute, was last updated in 1986, and is inadequate in several
respects.49 Nevertheless, comparison of the consent form with a "surrender"
form of the type used by the Department and Florida licensed agencies
reflects the organic differences between intermediary and Department/
licensed agency adoptions.50
Unless a parent's rights have been previously terminated within a
chapter 39 proceeding or otherwise (including by the death of a parent),
43. Id. § 63.212(l)(c).
44. Id. § 63.032(8).
45. See supra notes 24-32 and accompanying text.
46. When adoptions are contested by birth parents, they are usually seeking to revoke
a surrender or consent for adoption, or otherwise allege denial of due process. Fraud and
duress are presently the only statutory grounds upon which a birth parent may revoke a
surrender or consent for adoption. See infra note 66. Due process issues typically center on a
birth father's failure to receive notice, or denial of a right to withhold consent. See supra
notes 9-15 and accompanying text.
47. FLA. STAT. § 63.082(2).
48. Id. § 63.082(3)(a).
49. The form is defective in that: 1) it recites that the birth parent "agreets] to
relinquish" the child for adoption, thus giving rise to an argument that execution of the
document does not necessarily show a present intention to place the child for adoption; 2) the
statutorily required printed names, addresses and social security numbers of witnesses are not
called for as required by statute, § 63.082(4) of the Florida Statutes; and 3) the jurat does not
conform to current law requiring the notary to certify the type of identification upon which the
notary relied in verifying the identity of the individual executing the instrument. See FLA.
STAT. § 117.05(5) (1997). See form infra Appendix C.
50. See form infra Appendix D.
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parental rights are not terminated in a chapter 63 adoption proceeding until
the final judgment of adoption is entered.5' Thus, in intermediary adoptions,
termination of parental rights to the child to be adopted occurs later and
under different rules than in Department and Florida licensed agency
adoptions.
C. A Need for Change
Dichotomies of law and procedure between chapter 39 and chapter 63
have caused confusion and irrational results in contested Florida adoption
cases.52 This article suggests that Florida adoptions be processed exclusively
as a function of chapter 39 termination of parental rights proceedings, within
a unified statutory scheme embracing Department, agency, and intermediary
placements.53 Such a revision of the law would promote greater uniformity
in adoption actions, while affording optimal safeguards to protect not only
the best interests of children, but also those of birth parents and prospective
adoptive parents. This is because the law and procedures, as well as the
judicial and administrative expertise, already in place for chapter 39
proceedings, form the most appropriate paradigm within which to address
the legal issues presented in adoptions generally, and in contested adoptions,
specifically.
The Florida Senate's Committee on the Judiciary54 ("Judiciary
Committee") proposed Senate Bill 550 on adoption for consideration in the
51. See generally FLA. STAT. § 63.085(I)(d) (1997).
52. An example is Jones v. Children's Home Soc'y., 497 So. 2d 1265 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 1986), wherein the court held that the chapter 63 provisions that a birth parent's
consent to adoption of a child is irrevocable upon signing, Florida Statutes section 63.082(5),
did not apply to a surrender to the Department or a licensed agency under chapter 39. Id. at
1267. (Chapter 39 was amended to preclude this result by chapter 90-309 of the Laws of
Florida (amending FLA. STAT. 39.464(l)(a)(2)), after the Supreme Court of Florida
disapproved Jones on this point in Doe v. Roe, 543 So. 2d 741, 747-48 (Fla. 1989)). Only
recently has a Florida court determined that indigent birth fathers are entitled to court-
appointed counsel in chapter 63 proceedings wherein their parental ights are in jeopardy of
termination, though right to counsel in such situations is not mandated by statute as in chapter
39 proceedings. See supra note 32.
53. See infra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
54. The most active members of the Senate Judiciary Committee on Senate Bill 550
were Senators Dudley (R., S-25, Cape Coral) (chair); Campbell (D., S-33, Tamarac);
Ostalkiewicz (R., S-12, Orlando); Rossin (D., S-35, West Palm Beach); and Silver (D., S-38,
Aventura). The other members of the Committee were Senators Burt (R., S-16, Ormond
Beach); Crist (R., S-20, St. Petersburg); Grant (R., S-13, Tampa); Home (R., S-6, Orange
Park); Jones (D., S-40, Miami)(vice-chair); and Williams (D., S-4, Tallahassee). Of these, all
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1998 legislative session.5 The bill would have moved agency adoptions out
of chapter 39 and into chapter 63. Senate Bill 550 purported to establish
"parity" in private adoptions between Florida licensed agencies and
intermediaries, and would have otherwise significantly altered Florida
adoption law and practice.57 Though it won approval in the Senate, Senate
Bill 550 did not garner support in the House of Representatives, and thus
failed to pass into law. The bill's Senate supporters have prefiled the same
measure for consideration in the 1999 Legislature.
58
mn. UNWED FATHERS' RIGHTS AS ADDRESSED BY SENATE BILL 550
Before drafting Senate Bill 550, the Senate Judiciary Committee
identified eight "areas of concern" for adoption legislation.5 9 Birth parents'
but Home and Williams are attorneys, though none is a family law or adoption specialist.
Campbell is an adoptive parent and Jones has an adopted sister. It is unclear why the
Judiciary Committee's bill was not referred to the Senate's Children, Families, & Seniors
Committee for review and input.
55. S.B. 550, 15th Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1998).
56. See infra Appendix E for an analysis of the most significant aspects of the bill,
prepared by the law firm of Hausmann & Hickman, P. A., Boynton Beach, Florida.
57. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, COMM. SUBsTrTurE FOR S.B. 550, § 16, 15th
Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1998).
58. The bill has been filed as Sentate Bill 0002 for 1999.
59. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, STAFF ANALYSIS AND ECONOMIC
IMPACT STATEMENT, at 2-5 (Jan. 5, 1998). The eight concerns identified by the Senate
Judiciary Committee centered on:
1. bifurcation of adoption proceedings, first determining termination of
parental rights issues, then, if the child was determined in the first phase of
the proceeding to be available for adoption, finalizing the adoption;
2. banning of"prebirth termination" of birth fathers' parental rights;
3. improvement of safeguards to assure voluntariness of birth mothers'
consents;
4. assurance that birth parents are aware from their first contact with an
intermediary arranging an adoptive placement that the attorney represents the
adoptive parents' interests, not the birth parents';
5. creation of a centralized state repository for all adoption case records;
codification of the present case law rule that "best interests of the child"
6. evidence is not relevant in any adoption proceeding until the birth
parents' rights have been terminated, and the child is thus available for
adoption;
7. banning out-of-state placement for adoption of any child not falling
within the Florida Statutes section 409.166 definition of a "special needs
child" unless with a relative or stepparent; and
1998]
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rights issues are embraced by at least four of the Judiciary Committee's eight
concerns. 60 These concerns are collectively driven by just one immutable
underlying principle: that birth parents, including unwed fathers, are entitled
to a measure of due process protection in adoption proceedings. 61 However,
Senate Bill 550 moved perilously beyond the requirements of due process of
law, into the realm of child endangerment, by allowing an unwed father the
absolute right to veto a mother's decision to place a child for adoption and,
at the father's option, to take custody of the child, regardless of his fitness to
parent.62
8. extension of the fee and expense reporting requirements imposed on
adoption intermediaries to licensed adoption agencies.
Id.
60. See supra note 59, "concerns" listed 1, 2, 4, and 6.
61. The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly identified parental rights as
liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747 (1982). In Santosky, the
Court stated:
The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody and
management of their child does not evaporate simply because they have not
been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State.
Even when blood relationships are strained, parents retain a vital interest in
preventing irretrievable destruction of their family life.
Id. at 753. This principle applies to cases where the parental rights of unwed fathers are being
terminated. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983), supra note 12, as well as Caban v.
Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
62. One provision of the bill severely limited a biological father's rights where the
mother is a married woman and the birth father is not her husband, the bill expressly provides
that no notice to the birth father of the proceeding to terminate parental rights is required,
whether or not the mother was cohabiting with her husband at the time of conception or birth.
SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, COMM. SUBSTITUTE FOR S.B. 550, § 11, 15th Leg. Sess.,
Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1998) (proposing to amend FLA. STAT. § 63.062(l)(b), (c), and (d)(3) (Fla.
Leg. 1997)). This concept follows Florida's current paternity law. See G.F.C. v. S.G., 686
So. 2d 1382 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997). "[T]he trial court properly dismissed G.F.C.'s
petition because [the paternity statute] does not afford G.F.C. the statutory right to sue for
paternity since the child in question.. .was not born 'out of wedlock' and the paternity of the
child had been 'otherwise' established." Id. at 1385. "Paternity would 'otherwise' be
established when a child is born to an intact marriage and recognized by the husband and the
mother as being their child." Id.
The second district recently extended the holding of G.F.C. to deny an alleged
biological father's cause of action to establish paternity where the mother of a child born out
of wedlock subsequently married the child's "reputed" father, a man who supported the
mother emotionally and financially throughout her pregnancy, and executed the documents
necessary to have himself identified as the father of the child on the birth certificate when the
child was born, after which he "gave the child his love, attention, and financial support." I.A.
[Vol. 23:339
353
: Nova Law Review 23, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1998
1998]
In the typical contested case, an unwed birth mother surrenders her
child for adoption, but the child's father, who is alleged to have abandoned
the child, objects. Senate Bill 550 proposed to address these circumstances
by creating section 63.089 of the Florida Statutes, which concludes, in sub-
section (5), as follows: 63
If the court does not find by clear and convincing evidence that
parental rights of a birth parent should be terminated pending
adoption, the court must dismiss the case with prejudice and that
birth parent's parental rights remain in full force under the
law.... The court must enter an order based [on] written findings
providing for the placement of the minor.... Further proceedings,
if any, regarding the minor must be brought in a separate custody
action under chapter 61, a dependency action under chapter 39, or
a paternity action under chapter 742.
64
Thus, in the posited case, where the father has not consented to adoption of
the child, Senate Bill 550 would have required a court to dismiss with
prejudice a proceeding for termination of parental rights pending adoption
("TPRPA") unless the court were to find sufficient clear and convincing
evidence of the birth father's abandonment 6s of the child. As an incident to
dismissal of the case, the court would have been required to make "findings"
to support a "placement" for the child, with no statutory guidance as to what
subjects such findings were to address, that is, what the criteria for
placement would be.
v. H.H., 710 So. 2d 162, 162-63 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998). The court certified the issue to
the Supreme Court of Florida where the case remains pending. Id. at 166.
63. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, COMM. SUBSTITUTE FOR S.B. 550, § 16, 15th
Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1998) (proposing to amend FLA. STAT. § 63.089(5) (1997)).
64. Id. (emphasis added).
65. "Abandoned" is defined as:
[A] situation in which the parent or legal custodian of a child, while being
able, makes no provision for the child's support and makes no effort to
communicate with the child, which situation is sufficient to evince a willful
rejection of parental obligations. If, in the opinion of the court, the efforts of
such parent or legal custodian to support and communicate with the child are
only marginal efforts that do not evince a settled purpose to assume all
parental duties, the court may declare the child to be abandoned. In making
this decision, the court may consider the conduct of a father towards the
child's mother during her pregnancy.
FLA STAT. § 63.032(14) (1997).
Eisen
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A. An Irrebuttable Presumption of Fitness to Parent
However, the question of the child's placement upon dismissal of a
Senate Bill 550 TPRPA proceeding may be a nonissue because, under the
circumstances, the unwed father arguably would be the only legally available
custodian for the child. The mother having signed an unrevoked consent for
adoption,66 the father would be legally justified in insisting that the mother's
rights to the child be terminated before dismissal of the TPRPA action.
There being no dependency action underlying the termination of parental
rights proceeding, there would be no basis for placing the child in protective
care pending an investigation of the father's fitness to assume custody of the
child. 7 Further, there being no termination of the unwed father's parental
rights, the prospective adoptive parents would not be parties and would have
no standing to request temporary legal custody of the child.68 Thus, under
66. Present law provides that a birth parent's surrender or consent to adoption is
irrevocable once executed, absent fraud or duress. See FLA. STAT. §§ 39.464(1)(a)(2),
63.082(5) (1997). Senate Bill 550 would have provided a three-day revocation period (or one
day after a birth mother's discharge from a hospital in the case of a newborn adoption,
whichever occurs later) during which a birth parent could revoke a consent for any reason;
thereafter, consent could be withdrawn only if it was obtained by fraud or duress. See SENATE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, COMM. SUBsTrruTE FOR S.B. 550, § 12, 15th Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess.
(Fla. 1998) (proposing to amend FLA. STAT. § 63.082 (1997)).
67. In chapter 39 of the Florida Statutes, unless: a) both birth parents have
surrendered the child for adoption; b) the identity of location of a parent is unknown; c) a
parent has engaged in conduct toward the child which "threatens the life... [or] well-
being... of the child irrespective of the provision of services" through a case plan; d) a parent
is incarcerated under certain conditions; or e) a parent has engaged in "egregious conduct,"
the only way to proceed to a final judgment of termination of parental rights is by first
establishing that the child is "dependent" and then offering the parent(s) a case plan for
reunification which fails. See FLA. STAT. § 39.806 (Supp. 1998).
68. The issue of standing of the prospective adoptive parents in the TPRPA
proceeding under Senate Bill 550 is not entirely clear, however. One provision which might
elevate them to party status states:
The petition must contain all names by which the minor is or has been
known.... to allow interested parties to the action, including... persons
with custodial or visitation rights to the minor, and persons entitled to notice
pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act... to identify their
own interest in the action.
SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, COMM. SUBnSTrrurE FOR S.B. 550, § 14, 15th Leg. Sess.,
Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1998) (creating FLA. STAT. § 63.087(6)(f)(1) (1998) (emphasis added)).
Should the prospective adoptive parents somehow fit within one of these classifications,
perhaps party status would be theirs. Otherwise, though the prospective adoptive parents
would become parties once an adoption petition is filed, the bill specifically provides that "[a]
petition for adoption may not be filed until 30 days after the date the judge signed the
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the language of Senate Bill 550, a court may well have had no alternative but
to place the child with the unwed father, not only without regard to the
possibility that the mother may have wanted to reclaim her parental rights if
her adoption plan for the child was to be frustrated,69 but with no permissible
antecedent inquiry into the prospective safety and security of the child
clearly established by law.
Though it is fundamental that a biological parent enjoys the
presumption of fitness to raise his or her child, this is a rebuttable
70presumption. Yet, as just seen, implicit in Senate Bill 550 was an
irrebuttable presumption that an unwed father, by his mere refusal to agree
to adoption of a child7 2 is not only a fit parent, but is more fit than the
mother to have custody. 2
judgment terminating parental rights pending adoption." Id. (creating FLA. STAT. § 63.087(5)
(emphasis added)). See also SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, COMM. SUBSTITUTE FOR S.B.
550, § 19, 15th Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1998) (proposing to amend FLA. STAT. § 63.102)
("[A iter a court order terminating parental rights has been issued, a proceeding for adoption
may be commenced.") (emphasis added)). By analogy to the Florida Rules of Juvenile
Procedure, applicable in chapter 39 termination proceedings, the prospective adoptive parents
likely would have no party standing. FLA. R. JUV. P. 8.210(a).
69. It would be easy, and wrong, to suggest that a birth mother who has voluntarily
surrendered her child for adoption should not be permitted to reclaim the child if the birth
father subsequently objects to the adoption plan. The fact that a mother has surrendered a
child does not per se render her an unfit parent. On the contrary, Florida adoption
professionals confirm that birth mothers-who surrender may well be fit to parent
notwithstanding their decision to place. See infra Appendix F for "Results of Polling Florida
Adoption Professionals Regarding Psycho/Social Backgrounds of Children Placed for
Adoption" [hereinafter "Florida Adoption Professionals Poll"]. According to this poll, all
responding adoption attorneys and social service professionals agreed that a mother who has
surrendered should at least be permitted to request custody in these circumstances; 60%
agreed with the following statement: "Matters should go back to the way they stood before
the mother surrendered; the mother should have custody unless and until the father proves
[she is] unfit." Id. This is because some mothers make surrender decisions based upon
assumptions or conclusions that have changed or may be subject to change. For example,
before placing the child for adoption, birth mothers oftentimes refuse to explore the possibility
of family support of parenting their children, often keeping their pregnancies secret for fear of
family recrimination or disapproval. If the fact of the birth becomes known to the family
during an adoption contest, the birth mother may find support she had not otherwise expected.
70. See, e.g., Calle v. Calle, 625 So. 2d 988, 990 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
71. S.B. 550, 15TH LEG. SESS., REG. SESS. (FLA. 1998). It is very significant that
Senate Bill 550 did not in fact require the objecting father to request custody of the child in
order to stop the mother's adoption plan. Id. Thus, he could veto the adoption without
offering the child an alternative plan to raise the child himself.
72. See discussion supra note 69. A bias against birth mothers who surrender their
children for adoption appears evident in the fact that, despite the issue of fathers' fitness being
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B. Children at Risk
The decisions or actions of adults which bring a child to a court's
attention tend to reflect the presence of insecurity, instability, and even the
danger of abuse or neglect in the life of the child. There is no reason to
expect that the circumstances which bring a child before a court when an
unwed father contests the mother's adoption plan for their child are any
more pristine or benign than in other cases where child custody is at issue.
On the contrary, a child in these circumstances is "at risk" by any criteria
used for such assessments in child welfare cases.
"The quality of the research on child abuse and neglect" is considered
by social scientists to have advanced "in the 1970s and 1980s," providing
improved information through the use of "statistical analyses based [upon]
official reports [and] social surveys." 73 Theories based on this improved
research developed the theme that "'anyone' could abuse [or neglect] his or
her child in certain circumstances: when the stresses on them outweigh[] the
supports they [have]." 74 If anyone can abuse or neglect, then it is logical that
any child may be abused or neglected if the circumstances are right.
To determine the risk of child abuse or neglect for a given child, various
risk assessment models have been developed by social science scholars and
social service professionals. 75  What these models have in common is
repeatedly raised before the Judiciary Committee by this author, the only attention given to
parental fitness was in an eleventh hour floor amendment ("FAV 704320") permitting an
adoption entity to move a court for emergency relief to at least temporarily deny custody of a
child to a parent revoking consent to adoption if it is alleged that such a placement would
endanger the child. See Memorandum from Maggie A. Moody on C.S./S.B. 550 on Adoption
to the Adoption Round Table Members and Interested Parties (Apr. 17, 1998) (on file with the
Nova Law Review) (citing FAV 704320, 4/15/98). See also SENATE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, COMM. SUBSTITUTE FOR S.B. 550, § 12, 15th Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1998)
(creating FLA. STAT. § 63.082 (7) (1998)). In the majority of cases, consents are executed by
mothers only. Thus, Senate Bill 550 would have created the unreasoned policy that a birth
mother's fitness may be called into question if she seeks to exercise her statutory right of
revocation of consent proposed in the bill, but a putative birth father may have custody
without regard to his fitness.
It should be noted that FAV 704320 did not address the issue of to whom an adoption
entity should give custody of a child when both birth parents revoke their respective consents
to adoption.
73. RICHARD J. GELLES, THE BOOK OF DAVID: How PRESERVING FAMILIES CAN COsT
CHILDREN'S LIVES 81-82 (1996).
74. Id. at 82.
75. Id. at 80-86 (offering a general discussion of risk assessment factors and models).
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recognition of the nature of the factors that put children at risk. Though
generalization may offend, experienced Florida adoption professionals
confirm that the sociological profiles of children placed for adoption often
include many of the commonly recognized risk factors for abuse and
neglect.77
Furthermore, a mother's surrender of her rights to a child rmay, in some
cases, demonstrate her recognition of the child being at risk in some way.
This recognition may arise not only from a mother's belief that she cannot
successfully parent the child,78 but also from her negative evaluation of the
76. Id.
77. See infra Appendix F for the Florida Adoption Professionals Poll results. Seventy
percent of Florida adoption attorneys and social service professionals responding to a recent
survey identified "decreased emotional/mental stability and control, including immaturity due
to young age" as a risk factor, one-third responding that this characteristic was "typical" of the
psycho-social backgrounds of children under the age of five in whose adoptions the
respondents had been professionally involved. Id. Eighty percent identified "parent engaging
in or having history of alcohol/substance abuse [or] gambling" and "parent having history of
perpetrating or being victim of abuse [or] neglect" as risk factors, approximately one in five
reporting that the cases with which they were familiar "typically" involved these factors, and
half or more seeing these factors present "occasionally." Id.
78. Situations with which the public is most familiar are from news stories reporting
cases representing the two extremes of birth mother conduct. These two extremes denote
scenarios in which the birth mother did not want to parent. They are: 1) where the mother
abandons the child at birth, sometimes apparently intending that the child should die; and 2)
where the mother asserts, after having surrendered her child for adoption, that she was forced,
duped, or otherwise taken advantage of, such that the child should be returned to her.
The vast majority of cases fall somewhere between these two scenarios. The middle
ground is populated by mothers generally ranging in age between 15 and 35, who may or may
not be married, who may or may not have other children, who may or may not be receiving
public assistance, who may or may not have informed their families of their adoption plans,
who may or may not have been abused by the birth father of the child, who may or may not be
school drop-outs or college educated, who may or may not have a history of incarceration or
psychiatric admission, and who may or may not have a history of substance abuse. The birth
mother's belief that she cannot successfully parent the child, and thus that an adoption plan is
best, is affected by all of these factors, and more, in varying degrees.
It is very important that a birth mother receive meaningful preplacement counseling to
enable her to clearly identify for herself her reasons for making an adoption plan for her child.
If a birth mother has not been given this opportunity, or has refused to process this question,
one of two results may occur: either 1) after committing herself to an adoption plan, the birth
mother may come to realize, typically shortly before or immediately after the birth, that she
cannot go through with the placement; or 2) the birth mother will place the child for adoption,
but will suffer sometimes interminable grief and remorse with no hope of closure.
Postplacement counseling to assist in a birth mother's continuing adjustment post-partum is as
important as preplacement counseling, to help the birth mother through the mourning period
associated with placing a child for adoption.
Eisen
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birth father as a prospective parent7 9 This is not to say that a mother should
be permitted to veto a father's custody of a child. However, there is no good
reason for not investigating the grounds for a mother's warning that a child
80
may be at risk if placed with the unwed father.
C. When and Where to Protect the Child
It was contended by proponents of Senate Bill 550 that any question of
the child's security or safety, if placed with a contesting birth father, could
be adequately addressed in a dependency action under chapter 39 of the
Florida Statutes.8l However, that contention does not recognize that, under
the bill, a dependency action could not be filed under conditions most likely
to protect the child. First, because such an action was characterized in the
82bill as a "further" proceeding, it appears that the statutory scheme would
have required any dependency action to be brought subsequent to dismissal
of the TPRPA proceeding. Second, the dependency action would have been
a "separate" proceeding in a different court.8 4 Given these requirements,
79. A birth mother's negative opinion of a birth father, as a prospective parent, may
be grounded in any number of observations about the father, including matters ranging from
his personal family background, to his present lifestyle (including relationships with and
support of his other children, if any), to his stated feelings about parenthood. To be sure, just
as in the case of divorce, acrimony between the parents of a child cannot per se divest one or
the other of their parental rights. Nevertheless, information provided by the parents is
generally a useful starting point for custody evaluation.
80. In fact, Florida law would hold a parent criminally responsible for abuse or
neglect perpetrated by the other parent which could have been prevented or stopped by the
actions of the "innocent" parent. See FLA. STAT. § 827.03(3)(a)(2), (3)(b) (1997); see also In
re B.S., 697 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that the termination of mother's
parental rights was warranted by her knowing failure, despite having the opportunity and
capability, to prevent egregious abuse of child perpetrated by father, when mother acquiesced
in father's supervision of the child in her absence, notwithstanding father's history of pleading
guilty in manslaughter of another child, his four week old son, and repeated suspicious grave
injuries previously sustained by the child).
The "at risk" analysis in the text is also applicable, and a case plan method, like the one
described and set forth in the text accompanying notes 97-138, infra, could be used, where a
parent who has surrendered a child for adoption seeks to revoke the surrender under the
revocation provisions of the bill. See SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, COMM. SUBSTTUTE
FOR S.B. 550, § 12, 15th Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1998) (creating FLA. STAT. § 63.082(7)
(Supp. 1998)).
81. FLA. STAT. § 39 (1997 & Supp. 1998).
82. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, COMM. SUBSTITUTE FOR S.B. 550, § 16, 15th
Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1998) (proposing to create FLA. STAT. § 63.089 (Supp. 1998)).
83. Id.
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the opportunity to provide preemptive social services 5 before dismissing the
termination proceeding would be lost in favor of requiring a report of
suspected abuse, neglect, or abandonment 86 before intervention. Thus,
notwithstanding both what is known of the underpinnings of abuse and
neglect and, in given cases, a mother's concerns about a father's fitness too
parent, Senate Bill 550 would have permitted unnecessary risk to the
children by requiring courts to "look the other way" when dismissing
TPRPA proceedings.
D. Equal Protection of the Laws
Proponents of Senate Bill 550 also suggested that imposing a "fitness
test" upon an unwed father before allowing him custody of a child is
irrational and a violation of the constitutional right of equal protection of the
laws, because a married father is not subject to the same test on his way out
of the hospital with his wife and newborn baby. 87
Seductively simple, this argument is nevertheless inapt. It completely
disregards marriage as a legally significant social contract between society
and the participants in the marriage. 8  One important covenant of that
84. Senate Bill 550 would have established the TPRPA proceeding within chapter 63
of the Florida Statutes. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, COMM. SUBSTrruTE FOR S.B. 550,
§ 16, 15th Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1998). Though the bill does not assign chapter 63
matters to the family division of the circuit court, that is where chapter 63 cases have been
assigned throughout the state for some time. Id. Chapter 39 dependency proceedings, on the
other hand, are within the purview of the juvenile division. Id. The procedural requirements
involved in keeping one judge "on the case," obtaining a consolidation order, waste precious
time and effort when a child's welfare is at stake. Id.
85. Primary among the social services that should be made available to a parent
contesting an adoption should be parenting education such as set forth in the "Outline for
Proposed Legislation" beginning infra at the accompanying note 112.
86. These are the grounds for government intervention in the parent-child relationship
regarding a child not otherwise before a court. See supra text accompanying notes 23-3 1.
87. State statutes often distinguish between the parental rights of unwed mothers and
those of unwed fathers. Such statutes have been attacked as violative of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, though such challenges
are less successful than those brought under the Due Process Clause. See supra note 61 for
leading cases.
88. See Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888).
The consent of the parties is of course essential to its existence, but when the
contract to marry is executed by the marriage, a relation between the parties is
created which they cannot change. Other contracts may be modified,
restricted, or enlarged, or entirely released upon the consent of the parties.
Not so with marriage. The relation once formed, the law steps in and holds
Eisen
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contract is that the married couple will be co-responsible for the welfare of
children born to the wife or adopted during the marriage.89 This being so, it
can be said that the parenting of children is seen by society as a cooperative
venture between a mother and a father where each vouches for the
continuing fitness of the other to parent. At any time, one or the other
parent, or a government agency, may bring to the attention of society, in a
civil or criminal proceeding, that the security and/or safety of the child can
no longer be assumed. In such event, a court must ultimately decide what
custody disposition will be in the child's "best interests."
90
the parties to various obligations and liabilities. It is an institution .... the
foundation of the family and of society.
Id. at 211.
89. Indeed, the fact that a married man suspects he is not the father of a child born to
his wife does not automatically entitle him to require paternity testing in support of a
challenge of his obligation of support to the child. Such testing must be court ordered, and
will not be ordered if not determined by the court to be in the best interests of the child. See
FLA. STAT. § 742.12(2) (1997) ("the court may... require the child, mother, and alleged
fathers to submit to scientific tests.., to show a probability of paternity") (emphasis added).
Compare Department of Health & Rehabilitative Serv. v. Privette, 617 So. 2d 305, 308 (Fla.
1993) (holding that a trial court hearing a petition for paternity must determine "that the
child's best interests will be better served [by ordering a blood test] even if the blood test later
proves the child's factual illegitimacy"), with In re Paternity of Baby Doe, 558 N.W.2d 897
(Wis. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that the putative father of a child born out-of-wedlock has a
statutory right to a determination of paternity and the court may not conduct a best interests
hearing as a prerequisite for ordering blood tests).
90. For an interesting summary of the history of adopin in America, including the
evolution of the concept of "best intest of the child" in the adopion context, see 1 JOAN
HEIFETZ HOLLINGER, ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE, §§ 1.01-1.04 (1998). Hollinger
explains:
[A] distinctive feature of America's first adoption statutes was the
requirement of a judicial finding that the adopters were 'suitable' and that the
'moral and temporal' or best interests of the child would be served. Until
well into the 20th century, however, little was done to breathe life into this
requirement.... 'Suitability,' if scrutinized at all, was defined primarily in
terms of the financial solvency of the adoptive parents. The child's 'moral
and temporal' interests, or what would now be called the child's 'best
interests,' were similarly defined more in economic than in psychological
terms.
Id. § 1.03[2]. "Even as late as 1930 .... the best interest standard was confined to the
economic interest of the child." Id. § 1.03[7]. Today, "psychological and social conceptions
of children's well-being have displaced the earlier economic and moralistic ones. With this
has come a new understanding of why adoption is 'good' for children, adoptive parents and
birth parents." Id. § 1.04.
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Equal protection of the laws would certainly demand that an unwed
father not enjoy a greater presumption of fitness to parent than a married
father. Nevertheless, this would be the result if, as Senate Bill 550 appears
to have required, a child must be placed with an unwed father, regardless of
the fact that the child's unwed mother does not vouch for the father's fitness
to parent. On the contrary, where the mother has demonstrated her belief
that the child should be placed for adoption rather than be in the unwed
father's care,9' society has no alternative but to take seriously the mother's
concern and investigate the fitness of the father to parent before giving him
custody of the child.92
It might also be argued that a "test" for unwed fathers contesting
adoption of a child is irrational in light of the fact that an unwed mother who
chooses from the outset to parent, rather than place a child for adoption, is
not similarly scrutinized. Such an argument would miss the point that it is
not a parent's "unwed" status per se which calls his or her fitness into
question. Indeed, two unwed parents who agree extrajudicially on custody
and other matters regarding their child may never see the inside of a
courtroom. Rather, in a contested adoption, it is precisely because the
unwed parents have not agreed on a plan for their child, for whatever
reason, 93 that the child has come to public attention. In contrast, society's
91. The fact that the mother could have spared herself of the entire adoption process
by giving the child to the father to raise, if she perceived that as a feasible and desirable
alternative, should not be discounted in determining whether to heed her negative assessment
of the father's fitness to parent.
92. It bears mentioning here that there appears to have been disturbing implicit
assumptions about the motivations of birth parents in Senate Bill 550: a) the unsupported
negative assumption that a birth mother does not usually have valid, compelling reasons for
believing that the birth father of her child is or may be unfit to raise the child, or has no real
interest in raising the child; and b) the unsupported positive assumption that birth fathers who
make objections to adoptive placements do so only for the reason that they wish to create
homes for their children and raise them themselves. S.B. 550, 15th Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess.
(Fla. 1998). Though the occasional birth parent fits one or the other of these stereotypes, these
are hardly typical profiles. Id. As in so many other matters of human concern, there are very
few, if any, hard and fast rules in the sociolegal context of adoption. Id.
93. The parents may have reached no agreement regarding the child for any number of
reasons, including: 1) that the mother does not know the identity and/or location of the father;
2) that the father informs the mother that he has no interest in the child or denies paternity; 3)
that though the father is aware of the pregnancy, the mother informs him of her intention to
have an abortion and then relocates such that the father has no means of following up to
determine whether the pregnancy was terminated; 4) that there is generalized antipathy
between the parents, resulting in their inability to interact for the purpose of making crucial
parenting decisions; 5) the parents disagree on fundamental issues regarding custody, support,
education, visitation, etc.. or 6) the pregnancy was the result of sexual assault.
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social contract with married couples presumes that husbands and wives share
jointly the rights and responsibilities of the care, custody, and control of
their children.
It should be noted that the imperative to fully protect a child brought
within a court's jurisdiction is the reason the law dictates that prospective
adoptive parents participate in a "home study" before they can be eligible to
adopt.94 Further, a court must find a proposed adoption to be in the child's
best interests at the time of finalization.95 Absent the duty to protect children
placed for adoption, there could be no justification for such interference with
an infertile couple's plans for building a family. Instead, analogizing to
Senate Bill 550's illogic in setting the scene for automatic placement of
children surrendered for adoption with contesting unwed fathers, the law
would permit just anyone to adopt, and hope for the best.96
94. FLA. STAT. § 63.092 (Supp. 1998).
95. Section 63.092 of the Florida Statutes provides:
(2) PRELIMINARY HOME STUDY. - Before placing the minor in the
intended adoptive home, a preliminary home study must be performed by a
licensed child-placing agency, a licensed professional, or agency described in
[section] 61.20(2) .... The preliminary home study must include, at a
minimum:
(a) An interview with the intended adoptive parents;
(b) Records checks of the department's central abuse registry and criminal
records correspondence checks pursuant to [section] 435.045 through the
Department of Law Enforcement on the intended adoptive parents;
(c) An assessment of the physical environment of the home;
(d) A determination of the financial security of the intended adoptive
parents;
(e) Documentation of counseling and education of the intended adoptive
parents on adoptive parenting;
(f) Documentation that information on adoption and the adoption process
has been provided to the intended adoptive parents;
(g) Documentation that information on support services available in the
community has been provided to the intended adoptive parents;
(h) A copy of the signed statement required by [section] 63.085(1).
(i) A copy of the written acknowledgment required by [section] 63.085(1).
FLA. STAT. § 63.092 (Supp. 1998).
96. S.B. 550, 15th Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1998).
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IV. A "BRIEF CASE PLAN" APPROACH TO ADOPTION CONTESTS
BY UNWED FATHERS97
As previously explained, the United States Supreme Court recognizes a
state's right to impose limitations relating to the welfare of children upon
unwed fathers' parental rights.98  However, because the dynamics of
individual cases cannot be assessed in advance, limitations which will
safeguard a particular child cannot be adequately legislated. Instead, what is
reasonable is to establish legislative parameters within which appropriately
licensed professionals 99  may assess specific cases and make
recommendations to courts regarding child custody in contested adoptions,
while providing concurrent judicial processes to move cases to expeditious
conclusion. Building upon Justice Kogan's previously discussed
"performance" concept, 1°t Senate Bill 550 should be rethought with regard
to birth fathers' rights. The "brief case plan" approach outlined at the end of
97. The term "brief case plan" is used to describe the method proposed in this article
for resolving contested adoptions by unwed fathers. The move toward alternative dispute
resolution based on "brief" models is already recognized among child welfare professionals as
demonstrated by the currency of the use of "brief therapy" and "brief evaluation" as case
management tools in dependency cases. Though it is anticipated that the situations in which a
brief case plan proposal would be brought into operation would be where a birth mother has
executed an irrevocable surrender of the child for adoption, such that only birth father issues
remain to be resolved, this proposal anticipates: 1) instances where the birth mother seeks
to revoke her surrender, either alleging fraud or duress, or revocation pursuant to a statutory
revocation provision such as that proposed in Senate Bill 550 (See SENATE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, COMM. SUBSTrUTE FOR S.B. 550, § 12, 15th Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1998)
(proposing to amend FLA. STAT. § 63.082(4)(c) (1997)); and 2) those instances where the
court determines that the birth father's rights cannot be terminated and thus the custody of the
child is subject to contest between the biological parents.
98. See supra notes 12-23 and accompanying text
99. Chapter 63 of the Florida Statutes incorporates by reference a listing of mental
health professionals approved for conducting home study evaluations of prospective adoptive
parents in intermediary adoptions. See FLA. STAT. § 63.092(2) (Supp. 1998). The listing is
contained in section 61.20(2) of the Florida Statutes as follows:
A social investigation and study, when ordered by the court, shall be
conducted by qualified staff of the court; a child-placing agency licensed
pursuant to [section] 409.175; a psychologist licensed pursuant to chapter
490; or a clinical social worker, marriage and family therapist, or mental
health counselor licensed pursuant to chapter 491.
FLA. STAT. § 61.20(2) (1997). These professionals, depending upon their experience, may be
appropriate for this purpose.
100. See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
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the next section ("the Outline") is suggested as a framework for appropriate
legislation.'
0
'
Parts I through H1102 of the Outline address the basic issues of "who,
what, when, where, and how" as to the initial court procedures required to
process a birth parent's surrender of a child for adoption, regardless of the
child's age. Important features of these initial procedures include: 1)
adoption proceedings beginning and ending in juvenile courts, where the
most judicial experience in balancing child protection issues with the
preservation of parents' rights is concentrated, and where court rules which
facilitate such proceedings are already in place; 0 3 2) the possibility of filing
prebirth a petition to terminate parental rights to facilitate early identification
of interested parties (though termination would occur, if at all, only after
birth of the child);1°4 and 3) including in all surrenders an agreement to
submit to DNA testing, with or without a court order.
101. A detailed outline of suggested legislation is provided rather than a proposal cast
in bill form. This is because the proposal is made for revision of chapter 39 (Juvenile
Proceedings) to move all adoption matters into Juvenile Court, rather than for amendment of
chapter 63 (Adoption), even though the present legislative will appears to be in favor of
proposing to amend chapter 63. If the proposed policy were to be amended into chapter 63, it
is suggested that it be inserted immediately following section 63.032 (Definitions), and before
section 63.042 (Who may be adopted; who may adopt). If placed in chapter 39, it is suggested
that a new Part XII be created for adoption.
102. See infra notes 112-27 and accompanying text.
103. This proposal conflicts with Senate Bill 550 as to whether termination of parental
rights and adoption proceedings should come within the purview of juvenile courts under
chapter 39 of the Florida Statutes, as advocated here, or within the authority of the family
courts under chapter 63, as proposed in the bill.
There is presently only one provision in the family court rules, approved by the Supreme
Court of Florida in 1998, relating to adoption. See FLA. FAM. L. R. P. 12.200(a)(2) (requiring
the court to order a case management conference within sixty (60) days of the filing of an
adoption petition when: a) a waiver of consent is requested; b) "notice of the hearing on the
petition.., is not [to be] afforded a person whose consent is required but has not consented;"
c) "an intermediary, attorney, or agency is seeking fees or costs in excess of those provided
[by statute];" d) a party is to be served by constructive rather than personal service; or e) "the
court is otherwise aware that any person having standing objects to the adoption"). FLA. FAM.
L. R. P. 12.200(a)(2).
104. The filing of a prebirth petition for termination of parental rights would create a
more satisfactory basis for contacting a prospective father of a child to determine his
intentions toward the child once born. Service upon such individuals before birth would tend
to reduce the instance of ambiguity in the birth father's position regarding the child, It sets the
stage for a more expedient resolution of the child's status once born. If all prospective fathers
have been served by the time of birth, the case plan proposed can commence immediately,
thus reducing considerably the period of time after birth required to resolve the child's status.
See G.W.B. v. J.S.W., 647 So. 2d 918, 931 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994), rev'd, 652 So. 2d
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Part IV of the Outline ms establishes the beginning of "fast track" court
proceedings to resolve the child's future. Unless a court determines that
clear and convincing evidence of grounds for termination of the parental
rights of both parents already exist at the time of a preliminary hearing, this
procedure would provide the child with a brief case plan. The duration of
the case plan would be sixty days from the birth of the child, or the date of
the plan, whichever is later, or a lesser or greater period, if agreed upon by
the parties to the petition to terminate parental rights.
An evidentiary hearing is required to determine contested issues as to
termination of parental rights during the pendency of the case plan. Upon
expiration of the case plan, and depending upon whether the child was under
or over 180 days old, that is, an infant, at the time the petition for
termination of parental rights was filed, the proceedings would move in one
of several directions. Where an infant is involved, the case would go to a
disposition phase. In the case of non-infants, the court would permit, on
motion, the filing of a custody action under chapter 61 of the Florida
Statutes, a dependency action under chapter 39, or a paternity action under
chapter 742, within the same proceeding.
The requirements of the case plan, set forth in Part VI 6 of the Outline,
are intended to provide positive support to any party, as defined, seeking
custody of the child,1°7 while allowing an objective study of such person's
desire and ability to parent. The study requirements are comparable to those
imposed upon nonparty prospective adoptive parents under current law.
108
The concept of "constructive abandonment," a parent's demonstrated
unwillingness or gross inability to parent the child prospectively, is created
to address situations where the results of the case plan justify termination of
parental rights. The proposal also permits an unexpired case plan to be
curtailed if a court finds that the plan has become unnecessary due to a
change in circumstances.
The timetable established by the case plan proposal for contested cases
limits trial court proceedings for termination of parental rights to a maximum
816 (Fla. 1995), decision approved by 658 So. 2d 961 (1995) (Pariente, J., concurring)
(advocating this concept in theory).
105. See infra text accompanying note 128.
106. See infra text accompanying notes 133.
107. The "party seeking custody" may be either the mother or the father, or both. The
proposal provides that if parental rights are not terminated at an evidentiary hearing, such that
the case plan is extended for the purpose of determining a proper placement of the child, the
mother's surrender may be nullified by the court.
108. See FLA. STAT. §§ 63.092(2) (Supp. 1998), 63.125 (1997). See also FLA. ADMIN.
CODE R. 65C-15.028(3).
Eisen
366
Nova Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [1998], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol23/iss1/1
Nova Law Review
of 147 days after service of process, with the case plan running concurrently.
Review in the district court, and certiorari and appeal to higher courts
remain available, though it is expected that good social work will minimize
the number of cases moving beyond the trial court level.
Finally, the provision for repose suggested in Part XI'0 9 of the Outline is
keyed to the date of final judgment of the adoption of a child, rather than to
the date of termination of parental rights as was proposed in Senate Bill
550.110 This is meant to discourage prospective adoptive parents from
waiting for repose before psychologically and legally finalizing the child's
adoption.'1 ' The suggested time for repose is 180 days.
V. OUTLINE FOR PROPOSED LEGISLATION
I. Initiation of a Proceeding for Termination of Parental Rights
upon Parent's Surrender. In all cases where a parent ("the
Parent") of a child ("the Child") surrenders the Child for adoption
to an adoption entity ("Adoption Entity")' 12 licensed or authorized
in this state, a petition ("Petition") for termination of parental
rights pending adoption ("TPRPA") shall be filed in the juvenile
division of the circuit court ("the Court") of this state, in the
county where the Adoption Entity is located,' no more than seven
(7) days' 14 after the Parent's surrender is executed. No fee for
filing the Petition shall be charged by the Clerk of Court ("the
109. See infra text following note 138.
110. See SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, COMM. SUBSTITUTE FOR S.B. 550, § 27,
15th Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1998) (proposing to amend FLA. STAT. § 63.182) (1997)).
111. Id.
112. Senate Bill 550 coined the term "adoption entity" as an umbrella designation for
all persons and organizations permitted to place children for adoption in Florida. S.B. 550,
15TH LEG. SESS., REG. SESS. (FLA. 1998). See SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, COMM.
SUBSTITUTE FOR S.B. 550, § 6, 15th Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1998) (proposing to amend
FLA. STAT. § 63.032 by adding sub-section (15) which reads as follows: "'Adoption Entity'
means the department under chapter 39; an agency under chapter 63 or, at the request of the
department, under chapter 39; or an intermediary under chapter 63, placing a person for
adoption.").
113. This provision regarding venue adopts current law regarding venue for agency
adoptions. See FLA. STAT. § 63.102(2) (1997).
114. This time period accommodates the birth mother's statutory right of revocation of
her consent as proposed in SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, COMM. SUBSTITUTE FOR S.B.
550, § 12, 15th Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1998) (proposing to amend FLA. STAT. §
63.082(4)(c) (1997)).
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Clerk")." '5  If any other proceeding regarding the Child was
initiated in the a division of the circuit court of this state prior to
the time of filing the TPRPA Petition, the TPRPA action shall be
filed in the existing case.' 16 Any action previously filed in any
court in this state other than a juvenile division of the circuit court
shall be, if necessary, consolidated into the TPRPA action.
Prebirth Petitions. A prebirth Petition may be filed to facilitate
the process of providing notice of the intention of the mother ("the
Mother") to surrender the Child for adoption at birth, to any man
who may be, or may claim to be, the legal and/or biological father
of the Child ("Prospective Father"). Nevertheless, no surrender of
a child shall be executed, and no order terminating the parental
rights of a child's parent(s) shall be entered, until after the birth of
a child."
17
Agreement to Provide Biologic Material for Paternity Testing. A
surrender of a child for adoption shall contain a provision that the
party signing the surrender agrees to provide biologic material
necessary for the purpose of establishing the identity of the
biological father of the Child, with or without a court order.
II. Advisory Hearing; Appointment of Guardian Ad Litem;
Temporary Custody. At the time of filing the Petition, Petitioner
115. No filing fee is presently charged for chapter 39 termination of parental rights
actions. FLA. STAT. ch. 39 (1997 & Supp. 1998). A filing fee may be charged, as is the
present case, if and when the adoption proceeding is filed. See generally FLA. STAT. § 39.472
(Supp. 1998).
116. Present statutory law provides that in intermediary adoptions, the intermediary
must report any intended placement of a minor for adoption before the child is placed in the
prospective adoptive home (unless it is a family or stepparent adoption). FLA. STAT. §
63.092(1) (Supp. 1998). Senate Bill 550 would have perpetuated this requirement, and
extended it to all "adoption entities." See SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, COMM.
SUBSTrrUTE FOR S.B. 550, § 17, 15th Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1998) (proposing to amend
FLA. STAT. § 63.092(1) (1998)). If this reporting requirement is to be retained, the report
should be filed in juvenile court, with the petition for TPRPA being filed in the same
proceeding. Section 63.102(5) of the Florida Statutes permits the filing of a "petition for
declaratory statement" for "prior approval of fees and costs" in connection with a proposed
placement. FLA. STAT. § 63.102(5) (1997). If such a petition is to be filed, it would likewise
be filed in the juvenile court wherein the notice of intent to place is filed.
117. The "no prebirth surrender" requirement is presently the law, as provided by
statute. FLA. STAT. § 63.082(4) (1997).
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shall assure that the Clerk will set an advisory hearing ("Advisory
Hearing"), to be held within seven (7) days, at which time the
Court shall: a) appoint a guardian ad litem ("the GAL") for the
Child;' 8 b) make a determination of temporary custody of the
Child, which may be with the Prospective Adoptive Parents or in
foster care, whichever appears to be in the best interests of the
Child considering the facts and circumstances of the case; and
c) determine who, if anyone, shall have temporary visitation with
the Child.
IE. Parties. The necessary parties to the TPRPA proceeding shall be:
a) the Adoption Entity to which a Parent has surrendered or
intends to surrender the Child for adoption, as petitioner ("the
Petitioner"); b) the Mother;" 9 c) any Prospective Father of the
Child, including those identifiable through the inquiry outlined in
section 39.803 of the Florida Statutes; d) any other person or
118. Section 39.807(2)(b) of the Florida Statutes provides:
The guardian ad litem has the following responsibilities:
To investigate the allegations of the petition and any subsequent matters
arising in the case and, unless excused by the court, to file a written report.
This report must include a statement of the wishes of the child and the
recommendations of the guardian ad litem and must be provided to all parties
and the court at least [forty-eight] hours before the disposition hearing.
To be present at all court hearings unless excused by the court.
To represent the interests of the child until the jurisdiction of the court over
the child terminates or until excused by the court.
To perform such other duties and undertake such other responsiblities as the
court may direct.
FLA. STAT. § 39.807(2)(b) (Supp. 1998).
119. Though the mother's surrender would be irrevocable except upon a showing of
fraud or duress (unless a revocation period for surrender, such as that proposed in Senate Bill
550, were available) the mother's rights are not terminated automatically, but require judicial
action. Where a mother who has surrendered decides to contest on the grounds of revocation,
fraud, or duress, her rights would be addressed within the proceeding proposed in the Outline.
120. Section 39.803 of the Florida Statutes provides:
(1) If the identity or location of a parent is unknown and a petition for
termination of parental rights is filed, the court shall conduct the following
inquiry of the parent who is available, or, if no parent is available, of any
relative, caregiver, or legal custodian of the child who is present at the
hearing and likely to have the information:
(a) Whether the mother of the child was married at the probable time
of conception of the child or at the time of birth of the child.
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entity having physical or legal custody of the Child; and e) the
GAL.
Prospective Adoptive Parents not Parties. The Prospective
Adoptive Parent(s) of the Child, notwithstanding that they may be
granted temporary physical custody of, or temporary visitation
with the Child, shall not be parties to the TPRPA proceeding until,
if at all, they are notified by the Court that parental rights have
been terminated, the Child is free for adoption, and an adoption
petition may be filed.121 Such notification shall not issue until the
(b) Whether the mother was cohabiting with a male at the probable
time of the conception of the child.
(c) Whether the mother has received payments or promises of support
with respect to the child or because of her pregnancy from a man who claims
to be the father.
(d) Whether the mother has named any man as the father on the birth
certificate of the child or in connection with applying for or receiving public
assistance.
(e) Whether any man has acknowledged or claimed paternity of the
child in a jurisdiction in which the mother resided at the time of or since
conception of the child, or in which the child has resided or resides.
(2) The information required in subsection (1) may be supplied to the court
or the department in the form of a sworn affidavit by a person having personal
knowledge of the facts.
FLA. STAT. § 39.803 (Supp. 1998).
The Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure provide a form which tracks the statute set
forth above. FLA. R. Juv. P. Form 8.969 ("Affidavit of Mother Regarding Unknown Father").
It should be modified for use in situations where the father is known, but the possibility of
other prospective fathers is to be negated. See Appendix G infra for a worksheet to assist the
practitioner in assuring the completeness of the birth mother's affidavit regarding the identity
of the father.
121. The Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure limits the parties to juvenile
proceedings, including proceedings to terminate parental rights, as follows: 'Definitions.
For the purpose of these rules the terms 'party' and 'parties' shall include the petitioner, the
child, the parents of the child, the department, and the guardian ad litem, when appointed."
Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.210(a). Though, under this definition, prospective adoptive parents are not
parties to termination proceedings under current law, they do enjoy at least "'participant"'
status: "Additional Participants. 'Participant' means any person who is not a party but who
should receive notice of hearings involving the child. Participants include ... identified
prospective parents .... Participants may be granted leave by the court to be heard without the
necessity of filing a motion to intervene." Id. at 8.210(b). However, it is arguable that rule
8.210(a), by its very terms, is definitional only, and does not circumscribe the entire class of
persons who might otherwise become parties, even rule 8.210(b) "participants" who, though
they may be granted leave to be heard without the "necessity" of intervenor, nevertheless may
choose to move to intervene if they might otherwise establish a legal basis for doing so. Id.
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time for filing motions for rehearing or clarification has expired or,
if filed, disposed of as set forth in Part X, below.
Notice of Action and Preliminary Hearing. All necessary parties
shall be served with a notice ("the Notice") of action and
preliminary hearing ("Preliminary Hearing") for TPRPA,122 issued
by the Clerk, with a copy of the Petition attached, at the earliest
possible moment following the filing of the Petition, except that if
service of process is waived in writing by any necessary party,
notice to that party shall be provided by the Petitioner by certified
mail/return receipt requested/restricted delivery,123 and by the
Clerk by regular mail, to the address provided by that party in said
waiver.124 Notice shall not be excused except by order of the
Court, for good cause shown, upon written waiver by the party for
whom excuse of notice is sought.
Service of Process. Service of the Notice shall be in accordance
with the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure except as otherwise
provided herein. Service shall be by personal service if a party is
known, located, and residing within this state. Service shall be by
constructive service, as provided in chapter 49 of the Florida
Statutes, if a party is unknown, not locateable, or located but
residing outside this state. The affidavit necessary to support
constructive service upon any party1 5 shall be in compliance with
122. See Appendix H infra for a form for Notice of Action and Hearing.
123. Using the United States Postal Service's "restricted delivery" certified mail
service is advisable for three reasons: 1) the privacy of the addressee is protected by requiring
the addressee's signature, not just a recipient's signature, for delivery of the mail; 2) the
sender has a written record of actual receipt by the addressee personally, the certified mail
receipt being returned to the sender after delivery; and 3) under Senate Bill 550, a court
making a determination of abandonment is required to take into consideration "[w]hether
other persons prevented the person alleged to have abandoned the child from making the
efforts referenced in this subsection [to participate supportively in the birth mother's prenatal
care]." See SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, COMM. SUBSTITUTE FOR S.B. 550, § 16, 15th
Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1998) (proposing to create FLA. STAT. § 63.089(4)). Were
someone to be found to have intercepted unrestricted certified mail to the father, the father
would have legitimate grounds on which to avoid a finding of abandonment under the bill.
124. To further assure that the birth parent signing the surrender is on notice of the
anticipated TPRPA action, the surrender, a copy of which should be given to the birth parent,
should recite the name, address, and phone number of the court where the TPRPA will be
filed.
125. See FLA. STAT. § 49.031 (1997).
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section 39.803(6) of the Florida Statutes.126 If residing outside
this state, a party shall be mailed a copy of the Notice, with a copy
of the Petition attached, by certified mail/return receipt
requested/restricted delivery by the Petitioner, and by regular mail
by the Clerk.
127
IV. Response to Notice of Action. The Mother and/or a Prospective
Father of the Child who has been served with or has otherwise
received the Notice, who wishes to assert parental rights to the
Child, must respond ("Response") to the Notice by the date of the
Preliminary Hearing indicated on its face, which date may not be
less than thirty days nor more than forty-five days after the last
date of personal service upon any necessary party, and/or
126. Florida Statutes section 39.803(6) (Supp. 1998) provides:
The diligent search required by [these rules] must include, at a minimum,
inquiries of all known relatives of the parent or prospective parent, inquiries
of all offices of program areas of the department likely to have information
about the parent or prospective parent, inquiries of other state and federal
agencies likely to have information about the parent or prospective parent,
inquiries of appropriate utility and postal providers, and inquiries of
appropriate law enforcement agencies.
FLA. STAT. § 39.803(6) (Supp. 1998).
These are minimum requirements. Indeed, a better guide to the parameters of an
acceptable diligent search are reflected in Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure Form 8.968
("Affidavit of Diligent Search"). FLA. R. Juv. P. Form 8.968.
127. Section 49.12 of the Florida Statutes provides:
If the residence of any party to be served by publication is stated in the sworn
statement with more particularity than the name of the state or country in
which the defendant resides, the clerk or the judge shall mall a copy of the
notice by United States mail, with postage prepaid, to each defendant within
10 days after making or posting the notice, the date of mailing to be noted on
the docket with a copy of the pleading for which the notice was issued.
FLA. STAT. § 49.12 (1997).
Service of process by constructive service is not effective where the pleading is not
mailed along with the notice. See Coin Copies, Inc. v. Financial Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 472
So. 2d 869 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Tompkins v. Barnett Bank, 478 So. 2d 878 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1985). If a notice mailed by the clerk is not returned, it is presumed that it was
delivered as addressed. See Lear v. Lear, 95 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 1957). Because the mailing
(and nonreturn) of the notice is jurisdictional, an affidavit by the clerk that the notice was
mailed and not returned should be considered an important element of proof of service along
with the publication affidavit. See Appendix I infra setting out a form for "Clerk's Affidavit
of Compliance with Mailing Requirements for Constructive Service of Process."
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commencement of publication for constructive service,128 and
notify the court clearly and unequivocally of her/his desire to seek
custody of the Child. To "respond" shall mean to communicate
with the Court in a writing filed in the court file before the time of
the Preliminary Hearing, or to attend the Preliminary Hearing.
Postponement and Re-Notice. If the date of the Preliminary
Hearing must be rescheduled due to failure to timely serve a
necessary party, notice of the new hearing date shall be served by
mail upon any party previously personally served, at the same
address where personal service occurred, or at any other address
subsequently provided to Petitioner in writing by that party,
without the necessity of further service of process. Any party who
waived service of process shall be notified of the new hearing date
at the same address to which notice was previously mailed, or at
any other address subsequently provided to Petitioner in writing by
that party.
V. Termination of Parental Rights at Preliminary Hearing; Actual
Abandonment. If at the Preliminary Hearing the Court: a) finds
that all necessary parties have been served with the Notice as set
forth in Part I or IV, above; and b) finds that the Court has
received no Response from the Mother or any Prospective Father
notifying the Court of her/his desire to seek custody of the Child;
and c) finds by clear and convincing evidence that: 1) the Mother
surrendered the Child for adoption freely and voluntarily by an
unrevoked 129 instrument duly executed for that purpose; 13 and 2)
any and all Prospective Fathers surrendered the Child for adoption
freely and voluntarily by an unrevoked instrument duly executed
128. This time frame is different than what chapter 49 provides for constructive
service, but is within its due process limitations, and thus a scheme not in conflict with chapter
49. See FLA. STAT. ch. 49 (1997 & Supp. 1998).
129. Senate Bill 550 permitted revocation of a consent to adoption within three days of
signing under certain circumstances. See SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, COMM.
SUBSTITUTE FOR S.B. 550, § 12, 15th Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1998) (proposing
amendments to FLA. STAT. § 63.082 (1997)).
130. See Appendix J infra for a sort of self-proving "truth-in-adoption" document
developed by this writer to be used as evidence of the "free and voluntary" nature of a birth
parent's surrender.
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for that purpose, or executed a denial of paternity of the Child,131
or actually abandoned the Child, the Court shall enter a judgment
("Judgment") setting forth its specific findings of fact, terminating
the Mother's and any and all Prospective Fathers' parental rights
to the Child, and freeing the Child for adoption. To "actually
abandon" shall mean to abandon a child as defined in section
63.032(14) of the Florida Statutes. 132
VI. Case Plan; Appointment of Supervising Agency; Evidentiary
Hearing. If at the Preliminary Hearing the Court does not
terminate parental rights as provided in Part V, above, but finds
that the Mother and/or a Prospective Father by a Response has
clearly and unequivocally notified the Court at or before the
Preliminary Hearing that she/he wishes to seek custody of the
Child ("Party Seeking Custody"), the Court shall at the
Preliminary Hearing: a) inform any Party Seeking Custody, if
present, of her/his right to counsel;133 b) appoint counsel if any
Party Seeking Custody so requests and is indigent; c) direct the
Department of Children & Family Services ("the Department") or
a Florida licensed child-placing agency ("Licensed Agency"), as
supervising agency ("Supervising Agency"), to prepare and file a
proposed case plan ("Plan") for the Child within five (5) days of
the Preliminary Hearing, to be heard for Court approval within ten
131. Senate Bill 550 recognized an "affidavit of nonpaternity" as a substitute for
consent by a man identified by a birth mother as the father of her child. See SENATE COMM.
ON THE JUDICIARY, COMM. SUBSTITUTE FOR S.B. 550, § 11, 15th Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (Fla.
1998) (proposing to amend FLA. STAT. § 63.062 (1997)). The form contents required by this
section are inadequate to the form's purpose. First, though titled an "Affidavit of
Nonpatemity," the form never actually states that the affiant is not the father of the child.
Second, although proposed subsection (4)(a) of the same section requiring the affidavit states
that the affidavit "shall not be executed before birth of the minor," the form provides for
recitation, in paragraph 4, that affiant has "not supported the birth mother or her child or
unborn child with support of any kind." Most importantly, the form does not require
recitation of the child's birth date or gender, thus leaving open the potential for an attempted
withdrawal of the affidavit on the basis of mistake or fraud. A better method for allowing a
putative father to "sign off" his rights is by a "denial of paternity." Such an instrument is
identical to a surrender form, see Appendix D infra, except it states at the outset that 1) the
man executing the denial is not the child's father; but 2) even if he is the father, he surrenders
the child and waives all rights. See id.
132. FLA. STAT. § 63.032(14) (1997). See supra note 65 for text of definition.
133. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text for a discussion of the right to
counsel.
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(10) days of the Preliminary Hearing; and d) set an evidentiary
hearing ("the Evidentiary Hearing") on all then-contested issues,
which hearing must be held and completed no less than ten (10)
nor more than twenty (20) days from the date of the Preliminary
Hearing, unless good cause is shown to shorten or enlarge this
time. Neither the Department nor a Licensed Agency shall be
disqualified from serving as Supervising Agency for the Plan
because it is also the Petitioner.
Service of Plan; Objections to Plan. A copy of the proposed Plan
shall be served by mail by the Supervising Agency on all parties to
the proceeding. If any party objects to the Plan, the Court shall
determine at the Evidentiary Hearing whether and in what manner
the Plan should be modified.
Duration of Plan. The duration of the Plan shall be sixty days
from the birth of the Child, or the date of the filing of the Plan,
whichever is later, or a lesser or greater period if agreed to by the
parties and approved by the Court. The Plan shall be appropriate
to the needs of the Child, with the goal of assisting the Court in
determining what disposition to make of the Petition, among the
alternatives set forth in Part IX, below. Requirements for the Plan
are set forth in Part VII, below.
Termination of Parental Rights at Evidentiary Hearing. Should
the Court determine at the Evidentiary Hearing that the Mother and
any and all Prospective Fathers of the Child are estopped to assert
parental rights because they have executed surrenders of the Child
voluntarily, without fraud or duress, which surrenders have not
been revoked as may be provided by law, or that the Mother has
surrendered the Child as aforesaid or actually abandoned the
Child, and any and all Prospective Fathers have executed denials
of paternity, or actually abandoned the Child prior to filing a
Response to the Notice, the Court shall enter a judgment
("Judgment"): a) based upon written findings of clear and
convincing evidence, terminating all parental rights to the Child; b)
terminating the Plan; and c) freeing the Child for adoption.
Continuation of Plan When Rights Not Terminated at
Evidentiary Hearing - Child Under 180 Days of Age. If
parental rights are not terminated at the Evidentiary Hearing, the
Court shall enter its order a) setting forth all contested issues and
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the Court's findings of fact thereon and, if the Child was less than
180 days of age at the time of the filing of the Petition, b)
providing that the Plan shall remain in effect pending the
Disposition Hearing provided for in Part IX, below.
Child 180 Days Old or Older. If parental rights are not terminated
at the Evidentiary Hearing and the Child was 180 or more days of
age at the time of the filing of the Petition, the Court shall: a) on
proper motion and payment of any applicable filing fee, enter its
order allowing the filing of a custody action under chapter 61 of
the Florida Statutes, a dependency action under chapter 39 of the
Florida Statutes, or a paternity action under chapter 742 of the
Florida Statutes, within a time certain, not to exceed ten (10) days
from the date of the order, in the same proceeding, and b) enter its
order determining temporary custody of the child. If no such
action is filed within 10 days, the Court shall proceed as set forth
in the preceding paragraph without regard to the Child's age.
VII. Case Plan Requirements
A. Plan Contents. The Plan shall provide for:
1. The expiration date of the Plan;
2. Identification of Plan participants (i.e., the parties and
the Prospective Adoptive Parents), the Supervising Agency
and agency personnel responsible for the Plan, and outside
resources/personnel (including any out-of-state agencies) to
be utilized to promote the requirements of the Plan (including
names, addresses, telephone numbers, and other pertinent
data);
3. care and maintenance of the Child pending disposition of
the proceeding, including room and board, provision for the
medical, emotional, and social needs of the Child and, if
applicable, the educational, religious, and cultural needs of
the Child (physical custody of the Child to be with foster
parents, unless the GAL requests, the Supervising Agency
recommends in the Plan, and the Court orders, that physical
custody be with the Prospective Adoptive Parents, and they
are agreeable to the arrangement);
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4. supervised visitation by non-custodial Plan participants
(the Prospective Adoptive Parents, if not physical custodians
of the Child under the Plan, having no visitation with the
Child unless the GAL requests, the Supervising Agency
recommends in the Plan, and the Court orders, that they may
visit with the Child, and they are agreeable to the
arrangement);
5. modification of the Plan should the needs of the Child
change during the pendency of the Petition (including, but not
limited to, circumstances resulting in the need for a change of
physical custodian of the Child or a change in any visitation
schedule);
6. extension of the expiration date of the Plan if
necessitated by a motion for rehearing or clarification, or by
resort to a higher court;
1 34
7. paternity testing for any Party seeking custody who
claims to be the biological father ("the Father") of the Child;
8. counseling support for Plan participants pending final
disposition of the Petition;
9. a written psycho-social assessment of any Party seeking
custody of the Child including the Party's strengths,
resources, desire and readiness to parent; 35
10. parenting education for any Party seeking custody of the
Child; and
11. weekly assessment by the Supervising Agency as to the
Plan's progress and the Child's well-being, based on contact
with the Plan participants and review of any evaluations made
by third parties as required by the Plan;
B. Obligations of Parties Seeking Custody. Any Party seeking
custody of the Child shall submit to interviews and testing as
required by the Plan and shall provide upon the request of the
Supervising Agency:
134. See infra Parts X, XII.
135. See infra note 136.
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1. his or her full legal name, maiden name if applicable,
aliases if applicable, birth date, birth place, and social security
number, as well as the same information for all persons
residing in, or anticipated to reside in, the Party's household
should Custody of the Child be awarded to him or her;
2. information as to his or her employment history, places
and dates of residency, marital history, and familial
relationships;
3. a financial affidavit;
4. a blanket authorization for release of information by any
source having knowledge of the matters set forth in
subsection (c), below, and/or of matters arising from the
planning, testing, visitation, education, or any other service or
evaluation otherwise contemplated by the Plan; and
5. biologic material necessary for paternity testing at a time
and place, and in a manner, specified by the laboratory
conducting the testing.
Continuing Duties of Parties Seeking Custody. A Party seeking
custody of the Child shall have a continuing duty to keep the
Supervising Agency apprised of any changes in the information
required to be provided under this subsection (B), to cooperate
with the Supervising Agency and its agents, and to facilitate
implementation of the Plan.
C. Psycho-Social Assessment. The written psycho-social
assessment, referred to in subsection (A)(9), above, as to any Party
seeking custody of the Child, shall be prepared by a licensed
mental health professional trained and experienced in risk
assessment 136 and shall include data and impressions regarding:
1. the Party's social situation, medical health, mental
health, employment, and criminal history, including exposure
to or perpetration of child abuse, domestic violence, and/or
substance abuse;
2. the Party's current employment, income, other financial
resources, housing (a home visit is required), and plan for
136. See supra note 99.
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child care should Custody of the Child be awarded to him or
her;
3. the Party's potential for successful parenting as may be
determined by current psychological and/or psychiatric and/or
substance abuse and/or domestic violence evaluation(s),
parenting education outcomes, and performance as to other of
the Party's children, if any; and
4. state and local criminal background checks and child
abuse registry checks for the Party and all persons residing in,
or anticipated to reside in the Party's household, should
Custody of the Child be awarded to him or her.
D. Parenting Education. Parenting education shall be provided
to any Party seeking custody of the Child, including information to
allow the Party:
1. to identify various stages of child development;
2. to understand the emotional, nutritional, and intellectual
stimulation requirements of the Child;
3. to appreciate the principles of child safety;
4. to recognize alternatives to physical punishment to
accomplish child discipline;
5. to access medical and social services available to the
Child and the Parent; and
6. to understand and seek out resources for any existing
special medical and/or educational needs of the Child.
E. Copies of Plan to be Provided. A copy of the Plan shall be
provided to all Plan participants, except that information
identifying the Plan participants shall be redacted from the copies
to preserve the Plan participants' privacy.
VIII. Case Plan Status Report. Ten (10) days prior to expiration of the
Plan, the Supervising Agency shall file with the Court a status
report detailing the results of the Plan. A copy of the status report
shall be served by mail by the Supervising Agency upon all parties
to the termination proceeding.
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IX. Disposition Hearing. No later than the date of expiration of the
Plan, the Court shall hold a hearing ("Disposition Hearing") to
determine the final disposition of the Petition, and shall enter its
judgment ("Judgment") setting forth such disposition within five
days of the Disposition Hearing. The Court shall take into
consideration the report of the Supervising Agency, the
recommendation of the GAL, and the presentations and arguments
of any other party, and shall dispose of the Petition, based upon
written findings, in one of the following ways:
A. Termination of Parental Rights; "Constructive
Abandonment." If supported by clear and convincing evidence,
confirm the Mother's and/or the Father's surrender or denial of
paternity, or find the Mother and/or Father to have actually or
constructively abandoned the Child, and terminate the Mother's
and Father's parental rights, freeing the Child for adoption. 137 To
"constructively abandon" a child means to evince unwillingness
and/or gross inability, as demonstrated by the outcome of a child's
case plan, to assume care, custody, and control of a child for the
purpose of providing a child a safe and stable family life.
-OR -
B. No Termination of Parental Rights. If supported by clear
and convincing evidence of revocation, fraud, or duress as to the
surrender of either of them, void both the Mother's surrender and
the Father's surrender, if any, rendering the surrenders and the fact
of their execution nullities for all purposes, and, depending upon
the Court's findings as to the best interests of the Child:
1. Shared Parental Responsibility. The Court shall award
shared parental responsibility for the Child to the Mother and
the Father, determining primary residential custody of the
Child, awarding liberal visitation to the non-residential
Parent, and reserving jurisdiction to award child support upon
proper motion; or
2. Sole Custody to Mother. The Court shall award sole
Custody of the Child to the Mother, with or without visitation
137. Actual abandonment may be found at the Disposition Hearing notwithstanding a
previous finding of no actual abandonment if the court finds clear and convincing evidence of
actual abandonment at the time of the Disposition Hearing.
Eisen
380
Nova Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [1998], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol23/iss1/1
Nova Law Review
by the Father, reserving jurisdiction to award child support
upon proper motion; or
3. Sole Custody to Father. The Court shall award sole
Custody of the Child to the Father, with or without visitation
by the Mother, reserving jurisdiction to award child support
upon proper motion.
Continuing Jurisdiction. Should the Court dispose of the Petition
pursuant to this subsection (B), the Court shall retain jurisdiction
over the Child as in a child custody proceeding under chapter 61 of
the Florida Statutes.
Change in Physical Custody Following Trial Court's Order. If
physical custody of the Child is to change as a result of the Court's
Judgment under this Part IX, the Judgment shall set forth with
specificity the time, manner, and conditions for transfer of
custody, which shall occur no less than five (5) calendar days from
the date the Court's order becomes final, as set forth in Part X,
below.
X. Judgment; Motions for Clarification and/or Rehearing; Finality
of Judgment. Any Party to the TPRPA proceeding may file a
motion for clarification or a motion for rehearing of the Judgment
disposing of the Petition under Part IX, above, within seven (7)
days of the date of the Judgment, with a courtesy copy of said
motion, to be delivered by the moving party on the day of filing, to
the judge who entered the Judgment or, in his or her absence, to
the chief judge of the Court. If no such motion is filed, the
Judgment shall be final.
Disposition of Motions. If a motion for clarification or a motion
for rehearing is filed, the judge who entered the Judgment or, in
his or her absence, a judge designated by the chief judge of the
Court, shall consider the motion and, within five (5) days of the
filing of the motion, enter an order either denying the motion or
requiring response to the motion by the non-moving party or
parties. If required, the response(s) shall be filed within five (5)
days of the date of the order, with a courtesy copy delivered as set
forth above. Any reply shall be filed within five (5) days of
service of the last response, also with a courtesy copy delivered as
above. An order disposing of all outstanding motions shall be
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entered no later than ten (10) days after the filing of the last
permissible reply or response, whereupon the Judgment shall be
final as modified, if at all, by the order.
XI. Filing Petition for Adoption. A petition for adoption of the Child
shall be filed, if at all, only after the entry of a Judgment that is
final as set forth in Part X, above. The adoption petition shall be
filed within the TPRPA proceeding, accompanied by payment of
the appropriate filing fee for adoption cases in that circuit.
XII. Appeal. Any party to the TPRPA proceeding may file an appeal
from the Judgment disposing of the Petition. Appeal shall be to
the district court of appeal and shall be expedited pursuant to the
rules of court relating to child welfare cases. Notice of appeal
shall be filed within five (5) days of the date of the Judgment of
the circuit court becomes final.
En Banc Review. The district court shall consider en banc
whether the trial court's disposition of the Petition was, a)
supported by clear and convincing evidence and b) in the Child's
best interests without regard to the Child's prospective adoption.
Motions for Rehearing Prohibited. No motion for rehearing of
the district court's decision shall be filed. Motions for
clarification are permitted, but may be stricken on the court's own
motion if found to be primarily in the nature of a motion for
rehearing.
Change in Physicial Custody following District Court Decision.
If the district court's decision requires a change in physical
custody of the Child, the court's order shall set forth with
specificity the time, manner, and conditions for transfer of
custody, which shall occur no less than five (5) calendar days from
the date the court's decision becomes final after disposition of
motions for clarification, if any.
XIII. Early Termination of Case Plan and Disposition. A court may at
any time, on motion of any party to the TPRPA proceeding or on
its own motion, terminate the Plan and make final disposition of
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the Petition as otherwise provided herein if such is found to be in
the best interests of the Child.
138
XIV. Repose. No action or proceeding of any kind, by any person, to
vacate, set aside, or otherwise nullify a final order of termination
of parental rights pending adoption on any grounds may be filed
after 180 days from entry of a final judgment of adoption of the
Child.
VI. CONCLUSION
Statutes and court cases notwithstanding, adoption is not primarily a
legal event. When legal mechanisms fail in contested adoption cases, it is
because they are not forged in patient understanding of the non-legal
circumstances, motivations, needs, and goals of everyone involved in a
prospective adoption. 39 Because the primary imperative of the law is to join
the issues and render a decision, and because emotionally-charged matters
are at stake, the early circumspection necessary in these cases, which can be
accomplished through experienced social work, is not always practiced.
Though "wait, watch, and listen" is not in the general legal lexicon, such an
approach, properly managed, is precisely what will protect children's best
interests, in both the short term and the long term. At the same time, this
approach will also protect the kinship rights of the children's biological
parents, as well as the rightful expectations of prospective adoptive parents.
The essential shortcoming of Senate Bill 550, as it relates to unwed
birth fathers' rights, was its naive refusal to distinguish between fathers who
138. Those circumstances might include, but would not be limited to, a settlement
among the plan participants, the development of evidence that the prospective father is not the
biological father of the child, or abandonment of the case plan by the birth parent(s).
139. In adoption circles, the primary parties to an adoption are referred to as "the
triad," meaning the birth parents, the adoptive parents and the adoptee. See generally ELINOR
B. ROSENBERG, THE ADOPTION LIE CYCLE (1992). However, it is important to recognize that
because adoption, like procreation itself, is an issue which touches the very core of our lives,
there are many other "participants" in an adoption whose thoughts and feelings about adoption
may have significant impact on the process. These may include triad members' friends,
family, physicians, religious advisors, and teachers, to name a few, and, indeed, adoption
social workers and lawyers. Perhaps in recognition of the expansive nature of the adoption
"interest group," the Evan B. Donaldson Institute uses the term "adoption constellation" to
refer collectively to "birth parents, adoptive parents, adopted children and adults, and the
professionals who serve them." EVAN B. DONALDSON ADOPTION INST., ANN. REP., AUG.
1996-JUNE 1997.
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wish merely to assert parental rights and those who demonstrate commitment
and ability to undertake responsibility for parenting their children. An
unwed father's bare objection to the adoption of a child, presented with no
substantial intention and fitness to raise the child himself, should not
determine the child's fate.
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APPENDIX A
FORM FOR PROSPECTIVE ADOPTIVE PARENTS' ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
OF LEGAL RISK PLACEMENT (AGENCY)
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT AND AGREEMENT RE: LEGAL RISK PLACEMENT
Prospective Adoptive Parent(s):
Child's Adoptive Name-
Date of Birth: Date of Placement:
THIS IS A "LEGAL RISK PLACEMENT." PARENTAL RIGHTS HAVE NOT YET BEEN TERMINATED.
The birth mother of the child being placed in your home for the purpose of adoption executed a written
surrender as provided by law/has stated she will execute a written surrender as provided by law on or
about . Under Florida law, such a surrender is irrevocable
absent a showing of fraud or duress in the surrender process. Nevertheless, the law requires that a
judicial termination of the parental rights of both the birth mother and the birth father occur. Papers
initiating this proceeding will be filed by the Agency's attorney. (Note: The termination proceeding is
separate and apart from, and precedes the filing of, an adoption proceeding on behalf of the prospective
adoptive parents.)
The birth father's parental rights are expected to be addressed within the termination proceeding as
follows:
Depending upon the complexity of matters relating to the birth father's rights as described above, the
termination of parental rights process may involve one (1) to six (6) months. You will be notified in writing
of the court's decision. In the event the Agency is unable to obtain judicial termination of parental rights,
the Agency may require return of the child to the Agency's physical custody with or without a court order.
By execution of this Acknowledgement and Agreement re: Legal Risk Placement, you agree to relinquish
physical custody of the child to the Agency if so required.
Prospective Adoptive Parent
Prospective Adoptive Parent
Agency Representative
Date
Date
Date
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APPENDIX B
FLORIDA BAR GRIEVANCE COMMITEE LETTER
EXONERATING INTERMEDIARY CHARLOITE DANCIU
OF PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT IN BABY EMILY
THE FLORIDA BAR
May 3, 1995
RE: Complaint of Gary Bjorkland against Charlotte Danciu, Esquire
Fifteenth Judicial Circuit Grievance Committee 'F" has devoted considerable time at several of its
meetings to an extensive consideration of the remarks of the Fourth District Court of Appeals [sic] in the
Baby Emily adoption case and Mr. Bjorkland's grievance. It has, by unanimous vote, made a
determination of no probable cause for findings of violation ....
In its review, the committee found that the portion of the court's decision entitled "Conduct of the
Attorney/Intermediary" appeared to contain many inaccuracies. As an example, the court makes reference
to an August 12, 1992, hearing on the adoptive parents' 'motion to waive the biological father's consent
toadoption*. In fact, the motion that was noticed for August 10, 1992, specifically states that the purpose
of the hearing was to hear objections. The court further observes:
There is no evidence in the record, nor have we been apprised of any evidence,
to indicate that the biological father deliberately avoided service of the notice of this
hearing by a duly appointed process server.
It was obvious to the committee that the court simply did not have, as part of the record before it, the
transcript of the August 10, 1992, hearing. In fact, the court notes that the adoptive parents brought to
its attention the notice of hearing which it observed was not part of the record.
Further, the court noted that Ms. Danciu did not inform the trial court of the July, 1992,
conversation with Mr. Bjorldand. That is not accurate. Ms. Danciu informed Judge Vonhof of her
telephone conversation with Mr. Bjorkland. It appeared very clear to the committee that it was as a result
of that conversation that Ms. Danciu determined to attempt to address Mr. Bjorldand's position as related
to her In that call, by scheduling a pre-birth hearing for the purpose of hearing 'your [Mr. Bjorkland's]
objections.
The committee examined the testimony of the proposed adoptive father regarding when he learned
of Mr. Bjorkdand's objections. It appeared very clear to the committee that the proposed adoptive father's
testimony related to Mr. Bjorkland's post birth actions and did not purport to address when the proposed
adoptive parents first learned that Mr. Bjorldand was objecting. The proposed adoptive parents have
confirmed that they were aware of Mr. Bjorkland's objections soon after Ms. Danciu's July, 1992,
conversation with Mr. Bjorkland.
While the court seemed to criticize the procedure employed by Ms. Danciu, viz., a pre-birth hearing
for the purposes of addressing a father's objections, the committee found no ethical impropriety in Ms.
Danciu's attempt to proceed in that fashion. In fact, there appeared to the committee a rather considerable
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appeal to the concept of addressing all potential impediments to an adoption, pre-birth.
The committee very carefully read and re-read the colloquy between Ms. Danciu and Judge Vonhof
at the August.10, 1992, hearing. While there is no question but that Ms. Danciu stated: "There is no
objection at all... ., the committee concluded that when read in context of the events that preceded the
hearing and occurred at the hearing, the referenced remark was made in the context of filed objections.
It appeared obvious to the committee that there was no purpose for the hearing other than to address the
natural father's objections. The notice of hearing specifically so stated. Most persuasive to the committee
however, were the remarks of Judge Vonhof, who... reviewed the transcript of the August 10, 1992,
hearing and advised that "I can only say, once again, that I do not feel that I was in any way lead astray
by any comments, or lack of same, by Ms. Danciu." His honor had previously, unsolicited, informed that
[sic] committee that " .. . I truly believe that the record that the Fourth District Court of Appeals [sic]
reviewed could not have been complete or they would not have made the remarks that they did as to Ms.
Danciu's conduct."
Very truly yours,
Isl
DAVID M. BARNOVITZ
Branch Staff Counsel
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APPENDIX C
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN & FAMILY SERVICES' FORM
FOR CONSENT TO ADOPTION FOR USE BY ADOPTION INTERMEDIARIES
In The Circuit Court Of The
Judicial Circuit
Of Florida, By And For The
County Of
Case No.
In The Matter Of The Adoption of
CONSENT FOR ADOPTION
STATE OF FLORIDA
COUNTY OF
Before me this day personallyappeared ,who, being dulyswom,
deposes and says:
I,the undersigned ofa child known as
Mother/Father Sex First
bomthe dayof ,19.
Middle Last
at County,
do hereby agree to relinquish all rights to and custody of the child to a person or persons unknown to me and do further
consent to adoption by said person or persons if a Court of competent jurisdiction should approve. The names of the
person or persons to whom this Consent is given are known to
Intermediary. I hereby %vaive notice of any proceedings for this adoption.
That this Consent is executed voluntarily and is done so by the undersigned without requiring the identification
of the adopting parent or parents.
That the biological, sociological and medical history information regarding the above named child and the natural
parents, as required by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services pursuant to Section 63.082(3)(a), Florida
Statutes, is contained in HRS-CYF Form 5108, BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON PROSPECTIVE ADOPTIVE CHILD, and
HRS-CYF Form 5074, FAMILY, SOCIAL AND MEDICAL INFORMATION OF CHILD TO BE ADOPTED.
(SEAL)
Signed, sealed and delivered In the presence of.
STATE OF FLORIDA
COUNTY OF
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this day before me, an officer duly authorized in the state aforesaid and in the county
aforesaid to take acknowledgements, personally appeared
known to me to be the person described in and who executed the foregoing Consent for Adoption and acknowledged
before me that executed the same.
WITNESS my hand and official seal in the county and state last aforesaid this day of ,19
Notay Publc, State of Flodda at Large
(Notarial Seal) My Commission Expires:
HRSCfF Fer 5110. J7 n W- (ObS cle. 0 R-S) Fer 40 wi f na be noo)
POck N~eker 5749-0M11")
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APPENDIX D
FORM FOR SURRENDER OF CHILD FOR ADOPTION
TO A FLORIDA LICENSED CHILD-PLACING AGENCY
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
IN AND FOR COUNTY, FLORIDA
In the Interest of:
JUVENILE DIVISION
CASE NO.:
a Child.
SURRENDER AND CONSENT FOR ADOPTION
WITH WAIVER OF NOTICE. SERVICE OF PROCESS. AND RIGHT TO COUNSEL
_ _,_ I of , telephone ,
age _, the Birth Parent of , a __ child, born to
on , at Hospital, County, Florida,
desiring to release my said child for the purpose of adoption as provided by law, hereby freely and
voluntarily:
1. SURRENDER my child to ('the Agency'), a Florida
licensed child-placing agency willing to receive my child for the purpose of placement for
adoption, or its designate.
2. WAIVE NOTICE, SERVICE OF PROCESS AND ANY RIGHTTO COUNSELas to any and
all hearings and p'oceedings legally necessary for the termination of my parental rights.
commitment of my child to the custody and guardianship of said Agency or any designate
of the Agency, and for subsequent adoption proceedings.
3. CONSENT IRREVOCABLY, UNCONDITIONALLY, AND FINALLY TO:
(a) the permanent loss, deprivation and forfeiture of my parental rights to my child
as now exist or heretofore existed;
(b) the entry of a court order terminating my parental rights, committing my child to
the custody and guardianship of the Agency or its designate for subsequent
adoption and/or any other court orders sought with the consent of the Agency,
believing such termination of my parental rights to be In the manifest best
interests of my Child;
(c) the placement of my child by the Agency or its designate in a family home,
which may or may not be known to me, for prospective subsequent adoption; and
Page I of 2 Initials
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SURRENDER AND CONSENT FOR ADOPTION WITH WAIVER OF NOTICE, SERVICE OF PROCESS
AND RIGHT TO COUNSEL
(d) the appearance by the Agency or its designate as a party in any court where the
legal adoption of my child is pending, to make all necessary consents to such
adoption.
4. WAIVE ALL RIGHT to knowledge at any time hereafter of the whereabouts of my child,
or the identity or location of any custodian or adoptive parent of my child, or to have any
court compel the Agency, or anyone in its stead, to divulge any such information.
5. ACKNOWLEDGE that I have been offered the opportunity of receiving independent legal
advice at no charge to me before signing this legal document and have either received
such advice or have declined it.
BIRTH PARENT'S SIGNATURE:
PRINT NAME:
DATE:
SIGNED IN THE PRESENCE OF:
X
as witness to the voluntary nature of the Birth Parent's acts and waivers herein
Print Name: SS#:
Home Add.:
Bus. Add.:
X
as witness to the voluntary nature of the Birth Parent's acts and waivers herein
SS#:_ _Print Name:
Home Add.:
Bus. Add.:
STATE OF FLORIDA
COUNTY OF
BEFORE ME, an offiber authorized to take acknowledgments, appeared
, who produced as identification
and acknowledged that s/he did execute the foregoing Surrender and Consent for Adoption, Waiver of
Notice, Service of Process and Right to Counsel, freely, voluntarily and for the purposes stated therein at
--._ AM. PM. on this day.
WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL in the county and state last aforesaid this __ day of
,19__
NOTARIAL SEAL Notary Public
Page 2 of 2 Initials _
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APPENDIX E
ANALYSIS OF VARIOUS CHANGES TO FLORIDA'S ADOPTION STATUTE
AS PROPOSED IN THE FLORIDA SENATE JUDICIARY COMMIITEE'S
COMMITTEE SUBSTITUTE FOR SENATE BILL 550
(FLORIDA LEGISLATURE 1998)
Prepared by Hausmann & Hickman, P. A.
Attorneys at Law
Boynton Beach, Florida
1. Proposed Section 39.464: Child's Right to Petition for Termination of Parental Rights
The proposed bill's impact on Chapter 39 of the Florida Statutes (Juvenile Court Statutes) has the apparent
intent of removing agency adoptions from Chapter 39 proceedings and placing agency adoptions within Chapter 63
proceedings. However the additional language proposed for section 39A64 limits the class of individuals who have
standing to file a Chapter 39 Termination of Parental Rights Petition from "any person" to the Department, the GAL
and "any person related to the child." In practice, this proposed language would limit the child's ability to obtain
independent counsel and petition for termination. In the landmark case, In the Interest of Gregory K the Florida
Supreme Court stated that a child could petition for termination of parental rights provided he petitions through a next
friend. Traditionally, children file such petitions through professional attorneys who appear in a case as their next
friend and attorney ad litem. Most often, such professionals are not related to the child.
2. Proposed Section 63.03: Birth Parent Fraud
Adds a provision within the Adoption Statute which states that any person who accepts benefits related to the
same pregnancy from more than one adoption entity commits a second degree misdemeanor, and that any person who
knowingly provides false information shall be subject to civil repayment penalties. This is an excellent provision
designed to protect adoptive parents from fraud and misrepresentation.
3. Proposed Section 63.039: Liability of Attorneys and Adoption Entities
This proposed section places upon an attorney duties and liabilities outside of the obligations currently
imposed by the Florida Bar and potentially holds attorneys liable for malpractice outside of liability insurance and a
separate malpractice action.
Subsection (1) is a superfluous and redundant provision which essentially states that each adoption entity shall
comply with the law. Such concept is inherent in the law. This subsection requires extensive and repetitive disclosures
and repetitive acknowledgement of receipt of disclosure. While written disclosure is important and customarily
provided, the provisions of this subsection are onerous and, when read in conjunction with the remaining subsections,
are apparently designed to encourage litigation and sanctions against attorneys.
Subsection (2) holds an attorney absolutely liable for any document error. The document provisions of
section (1) are so numerous, extensive and redundant that errors, which will not materially affect the child's placement,
are likely to occur. These provisions will result in an increase in malpractice insurance premiums, and many errors
may not be covered by current malpractice policies: Accordingly, many reputable attorneys may withdraw from
adoption practice. Additionally, the small family practitioner preparing a stepparent adoption is also exposed to these
extreme liability standards. No other Florida statute holds attorneys strictly liable.
Subsection (3) proposes to hold attorneys liable outside of any malpractice proceeding when a consent is set
aside for fraud or duress. Like subsection (2), this provision would render adoption attorneys uninsurable or insurable
at high rates. Such an award would most likely not be covered by current malpractice policies. In order to assert any
right to insurance coverage in the event of a negative ruling, the attorneys must place their malpractice insurer on notice
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of any adoption challenge and allow the insurer to participate in the defense of that challenge. Such an action would
violate the privacy and confidentiality provisions of an adoption proceeding.
Subsection (4) holds attorneys and adoptive parents absolutely liable for attorneys' fees and costs of a birth
parent who successfully challenges an adoption. No other family law statute holds litigants strictly liable regardless of
ability to pay fees and costs. No Florida statute holds attorneys strictly liable. The concerns regarding insurability and
integrity within the practice also apply to this subsection.
This section creates liability and malpractice actions within the adoption statute, eliminating privity of contract
requirements and the right to ajury trial.
4. Proposed Section 63.052(2) and (3): Foster Care Placements
This section mandates that a child be placed in licensed foster care when an adoptive home is not identified at
the time the child is discharged from a medical facility. This would prohibit adoption entities from taking a child into
private care, thereby substantially raising the initial costs of such adoptions to adoptive parents, and potentially to the
State of Florida, and causing unnecessary complications and delays. A child cannot be placed in State sponsored foster
care unless a Court finds that the child has been abandoned, abused or neglected, adjudicates the child dependent and
provides for a reunification case plan or adoption case plan. Privately licensed foster care is expensive. Moreover,
some birth parents were raised in foster care and specifically choose private adoption for their children to avoid the
foster care system. This provision would eliminate a choice for these birth parents.
Proposed Section 63.082 (4) also encourages parents to place their children in foster care. This is an
extremely expensive and detrimental provision. Foster care costs are already a large burden upon the State budget and
children's advocates are always seeking new funds to improve our currently overburdened foster care system where
children are frequently abused and neglected. Moreover, the parental rights of a child placed in foster care cannot be
terminated for twelve months. Thus, the location of a permanent home for a child is substantially delayed.
5. Proposed Section 63.062(1)(d)(3): Birth Father Consents
This section requires notice to any man who the birth mother has reason to believe may be the birth father,
regardless of whether the man provided financial or emotional support to the birth mother, or assisted her in obtaining
medical care. This requirement places an undue burden on birth mothers and adoptive parents and will substantially
increase the risk of frivolous, time consuming and expensive litigation, thus raising the costs of an adoption and
rendering some adoptions unstable (e.g, if a birth mother lists 12 potential fathers, the adoptive parents must pay
expensive investigative and legal costs to search, notify, and obtain consent from each possible father). Any man who
had relations with the birth mother around the time of conception could unnecessarily delay or block an adoption, thus
prohibiting the birth mother from making decisions in the best interest of her child. This provision could potentially
encourage a birth mother to lie about the identity of a potential father after her consent to an adoption is irrevocable,
thus providing her an additional avenue to challenge an adoption and disrupt the placement and stability of a child.
Unstable and lengthy adoptions do not serve the interests of a child. Currently, the law sets forth a clearly defined class
of fathers whose consent is required, i.e. a man married to the mother, a man who has filed with the office of vital
statistics and a man who has filed a paternity action. Under the current law, attorneys and adoptive parents may search
public records to determine whether a father's consent is necessary for an adoption. As proposed, this stability would
be removed from the statute.
6. Proposed Section 63.052(2): Non Paternity Affidavits
This provision allows adoption entities to obtain an affidavit of nonpaternity from any named father prior to
the birth of the child. The proposed modification reasonably fills a hole in the current statute and encourages stable and
safe adoptions by allowing the adoption entity to advise the adoptive parents, prior to taking the child into their home,
of the status and stability of their adoption.
However, proposed section 63.052(4)(a) directly conflicts with this provision as it states that an affidavit of
non-paternity may not be executed until after the birth of the child. Many potential birth fathers who deny paternity are
difficult to locate and frequently move. Thus, it may take many weeks or even after the placement of the child in the
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adoptive home to locate these men to obtain their non-patemity affidavits which may potentially cause uncertain and
unstable adoptions. Many of these men have not supported the birth mother and would otherwise have no legal right to
object to an adoption.
7. Proposed Section 63.082(3)(a): Social Worker Interviews of Birth Parents
This provision requiring a social worker interview with a birth parent prior to execution of a consent for
adoption conforms with current standards of practice and assures that all precautions are taken to obtain a valid consent
for adoption.
8. Proposed Section 63.082 (4): Language and Form of Consents
This subsection also requires that all adoption consents contain the following language:
You have the right to:
(A) Consult with and attorney;
(B) Hold, care for, and feed the child;
(C) Place the child in foster care or with any friend or family
member you choose who is willing to care for your child;
(D) Take the child home;
(E) Find out about the community resources that are available
to you if you do not go through with the abortion.
(THIS IS TYPED IN 16 POINT BOLD FACE).
(Additional language is omitted).
The above language incorporated into a consent would only insult and traumatize a birth parent signing a consent to
adoption. Birth parents who voluntarily sign a consent for adoption do so after much thought and contemplation. The
staff and social workers at the hospital and the social worker who interviews the birth parent discuss these rights in a
private, dignified and personal manner prior to the time that a consent for adoption is presented to the birth parent for
signature. Many hospitals require a similar form which is not in which assumes that a birth parent is not intelligent and
cannot read normal type.
9. Proposed Section 63.082(4) and (7): Three (3) Day Revocation Period
This subsection allows a three (3) day revocation period which would only serve to promote unstable
placements and exploit the emotions of the adoptive parents. The majority of birth mothers are offered or receive
counseling prior to executing a consent for adoption and all birth mothers speak with a social worker and other
professionals prior to executing a consent for adoption. A birth mother may take as much time as she needs after the
birth of her baby before she signs any consent for adoption
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The recision period would place an adoptive child's home placement at risk, causing the child to be removed
from the original home many days after placement. For example, a birth parent who signs a consent on a Friday may
withdraw their consent by mail the following Tuesday. Such notification may not be received by the adoption entity
some 2 to 5 days after mailing.
Furthermore, many birth parents favor laws which provide that consents are final upon signing as those laws
allow them to proceed forward without the emotional burden of having additional days to continuously rethink their
decision.
10. Proposed Section 63.082(6): Repetitive Disclosure of Documents
This section requires that the adoption entity provide a copy of each signed consent to each person whose
consent is required and the adoption entity must obtain written verification that said copies were received. This
provision violates the confidentiality provisions of the statute and would unnecessarily increase the costs incurredby
adoptive parents.
11. Proposed Section 63.085(1): Statute of Repose and Appellate Period
Subsection 63.085(IX8) correctly advises birth parents that any action or proceeding to vacate an adoption
must be filed within one year of the final judgment because section 63.182 contains a statute of repose which protects
adoption orders from any challenge one year after entry of the final judgment of adoption.
However, subsection 63.085(l)(9) advises the birth parents that they have one year after entry of a final
judgment of adoption to appeal any irregularities in the adoption proceeding. While the statute does not technically
extend the appellate period, this misleading disclosure read in conjunction with subsections 63.085(l)(10) and
63.089(6)(c) would effectively extend the appeal period from thirty (30) days to one year. Subsection 63.085(1X10)
allows a birth parent to set aside an order terminating rights when their failure to timely assert their rights was the result
of misrepresentation and subsection 63.089(6)(c) renders all orders terminating parental rights voidable when a birth
parents' failure to act is the result of false information. Subsection 63.085(IX9) provides this misrepresentation which
would allow extension of the appellate period. Currently, all court order are subject to a 30 day appeal period a one
year appeal period would only serve to create unstable adoptions.
Pursuant to proposed section 63.142(4) a court is not authorized to enter a judgement for adoption until the
applicable appellate period has expired. As the language of this statute may potentially extend the appellate period to
one year, this would potentially delay finalization of adoption until the child is approximately eighteen (18) months old.
The mandatory disclosure laws advises a birth parent that they have one year to appeal an order terminating parental
rights, thereby postponing a final judgment until more than one year post-birth. This is inconsistent with prior sections,
which allow finalization within approximately 90-120 days post-birth. This could potentially delay the stability of an
adoption by two years thus, placing a child at risk of removal from an adoptive home at the age of two. Such a scenario
is detrimental to a child.
12. Proposed Section 63.087(4): Venue
This section requires that all adoption proceedings be filed in the venue where the birth parents reside, thus
eliminating the privacy provision which allowed adoptive parents to file their adoption proceeding in the venue where
their chosen adoptive entity exists if such choice protected the privacy of the adoptive parents. The privacy provision
has served to protect one of the primary and essential elements of an adoption - the identity and location of the adoptive
parents. The large majority of adoptions are uncontested. Only an extremely small number are challenged each year.
This provision would require that adoptive parents incur the additional expenses of filing outside the venue in every
uncontested case. The current law protects birth parents as a common law challenge to venue would allow the birth
parents to keep venue in their place of residence.
13. Proposed Section 63.087(6): Termination of Parental Rights Separate from Adoption Proceeding
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This procedure is contrary to current law that provides that the birth parent's rights are not terminated until the
rights of the adoptive parents are vested. This proceeding would effectively render a child without a legal parent for an
extensive period, thus raising concerns on the ability to authorize medical treatment, etc. Leaving a child without a
legal parent is contrary to the child's best interests. Thejuvenile court system is currently experiencing many problems
caused by children who do not have a legal parent for long periods of time while they await adoption.
Furthermore, as the petition requires no responsive pleading, the additional proceeding has no effect. The
proceeding only creates substantial delay, additional legal expenses which must be borne by the adoptive parents, and
increases use of valuable Court resources. Currently, birth parents who seek to challenge a petition for adoption may
do so by appearing in court or filing a motion. They gain no further rights under this proceeding.
The time delays caused by this proceeding are substantial. Currently, a petition for adoption may be filed
immediately after placement. Provided all consents or waivers are secured, an adoption may be finalized ninety (90)
days after placement. Proposed section 63.089 requires thirty (30) days notice after service of process before a hearing
on a Petition to Terminate Rights may be held. If the adoptive parents must publish to provide proper service to any
man who reasonably may be the father, they must wait sixty (60) days after diligent search and publication prior to
holding a hearing to terminate rights. After a delayed order terminating parental right is entered, the adoptive parents
must wait an additional thirty (30) days before filing a Petition for adoption. These delayed time periods are
unnecessary and potentially harm the best interest of a child. Currently, Chapter 39 provides that parents subject to
termination of parental rights petitions are entitled to a hearing as soon a reasonably possible, much earlier than 30
days. If a birth parent seeks to challenge an adoptive placement, the courts should proceed expeditiously, as delays
cause a child to further bond with adoptive parents who may lose custody of the child.
Subsection 63.089 requires a full evidentiary hearing in all adoption proceedings. Again, the large majority of
such proceedings are uncontested. This additional proceeding requires that the adoptive parents incur additional legal
expenses. Currently, the law protects birth parents by requiring a full evidentiary hearing upon challenge to a petition
for adoption. In the non-contesting case, the adoptive parents must also bear this additional unnecessary cost.
While these proceedings require the adoptive parent to incur many additional expenses and costs, no
requirements are placed upon the birth parents. Proposed section 63.089 does not even require that birth parents appear
in court to protect their rights. This section allows written denial of a petition to terminate rights. All other statutes
concerning termination of parental rights mandate the personal appearance of the parent. Without a personal
appearance, the Court would be unable to proceed in the case and conduct the mandatory inquiries. Moreover, any
parent truly serious about maintaining parental rights should personally appear before the Court. These provisions
would apply to any man who reasonably may be the father, regardless of his attempts to support the birth mother and
the child.
14. Proposed section 63.087(6)(b): Standing to File Petition to Terminate Rights
This subsection allows only a birth parent or legal guardian of a minor to file a petition for termination of
parental rights. The proposed law changes the custodial arrangements for a child after a birth parents signs a consent
for adoption. Under current law the adoptive parent becomes guardian of the child. As proposed, neither the adoption
entity nor the adoptive parents may become the legal guardian of the child. Thus, the birth mother must petition the
court to terminate her own legal rights to her child. This procedure makes an adoption extremely stressful and
potentially traumatic for the birth parent. Moreover, the birth mother is now a party to the proceeding and could
potentially request records which would provide confidential information regarding the adoptive parents.
15. Proposed section 63.088(4) & (5): Diligent Search and Inquiry & Publication
Subsection 63.088(4) mandates a diligent search and inquiry much greater than the burden currently placed
upon the Department of Children & Families in Chapter 39 Termination of Parental Rights proceedings. This
extensive diligent search requires that the adoptive parents search records to which they may not have standing to gain
access: re: pension records, utility company records, tax records. This would be an extensive and expensive search
which may be impossible to complete. Unlike the Department of Children & Families, adoption entities may not
access certain private records.
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Subsection 63.088(5) requires that the adoption entity publish their intent to terminate parental rights by
publishing information on the birth mother and the child. This is an affront to the privacy of the birth mother.
According to the provision, this must be done as to any man who reasonably may be the father of the child regardless
of any history of rape or abuse upon the birth mother, and could be emotionally devastating for the birth mother.
16. Proposed section 63.089(4): Abandonment and Affirmative Duty to Support Child and Birth
Mother
This subsection substantially changes affirmative duties which a birth father currently has to provide
emotional and financial support to the birth mother during her pregnancy. This provision effectively overturns and
ignores United States and Florida Supreme Court precedent on parental rights. Pursuant to this provision, a court may
not waive the birth father's consent for failing to provide emotional support to the birth mother, thus stripping the birth
mother of the ability to choose an adoption in the best interest of her child when she is emotionally abandoned and
abused by the birth father.
The proposed statute also places an additional burden upon the birth mother to prove abandonment by the
birth father. In order to make an adoption decision in the best interests of her child, she must affirmatively show that
the father or any man who may reasonably be the father.
1. has demonstrated a willful disregard for the safety of the child.
2. has not been prevented from making efforts towards the child by any person.
3. was provided with a request for financial support.
4. has refused to pay for medical treatment when insurance or other State funded resources would not pay for
such treatment
5. provided only nominal funds which were insufficient to provide for the child's needs given the relative
ability to pay of the parties.
6. knew her whereabouts and was advised of all medical appointments and tests relating to the child or
pregnancy.
The above burden is much greater than the burden placed upon the Department of Children and Families
when seeking termination for abandonment in a Chapter 39 proceeding. Most importantly, it is degrading and strips a
birth mother of her right to choose adoption as an option for her child, forcing her to parent a child that she cannot
afford and prepare for a life of fighting to receive child support from a father who did not support her during her
pregnancy. These burdens would require a woman who has been abused by the birth father to initiate constant contact
so that she can prove an abandonment claim. She also maintains this burden to contact him even after he moves with
no notice to her, causing her to search for him to give him proper notice. The proposed statute allows a father to sit
back and wait for the birth mother to come begging for money despite her obvious need. It also allows a birth father to
rely on State funds such as Medicaid to pay for his responsibilities, a burden this State cannot afford.
17. Proposed Section 63.089(4)(b): Abandonment by Habitual Criminals
This subsection authorizes a court to determine that a child is abandoned by the birth parent when the parent is
incarcerated for a sentence of eight (8) years or more and the parents criminal history meets specific delineated criteria.
This is a positive provision which will serve to provide a child permanency when a parent is not available to raise the
child. This provision is consistent with similar provisions in Chapter 39.
18. Proposed Section 63.089()and(6)(e) Authority to Order Paternity Testing
This subsection provides the Court with authority to order patemity testing. This is an important inclusion
into the statute allowing all potential issues to be resolved by the samejudge.
19. Proposed Section 63.097(4)(2): Prohibition Against Payment of Previously Incurred Expenses.
This subsection prohibits the payment of any expenses incurred by the birth mother prior to the time that the
adoptive parents contracted with the adoption entity. This provision would prohibit adoptive parents from receiving
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reimbursement when a birth mother backs out of a situation and is matched with other adoptive parents through another
adoption entity. This would necessarily increase the risk and expense to adoptive parents.
20. Proposed section 63.132(c): Confidential Record Publication by the Florida Department of Children
& Families
This subsection requires that the Department of Children & Families retain extensive records on each
adoption filed in the State of Florida and pay staff to redact confidential information. This would not only increase the
costs to Florida's taxpayers, but creates great risk of unintentional release of confidential information to the public.
Historically, the Department of Children & Families fails to comply with the duties imposed upon it under Florida
Law. This law would allow birth mothers to comparison shop for the adoption entity which pays the highest living
expenses.
21. Proposed Section 63.132(d)(5): Expenses
This section requires an affidavit seeking approval of expenses that could be covered by State sponsored
programs. Again, this provision mandates that birth parents access state funds at the expense of Florida's budget and
Florida taxpayers.
22. Proposed Section 63.207: Prohibition Against Out of State Placements
This section prohibits any adoption entity from placing a child with a family which resides outside of the State
of Florida unless the child is a member of a minority group or is otherwise special needs. This prohibition wrongly
treats children as a commodity of the State of Florida and discriminates against minority children by sending a message
that they are not a desirable commodity of the State. This provision would limit a birth parent's right to choose an
appropriate home for a child and violates the child's constitutional right to travel.
Only one state has a statute which contains similar prohibitions. The case law in that state (South Carolina)
creates exceptions to the law which have rendered the law powerless.
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APPENDIX F
RESULTS OF POLLING FLORIDA ADOPTION PROFESSIONALS
REGARDING PSYCHO/SOCIAL BACKGROUNDS
OF CHILDREN PLACED FOR ADOPTION
Twenty-three Florida adoption lawyers and social workers responding to a survey in
the summer of 1998 responded as shown to the following queries:
I. Please Indicate whether the following are typical of the psycho/social backgrounds
of children in whose adoptions you have been professionally Involved:
Typical Occasional Aypical No Response
23 0
0 0
1 0
2 0
10
15
10
7
8
0
0
0
5 0
14 7
0 0
2 0
(1) child newborn to age 5
(2) child suffering/likely to suffer
physical, developmental, learning
or mental disabilities
(3) parent lacking planning/follow-
through skills
(4) parent possessing decreased
emotional/mental stability and
control, including immaturity due
to young age
(5) parent engaging in or having
history of alcohoVsubstance
abuse/gambling
(6) parent having history of mental
ness and/or psychiatric admission
(7) parent having history of
incarceration
(8) parent having history of
perpetrating or being victim of
abuse/neglect
(9) parent having negative
history as to any other of his/her
children (estrangement,
nonsupport, abandonment,
removal)
(10) history of instability in parent's
family of origin
(11) parent lacing the extemal support
of family and friends
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Occasional Atypical No Response
9 0
2 0
(12) lack of community resources in
location where parent resides or
would reside with child
(13) parent being socially isolated
(14) parent in unstable marriage to party
other than child's other parent
(15) parent possessing low level of
primary education/skills training
(16) parent illiterate
(17) parent unemployed for more than
three months
(18) parent highly transient
(19) parent housed inadequately
il. Please list by number which of the above background characteristics, if any, you consider
as risk factors for child abuse or neglect based on your professional experience:
(#1) 2 (#2) 8 (#3) 8 (#4) 16 (#5) 18 (#6) 12 (#7) 11 (#8) 18 (#9) 12 (#10) 10 (#11) 13 (#12)
8 (#13) 8 (#14) 11 (#15) 9 (#16) 7 (#17) 10 (#18) 6 (#19) 7 (No Response) 3
Ill. Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statement. A birth mother
who has voluntarily surrendered her child for adoption should not be able to reclaim the child herself
if the birth father subsequently objects to the adoption and the placement is disrupted.
0 Agree: The mother has made her decision about parenting the child and it should be
final; the father should get sole custody
8 Uncertain: The mother should not get automatic custody, but she should have a right to
request custody.
14 Disagree: Matters should go back to the way they stood before the mother surrendered; the
mother should have custody unless and until the father proves her to be unfit
No Opinion
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APPENDIX G
FORM FOR WORKSHEET FOR BIRTH MOTHER'S AFFIDAVIT
BIRTH MOTHER'S AFFIDAVIT WORKSHEET RE: BIRTH FATHER
DIRECTIONS: TO BE COMPLETED BY BIRTH MOTHER, WITH STAFF ASSISTANCE/REVIEW
I. Does the birth father know you are pregnant and that you believe he is the father of your
child? Yes No
II. If known, please provide the birth fathers:
A. Full legal name
B. Current address
C. Current telephone
D. Social security number
E. Date of birth
F. Current work telephone
Ill. If the birth father's current location is not known, please provide his:
A. Last known address
B. Last known telephone
C. Birth father's friends or relatives who may know how to reach him (with their addresses
and telephone numbers)
IV. Additional identifying/locating information you may know regarding the birth father.
V. Date you last saw the birth father
Date you last talked on the phone with the birth father
Date you last received any written communication from the birth father
Address at which birth father last knew you to be residing
VI. If more than one man may be the birth father, please provide information requested in II. and Ill.
for such other man or men on the back of this sheet
If none others, please write 'none' here:
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VII. Are you now married or were you married at any time during the past twelve (12) months?
Yes No
If yes, please provide:
A. Husband's name
B. Husband's address
C. Husband's telephone
D. Husband's date of birth
E. Husband's social security no.
F. Date of marriage
G. Date of divorce (if applicable)
H. Date of death (if applicable)
VIII. Were you living with any man other than those named In I., VI., and VII., above, within the past
twelve (12) months? Yes No
If yes, please provide the information requested in I1. through V., above, on the back of this page.
IX. Has any man, other than those you have listed in I1., VI., VII., and VIII., above, claimed to be the
father, given you support, promised you support, or been named as the father of your child in
connection with receiving welfare payments? Yes No
If yes, please provide the information requested in I1. through V., above, on the back of this page.
X. Do you have other children? Yes No
If yes, please provide:
Child's Name Date of Birth
Father's Name
Child's Name Date of Birth
Father's Name
Xl. Please provide the following information:
A. City, county, state-where child was conceived
B. Cities, counties, states in which you resided/have been residing while pregnant
C. Your permanent address
D. Your next of kin/emergency contact
KNOWING THE IMPORTANCE of providing as much accurate and complete information as I have
regarding the identity and location of the birth father of my child, I hereby certify that I have completed the
foregoing form to the best of my knowledge.
x x
Birth Mother Agency Representative
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APPENDIX H
FORM FOR NOTICE OF ACTION AND HEARING
FOR PROPOSED TPRPA PROCEEDING
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
IN AND FOR COUNTY, FLORIDA
In the Interest of: JUVENILE DIVISION
,_ _ CASE NO.:
a Child.
NOTICE OF ACTION AND HEARING
TO: [names and addresses of all putative fathers and/or unknown claimants, as well as any
any other persons as set forth in Florida Statutes section 39. 462(1) (Supm. 1998)1.
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that a hearing on a Petition for Termination of Parental
Rights Pending Adoption as to the Child herein, born ,to , will be
held before this Court
AT COUNTY COURTHOUSE, ROOM
faddressl
THE HONORABLE , PRESIDING, TELEPHONE ( )__
ON AT__O'CLOCK._m.
YOU MUST EITHER APPEAR on the date and at the time specified or send a written response
to the Court before that time, with a copy to attorney for Petitioner, [name and address]. FAILURE TO
PERSONALLY RESPOND TO THIS NOTICE OR TO APPEAR AT THIS HEARING
CONSTITUTES CONSENT TO TERMINATION OR PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO THIS
CHILD (OR THESE CHILDREN).
YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO BE REPRESENTED BY AN ATTORNEY. IF YOU WANT
AN ATTORNEY AND CANNNOT AFFORD ONE, THE COURT WILL APPOINT ONE AT NO
CHARGE TO YOU IF YOU SO REQUEST.
YOU HAVE THE DUTY TO INFORM THE COURT AND ATTORNEY FOR
PETITIONER, BY CERTIFIED MAIL AT THE ADDRESSES SHOWN ABOVE, OF ANY
CHANGE IN YOUR ADDRESS.
WITNESS MY HAND AND THE SEAL OF THIS COURT -day of _ 19
CLERK
COURT SEAL
By: X
Deputy Clerk
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APPENDIX I
CLERK'S AFFIDAVIT OF COMPLIANCE WITH MAILING REOUIREMENTS
FOR CONSTRUCTIVE SERVICE OF PROCESS
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
IN AND FOR __ COUNTY, FLORIDA
In the Interest of: JUVENILE DIVISION
_CASE NO.:
a Child.
CLERKS AFFIDAVIT OF MAIUNG NOTICE OF ACTION
TO
STATE OF FLORIDA
COUNTY OF
BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, appeared , personally known to me or
who produced as identification , and being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
1. that s/he is a Deputy Clerk of the Office of the Clerk of the Circuit Court in and for
_ County, Florida, Juvenile Division, as such makes this Affidavit from her/his
own personal knowledge, and is over the age of eighteen.
2. that s/he did execute a Notice of Action and Hearing (=the Notice') to one
on _, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A".
3. that s/he did mail a copy of the Notice by United States mail, with postage prepaid, to said
.at ,within 10 days after making the Notice, to wit, on
together with a copy of the Petition for Termination of Parental Rights Pending Adoption
herein, and noted upon the docket the date of mailing.
4. that, as of the date of this Affidavit, the Notice so mailed to has not been
returned by the United States Postal Service as undeliverable.
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.
AFFIANT'S SIGNATURE: X
PRINT NAME: , Deputy Clerk
DATE:
WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL this _ day of , 19
NOTARIAL SEAL
Notary Public
[Vol. 23:339
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APPENDIX J
BIRTH PARENTS READINESS ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
IN AND FOR COUNTY, FLORIDA
In the Interest of
JUVENILE DIVISION
CASE NO.:
a Child.
BIRTH PARENT'S READINESS ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
Please read and, If you agree, Initial each of the following statements before signing the papers
(called "Surrender and Consent for Adoption with Waiver of Notice, Service of Process, and Right
to Counsel') allowing your child to be adopted.
1. You have read and understand what you are about to sign and have no questions about the
papers or procedures Involved.
2. You are aware that you have the right to have your own Independent lawyer explain these papers
to you at no charge to you.
3. You understand that when you sign these papers you are permanently ending all your rights as
birth parent of this child, and you will not be given notice of any of the court proceedings for
the adoption of your child.
4. You understand that unless he or she chooses to locate you after age 18, you may never see
your child again.
5. You are aware that there are choices other than adoption for you and your child, Including
putting the child into foster care for a while or keeping the child yourself.
6. You are aware that you could choose to take more time to decide what to do.
7. You are signing these papers of your own free will.
8. You feel well enough emotionally and physically to sign these papers.
9. You are not under the Influence of any prescribed medication or other drugs that would affect
your ability to understand what you are doing.
10. You are not under the Influence of alcohol.
Initials __Page 1 of 2
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BIRTH PARENT'S READINESS ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
Please read and, If you agree, Initial each of the following statements before signing the papers
(called "Surrender and Consent for Adoption with Waiver of Notice, Service of Process, and Right
to Counsel") allowing your child to be adopted.
11. You acknowledge receiving copies of all the papers you are signing.
I HAVE READ AND UNDERSTAND THE PREVIOUS 11 STATEMENTS.
BIRTH PARENT'S SIGNATURE:
PRINT NAME:
DATE:
STATE OF FLORIDA
COUNTY OF
BEFORE ME, an officer authorized to take acknowledgments, appeared _, personally
known to me or who produced as identification , and acknowledged that s/he did execute
the foregoing Birth Parent's Readiness Acknowledgement freely, voluntarily and for the purposes stated
therein.
WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL in the state and county last aforesaid this
,19 - .
NOTARIAL SEAL
_ day of
Notary Public
Page 2 of 2 Initials
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I. INTRODUCTION
Scholars and practitioners agree that the path to a successful medical
malpractice recovery is a thorny and treacherous one. One commentator
characterizes the presuit requirements of Florida's Medical Malpractice
Reform Act' ("the Act") in Shakespearian parlance, as a "labyrinth" where
"[m]inotaurs and ugly treasons lurk."2  Another warns of the "pitfalls"
involved in bringing a claim for medical malpractice. 3  Still another
scathingly opines that the Act robs innocent victims of redress, while the
perpetrators (i.e., the medical profession) are "getting away with 'murder."' 4
However, from this writer's viewpoint, if a homicide has occurred, it has
been in the metaphorical sense and probably amounts only to involuntary
manslaughter, with the Florida Legislature and courts being the perpetrators
and the state of the law of medical malpractice personifying the victim.
Since its inception in 1975, there have been numerous revisions and
amendments to the Act and a steady and copious stream of judicial decisions
interpreting it. Yet, the legislature and the judiciary have- failed to articulate
a clear line of demarcation between tort claims that fall within the Act's
coverage and those falling outside, or to differentiate adequately, between
claims subject to the medical malpractice statute of limitations and those
which are not. The result is that presently, plaintiffs' attorneys must proceed
at their peril (and obviously that of their clients) in a quagmire of ill-defined
terms and internal inconsistencies. Unfortunately, clairvoyant powers may
be needed to predict how a court will rule on presuit and/or statute of
limitations issues in a given case.
The focus of this article will be upon two questions: first, under what
circumstances do the presuit requirements5 apply to a tort claim? Secondly,
when does the medical malpractice statute of limitations 6 apply? It will
I. See generally FLA. STAT. §§ 766.101-.316 (1997).
2. John A. Grant, Florida's Presuit Requirements for Medical Malpractice Actions, 68
FLA. B.J. 12, 12 (Feb. 1994). The complete quotation, which Mr. Grant sets forth under the title to
his article, is as follows: "Thou mayst not wander in the labyrinth; There Minotaurs and ugly
treasons lurk." Ila (quoting WmLLm SHAKESPEARE, THE FIRsT PART OF KING HENRY THE SIXTH
act 5, sc. 3).
3. Jeffery L. Blostein, Judicial Interpretations of Presuit in Florida: How to Avoid the
Pitfalls of Bringing or Defending a Claim for Medical Malpractice, 71 FLA. B.J. 45,45 (1997).
4. Jessica Fonseca-Nader, Florida's Comprehensive Medical Malpractice Reform Act:
Is it Timefor a Change, 8 ST. THIOMAS L. REV. 551,569 (1995).
5. FLA. STAT. §§ 766.106; .203-.206 (1997). See discussion infra Part II.A for an
overview of the Act's presuit requirements.
6. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4)(b) (1997). The statute reads as follows:
An action for medical malpractice shall be commenced within 2 years from
the time the incident giving rise to the action occurred or within 2 years from
406 [Vol. 23:403
407
: Nova Law Review 23, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1998
Gunter
become apparent to the reader that these two questions are intimately related
and to an important extent, inextricably intertwined. Yet, inexplicably, the
Florida courts have used conflicting criteria in the resolution of each of these
two issues. Moreover, critical terms of art have been defined differently by
the Florida Legislature and by the courts, depending on whether it is a
coverage issue or a statute of limitations issue being addressed.
Following the introduction, Part II of this article will discuss the
definition of a claim for medical malpractice under the Act and how the
courts have construed and applied this definition, specifically in the context
of whether a claim arising out of an injury sustained in a medical setting is
subject to the presuit provisions of the Act. Part I will discuss how the
courts have resolved whether a claim is subject to the two-year medical
malpractice statute of limitations 7 or the four-year statute of limitations
governing claims for ordinary negligence. Also, both Parts II and III, will
analyze why the current statutory and case law is anomalous, inconsistent,
and likely to be confusing to the practitioner. Part IV will conclude with a
discussion of how the vagaries and inconsistencies relating to coverage and
statute of limitations issues can be eliminated and how,. until such reform
takes place, prudent attorneys may want to proceed.
II. DETERMINING WHEN THE PRESUIT REQUIREMENTS OF THE Acr APPLY
The focus of this part will be upon how the Florida courts have gone
about determining whether a given claim is subject to, inter alia, the presuit
notice, investigation, and screening requirements of the Act ("Presuit
Requirements").
A. An Overview of the Act's Presuit Requirements
The Act defines a "claim for medical malpractice" as "a claim arising
out of the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services."
Prior to filing a claim for medical malpractice, the claimant must satisfy
the time the incident is discovered, or should have been discovered with the
exercise of due diligence.... An "action for medical malpractice" is defined
as a claim in tort or in contract for damages because of the death, injury, or
monetary loss to any person arising out of any medical, dental, or surgical
diagnosis, treatment, or care by any provider of health care. The limitation of
actions within this subsection shall be limited to the health care provider and
persons in privity with the provider of health care.
Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. § 95.11(3)(a).
9. Id. § 766.106(l)(a).
1998]
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certain presuit requirements. First, the claimant must conduct and complete a
"presuit investigation" of the claim pursuant to section 766.203 of the
Florida Statutes.'0 Upon application to the court by the claimant, an
automatic ninety-day extension of statute of limitations will be granted to
facilitate this presuit investigation." The purpose of the presuit investigation
is to ascertain that there are reasonable grounds to believe that any party
ultimately named as a defendant in the lawsuit was negligent in the care and
treatment of the claimant, and that such negligence resulted in injury to the
claimant.' 2 Under section 766.203(2), corroboration of reasonable grounds
to initiate litigation for medical malpractice "shall be provided by the
claimant's submission of a verified written medical expert opinion from a
medical expert as defined in section 766.202(5)... which statement shall
corroborate reasonable grounds to support the claim of medical
negligence.' 3  After completion of the presuit investigation pursuant to
section 766.203 and before filing a claim for medical malpractice, the
claimant must notify each prospective defendant of an intent to initiate
litigation for medical malpractice.' 4 The notice must contain the "date and a
summary of the occurrence giving rise to the claim and a description of the
injury to the claimant."'15 No suit may then be filed for a period of ninety
days after the notice is mailed to any prospective defendant and during this
ninety-day period the prospective defendant's insurer must conduct a review
to determine liability of the defendant. 16  During the ninety-day period,
which the Act denominates as the "presuit screening period,' ' 17 the parties
conduct an informal, but mandatory discovery process 8 during which each
prospective defendant's insurer or self-insurer must undertake an
investigation and review of the claim in good faith, and both the claimant and
prospective defendant must cooperate with the insurer in good faith.' 9
Failure of a party to comply with the presuit notice requirement of section
766.103, the reasonable investigation requirements of sections 766.201-.212,
or the informal discovery requirements of section 766.106(6)-(9), constitutes
grounds for dismissal by the court of the claims or defenses.
20
10. FLA. STAT. § 766.106(2) (1997).
11. Id. § 766.104(2).
12. Id. § 766.203(2)(a), (b).
13. Id. § 766.203(2).
14. Id. § 766.106(2) (1997).
15. FLA. STAT. § 766.106(2) (1997).
16. Id. § 766.106(3)(a).
17. Id. § 766.106.
18. Id. § 766.106(6)-(9).
19. Id. § 766.106(3)(a).
20. FLA. STAT. §§ 766.106(3)(a), (6); .206(2). See also Community Blood Ctrs., Inc. v.
Damiano, 697 So. 2d 948, 952 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
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Under the Act, the notice of intent to initiate litigation must be served
within the time limits set forth in section 95.11(4)(b) of the Florida
Statutes.2' The notice of intent to initiate litigation must be accompanied by
the corroborating opinion.22 "[T]he notice of intent to initiate litigation and
the corroborating medical expert opinion, taken together, must sufficiently
indicate the manner in which the defendant doctor allegedly deviated from
the standard of care, and must provide adequate information for the
defendants to evaluate the merits of the claim."23  During the ninety-day
period following receipt of the notice by the prospective defendants, "the
statute of limitations is tolled as to all potential defendants." 24 The parties
are free to stipulate to an extension of the ninety-day presuit screening period
and the statute of limitations will be further tolled during any such
extension.2 5 Upon receiving notice of termination of negotiations in an
extended period or even where there has been no extension, but there has
been a rejection of the claim, "the claimant shall have 60 [sixty] days or the
remainder of the period of the statute of limitations, whichever is greater,
within which to file suit.
26
The foregoing is by no means an exhaustive discussion of presuit
requirements; an in-depth analysis of this issue would be beyond the scope of
this article.27 However, the above capsulation has been set forth for context,
so that the reader may be mindful of the importance of determining early on
whether the claimant and the prospective defendants must comply with
presuit requirements. Since noncompliance with these requirements can
result in sanctions as drastic as dismissal,28 obviously the prudent attorney
will want to be correct in assessing whether the contemplated action is
subject to presuit requirements and/or to the two-year limitations period
prescribed by section 95.11(4)(b).
21. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4)(b) (1997). See supra text accompanying note 6.
22. See FLA. STAT. § 766.203 (2).
23. Duffy v. Brooker, 614 So. 2d 539,545 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
24. See FLA. STAT. § 766.106(4).
25. Id
26. Id See also Tanner v. Hartog, 618 So. 2d 177, 182 (Fla. 1993).
27. There are several recent well researched articles discussing presuit issues
comprehensively. See Jeffery L. Blostein, Judicial Interpretations of Presuit in Florida: How to
Avoid the Pitfalls of Bringing or Defending a Claim for Medical Malpractice, 71 FLA. B.J. 45
(1997); John A. Grant, Florida's Presuit Requirements for Medical Malpractice Actions, 68 FLA.
B.J. 12 (1994).
28. See FLA. STAT. §§ 766.106(3)(a), .106(6), .106(4).
1998]
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B. Survey and Legal Analysis of Statutory and Case Law
As noted above, among the most crucial requirements of the Act are the
requirements of presuit notice, investigation, and screening. Section
766.106(2) of the Act provides in pertinent part: "[a]fter completion of
presuit investigation•., and prior to filing a claim for medical malpractice, a
claimant shall notify each prospective defendant.., of intent to initiate
litigation. 29  The above quoted section of 766.106(2) gives rise to two
crucial questions. First, what constitutes "a claim for medical malpractice?"
Second, what is the meaning of the term "prospective defendant?" For if a
claim is "a claim for medical malpractice" and it is against one to whom the
legislature was referring when it used the term "prospective defendant," then
the plaintiff must conduct a presuit investigation, procure a corroborating
opinion, and give notice to the defendant(s) of intent to initiate litigation for
malpractice.
C. What Constitutes a "Claim for Medical Malpractice "for Purposes of
Presuit?
This first question is only partially answered by the language of section
766.106(1)(a). Section 766.106(1)(a) defines a "claim for medical
malpractice" as "a claim arising out of the rendering of, or the failure to
render, medical care or services." Still, there is the further question of what
constitutes the "rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or
services" for purposes of section 766.106?
In NME Properties, Inc. v. McCullouh,32 the Second District Court of
Appeal attempted to answer this question. The court held that because the
complaint did not allege that employees or agents of the defendant nursing
home rendered medical care or service 34 to the plaintiff, the claim was not a
claim for medical malpractice.35 At the outset, the court noted that presuit
requirements apply only to "claim[s] for medical malpractice" as defined by
section 766.106(l)(a) of the Florida Statutes.6 The court went on to assert
that the "simplest test" for determining whether a particular claim is one for
29. Id. § 766.106(2) (emphasis added).
30. Weinstock v. Groth, 629 So. 2d 835, 838 (Fla. 1993) (citing FLA. STAT. § 766.106(2)
(1997)).
31. FLA. STAT. § 766.106(1)(a).
32. 590 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
33. Id. at 441.
34. See FLA. STAT. § 766.106(1)(a).
35. McCullough, 590 So. 2d at 441.
36. Id.
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medical malpractice subject to presuit requirements is "whether the
professional medical negligence standard of care described in section
766.102, Florida Statutes (1989), applies to the active tortfeasor."37
However, upon thoughtful analysis, this "test" is not a "simple" test at
all, but is complicated and circular. Section 766.102(1) provides in pertinent
part that "[t]he prevailing professional standard of care... shall be that level
of care, skill, and treatment which, in light of all relevant surrounding
circumstances, is recognized as acceptable and appropriate by reasonably
prudent similar health care providers."' 8 Although it articulates the standard
of care that is applicable when a claim arises out of the rendering of, or
failure to render, medical care or services, section 766.102(!) does not
resolve the threshold question of what constitutes "the rendering of, or failure
to render medical, care or services."39 Thus, it does not really answer the
question of what constitutes a claim for medical malpractice subject to
presuit requirements. Logic would dictate that only after one has first
determined that a particular claim is one for medical malpractice, (i.e., one
arising out of the rendering of, or failure to render, medical care or services)
should section 766.102(1) then come into play to guide the resolution of
whether the particular medical care or services rendered fell below the
applicable standard of care and thus, constituted a breach of duty. In this
commentator's view, the McCullough court put the proverbial cart before the
horse. The court suggested that one can discern whether a claim is one for
medical malpractice subject to presuit requirements by determining in the
first instance whether the professional standard of care set forth in section
766.102(1) "applies to the active tortfeasor."'' However, the reverse actually
makes more sense; that is, there must first be a threshold determination as to
whether the claim is "a claim for medical malpractice," to wit, a claim arising
out of the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services.
This determination having been made, only then should section 766.102(1)
be applied to determine whether the medical care or services rendered
comported with or fell below the applicable standard of medical care recited
in that section.4' A much simpler and more workable test would be to
37. Id.
38. FLA. STAT. § 766.102(1) (1997).
39. See id.
40. McCullough, 590 So. 2d at 441.
41. See also Broadway v. Bay Hosp., Inc., 638 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
In Broadway, the first district noted that "[tihe test for determining whether a defendant is entitled
to the benefit of the presuit screening requirements of section 766.106, Florida Statutes, is whether
the defendant is directly or vicariously liable under the medical negligence standard of care set
forth in section 766.102(1), Florida Statutes." Id. at 177. Again, framing the test in such terms is
circular and begs the question. We must first know whether the claim is one which arises out of
"the rendering, of or failure to render, medical care or services" and thus, whether it is "a claim for
1998]
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examine whether the alleged incidents giving rise to the claim involved the
professional skill or judgment of the defendant. The McCullough court
hinted strongly that if the plaintiff had alleged facts indicating negligence in
the exercise of medical skill or judgment, then the action would have been
deemed a claim for malpractice. 42 Implicitly, the court equated claims
arising out of the exercise of professional skill and judgment with claims
arising out of the rendering of, or failure to render, medical services or care,
when it noted that the plaintiff failed to allege that the incident involved the
defendant's professional skill or judgment.43
In any event, we are still left with the question of how to determine
whether a claim is one for medical malpractice for purposes of presuit. To
phrase it another way, how can an attorney figure out, with any degree of
certainty, when his client's claim "arise[s] out of the rendering of, or failure
to render, medical care or services?" 44 An exploration of some recent case
law may help to provide the answer.
In J.B. v. Sacred Heart Hospital,45 the Supreme Court of Florida
addressed the question of when an action constitutes a claim for medical
malpractice for purposes of whether presuit notice is required under section
766.106(2).46 As the court in McCullough had done, the supreme court
examined the definition of "a claim for medical malpractice" set forth under
section 766.106(1)(a) of the Florida Statutes.47 However, the J.B. court
concluded that because the plaintiff's claim did not arise out of the rendering
of, or failure to render, medical care or services, presuit notice and screening
requirements did not apply.48 The gravamen of the plaintiff's claim was that
the defendant hospital had asked the plaintiff to transport his brother, a
patient at the hospital, to another hospital without telling the plaintiff that his
brother had AIDS and without warning him that he could become HIV
positive if he came into contact with his brother's wounds.4 9 The court
observed that:
According to the allegations in J.B.'s complaint, the Hospital was
negligent in using J.B. as a transporter. The complaint does not
medical malpractice." FLA. STAT. § 766.106(l)(A) (1997). Only then can we determine whether a
defendant was negligent in the rendering of those medical services by applying the section
766.102(1) professional standard of care to the conduct of the defendant.
42. McCullough, 590 So. 2d at 441.
43. Id.
44. See FLA. STAT. § 766.106(l)(a).
45. 635 So. 2d 945 (Fla. 1994).
46. Id. at 947.
47. Id. at 948-49; see also McCullough, 590 So. 2d at 441.
48. J.B., 635 So. 2d at 949.
49. Id. at946-47.
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allege that the Hospital was negligent in any way in the rendering
of, or the failure to render, medical care or services to J.B.
Accordingly, the complaint does not state a medical malpractice
claim for chapter 766 purposes, and the notice and presuit
screening requirements are inapplicable.
50
The court's reasoning in J.B. does help to elucidate the meaning of the
term "rendering of, or failure to render, medical care or services" and serves
to illustrate that not every claim which arises in a medical setting is one for
medical malpractice. J.B. was not a patient, and he apparently had no
injuries, disease, or other condition; he did not in any way either seek or
receive professional care or services from the hospital.5' Arguably, the
failure of the hospital to warn J.B. that there was a risk of AIDS transmission
if he came into contact with his brother's wounds was a very serious lapse in
medical judgment. However, what appears to have been key to the court's
decision was the fact that the hospital's negligence did not occur in the
course of rendering medical services to the plaintiff, that is, to J.B .52
Conversely, if J.B. had been a patient of the hospital and he contracted AIDS
through, say, an improperly sterilized instrument or needle, then his claim
would undoubtedly have been one for malpractice. In such a case, the claim
would clearly have arisen out of the rendering of medical services to J.B.
Another case dealing with the distinction between claims subject to
presuit requirements and those which are not, is the recent decision of Feifer
v. Galen of Florida, Inc.5 3 In Feifer, the plaintiff, an elderly man, presented
himself at the defendant hospital after being directed to do so by his
physician. The plaintiffs hands were obviously shaking, he walked with
slow shuffling steps with his hand on his hip, and he openly complained to
the hospital about his weakness. In his complaint, the plaintiff alleged that
hospital's admission employees told him that he would have to walk under
his own power to the various areas of the building, down long corridors with
hard floors, no handrails, no benches or chairs for sitting or resting, and with
neither a wheelchair nor escort having been provided.56 The plaintiff further
alleged that the conditions of the corridor, as described above, constituted an
"unsafe passageway" and a "dangerously negligent condition" of which the
hospital knew or should have knownY Allegedly, the plaintiff then suddenly
50. Id. at 949 (emphasis added).
51. Id. at948.
52. Id. at 949.
53. 685 So. 2d 882 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
54. Id. at 883.
55. Id
56. Id.
57. Id at 883-84.
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fell to the floor after walking to various areas of the hospital, resulting in a
broken hip and other permanent and painful bodily injuries which required
emergency surgery. 58  The hospital moved for a dismissal of Feifer's
complaint for negligence on the ground that he had failed to comply with the
presuit notice and screening requirements of chapter 766.59 The trial court
granted the motion, but the Second District Court of Appeal reversed,
holding that the plaintiff had effectively alleged a cause of action for
premises liability based on the breach of the hospital's duty to exercise
reasonable care in the maintenance of its premises. The court pointed out
that this was not a case of the hospital's negligence in the rendering of
"medical care" as contemplated by the Act.61 Therefore, the court reasoned it
was not a claim for medical malpractice. 62 Rather, it was negligence in the
broader sense, a breach of the duty to exercise reasonable care in the
maintenance of property, a duty which is incumbent upon any prudent person
• 63
who owns or occupies premises.
The Feifer court appears to have made somewhat of a subtle distinction
in arriving at its holding. Mr. Feifer's injury occurred while he was at the
hospital seeking medical care and services; he was clearly in a medical
setting when he fell in the hospital corridor and when the injury from the fall
occurred.64 However, the injury allegedly occurred from the way in which
the hospital maintained the property-or more precisely-failed to maintain
it.65 The court characterized the negligence as being outside the sphere of the
rendering of, or failure to render, medical care or services.
66
However, upon closer analysis, the reasoning of Feifer is somewhat
questionable. Arguably, because of its specialized knowledge and
58. Feifer, 685 So. 2d. at 884.
59. Id. at 883.
60. Id.
61. Id. at885.
62. Id.
63. Feifer, 685 So. 2d at 884. See also Hicks v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 676 So. 2d 1019,
1019 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that action against hospital to recover for injuries
sustained by claimant when another patient, who was allegedly inebriated but allowed to keep a
cigarette lighter, set fire to his bed, was a claim for premises liability and not subject to presuit
requirements); Palm Springs Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. Perez, 661 So. 2d 1222, 1223 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1995) (holding that action wherein patient sued hospital for negligently placing her in room
with second patient who committed homosexual attack on patient was an action for ordinary
negligence/premises liability rather than medical malpractice and therefore was not subject to
presuit screening requirements); Broadway v. Bay Hosp., Inc., 638 So. 2d 176, 177 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1994) (holding that a suit based upon the collapse of claimant's hospital bed was not a
claim for medical malpractice and hence not subject to presuit requirements).
64. Feifer, 685 So. 2d at 883-84.
65. Id. at 884.
66. Id. at 885.
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experience, a hospital, unlike other property owners, is uniquely situated to
foresee the dangers which could befall elderly people like Mr. Feifer. Its
staff has the expertise to recognize that a patient's age or condition might
render a particular patient susceptible to dangers which might not necessarily
be foreseen by a layman property owner. The moment Mr. Feifer walked
through the door, he entrusted himself to the hospital's care. The hospital
staff directed Mr. Feifer to walk down the long corridors and provided no
escort, wheelchair, handrails, or benches for resting despite his obvious
frailty. In light of what it knew or should have known of the vulnerabilities
of an elderly person like Mr. Feifer, who exhibited cognizable symptoms of
physical illness and who complained of weakness, Galen Hospital arguably
committed medical negligence. Arguably, at the heart of the hospital's
omissions was a lapse of professional skill and judgment.67 However, if the
Feifer court was at all torn between ordinary negligence and medical
malpractice, it should not be surprising that the court resolved the issue in
favor of Mr. Feifer in finding ordinary negligence.68 The Feifer court quoted
the statement of policy articulated by the Supreme Court of Florida in J.B. v.
Sacred Heart Hospital that "[i]f there is doubt as to the applicability of such
a statute, the question is generally resolved in favor of the claimant."
69
Although the supreme court in J.B. was referring specifically to section
95.11(4)(b), the two-year medical malpractice statute of limitations, and the
Feifer court was referring to the Act's presuit requirements, the unifying
theme is that in the arena of medical malpractice, the courts have consistently
67. The distinction between medical care and ordinary or reasonable care can be
somewhat amorphous and elusive. The gist of Mr. Feifer's position that his claim was for
ordinary as opposed to medical negligence is captured in the following excerpt from his
memorandum in opposition to the hospital's motion to dismiss in the trial court:
[D]efendant's... argue that, because the word "care!' was used in the text of
the Complaint, and because the defendant corporate entity is generally
considered a health care provider, that plaintiffs' [sic] cannot pursue their
claim herein under an ordinary negligence cause of action but, rather, must
pursue it as a medical malpractice action with all the attendant statutory
conditions precedent to the filing of such a cause of action; defendant's
argument is a misconstruance of the word "care" into the context of "medical
care," a construction more favorable to the defendant, when the plain
meaning of the word "care" in the context used was such reasonable care as
any ordinary prudent person may be required by law to take to avoid injury to
others, in the classic definition of the tort of negligence.
Id. at 884 (quoting Response Brief for Appellant).
68. Id. at 885.
69. Id. (quoting J.B. v. Sacred Heart Hosp., 635 So. 2d 945,947 (Fla. 1994)).
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construed statutes restricting access to the courts in a manner which favors
access.
70
In light of Feifer, it would seem that claims arising out of a hospital's
negligence when a patient is awaiting or enroute to or from receiving medical
services must be distinguished from injuries which occur from the
administering of the care or services themselves. Only claims based on the
latter are subject to presuit requirements under the reasoning of Feifer.71
However, Feifer is not definitive because one can imagine situations where
the line between the rendering of medical care or services and negligent
maintenance of property could be quite blurry. It would be much harder to
criticize the Feifer court's reasoning if, for example, Mr. Feifer had slipped
on a patch of soapy water. Such a scenario would be more of a garden
variety type of negligence, a failure of reasonable care in the maintenance of
property; the consequence of which could befall anyone, of any age, in any
type of building which has a hallway or corridor.72 However, because of the
hospital's specialized knowledge of the frailties of the sick, elderly, and
infirm, what actually happened in Feifer could have justifiably been
considered a lapse of professional judgment which occurred in the course of
rendering medical service to a patient.
To illustrate this point, assume that a patient goes to a chiropractor for
treatment of a bad back. An interesting quandary would be presented if, for
example, while the chiropractor was treating the patient, the treatment table
collapsed. From the standpoint of time, the resultant injury occurred
"during" the rendering of medical services, but the question is, did it arise out
of the rendering of services from a conceptual standpoint? On one hand, one
could argue that the injury did not arise out of the rendering of medical
70. See Kukral v. Mekras, 679 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 1996); Patry v. Capps, 633 So. 2d 9 (Fla.
1994); Weinstock v. Groth, 629 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 1993); Community Blood Ctrs., Inc. v. Damiano,
697 So. 2d 948 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Melanson v. Agravat, 675 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. Ist
Dist. Ct. App. 1996). See also FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21 which provides: "The courts shall be open
to every person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or
delay." Id.
71. See Feifer, 685 So. 2d at 885.
72. But see Neilinger v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 460 So. 2d 564 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
In Neilinger, the plaintiff, a maternity patient, alleged that she slipped and fell on a pool of
amniotic fluid while descending from an examination table under the direction and care of hospital
employees. Id. at 566. The Neilinger court held that the complaint, on its face, alleged breach of a
professional duty and that the action was therefore one for medical malpractice as opposed to
ordinary negligence. Id. One might argue that Neilinger is distinguishable from Feifer in that in
Neilinger the plaintiff slipped and fell while descending from the table at the direction and
supervision of hospital employees. Id However, if the negligent assistance of hospital employees
in Neilinger was classified as medical negligence, it would seem that the allegation of a total lack
of assistance by hospital employees alleged by a frail and elderly Mr. Feifer could support a
finding of medical negligence in that case.
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services because it was a defect in the physical object upon which the patient
was being treated, rather than a defect in the treatment or care itself. On the
other hand, it can be argued that the table is a tool, in effect an "instrument"
of the chiropractor, and therefore in utilizing a substandard "instrument"
and/or in failing to maintain it in a safe condition, the chiropractor was
negligent in the rendering of medical services. In view of the policy favoring
access to the courts,73 most courts would probably find the patient's claim to
be for premises liability as opposed to medical malpractice, if such a finding
would result in dismissal of the claim.
To further illustrate the possibilities, let us consider an example of two
patients, both of whom are in the hospital. Patient A is injured as a result of
a nurse's failure to raise and secure the bed rails, while patient B is injured
due to the patient's bed collapsing. There is a respectable argument that
patient A's claim against the nurse and/or the hospital74 is a claim for
medical malpractice. We can safely assume that it is part of a nurse's
professional duties to see that the bed rails are raised for the protection of the
patient-if not the nurse, who else? In the author's view, a claim based on
the nurse's neglect to raise and secure the bed rails and the resultant injury to
the patient arises out of the rendering of or failure to render medical care or
services. It is a claim calling into account the exercise of her professional
skill and judgment." Undoubtedly, nurses are trained in many facets of
bedside care of patients. A nurse must know how to put in and take out
intravenous needles, wash and assist patients in excretory functions, help
them in and out of bed, and even know how to make a bed with a patient still
in it. Their training most likely includes the raising and securing of bed rails.
We can rest assured that the risk management division of the hospital will
insist upon such prophylactic measures. Indeed, the Florida courts have
recognized that one of the primary professional duties of a nurse is the
supervision of patients.76 The raising of bed rails is arguably a component of
73. See, e.g., Weinstock, 629 So. 2d at 838.
74. Even though a hospital may not itself be directly liable, a hospital can be held
vicariously liable for the negligent acts of its agents or employees. See Pinillos v. Cedars of
Lebanon Hosp. Corp., 403 So. 2d 365, 368-69 (Fla. 1981); Reed v. Good Samaritan Hosp. Ass'n,
Inc., 453 So. 2d 229, 230 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984). It should be noted that a hospital may
also be found vicariously liable on an apparent agency theory. See Orlando Executive Park, Inc. v.
Robbins, 433 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 1983). In Orlando Executive Park, the Supreme Court of Florida
approved the requisites necessary to establish apparent agency: "'(1) a representation by the
principal; (2) reliance on that representation by a third person; and (3) a change of position by the
third person in reliance upon such representation to his detriment."' Id. at 494 (quoting Orlando
Executive Park, Inc. v. P.D.R., 402 So. 2d 442, 449 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1981)).
75. NME Properties, Inc. v. McCullough, 590 So. 2d 439, 440 (Fla. 2d Dist. CL App.
1991).
76. See Evenson v. Miami Med. Ctr., Inc., 128 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 3d Dist. CL App. 1961).
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a nurse's supervisory duties, which duties are, in turn, a constituent of the
care rendered by a nurse. Thus, the practitioner should be cautioned that
presuit requirements could apply in such a situation.
However, patient B's claim, if any, falls into more of a gray area. On
one hand, the hospital could be said to have been negligent in the rendering
of "medical" care or services because the provision of a bed to patients
would seem to be an integral part of the services rendered by the hospital.
Nevertheless, on the other hand, we must ask, does the provision of a bed by
a hospital equate to the rendering of "medical" care or services? The
maintenance of a bed in good mechanical working order is not something
that involves medical skill or judgment. So even though in the broad sense,
patient B's injuries occurred in the course of the hospital's rendering of
medical care and services, it is doubtful B's claim would be construed by a
court to be one for medical malpractice. In fact, in Broadway v. Bay
Hospital, Inc.,78 the court held that a plaintiffs claim for injuries she
sustained when her hospital bed collapsed was a claim for ordinary
negligence.79 The court noted that the plaintiff's allegations that the hospital
had failed to properly maintain a piece of equipment, or to warn of a
dangerous condition made the claim one for negligent maintenance of the
premises as opposed to medical malpractice.
80
Another thought-provoking example might be that of two patients who
are injured by virtue of food they are served while in the hospital. Patient A
contracts salmonella as a result of ingesting undercooked chicken contamin-
ated with the salmonella virus while patient B, whom the hospital knows to
be a diabetic, develops complications as a result of being served a diet too
high in sugars. What distinguishes A's claim from B's is the fact that the
breach of duty to patient A does not involve a lack of medical expertise. In
the same vein as the hospital's food service staff, a chef in a restaurant, or
even a social host, could be deemed negligent for causing salmonella by
undercooking chicken as it is common knowledge. However, as regards to
patient B, because of its specialized medical knowledge and expertise, the
hospital is or should be uniquely able to foresee the serious medical reper-
cussions which could befall a patient with a disease requiring a special diet.
Thus, in the case of patient B, it would seem reasonable to conclude that the
hospital was negligent in the rendering of or failure to render "medical" care.
77. As we shall see and discuss in the next section of this article, the fact that a claim
arises out of the rendering of or the failure to render medical care or services and is therefore a
claim for medical malpractice, does not mean in and of itself, that presuit requirements apply; for
the prospective defendant must also be a "health care provider." See Weinstock v. Groth, 629 So.
2d 835 (Fla. 1993).
78. 638 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
79. Id. at 177.
80. Id.
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Consider one final example, that of a doctor, who, out of affection for a
patient, brings a vase of flowers to her bedside, but injures her when he
carelessly drops the vase upon her. Contrast that scenario to the doctor
poking that same patient in the eye with a sharp medical instrument in the
course of examining or treating her. While the former mishap exemplifies a
lack of ordinary care for which any layperson could be culpable, the latter
clearly involves neglect or a failure of skill in the rendering of a medical
service.
Although the determination of when an action will be deemed a claim
for medical malpractice for purposes of presuit is an inexact science, a
review of several other Florida cases should help the practitioner to
determine where the courts are likely to draw the line between actions which
constitute claims for medical malpractice and those which do not.
One such case is that of Palm Springs General Hospital, Inc. v. Perez.
In Perez, the Third District Court of Appeal upheld the denial of a hospital's
motion to dismiss, holding that the plaintiff had no obligation to comply with
presuit screening provisions where the hospital was allegedly negligent in
placing the plaintiff in a room with another patient who attacked her."2 The
Perez decision was well-reasoned in that it was not a medical risk to which
the patient was exposed, but rather the risk that another might harm her
because of known criminal propensities.83
In Jackson v. Biscayne Medical Center, Inc.,84 the plaintiff was a patient
who had allegedly been wrongfully removed from the defendant hospital
without medical authorization. The plaintiff alleged that he was then
assaulted, battered, falsely arrested, slandered, and ultimately maliciously
prosecuted for trespassing at the hospital.86 The Third District Court of
Appeal reversed a dismissal of these claims notwithstanding that they arose
from the same transaction as other counts which were based upon
malpractice and which were properly dismissed for failure to comply with
presuit requirements.87 Although the Jackson decision appears to be sound,
81. 661 So. 2d 1222 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct App. 1995).
82. Id. at 1223.
83. See also Hicks v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 676 So. 2d 1019 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
In Hicks, an inebriated patient at the hospital set a fire resulting in another patient's death. Id. The
court concluded that the claim did not sound in medical malpractice but rather premises liability
and therefore the claim was not subject to the presuit requirements of the Act. Id. at 1019. Other
recent decisions have held that certain claims against hospitals or other medical care facilities can
be grounded in premises liability as opposed to medical malpractice. See, e.g., Robinson v. West
Fla. Reg'l Med. Ctr., 675 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
84. 347 So. 2d 721 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
85. Id. at722.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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it is still somewhat questionable in that what precipitated the assault, battery,
false imprisonment, etc. was the wrongful discharge from the hospital
without medical authorization." If a patient is discharged from the hospital
before it is medically sound to do so, then arguably there has been a breach
of duty arising out of the rendering of, or more precisely, the failure to render
medical care or services. However, the intentionally tortious behavior, which
occurred following that wrongful discharge, is distinguishable from the
medical repercussions one might ordinarily expect, such as a relapse or
worsening of the underlying medical condition. In that the tortious conduct
in question was quite attenuated and remote from the expected consequence
of a wrongful discharge of a patient, the Jackson decision is justifiable. If,
on the other hand, the battery claim of the plaintiff were to have been based
on the failure of a surgeon to disclose risks and obtain informed consent, the
situation would have been altogether different, and the claim would properly
have been deemed one for medical malpractice.89
D. Who is a "Prospective Defendant" for Purposes of Presuit?
Section 766.106(2) of the Florida Statutes provides in relevant part that
"[a]fter completion of presuit investigation pursuant to § 766.203 and prior to
filing a claim for medical malpractice, a claimant shall notify each
prospective defendant... of intent to initiate litigation for medical
malpractice." 90 Since the Florida Legislature has not defined what it means
by the cryptic term "prospective defendant," the question arises as to exactly
who was intended to be included within this category of "prospective
defendants" for purposes of section 766.106(2).
A leading case addressing this question is the Supreme Court of
Florida's decision in Weinstock v. Groth.91 In Weinstock, the plaintiff filed
an action against a licensed clinical psychologist. 92 The gravamen of the
complaint was that in 1985, the plaintiff, Suzanne Groth, began receiving
psychotherapy and marriage counseling from the defendant psychologist, Dr.
Ronda Weinstock, and that subsequently, Dr. Weinstock had entered into an
affair with the plaintiffs husband who had attended several of the therapy
sessions.93 The complaint charged Dr. Weinstock with negligence and the
intentional infliction of emotional distress.94 Weinstock then filed a motion
88. Id.
89. FLA. STAT. § 766.103(3) (1997). See also Gassman v. United States, 589 F. Supp.
1534, 1544-45 (M.D. Fla. 1984).
90. FLA. STAT. § 766.106(2) (emphasis added).
91. 629 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 1993).
92. Id. at 836.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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to dismiss the complaint because it failed to allege that the plaintiff had
complied with the presuit notice requirements set forth in section 766.106(2)
of the Act.9 5 The trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss, but
the Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed on the ground that Dr. Weinstock
was not a "health care provider" under the Act and therefore the presuit
notice requirements did not apply.96 The Supreme Court of Florida noted
that section 766.106(2) does not define the "prospective defendants" to
whom notice must be given.97 The court explained "[h]owever, it is only
logical that the term refers to defendants in a medical malpractice action who
are health care providers as defined in chapter 766 or who, although not
expressly included within that class, are vicariously liable for the acts of a
health care provider."98 The court further asserted that "[ilt is clear that
under § 766.102(1) 'prospective defendants' in medical negligence actions
are 'health care providers as defined in [section] 768.50(2)(b)."' 99  The
Weinstock court did not adequately explain why it was so "logical" and
"clear" that the term "prospective defendants" used in section 766.106(2)
was synonymous with the term "health care provider" utilized in section
766.102(1). However, the court's unspoken reasoning was likely to have
been that section 766.102(1) sets forth the applicable standard of care in
actions based on "the negligence of a health care provider as defined in
[section] 768.50(2)(b), ' 'lco which by implication, means actions for medical
malpractice.101 Therefore, the "prospective defendants" in an action for
medical malpractice, to which section 766.106(1) refers, must mean the
"health care providers" subject to the medical or professional standard of
care set forth under section 766.102(1). Having posited the principle that the
presuit notice requirement must be satisfied in claims against health care
providers, the court then observed that if Dr. Weinstock was a "health care
provider," then the plaintiff's complaint was properly dismissed because
notice had not been given.1
02
95. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 766.106(2)).
96. Weinstock, 629 So. 2d at 836.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 837-38.
99. Id. at 838 (quoting FIA. STAT. § 766.102(1)).
100. FL. STAT. § 766.102(1). See infra text accompanying note 108.
101. The only alternative to this interpretation would be that in section 766.102(1), the
legislature was referring to actions for ordinary negligence when it used the term "negligence of a
health care provider." However, this reading would not make any sense in view of the fact that it
is the prevailing "professional" standard of care which expressly applies under section 766.102(1).
See infra text accompanying note 108.
102. Weinstock, 629 So. 2d at 836.
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Was Dr. Weinstock a "health care provider?" The Supreme Court of
Florida answered this question in the negative and its reasoning was as
follows:
[A]s both the trial and district courts below noted, psychologists
licensed under chapters 490 and 491, Florida Statutes (1991), are
not included in the chapter 766 definitions of "health care
provider." We agree with the district court below that the
exclusion of psychologists from the various definitions of this term
indicates a legislative intent that psychologists not be classified as
health care providers. This limited construction of the term
precludes the absurd conclusion that clergy and others who provide
counseling similar to that provided by Dr. Weinstock, but who also
are not expressly defined as health care providers, might be subject
to the provisions of the Act.
10 3
The Weinstock court pointed to three different sections of the Act, each
of which contained a definition of the term "health care provider:" 1 4 1)
section 766.101(1)(b); 105 2) section 766.105(1)(b); 1' 6 and 3) section
766.102(1),'0 7 which, in turn, incorporates the definition of health care
103. Id. at 836-37.
104. Id. at 836.
105. FLA. STAT. § 766.101(l)(b) (1997) defines "health care providers" as "physicians
licensed under chapter 458, osteopathic physicians licensed under chapter 459, podiatrists licensed
under chapter 461, optometrists licensed under chapter 463, dentists licensed under chapter 466,
chiropractors licensed under chapter 460, pharmacists licensed under chapter 465, or hospitals or
ambulatory surgical centers licensed under chapter 395." kli
106. FLA. STAT. § 766.105(1)(b) states that:
[t]he term "health care provider" means any: 1) hospital licensed under
chapter 395; 2) physician licensed, or physician assistant certified, under
chapter 458; 3) osteopathic physician licensed under chapter 459; 4)
Podiatrist licensed under chapter 461; 5) health maintenance organization
certificated under part I of chapter 641; 6) ambulatory surgical center licensed
under chapter 395; 7) "[o]ther medical facility" as defined in paragraph (c); 8)
professional association, partnership, corporation, joint venture, or other
association by the individuals set forth in subparagraphs 2., 3., and 4. for
professional activity.
Id.
107. Id. § 766.102(1) provides:
In any action for recovery of damages based on the death or personal injury of
any person in which it is alleged that such death or injury resulted from the
negligence of a health care provider as defined in s. 768.50(2)(b), the
claimant shall have the burden of proving by the greater weight of evidence
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provider set forth in section 768.50(2)(b).l'8 All of these sections contain, in
some cases overlapping and in some respects inconsistent, definitions of the
term "health care provider." For example, section 766.101(1)(b) defines
health care providers to mean "physicians licensed under chapter 458,
osteopathic physicians licensed under chapter 459, podiatrists licensed under
chapter 461, optometrists licensed under chapter 463, dentists licensed under
chapter 466, chiropractors licensed under chapter 460, pharmacists licensed
under chapter 465, or hospitals or ambulatory surgical centers licensed under
chapter 395.''109 However, section 766.101 deals only with the narrow
subject of immunity from liability of those serving on medical review
committees and with exclusion from discovery of matters arising out of
review performed by such committees." °
The Weinstock court further noted that psychologists were not included
within the section 766.105(1)(b) definition of health care provider either.111
The absence of psychologists from the section 766.105(1)(b) definition
buttressed the court's conviction that psychologists were not health care
providers entitled to presuit notice." 2 Unlike any of the other sections the
that the alleged actions of the health care provider represented a breach of the
prevailing professional standard of care for that health care provider.
Id. § 766.102(1) (1997) (emphasis added).
108. Interestingly, section 766.102(1) of the Florida Statutes incorporates by express
reference the definition of "health care provider" set forth under now-repealed FLA. STAT. §
768.50(2)(b) (1985) which has the most comprehensive definitions of what a "health care
provider" is:
"Health care provider" means hospitals licensed under chapter 395;
physicians licensed under chapter 458; osteopaths licensed under chapter 459;
podiatrists licensed under chapter 461; dentists licensed under chapter 466;
chiropractors licensed under chapter 460; naturopaths licensed under chapter
462; nurses licensed under chapter 464; clinical laboratories registered under
chapter 483; physicians' assistants certified under chapter 458; physical
therapists and physical therapist assistants licensed under chapter 486; health
maintenance organizations certificated under part II of chapter 641;
ambulatory surgical centers... ; blood banks... ; or ... associations for
professional activity by health care providers.
Id. § 768.50(2)(b) (1985). The Weinstock court noted that section 768.50 had been repealed
"except to the extent that it is incorporated by reference into section 766.102(1)." See
Weinstock, 629 So. 2d at 836 n.1.
109. FLA. STAT. § 766.101(1)(b).
110. Id.
111. Weinstock, 629 So. 2d at 836.
112. Ide at 836-37. Note that in P.W. Ventures, Inc. v. Nichols, 533 So. 2d 281 (Fla.
1988), the Supreme Court of Florida declared that express mention of one thing in a statute implies
exclusion of another. Id. Nichols was cited by Weinstock for this very proposition. Weinstock,
629 So. 2d at 837. Thus, since the various definitions of health care provider set forth in chapter
766 expressly mention other health care professionals in their definitions of health care provider
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Weinstock court reviewed, section 766.105(1)(b) includes: 1) health
maintenance organizations; 2) professional associations; 3) partnerships,
corporations; 4) joint ventures; and 5) "other medical facilit[ies]" within the
definition of health care providers 13 However, section 766.105 deals with
coverage under the "Florida Patient's Compensation Fund," a topic far afield
from presuit requirements or the applicable standard of care.'1
Finally, the court reviewed section 766.102(1), which incorporates the
definition of health care provider set forth under section 768.50(2)(b)." 5
Psychologists, the court stated, were not included in the section 768.50(2)(b)
definition of "health care provider" either." 6 Therefore, the Weinstock court
concluded, the legislature simply could not have intended psychologists to be
health care providers for purposes of entitlement to presuit notice under
section 766.106 in view of their absence from the various definitions of
health care -provider set forth in sections 766.101(1)(b), 766.105(1)(b), and
766.102(1).17 Clearly, the most crucial of the three sections examined by the
court was section 766.102(1)8 because the court stated outright that in
medical malpractice actions, the term "prospective defendants" means health
care providers as defined in section 768.50(2)(b)." 9
but psychologists are not included, this is strong evidence that the Florida Legislature did not
intend psychologists to be considered health care providers for any purpose under chapter 766.
See id.
113. FLA. STAT. § 766.105(l)(b). See supra text accompanying note 106.
114. See FLA. STAT. § 766.105(1)(b). The statute is entitled "Florida Patient's
Compensation Fund." Id. The only relationship between section 766.105 and the presuit
provisions set forth in section 766.106 would seem to be that both statutes are part of the Act.
115. Weinstock, 629 So. 2d at 837. See supra text accompanying note 108. Again, as
noted earlier, the court observed that section 768.50(2)(b) had been "repealed except to the extent
that it is incorporated by reference into section 766.102(1)." Weinstock, 629 So. 2d at 836 n.l.
116. Id. at 836 (citing FLA. STAT. § 768.50(2)(b) (1985)).
117. Id By negative implication, it could be argued that if psychologists were listed as
health care providers under any of the three sections the Weinstock court examined, they would be
entitled to presuit notice. This very argument was advanced quite recently in Community Blood
Ctr., Inc. v. Damiano, 697 So. 2d 948, 951 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997) and rejected by the
Fourth District Court of Appeal as follows:
The blood bank argues that although the medical malpractice statute of
limitations does not apply to actions against blood banks, plaintiffs
nevertheless were bound to comply with the presuit requirements of chapter
766, including subsection 766.106(2). This subsection requires notice to the
defendant in a medical malpractice action after completion of presuit
screening, "prior to filing a claim for medical malpractice."
Id. at 951.
118. Which incorporates section 766.50(2)(b)'s definition of "health care provider." See
supra text accompanying note 108.
119. Weinstock, 629 So. 2d at 838.
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Therefore, under Weinstock, we can conclude that if one is included in
the section 768.50(2)(b) definition of "health care provider," then one is a
health care provider and hence a "prospective defendant" for purposes of
entitlement to presuit notice. However in the recent case of Community
Blood Centers v. Damiano,120 the Fourth District Court of Appeal did not
reach that conclusion.'12 In Damiano, the defendant, a blood bank, moved to
dismiss the complaint on the ground that plaintiffs, who allegedly contracted
AIDS through HIV tainted blood supplied by the blood bank, had failed to
provide presuit notice to the defendant under section 766.106(2) of the
Florida Statutes.122 However, the trial court denied the defendant blood
bank's motion to dismiss.23 In affirming the trial court's decision, the
Fourth District Court of Appeal rejected the blood bank's contention that it
was a health care provider for purposes of presuit.124 The defendant pointed
out that blood banks were included in the section 768.50(2)(b) definition of
health care provider and argued that, under Weinstock, it was therefore a
"prospective defendant" entitled to presuit notice under section
766.106(2).125 The appellate court responded to this argument as follows:
"defendant points out that blood banks are defined as a health care provider
under subsection 768.50(2)(b). While that is true, blood banks are listed
nowhere else within the statutory definition of chapter 766; e.g., subsections
766.101(b) and 766.105(1)(b)." This statement shows that the Damiano
court may have misread Weinstock. The Weinstock court did indeed examine
three different subsections of chapter 766.127 Moreover, the Supreme Court
of Florida did conclude in Weinstock that the absence of psychologists from
any of the various statutory definitions of health care provider showed that
the legislature could not have intended psychologists to occupy the status of
health care provider.'2 However, the Weinstock court never indicated that
one who is defined as a health care provider under section 768.50(2)(b) must
also fall within the section 766.105(1)(b) and/or section 766.101(1)(b)
definition(s) of that term, before one can be considered a prospective
defendant for purposes of presuit notice. In fact, the court in Weinstock
indicated just the opposite in stating unequivocally, "[i]t is clear that...
120. 697 So. 2d 948 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
121. Id. at 949.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 952.
125. Damiano, 697 So. 2d at 951.
126. Id.
127. Weinstock 629 So. 2d at 838 (examining FLA. STAT. §§ 766.101(1)(b); .102 (1),
.105(1)(b)) which expressly incorporates section 768.50(2)(b). See also supra text accompanying
notes 105-08.
128. Weinstock, 629 So. 2d at 837.
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'prospective defendants' in medical negligence actions are 'health care
providers as defined in [section] 768.50(2)(b).' ' 29
However, even if the fourth district rendered an unduly restrictive
reading of Weinstock's test for whether one is a health care provider, it had
benevolent motives for doing so. First of all, the majority in Damiano
observed that it was not until June 18, 1996, over four years after plaintiffs
had filed the action, that the blood bank filed its motion to dismiss based on
the plaintiffs' noncompliance with section 766.106(2), presuit require-
ments. 1 30 As Judge Pariente pointed out in his concurring opinion, due to the
defendant's four-year delay in filing the motion to dismiss, it was too late for
plaintiffs to comply with the presuit notice requirements and "plaintiffs now
have no opportunity to cure the defect."' 3' Secondly, aside from this issue of
basic fairness, the Damiano court, citing Weinstock, reiterated the principle
that statutes should be construed in a manner which minimize their effect on
the constitutionally protected right of access to the courts under Article I,
Section 21 of the Florida Constitution.132 In any event, because the court
held that the blood bank had not rendered treatment or care to plaintiffs and
thus the claim was not one for medical malpractice, it would have made no
difference in the outcome even if the court had deemed the blood bank to be
a health care provider. 33 From a logical standpoint, it seems nonsensical to
require, as Damiano seems to suggest, that one must not only be listed in
section 768.50(2)(b) in order to be deemed a health care provider for presuit
purposes, but also must be included in one or both of the definitions of that
term set forth in section 766.105(1)(b), and 766.101(1)(b). 134
As the Fifth District Court of Appeal recently noted in Sova Drugs, Inc.
v. Barnes,135 in determining whether "pharmacists" were health care
providers for purposes of the presuit investigation and notice requirements of
section 766.106(2) of the Act:
Other parts of Chapter 766 include pharmacists in the list of
"health care providers".. . [h]owever, their inclusion in this
section [766.101(b)] is for the purpose of providing them immunity
when serving on medical review committees or providing
information in the scope of such a committee function. This
129. Id. at 838 (emphasis added).
130. Damiano, 697 So. 2d at 951.
131. Id. at 952 (Pariente, J., concurring).
132. Id. (citing Weinstock v. Groth, 629 So. 2d 835, 838 (Fla. 1993)).
133. Id. at 949. See also Silva v. Southwest Fla. Blood Bank, Inc., 601 So. 2d 1184 (Fla.
1992) (holding that an action against a blood bank as a supplier of blood was not a medical
malpractice action for statute of limitations purposes).
134. See Damiano, 697 So. 2d at 951.
135. 661 So. 2d 393 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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provision has little or nothing to do with filing medical malpractice
actions in civil courts.
13 6
The Barnes court admonished that "[t]he only sensible approach in
interpreting this Chapter [766], is to limit the applicability of each section to
its own definition of 'health care provider' if there is one provided."
137
If the legislature did intend the term "prospective defendants" used in
section 766.106(2) to mean "health care providers," its failure to say so or to
define the terms "prospective defendant" and "health care provider" for
purposes of section 766.106(2) has resulted in a lot of confusion. Indeed,
troubled by this confusion, the Second District Court of Appeal was
prompted to observe in NME Properties v. McCulough 38 that "[w]e
have... lamented the difficulty of interpreting chapter 766 because the
chapter lacks comprehensive definitions. This case presents similar
difficulties."'139 In McCullough, the plaintiff alleged that she entered the
defendant nursing home to recuperate after surgery on her fractured elbow
and that agents or employees of the home negligently treated or handled the
plaintiff causing her to suffer further severe injury to her previously fractured
elbow.14° The nursing home moved to dismiss because the plaintiff had
failed to comply and plead compliance with the presuit requirements set forth
in sections 766.104, 766.106, and 766.203-06.11 The trial court denied the
motion and the appellate court affirmed the denial, noting that nursing homes
were not included in the definitions of health care provider set forth in
sections 768.50(2)(b), 766.101(1)(b), or 766.105(1)(b) of the Florida
Statutes.142 Moreover, the court explained, the plaintiff had not alleged that
the agents or employees of the nursing home, to whom she ascribed her
negligent treatment or handling, were health care providers.1 43 The court
noted that the agents or employees might merely be orderlies or other
employees without professional status.1 4 - Since presuit requirements can
attach only when the defendant is a health care provider or alleged to be
vicariously liable for the acts of a health care provider and neither situation
136. Id. at 395.
137. Id.
138. 590 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
139. Id. at440 n.1 (citing Catron v. Roger Bohn, D.C., P.A., 580 So. 2d 814 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1991)).
140. Id. at440.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. McCullough, 590 So. 2d at 440.
144. Id.
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was obtained in this case, the court reasoned that the defendant's motion to
dismiss for noncompliance with presuit requirements was properly denied.
145
What is perplexing is that the McCullough court suggested that presuit
requirements would have been applicable if the plaintiff had alleged that the
harm was caused by a nurse employed by the nursing home. 4' - However,
nurses are not included in the definitions of health care provider set forth in
sections 766.101(1)(b) or 766.105(1)(b) but only in the section 768.50(2)(b)
definition.1 47 Therefore, under McCullough, it would appear that inclusion of
a defendant in the section 768.50(2)(b) definition of a health care provider
would suffice in and of itself to confer health care provider status upon a
defendant for purposes of presuit.' 48 This view is directly at odds with the
approach taken by the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Damiano, which
holds that inclusion in the section 768.50(2)(b) definition is not enough by
itself to cloak a party with the status of health care provider for purposes of
presuit.
149
In Goldman v. Halifax Medical Center, Inc.,150 a unique issue was raised
and resolved by the Fifth District Court of Appeal.' 5' In Goldman, the
plaintiff alleged that a hospital was vicariously liable for the negligence of its
employee, a radiologic technologist. 5 2  The plaintiff alleged that the
technologist negligently applied excessive pressure and caused one of her
silicone breast implants to rupture. 153  The plaintiff contended that
compliance with the presuit notice requirements of chapter 766 is not
necessary where the active tortfeasor is not a health care provider under any
of the statutory definitions. 54 Does the requirement of presuit notice apply
to a claim against a hospital based on the negligence of the hospital's
employee who was not a health care provider? The Goldman court's answer
to this question was "yes.' 55 At first blush, this holding seems surprising in
light of the supreme court's proclamation in Weinstock stating, "we conclude
that the notice requirements of the Act only apply in actions against 'health
care providers' as defined in chapter 766, Florida Statutes (1991), and those
145. Id. at440-41.
146. Id. at 440.
147. See FLA. STAT. §§ 766.101(1)(b); .105(1)(b); 768.50(2)(b). See supra text
accompanying notes 105-08.
148. McCullough, 590 So. 2d at 440.
149. Damiano, 697 So. 2d at 951.
150. 662 So. 2d 367 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
151. Id. at368.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Goldman, 662 So. 2d at 368.
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who are vicariously liable for the acts of a health care provider."156 Without
explicitly saying so, this language suggests that there are only two situations
in which presuit notice is required: 1) in a direct action against a health care
provider based on the provider's own negligence; and 2) in an action against
a party (health care provider or not) based on vicarious liability for the acts
of the defendant's employee or agent who is a health care provider.
However, Goldman's suit against the hospital was grounded in vicarious
liability based upon its employee's alleged negligence in performing a
mammogram.157 The employee, a radiographic technician, was not included
in any of the chapter 766 definitions of health care provider.1 58 Nevertheless,
Goldman held that presuit notice requirements applied to the vicarious
liability claim against the hospital.159 Arguably, this holding flies in the face
of the apparent restriction imposed by Weinstock that medical negligence
suits founded upon vicarious liability are subject to presuit only when the
underlying employee or agent is a health care provider.160 However, the
above quoted language from Weinstock is ambiguous. Again, the Weinstock
court stated that presuit requirements "only apply in actions against 'health
care providers' and those who are vicariously liable for the acts of a health
care provider."
161
As the court noted in Goldman, the hospital was defined as a health care
provider under sections 766.101(1)(b), 162 766.105(1)(b), 163 and 766.102(1)
vis-a-vis 768.50(2)(b).16 The Goldman case clearly involved an action
against a health care provider; therefore, it was argued that presuit notice
requirements should apply. At the same time, the Goldman case was
predicated on vicarious liability based on the negligence of a non-health care
provider. Thus, one could argue that presuit requirements were inapplicable
if the language "vicariously liable, for the acts of a health care provider" was
read to mean that in cases of vicarious liability presuit notice requirements
apply only in instances where the underlying employee or agent is a health
care provider. However, the Goldman court all but ignored the time-honored
edict underscored in the Weinstock, Damiano, and McCullough cases, that
156. Weinstock, 629 So. 2d at 835-36.
157. Goldman, 662 So. 2d at 368.
158. Id. Just as its predecessors in Weinstock, Damiano, and McCullough had done, the
Goldman court specifically examined the definitions of health care provider set forth under
sections 766.101(1)(b); 766.105(1)(b); and 766.102(1) (which incorporates § 768.50(2)(b)'s
definition of health care provider). Id. at 369. See supra text accompanying notes 105-08.
159. Goldman, 662 So. 2d at 370.
160. Weinstock, 629 So. 2d at 835-36.
161. Id.
162. Goldman, 662 So. 2d at 369. See supra text accompanying note 105.
163. Goldman, 662 So. 2d at 369. See supra text accompanying note 106.
164. Goldman, 662 So. 2d at 369. See supra text accompanying notes 107-08.
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statutes restricting access to the courts must be construed in such a manner
that favor access. 
65
In essence, the court in Goldman read Weinstock to say that presuit
requirements apply in three different scenarios: 1) where a health care
provider is alleged to have been directly negligent in the rendering of
medical care or services; 2) where a defendant (whether or not a health care
provider) is alleged to be vicariously liable for the acts of a health care
provider employee or agent; and 3) where a health care provider is alleged to
be vicariously liable for the negligence of a non-health care provider
employee or agent. 66  If scenario three is encompassed in what the
Weinstock court had in mind when it articulated when presuit notice
requirements apply, the following question might arise: If a non-health care
provider is negligent in maintaining the premises, thereby resulting in a
vicarious liability claim against the hospital, would the hospital then be
entitled to presuit notice? Under Goldman, the answer to this question is
"no," because the Goldman court qualified its holding by restricting the
application of presuit requirements in cases of vicarious liability to instances
where the defendant's employee or agent was negligent in the "rendering of
medical care or services. Because the technician employed by the
hospital in Goldman was engaged in the rendering of medical care or
services when the injury occurred, presuit requirements were held to ap l6y
notwithstanding the fact that the technician was not a health care provider.
The problem is that the Weinstock court's elocution of when a defendant
is entitled to presuit notice was imprecise and misleading.1 69 As a result, the
Goldman court may have had too much leeway to indulge in its own
interpretation of the legislative intent underlying section 766.106, the presuit
notice statute, an interpretation which was somewhat speculative and which
countermanded Florida's strong policy in favor of access to the courts.170 To
complicate matters further, the Goldman holding, to the extent it embraces
claims for vicarious liability based on the negligence of a non-health care
165. Weinstock, 629 So. 2d at 835-36; Damiano, 697 So. 2d at 951; McCullough, 590 So.
2d at 440. See also FLA. CONST. art. I, sec. 21.
166. Goldman, 662 So. 2d at 369-70.
167. Id. at 371.
168. Id.
169. See infra Part IV for a recommendation of how, inter alia, the courts and/or Florida
Legislature can clear up this problem.
170. See FLA. CONST. art. I, sec. 21. The Goldman court believed that Mrs. Goldman's
case was more akin to the claim made in Neilinger where "the court held that a hospital was
[engaged in] performing medical services when a patient slipped and fell on a pool of amniotic
fluid while descending from an examination table under the direction and care of the hospital
employees." See Goldman, 662 So. 2d at 370-71 (citing Neilinger v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 460 So.
2d 564 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1984)).
[Vol. 23:403
431
: Nova Law Review 23, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1998
Gunter
provider within the sphere of presuit, appears to be out-of-sync with the
crucial language of section 766.102(1). The Weinstock, Damiano,
McCullough, and Goldman decisions all seem to suggest that the simplest
test for when presuit requirements apply is "whether the defendant is directly
or vicariously liable" under the medical negligence standard of care set forth
in section 766.102(1) of the Florida Statutes.171 However, turning to section
766.102(1), it states that "the prevailing professional standard of care for a
given health care provider shall be that level of care .... which, in light of all
relevant surrounding circumstances, is recognized as acceptable and
appropriate by reasonably prudent similar health care providers., 172  This
suggests that the crux of a malpractice claim is based upon whether a health
care provider comported with an acceptable level of care, skill, and treatment
of other reasonably prudent health care providers. In Goldman, the case was
not predicated upon whether a health care provider comported with the level
of care, skill, and treatment that would be exercised by other reasonably
prudent health care providers. The employee technician was not a health
care provider at all. The standard set forth in section 766.102(1) is
incongruent and thus calls into question whether the claim was one for
medical malpractice for presuit purposes. There could be no "similar health
care provider" to the technician in Goldman; this would be a nonsequitur
since the technician himself was not a health care provider.174
171. See Weinstock v. Groth, 629 So. 2d 835, 838 (Fla. 1993); Community Blood Ctr. of
S. Fla. v. Damiano, 697 So. 2d 948, 951 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Goldman v. Halifax Med.
Ctr., 662 So. 2d 367,369 (Fla. 5th Dist Ct. App. 1995); NME Properties, Inc. v. McCullough, 590
So. 2d 439,440 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
172. FLA. STAT. § 766.102(1) (1997) (emphasis added).
173. Goldman, 662 So. 2d at 369.
174. The Goldman court compared the situation before it to the decision of Broadway v.
Baptist Hosp., Inc., 638 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 1st Dist. CL App. 1994) and Neilinger v. Baptist Hosp.,
Inc., 460 So. 2d 564 (Fla. 3d Dist. CL App. 1984), discussed earlier in this article. Goldman, 662
So. 2d at 370-71. The court distinguished Broadway by noting that the underlying negligence in
that case was not medical negligence. Id. at 370. That is, the plaintiff's claim in Broadway, that
she was injured when her bed collapsed, was found to be based upon ordinary negligence, to wit,
premises liability, rather than upon the negligent rendering of medical care or services. Id.
However, the claim in Goldman, in contradistinction to Broadway, was based upon the negligent
rendering of medical services by the hospital's radiographic technician. Id. The Goldman court
also noted that "Goldman's claim, that an improperly calibrated machine that was used on her
partly caused her injury, is not unlike a claim that one was injured when a doctor used an unclean
scalpel, a claim which would clearly fall within the realm of providing medical care." Id.
The Goldman court believed that Mrs. Goldman's case was more akin to the claim made in
Neilinger where "the court held that a hospital was [engaged in] performing medical services
when a patient slipped and fell on a pool of amniotic fluid while descending from an examination
table under the direction and care of the hospital employees." Goldman, 662 So. 2d at 370, 370-
71 (citing Neilinger v. Baptist flosp., Inc., 460 So. 2d 564 (Fla. 3d Dist. CL App. 1984)).
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To summarize Part II, the following observations can be made. First,
for the presuit requirements of the Act to apply, the action must be a "[c]laim
for medical malpractice." 175 This means the claim must arise out of "the
rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services."' 176 Discerning
when a claim does arise out of the rendering of, or failure to render, medical
care or services can be a tricky endeavor for attorneys. However, the
Supreme Court of Florida and the district courts of appeal seem to be in
general agreement that a claim arises out of the rendering of, or failure to
render, medical care or services, when the acts or omissions of a health care
provider that caused the injury to the claimant, allegedly fell below the level
of care and treatment that would be considered acceptable and appropriate by
reasonably prudent similar health care providers. 77
Second, the prospective defendants in a medical malpractice action to
which section 766.106(2) refers, and who, under that section, are entitled to
presuit notice of intent to initiate litigation, are those defined as health care
providers under section 768.50(2)(b). 78 Reading Weinstock in conjunction
with section 766.106(2), one can conclude that a two-prong test should be
used in determining whether presuit requirements apply: 1) the claim must
be "a claim for medical malpractice;" and 2) the defendant is a "health care
provider" or vicariously liable for the acts of a health care provider. 79
Finally, since section 766.106(2) is a statute tending to restrict access to
the courts, if there is doubt as to its application, it must be construed in a
manner which favors access.180 We now turn to part three and an exploration
into when the two-year medical malpractice statute of limitations set forth
under section 95.1 1(4)(b)181 applies to a claim.
175. FLA. STAT. § 766.106(1)(a) (1997).
176. Id.
177. See generally J.B. v. Sacred Heart Hosp., 635 So. 2d 945 (Fla. 1994); Feifer v. Galen
of Florida, Inc., 685 So. 2d 882 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Broadway v. Bay Hosp., Inc., 638
So. 2d 176 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994); NME Properties, Inc. v. McCullough, 590 So. 2d 439
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
178. See supra text accompanying note 108. See also Weinstock, 629 So. 2d at 836. It
should be noted that in the Damiano court's view, inclusion of one in the section 768.50(2)0b)
definition of "health care provider" is not enough in and of itself to conclude that one is a
prospective defendant for purposes of presuit. Damiano, 697 So. 2d at 951.
179. See Weinstock, 629 So. 2d at 838. See also FLA. STAT. § 766.106(2) (1997). The
Goldman court would modify the second prong of this test by using words to the effect of: the
defendant is a health care provider or vicariously liable for the acts of an agent or employee who
was negligent in the rendering of medical care or services, regardless of whether or not the agent
or employee is himself a health care provider. See generally Goldman, 662 So. 2d at 370.
180. See Weinstock, 629 So. 2d at 835; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21.
181. See supra text accompanying note 6.
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IH. DETERMINING WHEN THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS APPLIES
A. An Overview of the Medical Malpractice Statute of Limitations
The statute of limitations governing claims for medical malpractice is
set forth in section 95.11(4)(b) of the Florida Statutes and provides: "An
action for medical malpractice shall be commenced within 2 years from the
time the incident giving rise to the action occurred or within 2 years from the
time the incident is discovered, or should have been discovered with the
exercise of due diligence .... ,,1s2 The leading case construing the language
of section 95.11(4)(b) is Tanner v. Hartog.8 3 In Tanner, the parents of a
stillborn child sued two doctors and a hospital for medical malpractice.
18 4
The complaint alleged that on March 31, 1988, the doctors examined Mrs.
Tanner and then sent her to the hospital for testing and that the following
morning the baby was delivered stillborn.185 The Tanners alleged further that
"in light of the testing and Mrs. Tanner's condition, the doctors and the
medical staff at the hospital were negligent in failing to promptly perform a
delivery by caesarian section at a time when the child could have been
saved."'8 6 Finally, it was alleged that until December 29, 1989, the plaintiffs
neither knew nor should have known that the conduct of the defendants fell
below the applicable medical standard of care.187
The trial court dismissed the lawsuit on the ground that it had not been
filed within the two-year statute of limitations.'88 On appeal, the Second
District Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court's dismissal on the basis
that the Tanners' claim was time-barred. 8 9 The pivotal question presented to
the Supreme Court of Florida was, when does the statute of limitations begin
to run? 90 The supreme court began its decision by recognizing the lack of
clarity in the language of section 95.11(4)(b) and the need for definitive
judicial construction.'9 The court then revisited its earlier proclamation in
Nardone v. Reynolds,192 which had been controlling for almost two decades
182. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4)(b) (1997). See supra text accompanying note 6.
183. 618 So. 2d 177 (Fla. 1993).
184. Id. at 178.
185. IM
186. Id
187. Id.
188. Tanner, 618 So. 2d at 178.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 178-79.
192. 333 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 1976).
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on the issue of what triggers section 95.11(4)(b). 193 The Tanner court noted
that Nardone held the statute of limitations in a medical malpractice suit
begins to run either when the plaintiff has notice of the negligent act or
omission giving rise to the cause of action or when the plaintiff has notice of
the physical injury. 194 However, in Tanner, the supreme court placed an
interpretation on the Nardone rule intending to ameliorate the harsh results
which can sometimes occur by strict application of the rule.195
We hold that the knowledge of the injury as referred to in the
[Nardone] rule as triggering the statute of limitations means not
only knowledge of the injury but also knowledge that there is a
reasonable possibility that the injury was caused by medical
malpractice. The nature of the injury, standing alone, may be such
that it communicates the possibility of medical negligence, in
which event the statute of limitations will immediately begin to run
upon discovery of the injury itself. On the other hand, if the injury
is such that it is likely to have occurred from natural causes, the
statute will not begin to run until such time as there is reason to
believe that medical malpractice may possibly have occurred.
19 6
The court reasoned that "[m]ere knowledge of a stillbirth, without more,
would not suggest the possibility of medical negligence" since stillbirths
often occur even in the absence of negligence. Therefore, the supreme
court reversed the dismissal of the Tanner's claim, which was predicated on
the assumption that the Tanner's knowledge of the stillbirth alone triggered
the statute."9 '
While the Tanner court's updated interpretation of the Nardone rule is
unquestionably more equitable than its former strict application, it is far from
definitive. The term "reasonable possibility" that an injury was caused by
medical malpractice is a term of art woefully in need of, but perhaps
incapable of, precise definition. At what point does a layman become aware
of a reasonable possibility that his injury was the product of medical
malpractice? Laymen rarely, if ever, read medical journals. A treating
physician or surgeon is quite unlikely to refer a patient to another doctor for
the purpose of ascertaining whether he made mistakes, particularly in view of
193. Tanner, 618 So. 2d at 179 (citing Nardone v. Reynolds, 333 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 1976)).
194. Id. (citing Nardone v. Reynolds, 333 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 1976)). This was commonly
known as the "Nardone rule" and/or the "discovery rule." See also Barron v. Shapiro, 565 So. 2d
1319 (Fla. 1990) (reaffirming the Nardone rule).
195. Tanner, 618 So. 2d at 181.
196. Id. at 181-82 (footnotes omitted).
197. Maat 182.
198. Id. at 184.
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the fear of being sued for malpractice and the modem prevalence of health
management organizations which foster a reluctance to make referrals of any
kind. The Tanner court was mindful of the difficulties involved when it
observed:
We recognize that our holding will make it harder to decide as a
matter of law when the statute begins to run and may often require
a fact-finder to make that determination ... [t]he point at which the
statute [begins] to run can only be determined after the pertinent
facts have been developed. 199
Since they "neither knew nor should have known 'that the actions and
inactions of the defendants fell below the standard of care recognized in the
community' until December 29, 1989" (almost two years after the stillbirth),
it is reasonable to assume that some doctor(s) made the Tanners aware of the
reasonable _possibility that the stillbirth was the consequence of
malpractice.20 Realistically, how else could they have achieved such
awareness?
Obviously, an attorney cannot even begin to investigate or assess the
viability of a potential malpractice claim until a client shows up at the
attorney's office (or at least calls) and informs the attorney that he or she has
suffered an injury. It would seem logical that by that time, the client has at
least an inkling of a suspicion that the injury or condition was caused by
medical malpractice, but not necessarily so. For example, the client may
have been in, say, an automobile accident and is merely consulting a lawyer
to determine his legal rights vis-t-vis other drivers involved in the collision
and their insurers. However, perhaps unbeknownst to the client, his injury
may have been diagnosed incorrectly or he may have been mistreated,
leading to aggravated or still further injury. Still, in such an instance, it
would appear that the statute has not commenced, unless a reasonable person
would be aware of the possibility of malpractice purely from the nature of the
injury.20'
In any event, the most prudent course of action for a plaintiffs' attorney
(whether or not the client actually believes himself to have been the victim of
malpractice) is to maintain a healthy suspicion that medical malpractice may
have been at least partially responsible for the client's injury. Hence, if the
attorney believes the client was blind to what a reasonable person (albeit not
this particular client) may have believed to be malpractice, the attorney can
make a relatively accurate determination of when the statute began to run and
199. Id at 182.
200. Tanner, 618 So. 2d at 178.
201. See id.
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act accordingly. The event that triggers the statute is awareness of a
"reasonable possibility" of medical malpractice 202 which appears to be an
objective standard and counsel should not assume that his client does or does
not have the awareness that a "reasonable person" would have under the
same circumstances. Good faith ignorance will not erase the disastrous
results of unreasonableness when it comes to malpractice statute of
limitations.
As the Supreme Court of Florida pointed out in Tanner, there are certain
injuries, the nature of which, standing alone, communicate the possibility of
medical negligence in which case the statute begins to run immediately upon
discovery of the injury itself.20 3 Since the term "reasonable possibility" is
intrinsically nebulous, it is hard to predict what a fact-finder will conclude.
Pointed questions in the client interview will help greatly in flushing out the
possibility of malpractice. If the client reveals to the attorney that he has
already been advised by a doctor that some other health care provider may
have erred in diagnosing, treating, or caring for the client, then under Tanner,
the statute would have commenced when the client acquired such
knowledge.2° Since the hour glass has been turned, so to speak, the attorney
should then act quickly to ensure the claim is filed in a timely fashion, if that
is still possible.2 5 Recall that the plaintiff may petition the clerk of the court
for an automatic ninety-day extension of the statute of limitations in order
that before filing suit, he may conduct a reasonable investigation, obtain a
corroborating opinion and prepare the notice of intent to initiate litigation for
medical malpractice.
2°6
In order to help illustrate how section 95.11(4)(b) will be interpreted
under Tanner, consider the following hypothetical. Assume that on February
202. Id.
203. Id. at 180.
204. Id. at 178. Since the cases offer no clear-cut definition of what constitutes awareness
of a reasonable possibility of malpractice, the practitioner should assume that the client has
developed such awareness if there is any doubt whatsoever.
205. If however, nothing indicates that a client has knowledge, or reasonably should have
knowledge of a possibility of malpractice, but is consulting a lawyer for some unrelated reason,
such as an accident or food poisoning, the client should still be thoroughly interviewed regarding
any medical services received to date. If it appears to the attorney that malpractice might have
transpired, the attorney would be well advised to send the client to board certified specialists for
the purposes of flushing out possible medical malpractice. If the consulting specialist(s) then that
determines there is a reasonable possibility of malpractice, the attorney will not only have
knowledge that there is a viable claim for malpractice, but an expert witness to support the claim.
Most importantly, the attorney will be able to document the point in time at which the client
became aware of the existence of a claim and will be in a good position to refute defense
contentions that the statute began to run at an earlier date.
206. See supra Part II.A for a discussion on the filing of the notice of intent which will toll
the statute for an additional ninety days.
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15, 1995, a client consulted a chiropractor for back pain and that the
chiropractor diagnosed his condition as "sciatica. ' 2°7 Unbeknownst to the
client, this diagnosis was erroneous and the client's back pain was actually
due to a benign tumor which the chiropractor failed to diagnose even though
a simple x-ray would have revealed the tumor. Assume that the client had no
reason to know of the misdiagnosis until December 30, 1995, when she was
informed by a specialist of the tumor which now required surgery due to the
delay in diagnosing it. Assume further that surgery was then performed to
remove the tumor on January 15, 1996, but on the day following the surgery,
the client learned that the surgeon left a sponge in the client's body which, in
turn, caused immediate complications.
Under Tanner, the statute of limitations would not have started to run on
the client's misdiagnosis claim against the chiropractor until December 30,
1995. That was the day the client learned that his back pain was due to an
undiagnosed tumor rather than sciatica and that because the tumor had gone
undiagnosed, surgery was required. In other words, on December 30, 1995,
the client became aware of his injury and of a reasonable possibility that the
injury was caused by medical malpractice. 2 8 However, the injury resulting
from the sponge in the client's body is a different matter. This injury was of
a nature, standing alone, as the Tanner court put it, "that it communicates the
207. Defined as "[plain in the lower back and hip radiating down the back of the thigh into
the leg, initially attributed to sciatic nerve dysfunction." See STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY
1580 (26th ed. 1995).
208. See Tanner, 618 So. 2d at 180. See also Higgs v. Florida Dept. of Corrections, 654
So. 2d 624, 626-27 (1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995). In Higgs, the First District Court of Appeal applied
the Tanner rule to a claim for malpractice based on misdiagnosis and observed:
There has been some confusion concerning what constitutes discovery of the
incident under the statute. In Barron v. Shapiro, 565 So. 2d 1319 (Fla. 1990),
the supreme court reaffirmed a principle originally stated in Nardone v.
Reynolds, 333 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 1976), that the "limitation period commences
when the plaintiff should have known either of the injury or the negligent
act." That interpretation of Nardone, however, could lead to some unjust
results. In Tanner, the supreme court further clarified the Nardone rule, and
held that "the knowledge of the injury as referred to in the [Nardone] rule as
triggering the statute of limitations means not only knowledge of the injury
but also knowledge that there is a reasonable possibility that the injury was
caused by medical malpractice."
Higgs, 654 So. 2d at 626-27 (quoting Tanner v. Hartog, 618 So. 2d. 177 (Fla. 1993) (footnotes
and citations omitted)). The Higgs court added that "[iut, thus, appears that the position of this
court is that a misdiagnosis will constitute evidence that a plaintiff did not have knowledge
that the injury was caused by negligence until the plaintiff received a correct diagnosis." Id. at
627.
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possibility of medical negligence, in which event the statute of limitations
will immediately begin to run upon discovery of the injury itself. 209
No matter how promising a claim for medical malpractice might be, all
will be lost if the claim is dismissed for failure to meet the requirements of
the applicable statute of limitations. In most civil litigation this simply
means that the plaintiff must file the complaint before the limitations period
expires. However, in the arena of medical malpractice it means something
more. Section 766.106(4) of the Florida Statutes provides in pertinent part
that "[t]he notice of intent to initiate litigation shall be served within the time
limits set forth in [section] 95.11.,,210 Therefore, the plaintiff must not only
have his complaint on file before the statute runs but also must serve the
notice of intent prior to the running of the statute.21' Compliance with presuit
notice requirements is a condition precedent to filing a complaint and failure
to comply with the notice requirements within the limitations period justifies
dismissal of the complaint with prejudice even if the complaint was
otherwise timely filed. Therefore, attorneys should serve the notice of
intent and the accompanying corroborating opinion prior to filing the
complaint.
We now turn to the critical question of under what circumstances does
the two-year statute of limitations apply to a claim. That question will be
addressed through an exploration and analysis of relevant statutory and case
law.
B. Survey and Legal Analysis of Statutory and Case Law
Under section 95.1 1(4)(b) of the Florida Statutes, there is a two-part test
for determining whether an action for medical malpractice exists and thus,
whether that claim is subject to the two-year statute of limitations of section
95.11(4)(b): 1) whether the action arises out of "medical... diagnosis,
treatment, or care;" and 2) whether such diagnosis, treatment, or care was
rendered by a "provider of health care. 213 Two relatively recent supreme
209. Tanner, 618 So. 2d at 181-82.
210. FLA. STAT. § 766.106(4) (1997).
211. Tanner, 618 So. 2d at 181.
212. See Williams v. Campagnulo, 588 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1991); Lynn v. Miller, 498 So. 2d
1011 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
213. See FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4)(b) (1997). See also supra text accompanying note 6. It
should be noted that a cause of action against one who is not a health care provider would fall
within the ambit of medical malpractice if the defendant is in privity with a health care provider
who has rendered tortious medical diagnosis, treatment, or care. § 95.11(4)(b). Thus, the two-
year statute of limitations and presuit requirements would also be applicable to claims against the
non-health care provider in privity with a health care provider. § 95.11(4)0b).
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court decisions, Silva v. Southwest Florida Blood Bank2 14 and Kelley v.
Rice215 make it clear that both prongs of the test must be met before a claim
may properly be considered as one for medical malpractice for purposes of
the two-year statute of limitations set forth in section 95.11(4)(b) of the
Florida Statutes.
16
C. What Constitutes an "Action for Medical Malpractice" for Purposes of
the Statute of Limitations?
In Silva v. Southwest Florida Blood Bank, Inc.,217 the plaintiff sued a
blood bank for supplying HIV tainted blood for transfusions administered to
his wife while she was in the hospital.218 Plaintiff's wife subsequently
contracted the HIV virus and died of AIDS as a result of the transfusion.2 9
The blood bank argued that the suit was one sounding in medical malpractice
and that it was therefore subject to the two-year statute of limitations, which
had already expired.220 The Supreme Court of Florida disagreed.221 First, the
court concluded that under the plain and unambiguous language of section
95.11(4)(b) of the Florida Statutes, the blood bank had not rendered
diagnosis, treatment, or care of plaintiffs decedent.222 That is to say, the
blood bank had not engaged in ascertaining the decedent's "medical
condition through examination and testing" (diagnosis),m "prescribing and
administering a course of action to affect a cure" (treatment),224 or "meeting
the patient's daily needs during the illness" (care).225 Indeed, the court noted
214. 601 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 1992).
215. 670 So. 2d 1094 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
216. See Silva v. Southwest Fla. Blood Bank, Inc., 601 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 1992); Kelley v.
Rice, 670 So. 2d 1094 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
217. Silva, 601 So. 2d at 1184 (Fla. 1992).
218. Id at 1186.
219. Il
220. Id at 1187-89.
221. Id at 1189.
222. Silva, 601 So. 2d at 1189.
223. Id. at 1187.
224. Id.
225. Id. The Silva court also utilized alternative definitions for the terms diagnosis,
treatment, or care, borrowing from Webster's Third International Dictionary (1981), which defines
"diagnosis" as "the art or act of identifying a disease from its signs and symptoms," "treatment' as
"the action or manner of treating a patient medically or surgically," and "care" as "to provide for
or attend to needs or perform necessary personal services ...." Id (quoting WEBsm's TnIR
INTERNATIONAL DICrIONARY (1981)). The Silva court further stated that in medical terms,
"diagnosis" means "[tihe determination of the nature of a disease;" "treatment" means "[m]edical
or surgical management of a patient;" and "care" means "the application of knowledge to the
1998]
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that the blood bank had not dealt with the recipient patient at all and, in
reality, was nothing more than a supplier of a product. 226 As such, the claim
against the blood bank fell outside the definition of an action for medical
malpractice under section 95.11(4)(b) and hence was not subject to section
95.11(4)(b)'s two-year limitations period.227 This section of the Silva court's
opinion was clear, understandable, and well-reasoned.
Another recent case, Kelley v. Rice, 8 underscores the distinction for
statute of limitations purposes between claims based upon ordinary
negligence and claims for medical negligence. 29 In Kelley, the plaintiff was
a former inmate of the Pinellas County Jail.230 She alleged that on June 14,
1990, she was taken into custody by the Pinellas County Sheriff, Everitt
Rice, after having received emergency treatment for a leg laceration at a local
hospital. 231 Kelley set forth two separate counts of negligence against Sheriff
Rice in her complaint.232 In Count I, Kelley alleged that Rice was vicariously
liable for the medical negligence of his agent, ARA Health Services,
Incorporated ("ARA").233 Kelley alleged that ARA and Rice had a joint
venture agreement whereby ARA was to provide medical services to inmates
of the jail and that ARA was negligent in its diagnosis, treatment, and care of
the condition from which Kelley was suffering, to wit, infection and
necrotizing fascitis, 234 resulting in injury to inmate Kelley.235
The gravamen of Count II of Kelley' s complaint was that, at all material
times, the plaintiff was in custody of the defendant Sheriff Rice.2 36 Kelley
alleged that her detention was such that she was unable to care for her own
well-being relative to the need for medical care and that her ability to obtain
medical care was at the sole discretion of her custodian, Sheriff Rice. 7
Kelley further alleged in Count II that Rice had a duty to use reasonable care
in providing her access to necessary medical care, but he breached this duty
benefit of... [an] individual." Silva, 601 So. 2d at 1187 (quoting STEDMAN'S MEDICAL
DICTIoNARY 428 (25th ed. 1990)).
226. Id.
227. Id at 1188-89; FLA. STAT. § 95.1 l(4)(b) (1997); see also Community Blood Ctrs. of
S. Fla., Inc. v. Damiano, 697 So. 2d 948, 949-50 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that a
blood bank was not a health care provider for purposes of the Medical Malpractice Reform Act).
228. 670 So. 2d 1094 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
229. Id at 1095.
230. Id
231. Id
232. Id
233. Kelley, 670 So. 2d at 1095.
234. Defined as tissue death such as that associated with group A streptococcus infection.
See STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 632 (26th ed. 1996).
235. Kelley, 670 So. 2d at 1095.
236. Id
237. Id.
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by keeping her detained, thus denying her the opportunity to receive such
care.21 The trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that her claims were barred by the statute of
limitations governing medical malpractice.239 The Second District Court of
Appeal affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that while Count I of
Kelley's complaint was clearly a claim for medical malpractice which had
not been timely filed within the two-year statutory period, Count II was
based upon a breach of Defendant Rice's custodial duties and was
consequently subject to the four-year statute of limitations applying to claims
of ordinary negligence, which had not yet expired.24° The Kelley court
reasoned as follows:
[w]e conclude that paragraphs sixteen through eighteen, twenty-
one and twenty-two C. allege facts that sufficiently bring into
question appellee Rice's proper performance of his custodial
obligations to appellant outside of any vicarious obligations arising
from the medical care he contracted to be provided by ARA. In
the performance of his custodial duties, appellee was not
necessarily providing "diagnosis, treatment, or care" as
contemplated by the medical malpractice statute of limitations,
section 95.11(4)(b). We further conclude that under the reasoning
of Silva, the essential allegations of appellant's Count II relating to
appellee's alleged simple negligence do not bring appellee within
the two-pronged test of the medical malpractice statute of
limitations. Those allegations of Count II do not seek relief from
appellee as a "health care provider," nor do they seek relief from
injuries that arise out of appellee's medical, dental or surgical
diagnosis, treatment or care.24
238. Id.
239. Id.; see FLA STAT. § 95.11(4)(b) (1997).
240. Kelley, 670 So. 2d at 1096-97.
241. Id. at 1096-97 (citing Silva v. Southwest Fla. Blood Bank, Inc., 601 So. 2d 1184 (Fla.
1992)). The Kelley court noted that it found the reasoning of its prior decision in NMIE Properties,
Inc. v. McCullough, 590 So. 2d 439, 440 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991) controlling. Kelley, 670
So. 2d at 1097. In NME Properties, the court made the following distinction:
[a]lthough a nursing home is not itself a health care provider for purposes of
section 766.102, it may be vicariously liable under that higher standard of
care for the acts of some of its agents or employees. For example, East
Manor probably employs nurses who are licensed under chapter 464. Under
respondeat superior, East Manor may be liable under the higher professional
standard of care when its agent, who is actively involved in the incident, is a
health care provider rendering medical care or service. On the other hand,
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The teaching of decisions like Silva and Kelley is that although injury
may occur in a medical setting, a health care provider may nevertheless wear
two different hats: one being that of a health care provider who has rendered
negligent diagnosis, treatment, or care; the other being that of one who
happens to be a health care provider, but who has breached a duty to exercise
reasonable care independent of his duty to render diagnosis, treatment, or
care in accordance with the applicable medical standard of care.242 Of
course, if there are distinct and severable claims, as was the case in Kelley,
each claim can be pursued with the medical standard of care applying to one
and an ordinary negligence standard applying to the other.243 Ultimately, the
complaint will either be tested by a defense motion to dismiss one or both
claims, or the plaintiff may have to make an election at trial and present
proof in accordance with the appropriate legal standard.
244
For example, very recently in Lynn v. Mount Sinai Medical Center,
Inc.,245 the Third District Court of Appeal held that a hospital's mislabeling
of a urine sample used to screen for drugs did not constitute medical
malpractice for purposes of section 95.11(4)(b).246 The court noted that the
labeling of a urine sample under a detailed collection protocol supplied by
Dade County did not constitute the rendering of "medical diagnosis,
treatment, or care." 47 The Lynn court reasoned as follows:
East Manor may be liable under an ordinary negligence standard of care when
other nonprofessional employees commit alleged negligence, or when an
incident does not involve medical care.
McCullough, 590 So. 2d at 441.
242. See generally FLA. STAT. § 766.102 (1997).
243. See Kelley, 670 So. 2d at 1095.
244. In Feifer v. Galen of Fla., Inc., 685 So. 2d 882 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996), the court
made the following admonition:
[w]e would caution plaintiffs in those actions where they allege that a medical
care provider has committed an act of ordinary negligence that they will not
be allowed, in presenting their case, to slide back and forth between the
standards of care and proof required to show ordinary negligence as opposed
to medical negligence.
Id at 885. This pronouncement strongly suggests that plaintiffs will have to elect between two
inconsistent theories and that plaintiffs will not be permitted to attribute the knowledge and skill
that a health care provider should have in assessing whether the defendant breached his duty under
ordinary negligence standards. The problem with proceeding on two different theories arising out
of the same identical set of facts is that the jury would have to apply two diametrically opposed
standards of care. This would hopelessly blur the distinction between ordinary negligence and
medical negligence and render absurd results under Florida's Medical Malpractice Reform Act.
245. 92 So. 2d 1002 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
246. Id. at 1002; see FLA. STAT. § 95.1 l(4)(b) (1997).
247. Lynn, 692 So. 2d at 1004.
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Merely because a wrongful act occurs in a medical setting does not
necessarily mean that it involves medical malpractice. The
wrongful act must be directly related to the improper application of
medical services, and the use of professional judgment or skill. 248
Mt. Sinai did not engage in any medical skill or judgment by
collecting and shipping out urine specimens to an independent
laboratory, because it only functioned as an intermediary following
the strict guidelines set by the County. Moreover, Mt. Sinai did
not even test the samples they collected. Additionally, a
"diagnosis" under the statute [§ 95.11(4)(b)] is interpreted as
"ascertaining a patient's medical condition through examination
and testing, prescribing and administering a course of action to
effect a cure, and meeting the patient's daily needs during the
illness." This applies to patients submitting to tests in order to
diagnose illnesses. By contrast, the urine samples were not
analyzed at all, but only screened for drugs as per the hospitals
agreement with the county.
Consequently, as no professional skill or judgment was performed
by Mt. Sinai, the collection of the urine sample was not a medical
service as defined by the statute... Therefore, the liability of the
hospital stems from a breach of the duty of ordinary care in not
following the protocol required by Dade County.
249
The Lynn court's reasoning is sound. The court noted that in Silva, the
supreme court defined "diagnosis" to mean "'ascertaining a patient's medical
condition through examination and testing."' 2 °0 The court noted that Mt.
Sinai collected Ms. Lynn's urine and then capped, labeled, and sealed the
specimen. 1 In merely collecting the samples and sending them off to an
independent laboratory for testing, Mt. Sinai performed no diagnosis,
treatment, or care under section 95.11(4)(b) or Silva. 2 However, using this
rationale, if Mt. Sinai had performed the test on the sample of urine it
collected from the plaintiff and made an error in analyzing it, which then led
to her loss of employment, the claim should clearly be deemed one for
medical malpractice. Testing and analyzing urine for the presence of drugs is
248. Id. at 1003.
249. Id. at 1004 (citations and parentheticals omitted).
250. Id. (quoting Silva v. Southwest Fla. Blood Bank, Inc., 601 So. 2d 1184, 1187 (Fla.
1992)).
251. Id. at 1003.
252. Id. at 1004; see Silva, 601 So. 2d at 1184 (Fla. 1992); see also FLA. STAT. §
95.11(4)(b) (1997).
1998]
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a diagnostic process in that its end goal is the ascertainment of the testee's
condition.
J.B. v. Sacred Heart Hospital,253 which was discussed in Part II of this
article in reference to the applicability of presuit requirements, also provides
an excellent example of a claim which falls outside the ambit of a claim for
medical malpractice for purposes of the medical malpractice statute of
limitations. In J.B., it was alleged that a hospital requested the plaintiff to
transport his brother, a patient of the hospital, to another medical facility.2 55
Unknown to the plaintiff, his brother had AIDS, and the hospital failed to
warn the plaintiff that if he came into contact with his brother's open wounds
he could become HIV positive.256 The plaintiffs hands, which had cuts on
them, then came into contact with his brother's wound and consequently, the
plaintiff became HIV positive.5 7 The J.B. court addressed, inter alia, the
issue of whether the two year statute of limitations for medical malpractice
set forth in section 95.11(4)(b) barred the plaintiff's claim for negligence
against the hospital. 5 8 The court began its analysis by noting that, to be
subject to section 95.1 1(4)(b), a claim must constitute "an action for medical
malpractice."259 The court then took note of the definition of an action for
medical malpractice set forth in section 95.11(4)(b), which provides: "[a]n
'action for medical malpractice' is defined as a claim in tort or in contract for
damages because of the death, injury, or monetary loss to any person arising
out of any medical, dental, or surgical diagnosis, treatment, or care by any
provider of health care. '26
The "key inquiry" for the court was whether the plaintiffs action
"'ar[ose] out of any medical, dental, or surgical diagnosis, treatment, or
care. ' ' ,261 Noting that it had recently addressed the issue of whether a suit
constituted medical malpractice for statute of limitations purposes in Silva,
the J.B. court reiterated the definition of the terms "diagnosis," "treatment,"
and "care" that it had articulated in Silva.262
First, there is no ambiguity to clarify in the words "diagnosis,"
"treatment," or "care," and we find that these words should be
253. 635 So. 2d 945 (Fla. 1994).
254. Id. at 946.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 947
258. J.B., 635 So. 2d at 946.
259. Id. at 947 (citing FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4)(b) (1997)).
260. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4)(b) (1997)).
261. Id.
262. Id. at 948 (citing Silva v. Southwest Fla. Blood Bank, Inc., 601 So. 2d 1184, 1184
(Fla. 1992)).
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accorded their plain and unambiguous meaning. In ordinary,
common parlance, the average person would understand
"diagnosis, treatment, or care" to mean ascertaining a patient's
medical condition through examination and testing, prescribing
and administering a course of action to effect a cure, and meeting
the patient's daily needs during the illness. This parallels the
dictionary definitions of those terms. According to Webster's
Third International Dictionary (1981) "diagnosis" means "the art
or act of identifying a disease from its signs or symptoms."
"Treatment" means "the action or manner of treating a patient
medically or surgically." "Care" means "provide for or attend to
needs or perform necessary personal services .... ." Likewise, in
medical terms, "diagnosis" means "[t]he determination of the
nature of a disease." 'Treatment" means "[m]edical or surgical
management of a patient." And "care" means "the application of
knowledge to the benefit of... [an] individual. 263
Finding Silva to be "dispositive," the J.B. court held that just as the blood
bank in Silva had rendered no diagnosis, treatment, or care to the plaintiffs
there, Sacred Heart Hospital had rendered no diagnosis, treatment, or care to
J.B., who was the injured party in the case before it.264
The J.B. decision places an important limitation on the definition of
diagnosis, treatment, or care. After all, in the broad sense, the injury in J.B.
did arise out of the treatment, diagnosis, and care of someone. However, that
"someone" was J.B.'s brother, who was the hospital's patient, not J.B. The
hospital diagnosed J.B.'s brother's condition to the extent it had ascertained
that he had the condition of AIDS and determined that he would need to be
sent to another hospital. Sacred Heart treated J.B.'s brother by dressing and
putting a heparin lock on his wounds.265  Arguably, Sacred Heart was
engaged in care even in the very process of transferring J.B.'s brother to
another hospital. The hospital gave J.B. instructions on how to handle the
heparin lock covering his brother's infectious wounds,266 and in a sense, it
made J.B. its proxy for the rendering of care. Arguably, but for the
diagnosis, treatment, and/or care rendered by the hospital to J.B.'s brother,
J.B. would not have been in a car in close contact with his brother during the
transfer. Nevertheless, the crux of the J.B. holding is that the hospital had
simply not rendered diagnosis, treatment, or care to J.B .267 Therefore, J.B.' s
263. See J.B., 635 So. 2d at 948 (quoting Silva v. Southwest Fla. Blood Bank, Inc., 601 So.
2d 1184, 1187 (Fla. 1992)) (citations omitted).
264. Id.
265. Id. at 946.
266. Id. at 947.
267. Id. at 948.
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claim was not "an action for medical malpractice" that would be barred
under section 95.11 (4)(b).268
One of the most interesting legal aspects of the J.B. decision is that it
also addressed the issue of whether J.B.'s claim was a "claim for medical
malpractice" for purposes of whether the presuit notice requirements of
section 766.106 of the Florida Statutes applied to J.B.'s claim. 269 In so
doing, the court utilized not the definition of "an action for medical
malpractice" set forth in section 95.11 (4)(b),270 but the definition of "a claim
for medical malpractice" embodied in section 766.106(1)(a). 27' The latter
section defines "a claim for medical malpractice" as "a claim arising out of
the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services. 272 The
J.B. court's resolution of this issue was perfunctory. As noted earlier, in Part
II of this article, the court observed that the complaint did not allege that
Sacred Heart Hospital was negligent in any way in the rendering of, or the
failure to render, medical care, or services. 273 Accordingly, the court went on
to conclude that "the complaint does not state a medical malpractice claim
for chapter 766 purposes, and the notice and presuit screening requirements
are inapplicable. 27
In light of J.B., several questions come to mind. First, is there any
difference between an "action" for medical malpractice as per the section
95.11(4)(b)275 definition, and a "claim" for medical malpractice, the term
used in the section 766.106(1)(a) 276 definition? Although there is a legal
distinction between the two terms, it does not appear to be a material one. Is
there any reason for this subtle terminology? Generally, an "action" in its
usual legal sense means a "lawsuit brought in court" wherein one or more
claims can be asserted, while a claim is one particular "cause of action"
alleged in an action.277 While a claim is then a subset of an action in which
potentially there could be many claims asserted, there is nothing in the
legislative history of section 95.11(4)(b) and 766.106(1)(a) or the case law to
explain why (if indeed there was any reason) the legislature chose to phrase
the respective definitions as it did.
268. J.B., 635 So. 2d at 947; see FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4)(b) (1997).
269. J.B., 635 So. 2d at 948-49.
270. FLA. STAT. § 95.1 1(4)(b)(1997). See supra text accompanying note 6.
271. J.B., 635 So. 2d at 948 (citing FLA. STAT. § 766.106(1)(a) (1997)).
272. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 766.106(1)(a) (1997)). See supra Part lI.A for a
comprehensive discussion of this definition and its application.
273. Id.
274. Id. at949. See § 766.106(1)(a).
275 See FLA. STAT. § 95.11 (4)(b). See supra text accompanying note 6.
276. See id. § 766.106(1)(a).
277. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 28, 247 (6th ed. 1990).
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Second, assuming for purposes of a comparative discussion, the terms
"claim" and "action" are synonymous, there is no apparent reason why a
claim for medical malpractice under section 766.106(1)(a) should be defined
in different terms than it is under section 95.11(4)(b). The question is, if a
claim arises out of "the rendering of, or failure to render medical care or
services," 278 does it arise out of "medical, dental, or surgical diagnosis,
treatment, or care by any provider of health care?" 279 While at times, the
answer to this question would surely have to be "yes, 28 ° this question has
never been addressed, no less definitively resolved. Under section
95.11(4)(b), it appears that a claim for malpractice cannot arise out of
negligent diagnosis, treatment, or care of one who is not a health care
provider.21 Thus, under the holding of Lynn, for purposes of section
766.106's presuit provisions, the negligence of a radiographic technician
(who was clearly not a health care provide under any chapter 766 definition)
can serve as the predicate of a claim for medical malpractice against the
hospital for whom he worked. 2  However, for purposes of section
95.11(4)(b), the medical malpractice statute of limitations, a claim based
upon the technician's negligence might not be considered an action for
medical malpractice because the action did not arise out of the negligent
diagnosis, treatment, or care of a "health care provider" as mandated by the
section 95.11(4)(b) definition.283 Is there any rational basis for a distinction
whereby a claim could be characterized as one for "medical malpractice" for
purposes of presuit requirements, but not for statute of limitations purposes?
Not in this writer's view. To add to the confusion, we know that under both
subsections (sections 95.11(4)(b) and 766.106(1)(b)), neither presuit
requirements nor the malpractice statute of limitations apply unless the claim
is against a "health care provider" (or in the case of presuit, one who is
vicariously liable for the acts of a "health care provider"). Yet, as will
become apparent in the following subsection of this article, the definition of
"health care provider" is radically different for purposes of determining
whether presuit requirements apply than it is in cases where the issue is
whether the medical malpractice statute of limitations applies. Indeed, we
shall see that there is currently nothing to indicate, either in the Florida
Statutes, the underlying legislative history, or the case law precisely who
278. See FLA. STAT. § 766.106(a)(1).
279. See FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4)(b). See supra text accompanying note 6.
280. For example, when a physician negligently misdiagnosis a patient resulting in injury
to the patient, "diagnosis" is clearly a type of "medical service."
281. See FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4)(b) (1997). See supra text accompanying note 6.
282. Lynn v. Mount Sinai Med. Ctr., Inc., 629 So. 2d 1002, 1003 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1997).
283. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4)(b). See supra text accompanying note 6.
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and/or what is considered to be a health care provider for purposes of section
95.11(4)(b).
One thing we can glean from the case law is that unless a claim arises
out of negligence in the exercise of professional judgment and skill it will not
be considered one for medical malpractice either within the meaning of
section 766.106(1)(a) or 95.11(4)(b). Still, the fact that practitioners may,
at times, be able to clearly identify when a claim is not a claim for medical
malpractice does not alleviate the need to know when a claim is one for
medical malpractice. Under section 95.11(4)(b) and Silva, before a claim is
subject to the medical malpractice statute of limitations it must satisfy a two
prong test: 1) it must arise out of "medical diagnosis, treatment, or care;"
and 2) "whether such diagnosis, treatment, or care was rendered by a
'provider of health care.' 28 Accordingly, we shall now turn to the subject
of the second prong of the test, to wit, what is the meaning of the term
"health care provider" for purposes of section 95.11(4)(b) of the Florida
Statutes?
D. Who is a "Health Care Provider"for Purposes of the Medical
Malpractice Statute of Limitations?
Although the Silva court deemed the finding that the blood bank had not
rendered medical diagnosis, treatment, or care to the plaintiff to be
dispositive, it seized the opportunity to address and reject the blood bank's
contention that it was a "provider of health care" within the meaning of
section 95.11(4)(b).286 The defendant argued that it was a health care
provider because section 768.50(2)(b) expressly characterized blood banks as
such.287 However, the court concluded that the blood bank was not a "health
care provider," reasoning that the plaintiffs' claim was not governed by the
288Act or the accompanying two-year statute of limitations. Instead, the court
held, the four-year statute governing claims for ordinary negligence
applied.289
What is most interesting is that in Silva, the Supreme Court of Florida
had eschewed the section 768.50(2)(b) definition of "health care provider,"
that it embraced in Weinstock two years later, noting that section
768.50(2)(b) pertained only to collateral sources of indemnity and had been
284. See §§ 95.11(4)(b),766.106.
285. Silva v. Southwest Fla. Blood Bank Inc., 601 So. 2d 1184, 1186 (Fla. 1992); FLA.
STAT. § 95.11(4)(b).
286. Silva, 601 So. 2d at 1188.
287. Id.
288. lit
289. Icd (citing FLA. STAT. § 95.11(3)(a) (1989)).
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repealed in 1986.290 The Silva court held that for purposes of whether an
action is governed by the section 95.11(4)(b) statute of limitations for claims
of medical malpractice, the legislature could not have intended the section
768.50(2)(b) definition of health care provider to apply because that section
did not exist when section 95.11(4)(b) was promulgated. 29
1
How, if at all, can the holdings of Silva and Weinstock, neither of which
has been disapproved by the court, be reconciled? Reading between the
lines, the answer, while somewhat cryptic, if not totally anomalous, would
appear to be that, for purposes of the issue of whether a claim is subject to
the presuit requirements of the Act, the section 768.50(2)(b) definition of
health care provider is still relevant, while for purposes of whether the two-
year statute of limitations for medical malpractice of section 95.11(4)(b)
applies, the section 768.50(2)(b) is inapplicable.2 92  The only thing that
emerges as clear is that both the statutory scheme and the court's
interpretation of it are sadly in need of legislative overhaul and clarification.
While telling us the section 768.50(2)(b) is inapposite in the determination of
who is a "health care provider" for purposes of section 95.11(4)(b), Silva
gives us no clue whatsoever as to what section of the Act to look to or what
the legislature (or indeed the Silva court itself) meant when it required that in
order for section 95.11(4)(b) to apply, the diagnosis, treatment, or care be
rendered by a "provider of health care."293 We only know that one may not
look to the section 768.50(2)(b) definition in order to determine whether a
given defendant is a health care provider for statute of limitations purposes.
It is true, as Silva points out, that section 768.50(2)(b) had been repealed
and originally dealt with collateral sources, a topic not germane to the issues
of health care providers or the rendering of diagnosis, treatment, or care.
294
However, the Weinstock court noted that section 768.50(2)(b) had survived
to the extent that it supplied the definition of health care provider for
purposes of section 766.102(1), a section which sets forth the applicable
medical standard of care as it pertains to health care providers.295 Thus, the
Silva court's rejection of section 768.50(2)(b) as a source of the definition of
health care provider for purposes of the medical malpractice statute of296
limitations seems illogical and ill-conceived. Therefore, as Justice Grimes
290. Id. at 1188-99.
291. Silva, 601 So. 2d at 1189.
292. Id.; see also Weinstock v. Groth, 629 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 1993).
293. See FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4)(b); see also Silva, 601 So. 2d at 1188.
294. Silva,601 So. 2d at 1189.
295. Weinstock v. Groth, 629 So. 2d 835,836 (Fla. 1993) (citing FLA. STAT. §§ 766.102(1)
(1997), 768.50(2)(b) (1997)).
296. As pointed out in the preface to the official 1989 Florida Statutes: specific cross-
references to a statute are unaffected by later repeal of that statute. Preface to the Florida Statutes,
FLA. STAT. (1997). See also Silva, 601 So. 2d at 1189 (Grimes, J., dissenting).
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pointed out in his dissent in Silva, "[t]he fact that section 768.50 was
repealed in 1986 does not invalidate the reference to that statute because as
noted by the 1989 statutory reviser to section 766.102 'generally a specific
cross-reference is unaffected by subsequent amendments to or repeal of the
statute.''297 This point is particularly compelling in light of the fact that no
section of the Act is as intimately involved with the subject of medical
malpractice claims against health care providers as section 766.102(1), which
in turn, expressly incorporates the section 768.50(2)(b) definition of that
term.
Since the supreme court has not modified, clarified, amplified, or
overruled Silva since it was decided in 1992, practitioners are left with very
little guidance in resolving the vital issue of whether their clients' claims are
against health care providers for purposes of whether section 95.11(4)(b)
applies to those claims. The best one can do is to look to other definitions of
health care provider set forth in various sections of chapter 766.298 However,
undeniably, those sections bear no more relevancy to this issue of who is a
health care provider for statute of limitations purposes than section
768.50(2)b2), which the Silva court noted deals with collateral sources of
indemnity. 9 In fact, the section 768.50(2)(b) definition is far more relevant
to the issue of the rendering of diagnosis, treatment, or care by health care
providers because its definition of health care provider is expressly
incorporated into section 766.102(1) which sets forth the medical standard of
care for health care providers and uses the term "health care provider(s)"
fully five times in one short paragraph. 300 The one thing that the Silva
decision does share in common with Weinstock is the view that statutes
restricting access to the courts (which a statute of limitations obviously
qualifies as) must be strictly construed so as not to deprive litigants of their
causes of action. 30 1 Aside from that commonality, however, the two
decisions are inconsistent and hopelessly irreconcilable at the present time.
In this writer's opinion, the time for change is now.
297. Silva, 601 So. 2d at 1190 (Grimes, J., dissenting).
298. See supra text accompanying notes 105-08.
299. Silva, 601 So. 2d at 1189.
300. See generally FLA. STAT. § 766.102 (1997).
301. See Silva, 601 So. 2d at 1187. See also Baskerville Donovan Eng'rs, Inc. v.
Pensacola Executive House Condominium Ass'n, Inc., 581 So. 2d 1301 (Fla. 1991). The
Baskerville court stated, "[w]here a statute of limitations shortens the existing period of time the
statute is generally construed strictly, and where there is reasonable doubt as to legislative intent,
the preference is to allow the longer period of time." Id. at 1303.
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS: CLARITY, CONSISTENCY,
AND CONFORMITY
From the foregoing, it will come as no surprise that the law relating to
the applicability of presuit requirements and to the medical malpractice
statute of limitations needs to be reformed. The key elements for which the
Florida Legislature and/or courts should strive are clarity, consistency, and
conformity. The good news is that this can be achieved with a modicum of
thought and effort.
First, in the area of presuit, the legislature should clearly define exactly
what it means by the term "prospective defendants" in section 766.106(2) of
the Florida Statutes.0 2 If the term is intended to be synonymous with
"health care provider" as Weinstock suggests, 30 3 the legislature should clearly
state as much. Furthermore, the legislature could precisely define the term(s)
"prospective defendant' and/or "health care provider" in the body of section
766.102(2). The Florida Legislature did take the trouble to state under what
circumstances the claimant must notify, by certified mail, the Department of
Business and Professional Regulation of his intent to initiate litigation.
Therefore, there is no good reason why the legislature could not specifically
identify the precise individuals and/or entities who are entitled to presuit
notice under 766.106(2) in claims for medical malpractice. This would
obviate the need for courts to speculate or to jump from one subsection of
chapter 766 (none of which relate to presuit), to another in the vain hope of
determining who the legislature was referring to when it used the term
"prospective defendant" in section 766.106(2).
Second, the legislature and/or Supreme Court of Florida should clarify
the meaning of thephrase, "the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical
care or services. If that term is intended to mean instances where medical
skill and judgment is required, the legislature should not only say so, but to
the extent possible, define what types of negligence fall within the sphere of
medical skill and judgment and what types do not, perhaps even setting forth
302. FLA. STAT. § 766.106(2).
303. Weinstock v. Groth, 629 So. 2d 835,838 (Fla. 1993).
304. Section 766.106(2) of the Florida Statutes provides:
After completion of presuit pursuant to s. 766.203 and prior to filing a claim
for medical malpractice, a claimant shall notify each prospective defendant
and, if any prospective defendant is a health care provider licensed under
chapter 458, chapter 459, chapter 460, chapter 461, or chapter 466, the
Department of Business and Professional Regulation by certified mail, return
receipt requested, of intent to initiate litigation for malpractice.
Id.
305. FLA. STAT. § 766.106(1)(a).
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examples. The distinction between an obstetric patient who slips on amniotic
fluid while getting off a treatment table3°6 versus a frail and elderly patient
who slips and falls in a hospital corridor due to a failure to provide a
wheelchair, handrails, or supervisory attendants3°7 is tenuous at best. The
writer does not believe that the case law interpreting the term "the rendering
of, or the failure to render, medical care or services" 3°8 to mean instances
where the conduct in question fell below the standard of care set forth in
section 766.102309 is logical or practical. The threshold question here should
be, did the act or omission resulting in injury to the claimant constitute a
lapse in professional/medical skill and judgment or only a lapse in the
ordinary care any layman would be duty-bound to exercise in the same or
similar circumstances. Only then, for purposes of determining liability, not
coverage, does it make sense to inquire further whether the rendering or
failure to render medical care or services fell below what reasonably prudent
professionals would deem acceptable or appropriate in such a
circumstance. 10 The definition of "an action for medical malpractice" set
forth in section 95.11(4)(b) 311 is more precise and workable than the more
general definition of a "claim for medical malpractice" set forth in section
766.106(1)(a) 312 because it pinpoints the three specific areas out of which
culpability for medical malpractice can have its genesis (i.e. "diagnosis,"
"treatment," and "care").
Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Florida has at least defined those
terms with a reasonable degree of precision, thereby facilitating their
application. 31 3  Why not synchronize the two definitions by making the
section 766.106(1)(a) definition identical to the definition set forth in section
95.1 1(4)(b)? This would go a long way toward fostering clarity, consistency,
and conformity in the statutory scheme.
Third, concerning the issue of what constitutes "an action for medical
malpractice" for purposes of section 95.11(4)(b), the scope of the language
"by any provider of health care" following the language "medical, dental or
surgical diagnosis, treatment, or care ... . is undefined and unclear. If a
306. See Neilinger v. Baptist Hosp. of Miami, Inc., 460 So. 2d 564, 565 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1984) (holding defendant's conduct gave rise to a claim for medical malpractice).
307. See Feifer v. Galen of Fla, Inc., 685 So. 2d 882, 838 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996)
(holding defendant's conduct give rise to a claim sounding solely in ordinary negligence).
308. FLA. STAT. § 766.106(1)(a) (1997).
309. FLA. STAT. § 766.102.
310. Id.
311. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4)(b) (1997).
312. Id. § 766.106(1)(a).
313. Silva v. Florida Blood Bank, 601 So. 2d 1184, 1187 (Fla. 1992) (borrowing from the
medical definitions of "diagnosis" "treatment" and "care").
314. See FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4)(b).
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non-health care provider, like the employee/technician in Lynn,3 15 is
negligent, then on one hand, it could be argued that neither the resultant suit
against the technician or against the hospital is "an action for medical
malpractice" within the meaning of section 95.11(4)(b) because the culpable
acts were not committed by a "health care provider," nor in that instance,
would either of the claims be against one who is vicariously liable for the
acts of a health care provider. On the other hand, it is axiomatic in tort law
that the acts of the employee or agent are deemed to be the acts of the
employer or principal respectively.3r6 Therefore, one could argue that the
claim against the hospital indeed arose out of medical treatment by a health
care provider, to wit, the hospital, because the culpable acts of the hospital's
employee in the rendering of treatment are tantamount to the acts of the
hospital. The potential confusion could be eliminated if 95.11(4)(b) were to
clearly state whether or not the acts and omissions of an employee non-health
care provider in rendering diagnosis, treatment, or care are deemed to be the
acts and omissions of the health care provider employer or principal for
purposes of section 95.11(4)(b).
Finally, it is the utter lack of any definition of the term "health care
provider" as it is used in section 95.11(4)(b) that is most troubling,
particularly in view of how Silva handled this issue and the conflicting
manner in which the court has defined the term "health care provider" for
purposes of section 766.106(2) and section 95.11(4)(b) respectively. In
Weinstock, the court expressly stated that for purposes of presuit, the term
"health care provider" means those individuals and entities listed as health
care providers under section 768.50(2)(b),317 while in Silva the court
expressly rejected section 768.50(2)(b) as a source of the definition of health
care provider for purposes of 95.11(4)(b), the medical malpractice statute of
limitations.318  Not only does this seem arbitrary and inexplicably
inconsistent, but there remains a big gap in the fabric of section 95.11(4)(b),
because although the supreme court has told us which subsections cannot be
used to define the term "health care provider" for purposes of section
95.11(4)(b), 319 we are left clueless as to what that term means. This problem
could easily be solved if the legislature (preferably right in section
95.11(4)(b)) or the court, simply told us exactly who is a health care provider
for purposes of section 95.11(4)(b). Furthermore, there is no apparent reason
315. Lynn v. Mount Sinai Med. Ctr., Inc., 629 So. 2d 1002, 1003 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1997).
316. See W. PAGE KEETON Er AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 69,
499-501 (5th ed. 1984).
317. See Weinstock v. Groth, 629 So. 2d 835, 836 (Fla. 1993). See also supra text
accompanying note 108.
318. Silva v. Southwest Fla. Blood Bank, Inc., 601 So. 2d 1184, 1189 (Fla. 1992).
319. Id.
19981
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why the definition of health care provider should be any different for
purposes of who is entitled to presuit notice under section 766.106(2) from
the definition of health care provider for purposes of section 95.11(4)(b).
Again, clarity, consistency, and conformity are the keys to a statutory scheme
which would be more comprehensible and easier to apply.
In the meantime, it is recommended that attorneys who have made a
determination regarding the status of their clients' claims file a lawsuit as
early on as possible. If, for example, an attorney concludes as best he or she
can that a given claim is for ordinary negligence, he should try to have at
least a bare-bones complaint on file well within the date the client discovered
or should have discovered the claim.320 That way, in the event the attorney's
assessment may have been wrong, this would, in all likelihood, be flushed
out by a responsive pleading seeking dismissal for failure to satisfy presuit
requirements. Then, even if the motion is granted, there will still be time to
prepare, serve, and file a notice of intent and accompanying corroborating
opinion. Indeed, as long as the two-year statute has not run, the plaintiff can
obtain an automatic extension in order to buy time and conduct the required
presuit investigation and also, as discussed earlier, enjoy the benefit of the
automatic ninety-day tolling period that engages upon service of the notice of
intent.
V. CONCLUSION
One can only hope that the Florida Legislature and/or the courts resolve
the vagarite and inconsistencies brought to light in this article. Until then,
practitioners must wander into that "labyrinth" of the Medical Malpractice
Reform Act and the medical malpractice statute of limitations and do their
best to avoid the "minotaurs" and "ugly treasons" lurking therein."' Badly
needed revision and clarification in the areas of coverage and the malpractice
statute of limitations by the legislature and/or the courts will result in a clear
and consistent set of rules and guidelines for practitioners and their clients to
rely upon and will greatly serve the ends of justice in the arena of medical
malpractice.
320. Tanner v. Hartog, 618 So. 2d 177, 181 (Fla. 1993).
321. See John A. Grant, Florida's Presuit Requirements for Medical Malpractice Actions,
68 FLA. B.J. 12, 12 (Feb. 1994).
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I. BACKGROUND
In the past two years a proliferation of grandparent support groups,
loosely called the "Grandparents Raising Grandchildren Coalition,"1 has
sprung up across Florida. They receive support from national organizations
such as the AARP Grandparent Information Center in Washington, D. C. and
the Grandparent Caregiver Law Center in New York City. Their mission is
fueled by a common plight, i.e., the unexpected and often burdensome
2
responsibility of raising yet another generation of children. Theirs is a
common agenda: the desire to do more for these grandchildren so that they
will escape the dangers of drug abuse, teenage pregnancy, HIV/AIDS, and
* M.A. in Public Policy, University of Wisconsin, 1970; J.D., University of
Virginia School of Law, 1977; Legal Director, Children First Project, Shepard Broad Law
Center, Nova Southeastern University.
Acknowledgment is made of the financial support of the Joseph P. and Florence A.
Roblee Foundation and the Florida Bar Foundation and of the research assistance of Temple
Fett, Michael Cosculuella, and Joel Comerford.
1. Leslie Casimir, Coalition Wants to Help Struggling Grandparents, MIAMI HERALD,
Oct. 30, 1997, (Neighbors) at 9.
2. Jill Duerr Berrick, When Children Cannot Remain Home: Foster Family Care and
Kinship Care, T)HEFUTUEOFCHMLREN, Spring 1998, at 72,73.
456
Nova Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [1998], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol23/iss1/1
Nova Law Review
criminal involvement that beset the children's parents. 3 Estimates are that
nearly four million children nationally,4 231,000 in Florida,5 live with their
grandparents. High poverty rates, a retirement population, and ethnic
cultural values that put a premium on keeping children with kin make
Florida a hot spot for the "grandparents raising grandchildren" phenom-
enon. 6 Forty-four percent of these relative caretakers are raising children
due to parental drug abuse, twenty-eight percent due to child abuse or
abandonment, and twenty-eight percent due to teen pregnancy.7 Many live
on fixed incomes and suffer extreme financial hardship in meeting the needs
of these children.8  Some are at the brink of relinquishing them to state
custody.9
Among these grandparents is Eartha Walker of Miami, who is raising a
family of fourteen children (down from sixteen a year ago) from three sets of
families.'0 Two of the children are Ms. Walker's great-grandchildren, the
children of her incarcerated granddaughter." Four are the children of her
deceased daughter, the victim of a drug deal gone bad.12  One of the
grandchildren has emotional problems and has attempted suicide four
times. 13  Another is mentally handicapped. 14  "Walker raises them on a
combination of Social Security, WAGES benefits, and food stamps - not
enough to make ends meet. She gets subsidized child care, but
transportation to and from the childcare center costs [her] $120 a month."'' 5
The $800 she spends each month on groceries is $230 more than her monthly
food stamp allotment. 16 Ms. Walker says she used to go out into the fields to
3. River Ginchild & Melinda Perez-Porter, State Initiatives Slowly Respond to Kinship
Care, 30 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 521, 521-23 (1996); see Laurie Hansen and Irene Opsahl,
Kinship Caregiving: Law and Policy, 30 CLEARINGHOUSEREV. 481,482-83 (1996).
4. Faith Mullen, Welcome to Procrustes' House: Welfare Reform and Grandparents
Raising Grandchildren, 30 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 511, 511 (1996) (citing U.S. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, MARITAL STATUS AND LivING ARRANGEMENTS: MARCH 1994 (1994) (Series No. P.20-
44)).
5. Christina Zawisza, Help These Grandparents Raise 231,000 Florida Children, THE
MAMI HERALD, Apr. 20, 1998, at 9A.
6. Id.
7. John Barry, Granny As Nanny, THE MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 3, 1997, at 1A.
8. Zawisza, supra note 5, at 9A.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Zawisza, supra note 5, at 9A.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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pick vegetables, but her health will no longer allow her to do so.17 She must
rely on food pantries and free food distribution centers to feed her family. 8
She negotiates extended payment plans for her telephone and electric bills,
and yet somehow she copes.
The unexpected and rapid growth of the population of relative care
givers, exemplified by Ms. Walker, has created a huge new client base of
heads of households needing expert legal advice and assistance in order to
maneuver a myriad of legal custodial options, sources of financial assistance,
and eligibility for support services.20 Yet because this population group has
crept up on the Florida Legislature, straight paths to each family's receipt of
assistance are elusive. Florida has a hodge podge of legal provisions
favoring grandparents and other relatives. Most recent of these is the 1998
legislation, which created a funded Relative Caregiver Program for children
temporarily placed with relatives through the juvenile courts. 21 But Florida
lacks a cohesive and continuous framework of laws related to relative care
givers and a consistent set of principles guiding policy.
This article will discuss the child welfare framework in which the
"Granny as Nanny" phenomenon has arisen, both through social policy and
the law. The goals of protection, family preservation and support, and
permanence guiding these policies will be emphasized. Next, this article
will explore beneficial ways in which other state laws have responded to
assist relative care givers. Finally, it will analyze Florida law and suggest
needed improvements to provide the necessary consistent framework.
II. THE PLACE OF KINSHIP CARE IN CHILD WELFARE POLICY
Kinship care is defined as "[a]ny form of residential caregiving
provided to children by kin, whether full-time or part-time, temporary or
permanent, and whether initiated by private family a7,eement or under the
custodial supervision of a state child welfare agency.2 "Relatives have no
legal obligation to become children's care-givers," but choose to do so either
voluntarily or at the request of the state child welfare agency or juvenile
court. 2 A 1998 Florida study revealed that approximately 8126 children
under the protective supervision of Florida's child welfare agency, the
17. Id.
18. Zawisza, supra note 5, at 9A.
19. Id.
20. Hanson & Opsahl, supra note 3, at 486-501.
21. Relative Caregiver Program, ch. 98-403, § 70, 1998 Fla. Laws 2114, 2182 (codified
as amended at FLA. STAT. § 39.5085 (Supp. 1998)).
22. Marianne Takas, Kinship Care and Family Preservation: Options for States in
Legal and Policy Development, ABA Center on Children and the Law, Sept. 1994, at 3.
23. Berrick, supra note 2, at 73.
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Department of Children and Families, were living with a relative.24
Unknown numbers live with relatives under informal arrangements.
In the past ten years, child welfare systems have increasingly come to
depend on the placement of dependent children with relatives because of
the inability of the public systems to absorb the numbers of children needing
26
care outside the home of their birth parents. This toll on the child welfare
system comes both from a shrinking supply of foster homes and an
escalating demand for out-of-home care. Factors such as the growth of
single parent households, the number of women employed outside the home,
increasing divorce rates, and the rising_ costs of child rearing, contribute to
the decline of available foster homes. At the same time, the entrance of
more infants and youngchildren into the foster care system, due to factors
such as crack cocaine and other substance abuse, MIV/AIDS, homicide
related to domestic violence, incarceration of one or both parents, or mental
illness has swollen its ranks."9
The child welfare system has three major goals: protection for children,
family preservation and support, and assuring permanent homes for
children. Kinship care is being used around the country as a means to
achieve each of these goals, with varying degrees of success.3
The primary goal of the child welfare system is to "protect children
from harm at the hands of their parents or other caregivers.0 2 This goal
allows a state to intervene in family life and remove children from their
homes despite the parents' right to family integrity.33 For years, child
welfare workers and judges have been ambivalent about achieving the goal
of child protection by placing children with relatives. They believed that
these relatives would simply perpetuate the maltreatment that the parent
24. FLORIDA DEP'T OF CHILDREN & FAMIumS, "ISSUES RELATED TO KINSHIP CARE" A
REPORT TO THE FLORIDA LEGISLATURE, 3 (Jan. 1998).
25. In Florida, dependent children are defined as those who have been found by the
court to be abused, abandoned, or neglected. FLA. STAT. § 39.01(1 1)(a) (1997).
26. James P. Gleeson, Kinship Care as a Child Welfare Service: The Policy Debate in
an Era of Welfare Reform, 75 CHILD WELFARE 419,419-20 (1996).
27. Berrick, supra note 2, at 74.
28. Id.
29. Beatrice Yorker et al., Results of a Home-Based Intervention Study, Juv. & FAM.
Cr. J. 15, 16 (1998).
30. Berrick, supra note 2, at 73.
31. Id. at 73. See Mark E. Courtney, Kinship Foster Care and Children's Welfare: The
California Experience (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Nova Law Review); see also
Maria Gottlieb Zwas, Note, Kinship Foster Care: A Relatively Permanent Solution, 20
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 343 (1993).
32. Berrick, supra note 2, at 77.
33. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U. S. 745 (1982).
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grew up with, fostering a cycle of dependency. 34 This thinking, however,
has been replaced in recent years by a recognition that these extended
families are a way to "protect the ties that bind. 35 An increased focus on.
family strengths rather than deficits through improved, family centered,
community based service technology that has demonstrated results is largely
responsible for this shift in attitude.
Recent research studies have demonstrated that relatives typically do
provide safe and nurturing environments for children equal to those provided
by licensed, non-kin foster homes.37 Relatives, however, need supports,
resources, and training to be able to successfully care for these children.38
The emotional rewards experienced by relatives caring for children are
"accompanied by personal sacrifice, concern about safety of the
neighborhoods," and "competing demands of other family members. 39
They need services such as child care, respite care, parenting programs,
financial assistance, legal counseling, job counseling, drug addiction
education, and health care.40 Most relatives find the availability of such
services to be inadequate.41
The second goal of the child welfare system, family preservation and
support, also appears to be enhanced through relative care giving.
Historically, both in this country and around the world, extended families
have served as a resource during times of family distress.42 This has been
particularly true in the African-American, Hispanic and Haitian commun-
ities which are so heavily represented in Florida. s Kinship foster care
"provides continuity, lessens the trauma of [family] separation, preserves
family ties, and offers growth and development within the context of a
child's culture and community."4 Again, however, improvement is needed
in the types of services and supports that help make kinship care a positive
experience for the child, the care giver, and the other family members.45
34. Berrick, supra note 2, at 77.
35. Id. at 80.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 79-80.
38. Id.
39. Yorker, supra note 29, at 15, 17.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See id.
43. Barry, supra note 7, at 1A.
44. Charlene Ingram, Kinship Care: From Last Resort to First Choice, 75 CHILD
WELFARE 550,552 (1996).
45. Berrick, supra note 2, at 81. See also Julia Danzy & Sondra M. Jackson, Family
Preservation and Support Services: A Missed Opportunity for Kinship Care, 76 CHILD WELFARE
31(1997).
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The third goal of the child welfare system is permanence for the child.
Movement from placement to placement is unsettling to children. Multiple
placements are associated with disruptive behavior in children and with poor
life outcomes. 46 Research has shown that children in kinship care have more
stable placements and are reunited with their natural families just as
frequently as children placed in regular foster care.47 But while children's
personal relationships with relative care givers are fairly secure, their legal
relationships are not. They are more likely to grow up in informal custody
relationships or temporary custody than in legal guardian or adoptive• 48
relationships, the preferred permanency options. This is due primarily to
public policy decisions, federal and state, which encourage financial
assistance in temporary situations but not in more permanent arrangements.49
The tension between a child welfare policy that favors permanency, and a
fiscal policy that favors short-term, low level support, creates the greatest
ambivalence in kinship care policy to date.
50
]II. THE EFFECT OF FEDERAL SUBSTANTIVE LAW IN PROMOTING KINSHIP
RELATIVE CARE
The child welfare system goals of protection for children, family
preservation and support, and permanence have been fostered by federal
legislation. The first federal law to endorse the family preservation and
support goal of the child welfare system was the 1978 Indian Child Welfare
Act,51 which requires that Native American children be placed in the least
restrictive setting within reasonable proximity to their homes, taking into
account their special needs. 2 This law also mandates that preference be
given to extended family members when securing a placement for a Native
American child in foster care or a preadoption 3
The Indian Child Welfare Act is limited to a specific population of
children. The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980
("AACWA"), 54 the federal blueprint for today's child welfare system,
46. Berrick, supra note 2, at 72, 81.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 82.
49. Id. at 81-84.
50. Id.; see Courtney, supra note 31, at 46.
51. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-03 (1994).
52. Id. § 1915(b).
53. Id.
54. 42 U.S.C. §§ 620-27, 670-75 (1991). The AACWA is contained within the Social
Security Act, Subchapter IV, which contains five Titles. Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
[Vol. 23:455
461
: Nova Law Review 23, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1998
Zawisza
applies to all children and supplies the details for implementing the goals of
protection, family preservation and support, and permanence. Under the
AACWA, the protection goal is to be achieved by creating, in each state, a
continuum of child welfare and foster care services and by requiring case
56plans and case reviews for all dependent children. Permanence is to be
achieved by requiring case reviews by a judge or administrative body to take
place no less frequently than once every six months.57 These mechanisms
are used to determine the continued necessity for, and appropriateness of,
out-of-home placement and the extent to which circumstances requiring out-
of-home care are alleviated. 8 The law also requires dispositional hearings
no later than eighteen months after placement,59 and provides funds for
adoption assistance.
60
The family preservation and support goal is to be achieved through the
case plan and case review procedures cited above which provide services to
families to correct their identified deficiencies. It is also achieved by
requiring that children removed from birth families be "plac[ed] in the least
restrictive[,] most family like... setting available in close proximity to the
parents' home, consistent with the best interests and special needs of the
child. 61  The original AACWA does not specifically mention kinship
relative placements in carrying out these goals.
It has been argued that the AACWA's emphasis on providing
substantial federal dollars for foster care maintenance through Title IV-E of62
the Act served as a disincentive to preserve and support families. In 1993
the Act was amended to intensify the family preservation and support
goal.63 Congress appropriated one billion dollars to states through a grant
program to encourage the development of family centered, community based
services to support and preserve families.64  These services include:
1) programs designed to return children to their natural families or to be
placed for adoption; 2) preplacement preventative services such as intensive
U.S.C.). Title IV-B deals with child welfare services and Title IV-E deals with foster care
maintenance and services. 42 U.S.C. §§ 620-27, 670-75 (1991).
55. 42 U.S.C. §§ 620-27,670-75 (1991).
56. Id. §§ 625,671-72, 675.
57. Id. § 675(5).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. 42 U.S.C. § 673.
61. Id. § 675(5)(a).
62. Id. § 672. United States General Accounting Office, Foster Care: Services to
Prevent Out-of-Home Placements Are Limited by Funding Barriers, GAO-HRD 93-76 (1993).
63. Marc Katz, New Legislation Pours $1 Billion into Family Preservation, 8 Youru L.
NEws, Sept.-Oct. 1993, at 8.
64. Id.
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family preservation; 3) follow up care to a family to whom a child has been
returned; 4) respite care to provide temporary relief for care givers;
5) services designed to improve parenting skills; and 6) community based
services to promote child well being.65  There is no restriction on the
availability of these services to relative care givers.
In 1996, the United States Congress for the first time made explicit a
recognition that kinship care serves both permanence and family
preservation and support goals. 66 To be eligible for federal Title IV-E foster
care maintenance funds, Congress ordered states to consider giving
preference to an adult relative over a nonrelative care giver.67 Still assuring
the child protection goal, the 1996 amendment requires the relative to meet
all relevant state child protection standards.68
The AACWA was again amended in 1997 through the Adoption and
Safe Families Act to strengthen the goals of protection, family preservation
and support, and permanence. 69 Now, in order to implement the protection
goal, the child's health and safety is to take precedence over family
reunification. 70 But the family preservation and support program is extended
with additional appropriations for five more years. Permanence is to be
achieved by requiring a dispositional hearing within twelve months rather
than the previous eighteen, by prescribing certain conditions under which
.termination of parental rights _petitions must be filed, and by creating
additional adoption incentives. These incentives include payment of
adoption expenses and monthly adoption subsidies.73 The 1997 amendments
do not change the preference for relative placements, nor preclude relatives
from taking advantage of the adoption incentives. On the other hand, no
explicit financial incentives are provided to relatives to encourage them to
assume the care of dependent children, contrary to the result were they to
adopt.74
65. 42 U.S.C. § 629(1)(A)-(E) (1993).
66. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(19) (Supp. 1996).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. 42 U.S.C. § 671 (1997).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. §§ 671,673.
74. Berrick, supra note 2, at 82. In certain ethnic communities, there is a cultural norm
that does not favor adoption because it goes against the grain of "being there" for the extended
family members. Id.
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IV. THE EFFECT OF FEDERAL FISCAL LAW IN PROMOTING KINSHIP
RELATIVE CARE
The two main sources of federal maintenance support for relatives
caring for dependent children have been Aid to Families with Dependent
Children ("AFDC") and foster care maintenance payments under Title IV-
E.75 Prior to 1996, AFDC provided a monthly stipend to any relative home
(within certain required degrees of consanguinity) in which a parent was
76
absent or had abandoned the child. Both the care giver and the dependent
child were considered members of the AFDC assistance unit and received
financial assistance.7 7  The relative could alternatively apply for a
maintenance payment through Title V-E, which required foster care
licensing.78
Landmark welfare reform legislation enacted in 1996 changed the
ability of the care giver to be included in the AFDC grant, ended any
entitlement to services, and imposed a host of new hurdles to overcome.
79
AFDC was replaced with Temporary Assistance to Needy Families
("TANF") under the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996 ("PRWORA"). SU Time limits and work
requirements were imposed upon any adult who wished to accept welfare
assistance.8 ' The only alternative for relative care givers now is a "child-
only" category of assistance, at a substantially reduced benefit level.82 This
supports children in assistance units in which the care giver is ineligible for
benefits or chooses not to request them. 3 Under TANF, the only alternative
for relative care givers now is a "child-only" category of assistance, at a
substantially reduced benefit level. The child-only category supports
children in assistance units in which the care giver is ineligible for benefits
or chooses not to request them. Because many already poor care giver
relatives are unable to partake of work requirements due to age, health, or
the number of children in their care, their households have suffered a
substantial loss of monthly income. The ill-fitting TANF requirements were
75. Other sources include Medicaid, which provides health insurance for very low
income children, and Supplemental Security Income (SSI), which provides additional support for
children who are disabled or medically impaired.
76. 42 U.S.C. § 606 (1991).
77. Id.
78. 42 U.S.C. § 672(c) (1991).
79. 42 U.S.C. § 672 (Supp. 1996).
80. Id. § 601.
81. Id. § 615.
82. Id.
83. 42 U.S.C. §§ 607, 608 (1991) (stating that child only cases in Florida are limited to a
maximum of $180 per month in assistance).
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never designed for the vast cadre of impoverished grandparents caring for
another generation of children.84 Fiscal policy under TANF does not
consider the critical role relative care givers have assumed in caring for
children who would otherwise end up in foster care and thus discourages
relative care giving. Thus, fiscal policy under TANF conflicts with the
provisions of the AACWA.
Currently, the only other major source of financial assistance for
relative care givers is foster care maintenance payments under Title IV-E.85
Under PRWORA, the child's eligibility for such assistance is based on 1996
AFDC eligibility rules: 1) the child was eligible for AFDC benefits before
placement into foster care; 2) a state or county agency has placement
responsibility for the child; and 3) the foster home meets state licensing
standards.
86
In 1979, the United States Supreme Court ruled in Miller v. Youakim87
that the State of Illinois could not exclude relative care givers from foster
care maintenance stipends.88 The Court held that Congress never meant to
differentiate among neglected children based on their relationship to their
foster parents and noted that an exclusionary policy against relatives
conflicted with congressional intent to provide the best available care to
children. 89 Some relatives have chosen to become licensed foster parents to
take advantage of Miller. Many others, however, have custody through
informal arrangements not involving the state child welfare agency. Many
cannot meet the stringent space requirements necessary for state licensing, or
are unable or unwilling to participate in intensive foster parent training not
designed to address issues pertaining to kin.9° Thus for them, foster parent
licensing, in order to obtain the financial assistance necessary to sustain
these children's needs, is not a viable option.
Unlike AFDC, Title IV-E's foster care maintenance program survived
1996 federal welfare reform intact as an uncapped federal entitlement.91
That occurrence provided states with incentives to shift expenditures for
relative custodians from AFDC to Title IV-E at a higher federal
reimbursement rate, particularly where states had created funded kinship92
relative care giving programs. Not coincidentally, the 1996 amendments tothe AACWA requiring states to give preference to an adult relative over a
84. Mullen, supra note 4, at 511-12.
85. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 672 (West Supp. 1998).
86. Id. § 608(a).
87. 440 U.S. 125 (1979).
88. Id. at 146.
89. Id. at 138-:39.
90. See, e.g., FLA. ADMiN. CODE ANN. r. 65C-13.011 (1997).
91. 42 U.S.C.A. § 672 (West Supp. 1998).
92. Id.
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nonrelative when determining a placement for a child, were contained within
the same congressional act, PRWORA.93 This enables an interpretation that
Congress intended Title IV-E funds to be used to enforce the relative
preference. Legal disincentives to making such a shift, however, include the
requirement of foster care licensing, the need for child welfare agency
oversight in each case, and state matching dollar mandates. 94
Some states, however, have found their way around these impediments
through creative applications for federal waivers of regulatory
requirements.95  In June of 1996, the Children's Bureau of the
Administration for Children, Youth and Families in the Department of
Health and Human Services, granted ten waivers to states to conduct
demonstration projects to test out innovations in service delivery and
financing strategies using Title IV-E dollars. 96 Several states have used their
waivers to support relative care givers. 97 California, for example, subsidizes
relatives who are willing to assume legal guardianship for children over
thirteen who are in stable placements, and for whom reunification or
adoption is not feasible.98 They receive payments up to the foster care basic
payment rate. Delaware does the same, without an age requirement.
99
Maryland serves this population without regard to age but limits benefits to
$300 per month.100 Illinois provides payments ranging from $343 to $415
per month, regardless of age.
These innovative state projects are certainly laudable. However, the
best means at the federal level to assure the goals of protection, family
preservation and support, and permanence, while recognizing the vastly
93. Rob Geen and Shelley Waters, The Impact of Welfare Reform on Child Welfare
Financing, NEW FEDERALISM: ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR STATES (The Urban Institute,
Washington, D.C.), Series A, No. A-16, Nov. 1997, at 1.
94. Id. at 4-5. It has been estimated that Florida stands to gain an increase of $195 per
month per child if this shift were made. The shift, however, requires the appropriation of general
revenue matching dollars that are not already committed to match another federal program. Id. at
6. Title IV-E provides to Florida approximately 57% of foster care room and board costs, 50%
for DCF staff and administrative costs, and 75% for training foster and adoptive parents. UNTrED
STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMrITEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, OVERVIEW OF
ENTm.EMENTPROGRAMS: GREEN BOOK, 454-55 (1996).
95. Lorrie L. Lutz, An Overview of the Title IV-E Waivers, 1 CHILDREN'S VANGUARD
(Child Welfare League of America, Gettysburg, Pa.) Feb., 1998 at 1 (stating that the states are:
California, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, New York, North Carolina, Ohio,
and Oregon).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 3-5.
98. Id. at 3.
99. Id.
100. Lutz, supra note 95, at 4.
101. Id.
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changed composition of households in which dependent children are
successfully being raised, is for Congress to enforce the relative placement
preference with specific authorization to the states to use Title IV-E funds to
establish relative care giver financial assistance programs. The prohibitive
restrictions regarding foster care licensing and case specific child welfare
agency oversight would also have to be eased to make this a viable option
for relatives.
V. WAYS OTHER STATES SUPPORT KINSHIP RELATIVE CARE GIVERS
Supporting kinship relative care givers through the use of Title IV-E
waivers is a relatively new policy development. Some states have operated
kinship relative care giver programs by statute for years, most through
qualifying relatives as licensed foster parents. In New York, prompted by
litigation in Eugene F. v. Gross,102 relative care givers receive the same
financial assistance and services as foster parents, but children remain in the
legal custody of the child welfare agency.103  Foster care licensing
requirements have been reduced for these care givers, and they do not need
to meet the same physical space and size requirements pertaining to foster
parents. 104 In addition, relatives can receive emergency approval within
twenty-four hours to receive a child, thus avoiding the child's trauma of
removal to the home of strangers. 105
In the wake of Miller, Illinois extended full foster care benefits to
relative care givers regardless of their licensing status or Title IV-E
eligibility in the early 1980's.'06 But in the early 1990's, faced by the largest
increase in foster care caseloads in the country, Illinois sought to reduce its
administrative costs for operating these programs.1 By administrative rule,
Illinois created a new permanency option called Delegated Relative
Authority ("DRA") in 1995. A child with DRA status continues in the
legal custody of the child welfare agency and retains eligibility for medical
care and foster care board payments, but casework services and
administration are reduced to the minimum necessary to maintain Title IV-E
eligibility.' °9 Illinois also succeeded in encouraging twenty-one percent of
102. No. 86-1125 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. filed Feb. 23, 1990).
103. Zwas, supra note 31, at 357.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Miller v. Youakim, 440 U.S. 125 (1979).
107. Id.
108. Mark F. Testa et al., Permanency Planning Options for Children in Formal Kinship
Care, 75 Cmi.D WELFARE 451,466 (Sept.-Oct. 1996).
109. Id. at459.
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its relative care givers to adopt the children in their custody through the
subsidized adoption program.
Dissatisfied that its relative care giver program did not yet sufficiently
address the permanency goal of the child welfare system," Illinois further
refined the program through its federal waiver application in 1996.112 It
created a subsidized guardianship option which terminates state custody for
children who have been in care for at least two years, have been in their
current home for at least one year, and for whom adoption or reunification
with parents within one year is unlikely. 113 By statute, also in 1996, Illinois'
child welfare agency was authorized to create an informational pamphlet for
relative care givers to inform them about their legal options, benefits and
services available, and the location of support groups and resources.
1 14
California, with the largest substitute care population of any state, has
adopted legislation to promote greater permanency for children placed with
relatives byI establishing year long-term kinship care pilot projects in five
counties." Children in these pilots receive the same monthly foster care
board rate as other children, but their dependency cases in juvenile court are
dismissed, and they are freed from ongoing court hearings and supervision
by the child welfare agency.1
6
Following the example of large states such as New York, Illinois, and
California, other states have added funded kinship relative care programs to
their arsenal of permanency options for foster children. In 1995, Arkansas
created a funded kinship foster care program which provides the full foster
care board rate to relatives who have successfully completed an investigation
to ascertain criminal history and personal qualifications 17 Arkansas does
not require relatives to meet foster care licensing requirements, but
maintains the child in the custody of its child welfare agency.1 8 Oklahoma
adopted identical statutory language in 1996.119 Nebraska, in contrast,
bypassed state custody and passed legislation in 1997 which provided funds
to guardians for maintenance costs, medical and surgical expenses, and other
110. Id. at 462.
111. Id. at 468.
112. HHS Approves Child Protection Waiver for Illinois, HHS NEws (U.S. Dept. Of
Health and Human Services, Washington, D.C.) Sept. 18, 1996 at 1.
113. Id.
114. 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/34.11 (West 1996).
115. CAl. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11465.5 (Deering 1994 & Supp. 1997).
116. Id.
117. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-28-501 (Michie 1998).
118. Id. § 9-28-503.
119. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7004-1.5 (West 1996).
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incidentals for any child who has been a ward of the state and for whom the
guardianship would not be possible without financial aid.'2
Missouri created a "Grandparents as Foster Parents Program" in 1997
for grandparents who are fifty-five years of age or older, the legal guardian
of a grandchild placed in the grandparent's custody, and who participate in
parent skills training, foster parent training, childhood immunizations, and• 121
other health screenings. Missouri grandparents must meet a needs test in
order to receive reimbursement at the current foster care rate. 122 Minnesota
has established a somewhat limited program. It authorizes placement of a
child in the permanent physical custody of the relative and provides a
monthly relative custody assistance payment for relatives whose incomes do
not exceed 200% of the poverty level, as long as the child is either a member
of a sibling group placed together or has a physical, mental, emotional, or
behavioral disability that requires financial support.
123
Wisconsin has taken a different approach to supporting kinship relative
care givers, recognizing that relatives who raise children under informal
arrangements are often just as needy of services and financial assistance as
are relatives who raise children under child welfare agency supervision. 124
In 1995, Wisconsin created a kinship care program that provides payments
of $215 per month to relatives who apply through the child welfare agency,
regardless of legal status.125 The agency is required to determine that:
1) there is a need for the child to be placed with the kinship care relative;
2) it is in the best interest of the child to be so placed; 3) the child meets
dependency criteria or is at risk of meeting dependency criteria; and 4) the
relative passes criminal background checks. Strikingly, the child need
only be at risk of dependency, but does not have to be under any juvenile
court scrutiny. 127  The child welfare agency must review the child's
placement at least once a year to determine whether the above conditions
still exist.
128
In 1997, Wisconsin enhanced its permanency options by creating the
Long-Term Kinship Care Program, 129- which reduced its administrative
costs.130 For relatives who obtain legal guardianship of a child, payments of
120. NEB. REv. STAT. § 43-284.02 (1998).
121. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 208.029 (Supp. 1998).
122. Id.
123. MINN. STAT. § 257.85 (1998).
124. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.57(3) (West 1998).
125. Id. § 48.57(3m)(am).
126. Id. § 48.57(3m)(am)1,2,4,4m.
127. Id. § 48.57(3m)(am)2.
128. Id. § 48.57(d).
129. Wis. STAT. § 48.57(3n) (West 1998).
130. Id.
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$215 per month continue, but the child welfare agency is no longer required
to conduct an annual review of the child's circumstances, other than to
assure that the child is still living in the home, has not yet turned eighteen,
the guardianship has not terminated, or similar factors.
131
In addition to supporting relatives through financial assistance and
concrete services, some states have provided special supports to encourage
relatives in thinking through various legal options and connecting with
community support services. Such efforts further reduce state expenditures
on caseworkers, court time, supervision, financial disbursement, reporting
functions, and overhead. Oregon operates Project Connect, which advises
relatives about permanency options, assists in family decision making,
provides ambivalence counseling to encourage guardianship or adoption, and
expands support services for care givers. The Pennsylvania Department of
Public Welfare together with the Philadelphia Society for Services to
Children operates the "Kids 'n' Kin" Program.133 This program assists
family members to access necessary services and entitlements and to make
decisions about permanent custody or adoption through the provision of
home-based social work intervention services, home-based family therapy,
and legal advocacy and representation. 134 In 1997, the Philadelphia program
diverted ninety-four percent of its clients from the foster care system,
secured a permanent plan for eighty-eight percent of the children living with
relative care givers, returned six percent of children to biological parents,
and closed seventy-seven percent of the children's child welfare agency
135
cases.
The efforts of these states illustrate a growing national recognition that
the phenomenon of children being raised by relatives is here to stay and that
public policy must respond. Although there are advantages and
disadvantages to the various state options chosen, all have in common a
recognition that financial assistance and support services provided to
relatives are essential to forestall greater numbers of children entering the
foster care system. Some states now have sufficient experience to know that
legal custody retained in the public agency thwarts the goal of permanence.
These states secure greater permanence through creative encouragement of
guardianships or adoptions, thus benefiting the child while also saving
public dollars.
131. Id. § 48.57(5r)-(6).
132. Oregon's State Office for Services to Children and Families, Kinship Care (last
modified May 1998) <http://www.scf.hr.state.or.us/idnshipcare.hn>.
133. KIDs 'N' KiNPRoGRAMs (Phila. Soc'y for Servs. to Children, Phila., Pa.), 1998, at 1.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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VI. FLORIDA'S CHOICES TO SUPPORT KINSHIP RELATIVE CARE
Florida law supporting kinship relative care has developed piecemeal
beginning in 1978, and does not exhibit a cohesive policy framework.
13 6
Whether the legislature, prior to 1998, was cognizant of this new
phenomenon of "grandparents raising grandchildren" or that kinship relative
care giver placements meet the child welfare system's goals of child137
protection, family preservation and support, and permanence is not
ascertainable through legislative intent language.
The first major effort to address kinship care giver custody occurred in
1993 when the legislature gave the circuit court general jurisdiction to award• 138
temporary legal custody to an extended family member. This statute
applies only when the child's parents consent.a39  If a relative wishes to
claim that the parent is unfit, the case must be resolved in juvenile court.14°
This statute recognizes that many children are well cared for by extended
family members,41 But these relatives need a legal document that explains
and defines their relationship to the child, to consent to care provided to the
child by third parties, and to obtain the child's medical, educational, and
other records. 142 No financial support, however, is available to relatives who
hold custody of a child under these provisions.
Apart from the above circuit court family law procedures, a more
common venue for relative care givers to obtain custody of a child is through
136. The first prominent legislative effort to respond to the growing grandparent
movement occurred in 1990 and addressed kinship care in the context of visitation rights. FLA.
STAT. § 752.01 (Supp. 1990). It established the right of grandparents to petition for visitation of
children when their parents were deceased, when the parents divorced, when the child was
deserted by the parent, or when the child was born out of wedlock. Id. This statute was amended
in 1993 to include situations where the natural parents are married to each other but have used
their parental authority to prohibit a relationship between the child and the grandparents. FLA.
STAT. § 752.01(I)(e) (1993).
137. JUNE M. MIcKENs & DEBRA R. BAKER, ABA CENTER ON CHIIDREN AND THE LAW,
MAKING GOOD DEcISIONs ABoUr KINSHIP CARE 2 (1997). The general hierarchy of permanency
options recognized in the literature in order of least to most permanent are: 1) informal
arrangements with no custodial provision; 2) informal arrangements with power of attorney;
3) informal arrangements with permission to consent to medical treatment; 4) court ordered
emergency placement in the home of a relative under protective supervision; 5) court ordered
temporary legal custody to a relative; 6) long-term relative custody; 7) legal guardianship; and
8) adoption. Id.
138. FLA. STAT. §§ 751.01(l)-(2) (1997).
139. Id. § 751.03(8).
140. Id. § 751.05(3).
141. Id. § 751.01(3).
142. Id. §§ 751.01(1)-(3).
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Florida's dependency statute, chapter 39 of the Florida Statutes.143 Since
1978, chapter 39 has expressed a preference for relative placements over
nonrelatives and has authorized the juvenile judge to release a child to a
responsible adult relative upon taking an alleged dependent child into
custody. 144 This forestalls the child's placement in shelter care. 145
Chapter 39 further provides that after a child has been adjudicated
dependent, the court can place the child in the home of a relative with or
without the protective supervision of the Department of Children and
Families. 46 Protective supervision may be terminated by the court whenever
the court determines the child's placement is stable or that supervision is no
longer needed.147 Alternatively, the juvenile judge may choose to place the
child in the temporary legal custody of the relative.148 There are no
legislative guidelines as to when the court should choose one disposition
over another. Regardless of either status, the law requires that case plans be
developed and services provided by the Department of Children and
Families, and regular judicial reviews held to determine whether the child
should be reunited with the natural parent or moved on to a more permanent
legal option.149 These other options include adoption, long-term foster care,
independent living, custody to a relative on a permanent basis with or
without legal guardianship, or custody to a foster parent with or without
legal guardianship.150
Creating even greater confusion for relatives, the 1994 Florida
Legislature established another permanency option for dependent children,
long-term relative custody.15 This option applies when the child's parents
have failed to comply with a case plan and the court determines that neither
reunification, termination of parental rights, or adoption are in the best
interest of the child.152 It also provides that the court may relieve the
Department of Children and Families from protective supervision if the court
determines that the placement is stable and that such supervision is no longer
needed.153 In that case the court must set forth the powers of the custodian,which ordinarily include the powers of the guardian of the person of the
143. FLA. STAT §§ 39.39-.418 (1997).
144. Id.
145. Id. § 39.401(2)(a). However, the law does not provide guidelines as to when either
of these dispositions should be used. See id.
146. Id. § 39.41(2)(a)3.
147. FA. STAT. § 39.41(2)(a)3.
148. Id. § 39.41(2)(a)4.
149. Id. § 39.45(2).
150. Id.
151. FLA. STAT § 39.41(2)(a)5.a (Supp. 1994).
152. Id.
153. Id. § 39.41(2)(a)5.b.
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minor unless otherwise specified.15 4 No financial supports accompany the
status of long-term relative custodian, although the Department is instructed
to provide services to ensure the long-term stability of the relationship.
55
In 1994, the legislature also materially strengthened this state's focus on
family preservation by requiring the child welfare agency to diligently search
for relatives with whom the child might be placed. 56  The court was
instructed to affirmatively indicate in each disposition order why the child
was not placed with a relative.
57
Totally apart from juvenile dependency and family court custody
processes, however, the legislature in 1990 completely revamped Florida's
guardianship law and established proceedings for individuals, including
relatives, to petition to establish guardianship of a minor. 58 This legislation
forced relatives who received custody of a child through juvenile
dependency proceedings to file a separate petition for guardianship in yet
another court, the probate court, at considerable legal costs and time
delays.
59
In 1998, the legislature partially corrected this situation by authorizing
the juvenile court to exercise general and equitable jurisdiction over
guardianship proceedings pursuant to chapter 744 as well as over
proceedings for temporary custody of minor children by extended family
members under chapter 751.160 The relative, however, is still required to file
a petition for guardianship and follow the requirements of these chapters.'
61
The legal guardian in Florida, unlike in other states, is not eligible for
financial assistance.
62
Florida has long operated a subsidized adoption program, which makes
financial aid available to potential adoptive families in which a child has: 1)
established significant emotional ties with a foster parent; or 2) is not likely
to be adopted because she or he is eight years of age or older, mentally
retarded, physically or emotionally handicapped, or a member of a sibling
group. 16 This law, however, establishes that adoption without subsidy is theplacement of choice.' 64 State regulations require a series of medical, mental
154. Id.
155. Id. § 39.41(2)(a)5.a.
156. FLA. STAT. § 39.41(4)(a) (Supp. 1994).
157. Id.
158. FLA. STAT. § 744.3021 (Supp. 1990).
159. Id.
160. FLA. STAT. § 39.013(3) (Supp. 1998) (defines, for the first time, legal guardianship in
the context of juvenile dependency law).
161. Id. § 39.013.
162. FLA. STAT. § 409.166 (1997).
163. Id.
164. Id. § 409.166(1).
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health, and other professional evaluations prior to adoptive placement in
order to determine if the statutory conditions are met. The amount of
adoption subsidy is to be determined through negotiations with the
prospective adoptive family. A basic subsidy is calculated based on the
family's income. This is supplemented by a subsidy based on family size
and another subsidy based on the age of the child. 16 In addition, a family
may receive a supplemental maintenance payment up to the amount the child
would have received in foster care if there are documented mental, physical,
emotional, or behavioral conditions which require extraordinary care,
supervision, or structure. 67 Subsidies must be redetermined annually.
168
This complicated formula results in a payment as low as $154 per month and
as high as $425 per month, with the average payment being $267 per
month.
6 9
The 1998 Florida Legislature presented relatives with a new
opportunity when it created a funded Relative Caregiver Program within the
Department of Children and Families. 70 This law provides financial assis-
tance to relatives within the fifth degree of relationship to a parent or step-
parent of the child who are caring full-time for a child in the role of substi-
tute parent. 171 The child must have been abused, neglected, or abandoned,
and placed with the relative under chapter 39. The law also allows relatives
to receive family preservation and support services, flexible funds, 172 sub-
sidized child care, and Medicaid coverage. 7 3  Unfortunately, financial
assistance is limited to placements under court ordered temporary legal
custody to the relative under section 39.508(9) of the Florida Statutes or
court ordered placement in the home of a relative under protective super-
vision of the Department under section 39.508(9). 174 Children in more
permanent kinship arrangements, such as long-term relative placement or
legal guardianship, will not benefit from this legislation. Relatives must also
participate in the case planning process and periodic judicial reviews,
presumably until the child reaches eighteen, even after protective
supervision is terminated.
175
165. FLA. ADMiN. CODEANN. r. 65C-16.013(3) (1997).
166. Id. r. 65C-16.013(4)(a), (b), (c) (1997).
167. Id. r. 65C-16.013(5) (1997).
168. Id. r. 65C-16.013(10) (1997).
169. Telephone Interview with Gloria Walker, Adoption Specialist, Fla. Dep't of Children
& Faniles (Sept. 23, 1998).
170. FLA. STAT. § 39.5085 (Supp. 1998).
171. Id.
172. Id. § 409.165.
173. Id. § 39.5085(2)(f).
174. Id. § 39.5085(2).
175. FLA. STAT. § 39.5085(2) (Supp. 1998).
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Relatives who qualify for the Relative Caregiver Program are not
required to meet foster licensing standards, 176 but a home study must be
completed. 177 The home study must ascertain that the relative is capable of
providing a physically safe environment and a stable, supportive home for
the children and must assure that the child's well-being is met, including, but
not limited to the provision of immunizations, education, and mental health
services. 78
The benefit amount is to be set by the Department of Children and
Families and is to be based on the child's age, subject to available fund-
ing. 179 The amount of funding available for the relative care giver program
is not to exceed eighty-two percent of the statewide average foster care rate,
nor may the cost of providing such benefits exceed the cost of providing out-
of-home care in emergency or shelter care.180 As a result, the Department of
Children and Families has decided upon a rate this year of seventy percent of
the average statewide foster care rate. This will result in the following
payment levels: $242 per month for a child zero to five; $249 per month for
a child six to twelve; $298 per month for a child thirteen to eighteen.
Funding of approximately twenty-six million dollars to establish the
Relative Caregiver Program was obtained by allocating unencumbered
TANF block grant funds, not through Title IV-E, the funding source in
most other states. The effect of this funding source, according to the
Department of Children and Families, is to subject relatives not only to the
provisions of chapter 39 but also to the requirements of the Work and Gain
Economic Self-sufficiency ("WAGES") law. 1 2  WAGES requires
semiannual eligibility redeterminations and sanctions which amount to loss
of the monthly payment if the child has sufficient unexcused absences so as
176. Id. § 39.5085(2)(c).
177. Id. § 39.5085(2)(b).
178. Id. The 1998 law also mandates a home study for any out-of-home placement for a
child under chapter 39. Id. § 39.508(2)(q). The home study must include: 1) criminal
background checks; 2) an assessment of the physical environment of the home; 3) a
determination of the financial security of the caregivers; and 4) a determination that suitable child
care arrangements are available for a caregiver employed outside the home. FLA. STAT.
§ 39.508(3)(a) (Supp. 1998).
179. Id. § 39.5085(2)(d).
180. Id. The 1998 Legislature increased the foster care board rate for licensed foster
parents to levels that range from $345-$425 per month. Telephone Interview with Carolyn
Glynn, Foster Care Specialist, Florida Department of Children and Families (Sept. 16, 1998).
181. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON CHILDREN, FAMILns & SENIORS, COMM. SUBSTIUrTE
FOR S.B. 1540, STAFF ANALYSIS AND ECONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT, 15th Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess.,
at 2, (Fla. 1998).
182. FLA. STAT. § 414.015-.55 (1997). The Work and Gain Economic Self-sufficiency
Program is Florida's version of TANF.
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not to make satisfactory school progress. 183 No other state imposes such
harsh penalties on kinship families. Taking away a dependent child's
monthly subsistence benefit for failure to attend school is a questionable
method to achieve the child welfare system's protection and permanence
goals. Although a blessing for many relatives caring for dependent children,
the burdens of home studies, eligibility redeterminations, sanctions, case
plans, and court hearings may deter many needy kinship family units from
taking advantage of this new program.
VII. OPPORTUNITIES FOR FLORIDA TO IMPROVE ITS SUPPORT FOR KINSHIP
RELATIVE CARE
It is time for Florida to revisit and revamp its policy for kinship relative
care givers. Public policy needs to encourage the most stable of custody
arrangements, i.e., legal guardianship or adoption, through financial
assistance, not the least permanent, i.e., temporary custody or protective
supervision.18 The complexity, inconsistency, redundancy, and lack of
goals in Florida law bedevils the most skillful advocate, not to mention the
struggling grandparent.
Now is the time for Florida to establish a cohesive kinship relative care
giver framework based on the following principles: 1) Consistency;
2) Simplicity; 3) Goal orientation: child protection, family preservation and
support, and permanence for the child; 4) Experience: Florida's history as
well as the experience of other states; and 5) Maximization of federal
funding opportunities.
Florida can address these principles while giving long awaited
recognition of recognizing its social and fiscal dependence upon relative care
givers to raise the next generation of Floridians by taking the following
steps:
1. TRIAGE FISCAL POLICY. Recognize that there are two types of
relative care givers: those who are financially able to support children on
their own and those who are struggling on the margins of basic subsistence.
Leave the financially able to raise their kin alone, unencumbered by
unnecessary government oversight. Support those financially unable in the
least intrusive, least administratively costly method available. Always ask:
Is it more cost beneficial to support this relative or to maintain this child in
the foster care system? Provide the same level of support for relatives
regardless of legal status by equalizing the Relative Caregiver benefit and
183. Id. § 414.125(7).
184. Helaine Homby et. al, Kinship Care in America: What Outcomes Should Policy
Seek?, 75 CHILD WELFARE 397, 416 (1996).
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the adoption subsidy.'85 Appropriate sufficient general revenue to enable
Florida to apply for a federal Title IV-E waiver to finance this legislative
scheme.
2. TRIAGE CHILD WELFARE POLICY. Recognize that there are
several types of relative care givers. There are those who are caring
temporarily for children who ultimately can be successfully reunited with
their natural families. For these relatives, financial assistance coupled with
temporary legal custody under protective supervision of the child welfare
agency and the courts, while parents are working on case plans for
reunification, makes sense. Next, there are those small numbers of relatives
for whom reunification of children with the natural parent is not an option,
yet the relative's history or circumstances is such that there are some
questions about the safety or stability of the arrangement. These relatives
need financial assistance and also need temporary custody and child welfare
agency and court supervision to protect the children. Third, there are
relatives caring for children for whom reunification is not an option, who
provide safe and stable homes, who have cultural or family values opposed
to adoption, but who need financial assistance in order to provide for the
child's needs. They do not need agency and court oversight. Legal
guardianship is an appropriate option for them. Finally, there are relatives
who would adopt were it not for the financial inability to make ends meet.
Subsidizing adoptions at the same rate as the Relative Caregiver Program
will eliminate any bartering among these options based on financial levels.1
86
3. SIMPLIFY THE STATUTES. The current multiplicity of
placement options is not necessary and causes confusion. Florida should
enact only four options: 1) permanent custody with an extended family
member without subsidy; 2) temporary custody under protective
supervision with subsidy and court oversight; 3) legal guardianship with
subsidy; 88 or 4) subsidized adoption at the same rate as legal guardianship.
4. PILOT KIN SUPPORT PROGRAMS. Establish pilot programs
modeled after those of Oregon and Philadelphia to assist relatives
financially, legally, and socially so that more Florida relative caregivers can
185. Both relative care givers and adoptive parents should be eligible for a supplemental
maintenance payment for children with specialized physical, emotional, mental, or behavioral
needs.
186. Wisconsin's legislative scheme comes closest to these recommendations. Wis. STAT.
§ 48.57(3m) (1998).
187. This can be accomplished either in circuit court or juvenile court, although
centralizing all children's cases in one court has merit.
188. This would best be accomplished if legal guardianship were a dispositional option in
dependency proceedings, not requiring the filing of a separate petition, and if guardianship
procedures were simplified and customized to address the specific needs of the dependency
population.
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move to the ranks of unsubsidized legal guardians or adoptees through
maximization of community resources including mortgage assistance,
medical insurance, and other means of family support.
All of these proposals will better address the desired child welfare
system goals of assuring that children are protected, that their families are
preserved and supported, and that they are in permanent homes, at the same
time freeing court and administrative resources to serve more pressing needs.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Eartha Walker and thousands of relatives like her have experienced a
slight ease in their child-caring burden through the Florida Legislature's
creation in 1998 of the Relative Caregiver Program. But to take advantage
of this Program they must forego a permanent legal relationship with the
child and subject themselves to layers of supervision, reporting, assessment,
documentation, and possible sanctions by the child welfare agency and the
juvenile court. Such hurdles make no policy sense.
If the Florida Legislature is sincere in its desire to protect children,
assure them permanence, and foster family preservation and support, it will
look to other states' experiences and dramatically simplify its statutory
scheme. Through appropriating general revenue funds to match federal Title
IV-E funds, extending the Relative Caregiver Program to legal guardianship,
promoting adoption subsidies at the same dollar level, and piloting relative
support initiatives, the Florida Legislature can truly "protect the ties that
bind," while still protecting its coffers.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Until 1980, the State of Florida was without any textual provision that
afforded its citizens a right of privacy. However, the Supreme Court of
Florida, at least to some degree, recognized that a right of privacy was
protected in some manner by the state constitution. Since the introduction
2
of Article I, Section 23, the right of privacy amendment to the Florida
Constitution, the Supreme Court of Florida has had many opportunities to
replace the arguably vague and ambiguous language of the mendment with
3
more concrete terms. J.A.S. v. State, decided in February of 1998, is one
recent Supreme Court of Florida decision in which the court had an
opportunity to express its views on privacy rights and, in particular, how
those rights relate to minors.4 Fundamentally, the J.A.S. decision is premised
upon a minor's right of privacy and how far the government may out stretch
its arm to limit that right.5 In order to understand the basis for the right to
privacy argument, it is important to consider the origin of the right to privacy
in the State of Florida.
1. David C. Hawkins, Florida Constitution Law: A Ten-Year Retrospective on the
State Bill of Rights, 14 NovAL. REv. 693, 826 (1990).
2. FLA. CONST. art I, § 23.
3. 705 So. 2d 1381 (Fla. 1998).
4. Id.
5. Id.
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Unlike the right of privacy that the United States Constitution provides,
which emanates from the Fourteenth Amendment, 6 the Florida Constitution
specifically sets forth a right to privacy in Article I, Section 23.7 Article I,
Section 23 states that "[e]very natural person has the right to be let alone and
free from governmental intrusion into his private life except as otherwise
provided herein. This section shall not be construed to limit the public's
,8right of access to public records and meetings as provided by law." It seems
important to mention that this amendment, proposed by the state legislature
and approved by Florida voters, apparently evidenced a strong commitment
on the part of Florida voters to protect privacy rights.9
This seemingly strong commitment on the part of Florida voters is
consistent with the Supreme Court of Florida's ruling in Winfield v. Division
of Pari-Mutuel Wagering,l0 where the court recognized the importance of
Article I, Section 23 by extending the highest standard of review to cases in
which the right of privacy is implicated.1 The court in Winfield set the
standard by which all subsequent cases dealing with the right of privacy
would be adjudicated. 2 The right of privacy was recognized by the court as
a "fundamental right," and as such, one that could only be limited based,, ,, .13
upon a compelling" state interest. The court then set the test by which an
alleged governmental intrusion into an individual's right of privacy would be
measured.' 4 Once a right of privacy is implicated the burden of proof shifts
to the state.'5 "The burden can be met by demonstrating that the challenged
regulation serves a compelling state interest and accomplishes its goal
through the use of the least intrusive means." 16 The Winfield court noted that
the right of privacy was not absolute and was subject to the compelling
interest of the state, which further cemented the power of both the individual
6. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
7. FLA. CONsT. art. I § 23.
8. FLA. CONST. art. I § 23.
9. Hawkins, supra note 1 at 826-27. "With the adoption of the privacy amendment,
Florida became the fourth state to create an express textual basis for the right of privacy. In so
doing, Floridians demonstrated a 'deeply protectionistic attitude' and assured themselves an
'independent, freestanding [and] fundamental' right of privacy." David C. Hawkins, Florida
Constitution Law: A Ten-Year Retrospective on the State Bill of Rights, 14 NOVA L. REV.
693, 826 (1990). (quoting Florida Bar v. Schreiber, 407 So. 2d 595, 598 (Fla. 1981); Winfield
v. Division Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544, 548 (Fla. 1985)).
10. 477 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 1985).
11. Id. at 547.
12. Id. at 548
13. Id. at 547.
14. Id.
15. Winfield, 477 So. 2d at 547.
16. Id.
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and the state in this area. '7 Arguably, it was the suggestion of the court that
the mere implication of the right to privacy would not easily overcome the
potential strength of the state's interest.1
8
It is difficult to determine when an individual's right to privacy is
implicated, given the vagueness of Article I, Section 23. However, the
Winfield court stated that "before the right of privacy is attached and the
delineated standard applied, a reasonable expectation of privacy must
exist." 9 "A reasonable expectation of privacy"' and "the right to be let
alone" 21 give little guidance with regard to the implication of privacy rights.
However, the court in Winfield was willing to say that:
Since the people of this state exercised their prerogative and
enacted an amendment to the Florida Constitution which expressly
and succinctly provides for a strong right of privacy not found in
the United States Constitution, it can only be concluded that the
right is much broader in scope than that of the Federal
Constitution.22
Whenever the court determines whether privacy rights exist in any given
situation, based upon a "reasonable expectation of privacy," a broad or
narrow reading of Article I, Section 23 will result. Consequently, Article I,
Section 23 might be a vehicle for judicial legislation when the legislature
drafts imprecise laws that implicate an individual's right of privacy.
Regardless, the court has found privacy rights implicated in a diverse array
of areas from financial records to abortion.
In J.A.S., the court was essentially being asked whether these previous
findings supported the conclusion that a minor's right of privacy includes a
right to "consensual" sexual activity that outweighs the states compelling
interest in protecting minors from such activity. 2 4 Specifically, the question
certified to the Supreme Court of Florida in J.A.S. was:
WHETHER THE POTENTIAL PENALTY FOR VIOLATION
OF SECTION 800.04, FLORIDA STATUTES, BY A MINOR
UNDER THE AGE OF SIXTEEN FURTHERS A COMPELLING
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Winfield, 477 So. 2d at 547.
21. FLA. CONST. art. I § 23.
22. Winfield, 477 So. 2d at 548.
23. In reT.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1192 (Fla. 1989).
24. J.A.S v. State, 705 So. 2d 1381, 1382 (Fla. 1998).
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STATE INTEREST THROUGH THE LEAST INTRUSIVE
MEANS?'
Briefly stated, J.A.S. involved two fifteen-year-old boys who had
"consensual" sexual intercourse26 with two twelve-year-old girls.27  These
facts triggered serious constitutional questions and raised doubts about the
consistency of prior court decisions.28
Part II of this article will focus on the cases which underscore the J.A.S.
decision. Part III of this article will dissect the J.A.S. decision, including the
district court opinion and the concerns outlined by the trial court. Part IV
will attempt to offer some rationale for J.A.S. and its progeny.
II. CASE LAW OVERVIEW
A. In re T.W.- A Minor's Right to Abortion
In re T. W. 9 was one of the first opportunities the Supreme Court of.... 30
Florida had to explore the right of privacy with regard to minors. T.W., a
fifteen-year-old minor, sought an abortion as a result of an unwanted31 3
pregnancy. Pursuant to section 390.001(4)(a) of the Florida Statutes,
32
T.W., as a minor, was required to obtain "written informed consent of a
parent, custodian, or legal guardian" or seek a judicial bypass in order to
25. Id. at 1382.
26. "Intercourse" is generally used to refer to any act which would constitute a
violation of sections 800.04 (Supp. 1991) and 794.05 (Supp. 1996) of the Florida Statutes.
27. J.A.S., 705 So. 2d at 1382.
28. See id. at 1385-87.
29. T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1192.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1189.
32. Florida Statutes section 390.001(4)(a)(1) (Supp. 1988) provides:
If the pregnant woman is under 18 years of age and unmarried, in addition to
her written request, the physician shall obtain the written informed consent of
a parent, custodian, or legal guardian of such unmarried minor, or the
physician may rely on an order of the circuit court, on petition of the pregnant
unmarried minor or another person on her behalf, authorizing, for good cause
shown, such termination of pregnancy without the written consent of her
parent, custodian or legal guardian. The cause may be based on: a showing
that the minor is sufficiently mature to give an informed consent to the
procedure; the fact that a parent, custodian, or legal guardian unreasonably
withheld consent; the minor's fear of physical or emotional abuse if her
parent, custodian, or legal guardian were requested to consent; or any other
good cause shown.
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obtain an abortion. 33 T.W. sought a judicial bypass on the grounds that "(1)
she was sufficiently mature to give an informed consent to the abortion, (2)
she had a justified fear of physical or emotional abuse if her parents were
requested to consent, and (3) her mother was seriously ill and informing her
of the pregnancy would be an added burden. 34 Using the standard of review
set forth in Winfield v. Pari-Mutuel Wagering, the court found the statute
unconstitutional because the state's interests were not "sufficienty com-
pelling under Florida law to override Florida's privacy amendment." The
court began its analysis of the case by citing Roe v. Wade,37 noting that this
landmark case announced "a right to privacy implicit in the fourteenth
amendment [which] embraces a woman's decision concerning abortion."38
The court stated that for section 390.001(4)(a) 39 to pass judicial scrutiny, it
must be reconciled with both the United States Constitution and the Florida
Constitution.4° However, the court reasoned that review under the Florida
Constitution was the most prudent starting point because unless the statute
could be held constitutional within the meaning of the Florida Constitution,
there would be no reason to determine whether it would pass scrutiny under
the United States Constitution.
The court started with the premise that a woman's decision to have an
abortion is a fundamental right, which is undoubtedly supported by the right
of privacy amendment in the Florida Constitution. More important to the
discussion of a minor's right of privacy, the court stated that the "freedom of
choice concerning abortion extends to minors.., based on the unambiguous
language of the amendment: The right of privacy extends to '[e]very natural
person."' 43 The court did, however, add the caveat that "[c]ommon sense
dictates that a minor's rights are not absolute." 44 Nevertheless, the court
declared that for section 390.001(4)(a) to pass judicial scrutiny and be held
constitutional, it must serve a compelling state interest by the least intrusive
means.
45
33. T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1189.
34. Id.
35. 477 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 1985).
36. T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1194.
37. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
38. T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1190 (citing Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
39. FLA. STAT. § 390.001(4)(a) (Supp. 1988).
40. T.W.,551 So. 2d at 1190.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1193.
44. Id.
45. T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1195.
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With regard to the interests of the state, the court was quick to note that
"protecting minors" and "preserving family unity are worthy objectives" yet
the court did not believe that these objectives were "compelling., 46 This
assertion relied upon other decisions holding that the above objectives were
not strong enough state interests to justify the imposition of a parental
consent requirement when minors sought other medical procedures, some of
which were potentially "life-or-death" decisions.4 7  The court found it
interesting that a minor may place a child up for adoption without parental
consent, a decision the court stated was "fraught with intense emotional and
societal consequences. 48
The court also found that neither parental consent nor a judicial bypass
was the least intrusive means to protect the state's interests and, therefore,
was contrary to the test set forth in Winfield.49 The court seemed to suggest
that the procedural pitfalls of the statute rendered the statute unconstitutional
with regard to its intrusiveness.50  Specifically, the Court found "[i]n
proceedings wherein a minor can be wholly deprived of authority to exercise
her fundamental right to privacy, counsel is required under our state
constitution.' ' Therefore, statute 390.001(4)(a) did not seek the interests of
the state by the least intrusive means because it neither made a "provision for
a lawyer for the minor or for a record hearing. ' 2
It might be argued, that the decision of the Supreme Court of Florida in
T. W. expressed strong support for a minor's right of privacy, especially in
the area of personal autonomy. When the court ruled that a minor could
access abortions, free of parental consent or judicial intervention, via a• • • 53 ...judicial by-pass, it seemingly indicates a commitment by the court to
advance increased freedom for minors within the realm of intimate personal
relations. The T.W. holding opened the door for future litigants to assert
their contention that minors may consent to intercourse. Arguably, if the
court was willing to allow a minor to deal with the possible ramifications of
sexual intercourse, for example, abortion or adoption, it would also seem
logical that the court would allow a minor to lejally consent to sexual
intercourse, which could lead to those consequences.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. T.W.,551 So. 2d at 1195.
51. Id. at 1196.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See infra note 71.
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B. Jones v. State- "Adult-Minor" Statutory Rape
Clearly, the defendant in Jones v. State55 believed the decision in T.W.
afforded expansive privacy rights for minors, when he argued that the
holding in T.W. supported the conclusion that minors may consent to sexual
relations.5 6 Jones, an eighteen-year-old, was charged with statutory rape
57
under section 800.04 of the Florida Statutes,58 which states in relevant part
that an individual may not, among other things, have "sexual intercourse"
with a "minor under the age of 16" and that "the victim's consent" is not a
defense.9 Jones was charged and convicted of violating section 800.04, as a
60
result of having sexual intercourse with a minor under the age of sixteen.
Jones appealed and questioned the constitutionality of section 800.04
because it made no provision for consent on the part of the minor in
violation of the minor's privacy rights.61 Essentially, he argued that because
T.W. afforded a minor the unrestricted right to an abortion, it was only
logical that a minor could consent to sexual intercourse. 62 The Supreme
Court of Florida disagreed with Jones's reading of the T.W. decision and
55. 640 So. 2d 1084, 1084 (Fla. 1994).
56. Id. at 1087.
57. Id. at 1085.
58. FLA. STAT. § 800.04 (1991) Lewd, lascivious, or indecent assault or act upon or in
presence of child.-Any person who:
(1) Handles, fondles or makes an assault upon any child under the age of 16
years in a lewd, lascivious, or indecent manner;
(2) Commits actual or simulated sexual intercourse, deviate sexual
intercourse, sexual bestiality, masturbation, sadomasochistic abuse, actual
lewd exhibition of the genitals, or any act or conduct which simulates that
sexual battery is being or will be committed upon any child under the age of
16 years or forces or entices the child to commit any such act;
(3) Commits an act defined as sexual battery under s. 794.011(1)(h) upon
any child under the age of 16 years; or
(4) Knowingly commits any lewd or lascivious act in the presence of any
child under the age of 16 years, without committing the crime of sexual
battery, commits a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided
in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. Neither the victim's lack of
chastity nor the victim's consent is a defense to the crime proscribed by
this section.
Id.
59. Id.
60. Jones, 640 So. 2d at 1085.
61. Id. Jones had standing to make his assertion because of precedent, which stated
"sellers of obscene materials had vicarious standing to raise the privacy rights of their
customers." Id.
62. Id. at 1086-87.
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found section 800.04 constitutional. 63 The court stated that "T.W. did not
transform a minor into an adult for all purposes."
64
Though the plurality opinion of the court never addressed the question
directly, the opinion suggested that a minor's privacy rights did not extend to
sexual relations. 65 However, the court did say "Florida has an obligation and
a compelling interest in protecting children from 'sexual activity and
exploitation before their minds and bodies have sufficiently matured to make
it appropriate, safe and healthy for them."' 66  The use of the phrase
"compelling interest" with respect to privacy rights should arguably have led
to a Winfield analysis, yet the court never spoke in terms of privacy rights
and, thus, one might conclude that no such privacy right exists with regard to
minors and "consensual" sex.
For more guidance, Justice Kogan, in his concurring opinion, stated
quite clearly that "T. W., in sum, does not create a right for young adolescents
to 'consent' to sex.6 Kogan illuminated the heart of section 800.04,
something the plurality had trouble doing, when he pointed out that the
purpose of section 800.04 was to "prevent children and young adolescents
from being exposed to the wide-ranging risks associated with sexual
exploitation and premature sexual activity." Kogan also reasoned that in
T.W. the court found the irrational application of section 390.001(4)(a)
69
problematic because minors could consent to certain types of dangerous
medical procedures but they could not consent to abortion without running a
procedural maze.70 He found it ridiculous to suggest that the T.W. decision,
one designed to help minors deal with the consequences of sexual activity,
supported the conclusion that minors could consent to intercourse. 71
By contrast, Kogan explained that the purpose of section 800.04,72 to
protect minors from "predatory exploitation," "clearly outweighs whatever
63. Id. at 1087.
64. Jones, 640 So. 2d at 1087.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1087 (quoting Jones v. State, 619 So. 2d 418, 424 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1993)(Sharp, J., concurring specially)).
67. Id. at 1087 n.5 (Kogan J., concurring).
68. Id. at 1088 (Kogan, J., concurring).
69. FLtA. STAT. § 390.001(4)(a) (1988).
70. Jones, 640 So. 2d at 1087 (Kogan, J., concurring).
71. Id. Some have argued that recognizing a minor's right to an abortion, however
limited that right may be, necessarily means there is a corresponding right for minors to
engage in "consensual" sex. Such an argument is no different than saying that, because
minors have a right to consent to alcohol-and drug-abuse treatment, § 397.601, FLA. STAT.
(1991), they also must have a right to consume alcohol and ingest drugs in the first instance.
This is an unsupportable brand of logic. Jones, 640 So. 2d at 1087 n.5.
72. FLA. STAT. § 800.04 (1991).
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'right' children may have in consenting" to sexual activity. 73 Justice Kogan
then went on to explain the effects of such exploitation, highlighting studies
indicating the pervasive nature of sexual abuse of children and the far
reaching results such abuse has on children who are affected by it.74 Further,
Kogan explained the merits of the legislature's "bright-line cut-off at a
specific age" with regard to an individual's ability to give consent to
intercourse.75  So long as that age is "within a range that bears a clear
relationship to the objectives the legislature is advancing," he reasoned that
the legislature must choose an age at which an individual can understand the
ramifications of certain critical and life long decisions, such as consenting to
intercourse.
76
The plurality opinion in Jones clearly expressed the view that section
800.04 is constitutional, albeit with little clear-cut reasoning. Justice
Kogan's concurrence offered a lengthy explanation with regard to the
soundness of section 800.04, but his reasoning did not gain the full support
of the court.77 Though the rationale of the Supreme Court of Florida was not
clear from the Jones decision, it appeared that the court was committed to
protecting minors from sexual activity by not recognizing any right to
engage in "consensual" intercourse. This might have been a fair
assessment of the court's reasoning had Jones been the final word on
whether a minor could "consent" to intercourse.
C. B.B. v. State- "Minor-Minor" Statutory Rape
The court's decision in B.B. v. State7 9 appeared to call into question
whether the court was truly committed to preventing minors from80
participating in consensual intercourse. The facts in B.B. are strikingly
similar to those of Jones, yet the result was completely opposite.81 B.B., a
sixteen-year-old, was charged with having sexual intercourse with another
73. Jones, 640 So. 2d at 1088 (Kogan, J., concurring) (quoting Schmitt v. State, 590
So. 2d 404,418-19 n.17 (Fla. 1991) (Kogan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)). "Some
studies, for example, indicate that 5 to 9 percent of males and 8 to 28 percent of females in the
general population report that they were sexually exploited as youths." Jones, 640 So. 2d at
1088 (Kogan, J., concurring).
74. Id. at 1088-89 (Kogan, J., concurring).
75. Id. at 1089.
76. Id. at 1090.
77. Id. at 1087.
78. Jones, 640 So. 2d at 1087.
79. 659 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 1995).
80. Id. at 257.
81. Compare B.B. v. State, 659 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 1995), with Jones v. State, 640 So.
2d 1084 (Fla. 1994).
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82
sixteen-year-old. B.B. was charged under section 794.05 of the Florida
83Statutes, which states in relevant part, "[a]ny person who has unlawful
carnal intercourse with any unmarried person, of previous chaste character,
who at the time of such intercourse is under the age of 18 years, shall be
guilty of a felony .... ,84 B.B. beckoned the court to find section 794.05
"unconstitutional as violative of his right to privacy. 86 The court seemingly
agreed with the assertion of the petitioner, finding section 794.05
unconstitutional. 7
In both Jones and B.B., the court was dealing with statutory rape
statutes.88 It was undisputed that the individuals had intercourse with minors
under the statutory age, yet in Jones the court held the statute constitutional
and thus upheld the conviction 89 and in B.B. the court held the statute
unconstitutional and remanded the decision. 90 It seems quite logical to
conclude, "the court arrived at diametrically opposed results."9' Practically
speaking, this conclusion seems sound. However, the court's decisions,
when examined, indicate that the court had little choice given the language
of section 794.05 and the factual distinction between B.B. and Jones.
In both cases the court clearly stated that it would not and was not
92
endorsing consensual intercourse between minors. In Jones, the court
82. B.B., 659 So. 2d at 257.
83. Florida Statute section 794.05 (1991) provides:
Carnal intercourse with unmarried person under 18 years.-
(1) Any person who has unlawful carnal intercourse with any unmarried
person, of previous chaste character, who at the time of such intercourse is
under the age of 18 years, shall be guilty of felony of the second degree,
punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(2) It shall not be a defense to a prosecution under this section that the
prosecuting witness was not of previous chaste character at the time of the act
when the lack of previous chaste character in the prosecuting witness was
caused solely by previous intercourse between the defendant and the
prosecuting witness.
FLA. STAT. § 794.05 (1991).
84. Id.
85. FLA. STAT. § 794.05 (1991).
86. B.B., 659 So. 2d at 258.
87. Id. at 260. "Thus, we do not hold that section 794.05 is facially unconstitutional
but only that it is unconstitutional as applied to this 16-year-old as a basis for a delinquency
proceeding." Id.
88. Id. at 257, 259.
89. Jones, 640 So. 2d at 1087.
90. B.B., 659 So. 2d at 260.
91. Mark M. Dobson, Criminal Law: 1995 Survey of Florida Law, 20 NOVA L. REV.
67, 108 (1995).
92. See B.B., 659 So. 2d at 258; Jones, 640 So. 2d at 1087.
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stated that "TW. , in sum does not create a right for young adolescents to
'consent' to intercourse." 3 In B.B., the court maintained, in dictum, that "if
[their] decision were based upon whether minors could consent to sexual
activity as though they were adults, [their] decision would be 'no.' ' 94 This
quote raises the obvious question, upon what was their decision based?
The answer to this question appears to lie within the somewhat subtle
differences between the factual circumstances giving rise to each case. First,
the court framed the issue in B.B. so that they would not have to reach the
question of whether minors may consent to intercourse. 95 Second, as
previously stated, Jones and B.B. were charged under different statutes, a
fact that would prove extremely important.96  Next, the court in B.B.
unequivocally stated that section 794.05 implicated B.B.'s privacy rights and
therefore required a thorough Winfield analysis, a step not truly taken in
Jones.97 Finally, the defendant and the victim in B.B. were both minors,
whereas the defendant in Jones was an adult.98 These factors coalesced and
led the court to its conclusion; a conclusion one might argue was
manufactured to avoid a question the court did not want to 
answer.9
The question certified to the Supreme Court of Florida, by the Second
District Court of Appeal, was whether "Florida's privacy amendment, article
I, section 23 of the Florida Constitution , render section 794.05...
unconstitutional as it pertains to a minor's consensual sexual activity?" 10°
However, the Supreme Court of Florida stated the issue to be "whether a
minor who engage[d] in 'unlawful' carnal intercourse with an unmarried
minor of previous chaste character can be adjudicated delinquent of a felony
of the second degree in light of the minor's right to privacy guaranteed by
the Florida Constitution."'  The difference between the question certified
and the issued ruled upon, seemingly infinitesimal, was actually infinite.
The court removed the question of "consensual activity" and refocused the
issue toward the nature and language of the statute as it pertains to the right
of privacy in Florida with regard to minors.1°2 This essentially allowed the
court to withhold judgment on the issue of consensual intercourse between
minors. Having changed the question presented, the court set out to answer
93. Jones, 640 So. 2d at 1087 n.5 (Kogan J., concurring).
94. B.B., 659 So. 2d at 258.
95. Id. at 257.
96. Id. at 258.
97. Id. at 260.
98. Id. at 259.
99. After B.B. it was truly unclear how courts were going to deal with minors
engaging in sexual intercourse and subsequently being charged with statutory rape.
100. State v. B.B., 637 So. 2d 936, 937 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
101. B.B., 659 So. 2d at 258.
102. Id.
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its own contrived question. It should be noted that Justice Harding dissented
based on the court's failure to reach the actual question presented. 0 3 He
also suggested that the court would have had to find the statute constitutional
if it had answered the certified question.
104
Having first reiterated the court's assertion in T.W., that the right of
privacy extends to minors, the court then moved to the question they failed
to definitively opine upon in Jones, that is, whether a right of privacy is
implicated with regard to minors and "consensual" intercourse.105 It would
seem that the court's position with regard to whether a right of privacy exists
in "consensual" intercourse between minors is clearly stated in their
assertion "that Florida's clear constitutional mandate in favor of privacy is
implicated in B.B., a sixteen-year-old, engaging in carnal intercourse."
106
Thus, the court was willing to say that a minor's right to privacy was
implicated when that minor engaged in consensual sexual activity.'07
However, the court went no further with this line of thought.
08
Rather, the court then focused upon two key distinctions between B.B.
and Jones, which allowed them to dodge the broader issue of minor's
"consenting" to intercourse.1°9 First, the court explained that the compelling
state interest in Jones was protecting a minor from the sexual exploitation of
an adult. 10 By contrast, the court held that the interest in B.B. could not be
sexual exploitation because both the defendant and victim in B.B. were
minors." Rather, the court recognized the state's asserted interest was
"protecting the minor from the sexual activity itself for reasons of health and
quality of life."
1
'
2
Having placed the interest of the state in these terms, the court
concluded "that the State ha[d] failed to demonstrate in this minor-minor
situation that the adjudication of B.B. as a delinquent through the application
of section 794.05 [was] the least intrusive means of furthering what we have
determined to be the State's compelling interest."" 3  To reach this
conclusion the court pointed to the archaic language of the statute, which
essentially created a preferred class of minors. The court found it
103. Id. at 262 (Harding, J., dissenting).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 258.
106. B.B., 659 So. 2d at 259.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 258-59.
110. Id. at259.
111. B.B., 659 So. 2d at 259.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
[Vol. 23:477
490
Nova Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [1998], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol23/iss1/1
1998]
impossible to reconcile the fact that the alleged purpose of the statute was to
protect minors from the dangers of sexual activity, yet the statute only
extended to those minors of "chaste" character.115 As a point of clarity, the
court wished to add, "[w]e do say that if our decision was what should be
taught and reasoned to minors, the unequivocal text of our message would be
abstinence."'1 6  The court was restrained by what it reasoned was
constitutionally sound, not wanting their opinion to be based upon their own
moral or political views, a noble approach for Florida's high court, yet a
confusing notion for most.
Some perspective on the potential pitfalls of adjudicating minors
delinquent in minor-minor statutory rape cases might be gained by the
assertions of Justice Kogan's concurring opinion and Chief Justice Grime's
dissent. These opinions have particular weight with respect to the J.A.S.
court's decision and arguably strike at the heart of the minor-minor statutory
rape debate. Justice Kogan offered, with respect to who should be charged
in minor-minor statutory rape cases, that "[a]ttempting to brand one as the
aggressor and the other as the victim raises very serious questions of equal
protection, especially where prosecutors always assume that one type of
child-such as 'the boy,' or the one who is 'uncha'ste'-must be the
aggressor."'1 7 Chief Justice Grime's fear of events to come might easily be
115. Id.
Thus, by its own terms the statute at issue here does not protect unmarried
minors who had lost their virginity through a liaison with a third party prior
to the act in question. This singularly odd state of affairs indicates that the
real objective of this statute is not to protect children as a class, but to prevent
the loss of chastity of those not already 'despoiled'. Any person-child or
adult--thus does not violate this particular statute by a sexual liaison with an
unchaste minor.
B.B., 659 So. 2d at 260 (Kogan, J., concurring).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 261 (Kogan, J., concurring). Justice Kogan's statement raises serious
concerns about the inherent potential for equal protection violations when one minor is
singled out and charged with statutory rape in minor-minor situations. Id. Although Justice
Kogan raised the equal protection issue, he did not analyze this potential problem under either
the Florida or United States Constitution. However, the United States Supreme Court has
opined with respect to equal protection and statutory rape statutes. See also, Michael M. v.
Superior Court of Sonoma Couny, 450 U.S. 464 (1981), which held a statutory rape statute,
which only applied to males, constitutional despite the argument that the statute violated the
equal protection clause because "the gender classification [was] not invidious, but rather
realistically reflectfed] the fact that the sexes [were] not similarly situated in certain
circumstances" particularly, "that the consequences of sexual intercourse and pregnancy f[e]ll
more heavily on the female than on the male." Id. at 464. However, Michael M. dealt with a
statute that facially discriminated against males, whereas, Florida's statutory rapes statutes are
facially neutral. See also, Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (asserting that "our
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evidenced by his response that "holding section 794.05 unconstitutional as
applied, the majority appears to be saying that a sixteen-year-old child has a
constitutional right to engage in sex with another sixteen-year-old child,
though an older person would not have such a right."118 The Chief Justice
also noted that, if convicted, B .B. might have a viable challenge based upon
cruel and unusual punishment.1 9 Further, Chief Justice Grime's fears might
not have been assuaged when the Florida Legislature changed the language
of section 794.05. The relevant change came by way of removing any
language relating to "chaste character" and clearly prohibiting an adult over
the age of twenty-four from having sexual relations with a sixteen or
seventeen-year-old.1
20
In many ways the trepidation found in both Chief Justice Grime's
dissent and Justice Kogan's concurrence are in essence the true problems
when dealing with statutory rape, where both victim and accused are minors
claiming consent. The court must deal with the problem of who is the victim
cases have not embraced the proposition that a law or other official act, without regard to
whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a
racially disproportionate impact"). Applying this line of thought, it might be argued that the
mere fact that boys are charged more often might not be sufficient to sustain an equal
protection claim. Rather, the party challenging the statute on equal protection grounds would
apparently have to demonstrate purposeful activity on the part of the State of Florida to charge
males. Davis, 426 U.S. at 239.
118. B.B., 659 So. 2d at 262 (Grimes, C.J., dissenting).
119. Id.
120. FLA. STAT. § 794.05 (1996).
Unlawful sexual activity with certain minors.
(1) A person 24 years of age or older who engages in sexual activity
with a person 16 or 17 years of age commits a felony of the second degree,
punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. As used in
this section, "sexual activity" means oral, anal, or vaginal penetration by, or
in union with, the sexual organ of another; however, sexual activity does not
include an act done for a bona fide medical purpose.
(2) The provisions of this section do not apply to a person 16 or 17
years of age who has had the disabilities of nonage removed under chapter
743.
(3) The victim's prior sexual conduct is not a relevant issue in a
prosecution under this section.
(4) If an offense under this section directly results in the victim giving
birth to a child, paternity of that child shall be established as described in
chapter 742. If it is determined that the offender is the father of the child, the
offender must pay child support pursuant to the child support guidelines
described in chapter 61. Id. (It seems that this change does in fact allow a
sixteen-year-old to engage in sexual intercourse with another sixteen-year-
old.)
FLA. STAT. § 794.05 (1996).
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and who is the victimizer, but remain mindful of the equal protection
implications. The court must also balance on the very thin line between
constitutionally entitled activity and endorsing intercourse between minors.
Essentially, the three cases outlined above, T.W., Jones, and B.B., placed the
court squarely in the middle of this very confusing and sensitive problem and
set itself up to ultimately decide the issue of "consensual" intercourse
between minors. After B.B. was decided, the court's record on the issue of a
minor's right to privacy was not quite clear. They had allowed minors the
unrestrained right to abortion, then failed to recognize any consensual
right to intercourse with respect to minors and adults, 2 2 and finally struck
down a statute that allowed a minor to be charged with statutory rape of
another minor.
23
III. J.A.S. V. STATE-A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
A. The Trial and District Court
State v. J.A.S124 may have been the court's opportunity to finally
determine the issue of adjudicating minors delinquent of so called "minor-
minor" consensual intercourse. The facts surrounding the case were
relatively simple. Two fifteen-year-old boys had "consensual" intercourse
with two twelve-year-old girls and were charged with statutory rape under
section 800.04, the same statute applied in Jones.125 Perhaps relying upon
the B.B. decision, the trial judge mirrored the sentiments of the concurrence
and dissent. He found section 800.04 unconstitutional as applied to both
minors in J.A.S., because section 800.04 "violated their right to privacy and
equal protection under the law" and because "the potential sanction was
grossly disproportionate to the crime and would constitute cruel and unusual
punishment."' 6 The trial court's line of thought might seem predictable,
given the suggestions of the B.B. court. However, the district court was
unmoved. The district court was quick to dismiss the assertions of equal
protection and cruel and unusual punishment, but could not be as dismissive
with the right of privacy issue.
27
The court first found it unreasonable for the trial judge to have
assumed, based solely on his "experience of five years as juvenile judge,"
121. In reT.W., 551 So. 2d 1186,1188 (Fla. 1989).
122. Jones v. State, 640 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 1994).
123. B.B. v. State, 659 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 1995).
124. State v. J.A.S., 686 So. 2d 1366 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
125. Id. at 1367.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1367, 1369.
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that "whenever sexual misconduct is charged between the opposite sexes, the
boys are always charged by the state. ' 128 Further, because the defense
presented no evidence to support such a conclusion, the State had nothing
tangible to dispute. 129 The State did, however, present evidence that one of
the juveniles charged had had extensive juvenile "referrals" and "previously
engaged in intercourse with the victim's [thirteen-year-old] sister."'' 30
Apparently, this was the court's way of saying the State had accurately
charged the victimizer and therefore there were no equal protection
problems. Regardless, the court stated that choosing who would be charged
was a matter of the prosecutor's discretion.' 3' 132
The court then moved to the issue of cruel and unusual punishment.
Essentially, the court said that they could not say whether the juveniles
would be subject to cruel and unusual punishment because the trial court
dismissed the charges against the juveniles. 33 Further, they stipulated that it
might be appropriate for the juveniles to be punished harshly if the crime
they committed warranted such punishment.
34
The court finally addressed the question of privacy rights when both the
defendant and the victim are minors. The court did not apply the Winfield
test, which they recognized was the proper means to address a right to
privacy question. 136 Rather, the court focused upon whether it was proper to
charge a minor under section 800.04.137 The court recognized the inherent
problem a court faced when adjudicating one minor a delinquent in "minor-
minor" statutory rape cases. 138 However, the court had both precedent and
the indecision of the state legislature to rely upon.139
128. Id. at 1367.
129. J.A.S., 686 So. 2d at 1368.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. J.A.S., 686 So. 2d at 1368.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1369.
137. Id. at 1368.
138. Id. at 1369 n.2. The court in J.A.S. recognized:
[t]he potential incongruity of punishing one under 16 who is supposed to be
protected from the sexual advances of others because of his or her age and
inability to fully consent to sex, equally with one 16 or 60, who is presumed
to be of an age and maturity to understand his sexual decisions.
J.A.S., 686 So. 2d at 1369 n.2.
139. Id. at 1369 "The failure to enact any legislation before retiring from the 1996
session indicates to us that the members of the legislature have no better idea of how to deal
with problem than that adopted by L.L.N." The fact that the debate in the legislature existed
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Citing precedent set forth in L.L.N. v. State,'40 the court denied any
attempt to claim that section 800.04 was constitutionally vague with respect
141to minors. In L.L.N., a minor, charged under section 800.04, unsuc-
cessfully claimed that the statute was unconstitutionally vague because it
was being used to "prosecute a member of the protected class." 142 The court
was quick to note that the Supreme Court of Florida denied certiorari in
L.L.N., imVlying that the high court was satisfied that L.L.N. was decided
properly. 1 3 The court also suggested that the failure on the part of the
legislature in the previous term to decide whether it is proper for minors to
be charged under section 800.04 was proof that the legislature realized a
problem existed and that they, too, had no better solution than that used by
the courts. 144 However, the court recognized in B.B. that the Supreme Court
of Florida found it problematic to adjudicate a minor delinquent in a statu-
tory rape case because of the potential penalties involved.1 45 Regardless, the
court believed that the B.B. decision was inconclusive with regard to the
potential penalty and therefore suggested that the Supreme Court of Florida
wished to leave the question to the legislature.146
The court seemed to endorse the view that minors can be con-
stitutionally charged and convicted under section 800.04 because of the
strength of the statutory language and the apparent commitment on the part
of the Supreme Court of Florida to prevent "consensual" intercourse
between minors.' 47 Although the district court did vacate the dismissal of
the trial court, it is difficult to grasp the rationale that motivated their
findings. Particularly, because the court certified the following question to
the Supreme Court of Florida:
suggested to the court that "the legislature [was] aware of the serious problem of sexual
activity among minors." Id.
140. 504 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
141. J.A.S., 686 So. 2d at 1368 (citing L.L.N. v. State, 504 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1987)).
142. L.LN., 504 So. 2d at 7.
143. J.A.S., 686 So. 2d at 1368.
144. Id. at 1369.
145. Id.
146. Id.
[The current supreme court was unable to accept the potential penalty
appropriate for an adjudication of guilt of a second degree felony in B.B. The
result attained in B.B. was to refer the matter back to a legislature that was
unable to resolve the matter during its entire 1996 session.
Id.
147. J.A.S., 686 So. 2d at 1368. "Ihe conclusion to be drawn from the supreme court's
statements in B.B. and the legislature's statement in section 800.04 is that sexual activity
between minors is prohibited whether or not each of the participants believe that they have
'consented."' Id.
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WHETHER THE POTENTIAL PENALTY FOR VIOLATION
OF SECTION 800.04, FLORIDA STATUTES, BY A MINOR
UNDER THE AGE OF SIXTEEN FURTHERS A COMPELLING
STATE INTEREST THROUGH THE LEAST INTRUSIVE
MEANS.
48
B. The Supreme Court of Florida
The factual circumstances of B.B. and J.A.S. are similar because they
both deal with minors charged with statutory rape based upon "consensual"
intercourse with other minors.149 The court's conclusion in B.B., that the
state's compelling interest was not furthered by the least intrusive means by
adjudicating B.B., a minor delinquent,1 50 might lead one to reason that
J.A.S., a minor, would not be adjudicated delinquent. However, in J.A.S. the
court "conclude[d] that section 800.04, as applied herein, furthers the
compelling interest of the State in the health and welfare of its children,
through the least intrusive means, by prohibiting such conduct and attaching
reasonable sanctions through the rehabilitative juvenile justice system."'
Support for the court's conclusion was essentially derived from
distinguishing B.B. from J.A.S. and explaining the similarities between J.A.S.
and Jones.' 
52
The court began its discussion by outlining their holdings in both Jones
and B.B. and explaining why those holdings support the J.A.S. decision.1
53
154The court stated that section 794.05, the statute used to charge B.B., was
designed to protect minors from adults. 155 Because B.B. was a minor,
prosecuting B.B was not furthering the purpose of the legislation. 56 Though
both defendant and victim in J.A.S. were minors, the court found a
distinction between J.A.S. and B.B. in the fact that B.B. dealt with two
sixteen-year-olds, while J.A.S. dealt with two fifteen-year-olds (the
defendants) and two twelve-year-olds (the victims).1 57  This factual
distinction between the cases proved extremely important because the court
found that "twelve-year-old children are entitled to considerable protection
148. Id. at 1370.
149. Compare J.A.S. v. State, 705 So. 2d 1381, 1382 (Fla. 1998) with B.B. v. State,
659 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 1995).
150. B.B. v. State, 659 So. 2d 256, 259 (Fla. 1995).
151. J.A.S., 705 So. 2d at 1386.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1383-85.
154. FLA. STAT. § 794.05 (Supp. 1996).
155. J.A.S., 705 So. 2d at 1384.
156. Id. at 1385.
157. Id. at 1386.
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by the State, even when some of them resist its extension to them."'158 Of
course, one wonders if the court was suggesting that a sixteen-year-old was
not entitled to the same protection.
In B.B., the court explained that "[s]ection 794.05 is not being utilized
as a shield to protect a minor, but rather, it is being used as a weapon to
adjudicate a minor delinquent."'159 In J.A.S., the court summarily found that
"section 800.04 is being primarily utilized as a shield to protect the twelve-
year-old girls."'' The court offered no explanation for this distinction, yet
there is little doubt that the family of the sixteen-year-old female victim in
B.B. was equally confused by the court's failure to "shield" her from the
defendant, instead choosing to "shield" him from punishment.,
The court then reiterated that Jones, among other things, stood for the
proposition that minors should be protected from sexual exploitation, which
the court deemed to be a compelling state interest.162 It appears that one of
the similarities between J.A.S. and Jones rests in the notion of exploitation as
a compelling state interest. In Jones, the court was dealing with an adult-
minor situation, where the court found it easy to see the propensity for
sexual exploitation. 163 Similarly, the age disparity in J.A.S. seemingly led
the court to conclude that the state had a compelling interest. 16 Therefore, it
might be argued that the court reasoned if the minor victim was quite young
or if the age disparity was significant, the danger of sexual exploitation
would rise to a level that supported adjudicating the older minor delinquent.
This statement is supported by the court's conclusion that "whatever privacy
interest a fifteen-year-old minor has in carnal intercourse is clearly
outweighed by the State's interest in protecting twelve-year-old children
from harmful sexual conduct."'
165
The court also opined on several other issues raised by statutory rape
cases dealing with minors.166 The court made it clear that "minors under
sixteen have no unfettered right to engage in recreational intercourse with
others under sixteen."' 67 Further, T.W. gave the court the power to take steps
158. Id. at 1385.
159. B.B., 659 So. 2d at 260.
160. J.A.S., 705 So. 2d at 1386.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1384. "We noted that Jones implicated an adult-minor situation where 'the
crux of the State's interest ... [was] the prevention of exploitation of the minor by the adult."'
Id. (quoting B.B., 659 So. 2d at 259).
163. Jones, 640 So. 2d at 1086 (quoting Schmitt v. State, 590 So. 2d 404, 410 (Fla.
1991)).
164. J.A.S., 705 So. 2d at 1384.
165. Id. at 1386.
166. Id.
167. Id.
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necessary to prevent minors from participating or being lured into sexual
activity. M Also, the court reasoned that the vast amount of legislation
aimed at protecting minors from sexual exploitation supported the
conclusion that adjudicating a minor delinquent for statutory rape was
consistent with the intent of the legislature.
69
The court also found that punishment could be achieved through the
least intrusive means because of the "rehabilitative" nature of the juvenile
justice system. 17  Particularly, the court pointed to the fact that the
defendants in J.A.S. were not charged as adults and therefore could not be
sentenced to the possible "maximum fifteen-year prison sentence."'1' The
rationale that the defendants were not charged as adults begs the question
whether the court would have found differently if the defendants were
charged as adults.
As dictum, the court offered, "[i]f we blinded ourselves to the unique
facts of each case, we would render decisions in a vacuum with no thought
to the serious consequences of our decisions for the affected parties and
society in general."' This appears to be an attempt to reconcile the court's
arguably inconsistent holdings with respect to privacy rights of minors found
in T.W., Jones, B.B., and J.A.S. It is also likely that the court is illustrating
the difficulty they encounter when trying to fashion a workable and clear-cut
test to deal with statutory rape where the defendant and victim are both
minors and the activity was "consensual."
IV. CONCLUSION
Certain conclusions may safely be drawn from the somewhat confusing
line of cases cited above. Perhaps the safest conclusion can be drawn from
the court's hard-line stance with respect to adult-minor "consensual"
intercourse. It seems clear that the court will not recognize any privacy
right to "consensual" intercourse between an adult and minor because of the
overwhelming propensity for sexual exploitation of children. 73 Though less
clear, it might also be argued that the court is willing to adjudicate
delinquent minors who engage in "consensual" intercourse with young
children or where the age disparity is significant. The most confusing
question is whether the court is willing to allow a minor to be charged when
the age between the consenting minors is the same or very close.
168. Id. at 1386; see also T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1193 (holding "a minor's rights are not
absolute").
169. J.A.S., 705 So. at 1385.
170. Id. at 1386.
171. Id. at 1386-87 n.15.
172. Id. at 1387.
173. Jones v. State, 640 So. 2d 1084, 1086 (Fla. 1994).
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The failure on the part of the legislature to craft statutes that finally
determine these issues has forced the court to make difficult choices with
respect to a minor's right of privacy. The fear of endorsing behavior the
court clearly finds reprehensible, coupled with the court's need to decide
issues based upon constitutionality rather than moral beliefs, has left the
court in the difficult quandary of deciding between rights, morals, and
political views. These are not easy choices, especially because the court is
supposed to be apolitical, leaving its own political, moral, and religious
predilections behind when stepping onto the bench.
Regardless, the fact remains, the court is dealing with an intimately
sensitive subject that calls into question present day values and beliefs
concerning an individual's sexuality. At what age does one begin to
understand and comprehend the potential life long decisions arising from
sexual activity? Does the existence of deadly sexually transmitted diseases
such as AIDS allow more leeway for the court to restrict privacy rights to
protect younger people who might not have the capacity to understand the
ramifications of their actions? Having raised these questions, it seems
logical to ask whether these are questions the court should be answering. If
these questions, which go to the heart of an individual's personal autonomy,
should not be answered by a panel of judges, then it is the duty of Floridians,
who have already made a commitment to privacy rights, to force their
legislators to craft statutes that clearly address and reflect the sentiments of
people of the State of the Florida.
Gregory R. Beck
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I. INTRODUCTION
Florida's new law,1  which F roscribes the administration of
medroxyprogesterone acetate ("MPA") to sexual battery offenders, became
effective in October of 1997. More than one hundred, out of one hundred
and twenty members of the House of Representatives, voted for the law, with
virtually no debate.3 The lawmakers' vote was bold because, although other
states have similar statutes,4 none have been challenged.5  Therefore, the
constitutionality of a law that mandates MPA treatment is still in question.
As with any new and untraditional method of crime prevention or
rehabilitation, 6 constitutional challenges are expected. The list of challengeswill probably include equal protection,7 cruel and unusual punishment,8
1. FLA. STAT. § 794.0235 (1997).
2. See discussion infra Part IV.
3. Jeremy Wallace, Chemical Castration Bill Passes in House, BRADENTON HERALD,
Apr. 25, 1997, at LI (stating that 108 of 120 House of Representatives members voted for the
MPA statute).
4. CAL. PENAL CODE § 645 (West 1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-9-44.2 (1982); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 538 (West 1998); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-512 (1997).
5. Bryan Keene, Note, Chemical Castration: An Analysis of Florida's New
"Cutting-Edge" Policy Towards Sex Criminals, 49 FLA. L. REV. 803, 804 (1997) (discussing
MPA legislation).
6. See generally Kenneth B. Fromson, Note, Beyond an Eye for an Eye: Castration
as an Alternative Sentencing Measure, 11 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 311, 313-17 (1994)
(discussing case and legislative history of castration in the United States).
7. Whether or not MPA statutes violate the Equal Protection Clause is an issue
because, although a statute may be gender neutral, the drug affects men and women
differently. Recent Legislation, Constitutional Law-Due Process and Equal Protection-
California Becomes First State to Require Chemical Castration of Certain Sex Offenders-
Act of Sept. 17, 1996, ch. 596, 1996, Cal. Stat. 92 (to be Codified at Cal. Penal Code § 645),
110 HARV. L. REV. 799, 801-04 (1997) (arguing that California's hormonal control statute
violates the Equal Protection Clause because MPA sterilizes women).
8. See Edward A. Fitzgerald, Chemical Castration: MPA Treatment of the Sexual
Offender, 18 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 31 (1990) (explaining the history of the Eighth Amendment
and why MPA treatments are not cruel and unusual punishment); Larry Helm Spalding,
Florida's 1997 Chemical Castration Law: A Return to the Dark Ages, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
117, 130-31 (1998) (contending that hormonal control is cruel and unusual punishment); Jodi
Berlin, Note, Chemical Castration of Sex Offenders: "A Shot in the Arm" Towards
Rehabilitation, 19 WHrrrER L. REV. 169, 188-94, 212 (1997) (discussing the history and
legal tests for cruel and unusual punishment and explaining that MPA treatment is not cruel
and unusual punishment). MPA is not inherently cruel because the side effects are minimal
and reversible. Id. at 212. It "is proportional to the offense because it is" sentenced for the
same period of time as probation leaving "no arbitrary and excessive use" of MPA. Id. It is
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double jeopardy,9 due process, 0 First Amendment," and the right to
privacy. 2  Constitutional challenges were apparently anticipated, as
evidenced by the inclusion of a clause that protects the statute if part of it is
held invalid by providing that the parts that are not invalidated are still good
law.13
the least restrictive means of accomplishing "deterrence and rehabilitation" because physical
castration is more restrictive. Id.
9. Spalding, supra note 8, at 133-35 (arguing that the statute violates the Double
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment because a defendant's withdrawal from treatment
results in a violation of probation and a second-degree felony).
10. Due process requires that a condition of probation be reasonably related to the
crime that the defendant was convicted of, the prevention of future criminality, or public
safety. Id. at 131-32 (urging that MPA statute fails the reasonable relationship test required
of all probation conditions). "[W]ith regard to non-paraphiliacs and involuntarily-treated
paraphiliacs" MPA is not reasonably related to the goals of the statute because incarceration is
a "more narrowly tailored means" of accomplishing the state interest of protecting its citizens.
Id. at 132. The statute indiscriminately mandates MPA, and the statute does not "necessarily
prevent future criminality" because it does not address violent tendencies unrelated to sexual
drive. Id. at 132-33. This analysis is incomplete because it does not incorporate the
"medically appropriate" requirement, which will presumably ensure that MPA sentenced
defendants are likely to experience a decreased likelihood of re-offense when treated. See
discussion infra Parts III.B, IV.B.
11. Mandatory MPA treatments implicate the issue of whether an individual's First
Amendment right to mental autonomy is violated because MPA decreases sexual fantasies in
its recipients. Fitzgerald, supra note 8, at 26-31 (discussing the right to mental autonomy and
its relation to statutes that proscribe administration of a drug that decreases sexual thoughts).
Whether a statute interferes with the mental autonomy guaranteed by the First Amendment
depends on the degree of the intrusion. Id. Administration of MPA is not so intrusive so as to
violate the First Amendment. Id. at 28 (detailing an analysis of MPA treatment and the test
for determining whether an intrusion violates the First Amendment right to mental autonomy).
See also Berlin, supra note 8, at 186-88, 210-12 (concluding that First Amendment rights are
not violated); G.L. Stelzer, Note, Chemical Castration and the Right to Generate Ideas: Does
the First Amendment Protect the Fantasies of Convicted Pedophiles?, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1675,
1704-09 (1997) (proposing that a new test is needed to determine whether MPA statutes
violate the First Amendment).
12. Spalding, supra note 8, at 128-30 (arguing that the statute violates the federal
right to privacy); Keene, supra, note 5, at 813-17 (arguing that the statute violates the right to
privacy in the Florida Constitution).
13. Ch. 97-184, § 2, 1997 Fla. Laws 3455, 3457 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 794.0235
(1997)). Section two of Chapter 97-184 of the Laws of Florida reads as follows:
If any provision of this act or the application thereof to any person or
circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity shall not affect other provisions or
applications of the act which can be given effect without the invalid provision
or application, and to this end the provisions of this act are declared
severable.
1998]
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The department of corrections anticipates that no more than three
persons will be eligible for the MPA treatment within the next year.14 This
is probably because not all defendants are medically appropriate for the
treatment.15  Additionally, prison officials do not anticipate the first
6treatments to begin for years. Defendants sentenced to MPA treatment are
not eligible to receive it until approximately one week before the expiration
of the their prison sentences. 17 It is possible that, by the time the Florida
Statute is challenged, there will be a United States Supreme Court opinion
addressing a similar statute on a federal right to privacy challenge.' 8 Florida
courts could then use such an opinion as a guide. In the meantime, however,
this is uncharted territory deserving of a constitutional debate.
This article analyzes the new hormonal control statute's validity under
Article I, section 23 of the Florida Constitution, Florida's right to privacy,
and offers non-frivolous arguments for the application and extension of
existing law in advancing the proposition that the statute is constitutional.
Part II explains why the treatment should not be referred to as chemical
castration. Part Il provides an overview of the statute. Part IV describes the
MPA drug and explains how it decreases recidivism. Part V discusses the
federal right to privacy, and Part VI explains Florida's constitutional right to
privacy while proposing arguments for its constitutionality.
I1. "CONTROL" NOT "CASTRATION"
The administration of medroxyprogesterone acetate is properly phrased
"hormonal control" not "chemical castration." The word "castrate" suggests
removal of all sexual function. It is of paramount importance to understand
that MPA does not castrate, but rather controls and decreases the level of
testosterone in the brain, thereby causing the recipient to experience a
diminished sex drive. 19
Id.
14. Drug Castrations May be Years Away, ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 2, 1997, at C6.
15. See discussion infra Parts III.B, IV.B.
16. Castration Legal, but Not Practiced-Yet, BRADENTON HERALD, June 2, 1997, at
L3.
17. FLA. STAT. § 794.0235(2)(b) (1997) (stating that MPA injections "shall
commence not later than one week prior to the defendant's release from prison or other
institution.").
18. See Wallace, supra note 3.
19. See discussion infra Part IV.
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A common myth of MPA treatment is that it causes impotence. 20
Although the frequency of spontaneous erections may decrease, MPA
recipients are still able to achieve an erection,22 have sex, and father
children. 24 The phrase "chemical castration" encourages the myth that MPA
prevents its recipients from committing a sexual offense by imposing
impotence.
The word "castration" conjures up images of medieval ceremonies
involving bloody torture tools.2 A medication that controls hormone levels
bears no relation to such torture. Yet, those torturous images cannot be
separated from the word "castration." Opponents of MPA, while cleverly
using it to create emotional dishevel, correctly define "castration" as "to
deprive of the testes," but fail to establish how decreasing sexual fantasy by
controlling levels of testosterone fits that definition.26 The statute does not
mention the phrase "chemical castration," and that phrase should not be used
in its description.27 The use of the phrase is prejudicial because it causes
emotional uncertainty, and is inaccurate because it does not properly
describe MPA treatment. Further, the use of the phrase is unnecessary
because the procedure can be called "hormonal control" in order to eliminate
this prejudice.
Conceivably, either "hormonal control therapy" or "hormonal control"
more accurately and less prejudicially describes the treatment. The role of
MPA in treating or "controlling" sexual offenders is to lower sexual libido
and the likelihood of a repeat offense by controlling the body's ability to
produce and process testosterone. 2S If physical sexual dysfunction, which
does not occur in all recipients, appears as a side effect, adjusting the
20. Fitzgerald, supra note 8, at 7.
21. Id. at7.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Daniel L. Icenogle, Sentencing Male Sex Offenders to the Use of Biological
Treatments, 15 . LEGAL MED. 279, 285 (1994).
25. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 404 (1910) (explaining that the cruel
and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment was "intended to prohibit the
barbarities of... castration").
26. Keene, supra note 5, at 803 (quoting WEBsTmR's THIRD N w INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 349 (1993)).
27. See FLA. STAT. § 794.0235 (1997).
28. See discussion infra Part IV.
29. See discussion infra Part IV.
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dosage can reverse it.30 Clearly, "hormonal control" is the correct way to
describe MPA treatment.
III. THE HORMONAL CONTROL STATUTE
A. The MPA Sentence
Section 794.0235 of the Florida Statutes alters sentencing guidelines
for sexual battery defendants to include weekly injections of
medroxyprogesterone acetate. 31 The injections are in addition to, not instead
of, any prison sentence incurred by the same offense.32 Depending on the
particular defendant's past criminal history, the judge "may" or "shall"
33
sentence the defendant to undergo the treatment after release from prison.
For first-time sexual battery offenders, the judge has discretionary power to
impose the injections.34 If the offender, however, has a prior sexual battery
conviction, MPA treatment is mandatory. 35 In either case, when the judge is
determining the duration of the treatment, he or she can specify a specific
number of years or has discretion to order the treatment to continue for the
life of the defendant.
36
B. The Medical Expert and Medically Appropriate Requirement
Judges do not retain complete autonomy in sentencing offenders to
hormonal control. The requirement that a medical expert must determine the
defendant to be an appropriate candidate for the MPA treatment significantly
reduces the judge's power to impose the sentence.37  Any defendant
sentenced to MPA must be a medically appropriate candidate at the start of
the treatment and throughout the course of the injections. 38 In other words, a
defendant must be a medically appropriate candidate at all times to be
eligible for MPA.39 Unfortunately, the lawmakers did not define "medically
30. Berlin, supra note 8, at 181 (citing AMERICAN HOSPITAL FORMULARY SERVICE, 96
DRUG INFORMATION 2333, 2333 (Gerald K. McEvoy ed., 1996)).
31. FLA. STAT. § 794.0235 (1997).
32. Id. § 794.0235(1)0,).
33. Id. § 794.0235(1)(a)(b).
34. Id. § 794.0235(1)(a).
35. Id. § 794.0235(1)(b).
36. FLA. STAT. § 794.0235(2)(a) (1997).
37. Id.
38. Id. § 794.0235(2)(a), (3).
39. Id. § 794.0235(3).
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appropriate."''4 The logical interpretation is that a defendant is a medically
appropriate candidate if the medical expert determines that MPA will
produce the desired effect if administered. The desired effect is a decrease
in the recipient's sexual libido.41 This interpretation would exclude women
completely because MPA is a widely used female contraceptive and does not
significantly affect a woman's libido.42
C. The Alternatives
The statute permits defendants to refuse the treatment by allowing two
alternatives.43 First, a defendant may submit a motion to the court for
physical castration instead of hormonal control. 44 This motion gives the
judge the power to levy a physical castration sentence in lieu of the MPA.45
46The second option is to simply refuse hormonal control and stay in jail.
Refusal by a sentenced offender to undergo treatment is a second-degree
felony.47 This option to refuse treatment remains available throughout the
course of treatment, and the defendant may at any time choose to discontinue
the hormone control therapy and return to prison.
The Department of Corrections provides the services needed to49
administer the treatment to the defendant. The weekly injections begin one
week prior to the defendant's release from prison, and continue through the
duration of the term specified by the sentencing judge.:° It is estimated that
the treatments will cost the Department of Corrections $2000 per year for
each defendant, plus any incidental costs of staffing and additional
facilities.
5 1
40. Id.
41. See discussion infra Part IV.
42. Recent Legislation, supra note 7, at 800.
43. FLA. STAT. § 794.0235(2)(a), (5) (1997).
44. Id. § 794.0235(1)(b).
45. Id.
46. Id. § 794.0235(5).
47. Id.
48. See FLA. STAT. § 794.0235 (1997).
49. Id. § 794.0235(3).
50. Id. § 794.0235(2)(a).
51. Drug Castrations May Be Years Away, supra note 14.
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IV. MEDROXYPROGESTERONE ACETATE
A. MPA Therapy Generally
Proper analysis of the hormonal control statute requires an
understanding of what MPA is, on whom it will work, how it works, and
how it affects its recipient. When analyzing a statute calling for mandatory
medical treatment, issues such as effectiveness and adverse side effects are
important to determine whether the treatment is the least intrusive means of
accomplishing the statute's goal.52  For example, if the drug does not
accomplish the desired effects, it fails the least intrusive method requirement
because the least intrusive means of achieving nothing is nothing.
Accordingly, if a drug capable of achieving the desired results on certain
individuals is mandated for individuals not within that class, the drug, in
effect, does nothing, and is not the least intrusive means of producing that
result. In essence, if the drug does not accomplish the purported goal of the
law, it is not necessarily related to the state interest involved. Understanding
possible and probable side effects is required to fully anticipate the degree to
which administration of a drug will infringe on a person's private life and
make a decision as to whether other methods are less invasive in
accomplishing the government's goal.
MPA, more commonly known as Depo-Provera, a non experimental53
synthetic hormone, is the most commonly used hormonal control drug.
54
When administered to males intravenously on a weekly basis, it decreases
uncontrollable sexual libidos by controlling testosterone levels. 55  MPA
alleviates the amount of testosterone in the body by increasing testosterone
metabolism in the liver and reducing the amount of testosterone produced by
56the testes . This induces a tranquilizing effect on the brain, relieving the
recipient of his unmanageable sexual impulses by decreasing the frequency
of sexual fantasies.57
52. See discussion infra Parts VI.C.4, IV.D.4.
53. Fitzgerald, supra note 8, at 6.
54. Icenogle, supra note 24, at 284.
55. Id. at 284.
56. Stelzer, supra note 11, at 1683-84. See generally Icenogle, supra note 24, at
283-84 (explaining the "physiology of male sex hormones").
57. Stelzer, supra note 11, at 1684.
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B. The Paraphiliac
Research shows that MPA reduces recidivism for sexual offenders
suffering from a paraphiliac disorder.5 8 Paraphiliacs exhibit "a pattern of
sexual arousal, erection and ejaculation," commonly formalized by a
"specific fantasy or its actualization." 59  This means that the individual
achieves sexual excitement from a particular fantasy or by acting out that
fantasy in real life. 60 For example, a pedophile with a paraphiliac disorder
would become sexually aroused by a fantasy involving sexual relations with
a child or by actually having sexual relations with a child.61
When attempting to diagnose a paraphiliac disorder, a doctor typically
relies on whether "persistent fantasies about some type of deviant sex" are
present.62 If these fantasies are not satisfied, the individual experiences
"intense cravings" which, if left unfulfilled, will cause the individual to
suffer "negative feelings."'63 In other words, paraphiliacs have a fantasy
about some type of non conventional, possibly illegal, sexual act.' The
fantasy is beyond the individual's control, in so far as he cannot change it or
prevent himself from having it.65 If the individual fails to act out the fantasy
in real life, he suffers some degree of mental anguish.66 If the pedophile
from the earlier example resisted the urge to have sexual relations with a
child, as dictated by his fantasy, he would suffer "intense cravings" to fulfill
the fantasy, which would ultimately cause him mental suffering.
67
The paraphiliac's past probably includes "manifested stereotyped
sexual activity because satisfaction of these cravings requires precise
recreation of the fantasy."68 This means that, at some point, the individual
has probably acted out his exact fantasy in real life because the cravings
suffered as a result of the fantasies can only be satisfied if the fantasy is
58. Icenogle, supra note 24, at 285 (discussing research conducted by the Johns
Hopkins Sexual Disorders Clinic).
59. Fitzgerald, supra note 8, at 4.
60. Id.
61. See id.
62. Icenogle, supra note 24, at 281 (citing Berlin & Meincke, Treatment of Sex
Offenders with Antiandrogenic Medication: Conceptualization, Review of Treatment
Modalities and Preliminary Findings, 138 AM. J. PsYcHIATRY 601, 601 (1981)).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. See Icenogle, supra note 24, at 281.
68. Id.
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69precisely recreated. In terms of the pedophile example, only a child partner
can fulfill the urges imposed by the fantasy of having sexual relations with a
child.70 An adult partner would prevent precise recreation of the fantasy and
would not temper the unmanageable "intense cravings." 71 The fantasies and
the corresponding behavior remain for an indefinite period and tend to stay
72the same over time. In terms of paraphiliacs experiencing an illegal
fantasy, this is bad news because it makes them extremely likely to commit
the crime in the same manner yet again.
73
In the case of a paraphiliac, his fantasy is his enemy because his fantasy
is the catalyst that causes him to engage in the fantasized sexual activity,
which might be illegal.74 Denied of his fantasy, he would have "intense
cravings," requiring real life actualization of the sexual acts depicted in the
fantasy and his future would be less likely to include "manifested
stereotyped sexual activity. 75 MPA denies the fantasy.76 By decreasing the
amount of testosterone in the body, MPA sedates the brain and interrupts
sexual fantasies, including those perpetuating the cravings for illegal sex,
causing the sex drive and accompanying cravings to decrease.77  This
increases the offenders ability to control otherwise uncontrollable sexual
impulses.78
Because not all sexual offenders are paraphiliacs,79 the hormonal
control statute accounts for this discrepancy in effectiveness by allowing
administration of the drug to only those defendants deemed medically
appropriate for treatment by a medical expert. 8 The inclusion of such a
requirement ensures that defendants are not indiscriminately sentenced to
MPA treatment.8'
69. Id.
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. Icenogle, supra note 24, at 281.
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See id.; see also Stelzer, supra note 11, at 1684.
77. Stelzer, supra note 11, at 1684.
78. Id.
79. Fitzgerald, supra note 8, at 4-5 (discussing the types of sexual offenders).
80. FLA. STAT. § 794.0235(2)(a) (1997). See discussion supra Part III.B. (proposing
that "medically appropriate" requires that the defendant be the type of person that would be
less likely to committ the crime again if administered MPA).
81. See discussion supra Part III.B.
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C. Side Effects
Some recipients report side effects including "weight gain, mild
lethargy, cold sweats, hot flashes, nightmares, hypertension, elevated blood
sugar, shortness of breath, and lessened testis size. 82 Recipients rarely
suffer anything but minimal side effects. 83 The list of side effects may seem
extensive, but it is important to note that whenever a drug is used for a new
or different objective, all of its potential side effects, no matter how remote,
must be documented and registered. 4
MPA does not cause an inability to achieve erection or ejaculation. 5
Although the body's ability to experience spontaneous erections and
ejaculations does decrease, recipients of the treatment do retain the physical
and mental ability necessary to engage in sexual activity when stimulated by
a partner.86 In fact, MPA recipients concede that the treatment minimally
affects consensual sexual activity. Furthermore, men have fathered
88
children while undergoing MPA treatment. Hypothetically, adverse effects
on one's sex drive can be adjusted by changing the MPA dosage.8 9 In any
case, effects of the drug cease upon discontinuation of treatment. 90
V. FEDERAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY
A. The Implied Right to Privacy
Although the "Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of
privacy,"91 the right to privacy implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution has been interpreted by the United States
Supreme Court to protect areas such as contraception 92 and abortion.93 The
82. Icenogle, supra note 24, at 285. See generally Fitzgerald, supra note 8, at 7
(discussing additional "possible" side effects).
83. Fitzgerald, supra note 8, at 7.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Icenogle, supra note 24, at 285.
89. Fitzgerald, supra note 8, at 7.
90. Icenogle, supra note 24, at 285.
91. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (discussing the history of the implied
right to privacy).
92. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (invalidating a statute that
forbade contraceptive use because it infringed upon the right of marital privacy).
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Supreme Court has never held that hormonal control of sexual offenders is
unconstitutional. 94 However, the right to privacy granted by the United
States Constitution is not at issue here. The right to privacy contained in
Florida's Constitution is broader and provides more comprehensive
protection against governmental intrusion than its federal counterpart.
95
B Supreme Court Treatment of Biological Alteration
It is important to examine how the United States Supreme Court has
treated biological alteration in the past, so that a foundation can be laid for
litigation in the future. 96 In Jacobson v. Massachusetts,97 the Court upheld a
criminal sentence imposed for refusing to submit to a smallpox
vaccination. 98 The Court, in Buck v. Bell,99 upheld a law as constitutional
which called for involuntary sterilization of mental defectives for the welfare
of society.1°  In Skinner v. Oklahoma,'01 the Court invalidated a law
mandating sterilization of defendants convicted of two felonies without
addressing the biological alteration issue on the grounds that the law violated
102the Equal Protection Clause by not including white collar crimes. The
Washington v. Harper103 decision upheld forcible administration of
antipsychotic drugs that alter the chemistry of the brain' °4
It is clear that, under certain circumstances, what might be
unconstitutional if applied to the general public may be constitutional with
respect to certain groups of individuals when their special circumstances call
for special treatment. The Court in Buck articulated this thought by
providing that its ruling was "confined to the small number who are in the
93. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53 (invalidating a state law permitting abortion only to save
a mother's life).
94. Recent Legislation, supra note 7, at 799.
95. See, e.g., Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, Dep't of Bus.
Regulation, 477 So. 2d 544, 548 (Fla. 1985).
96. See generally Sheldon Gelman, The Biological Alteration Cases, 36 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 1203, 1204-15 (1995) (analyzing Supreme Court decisions regarding
biological alteration).
97. 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
98. Id. at 31.
99. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
100. Id. at 207.
101. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
102. Id. at 538.
103. 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
104. Id. at 227.
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institutions named" and did not apply "to the multitudes outside."'10 5 The
Supreme Court's treatment of cases involving the invasion of bodily
autonomy reveal that a state's compelling interest in mandating a particular
procedure can override an individual's right to maintain complete control
over his or her body.
VI. FLORIDA'S RIGHT OF PRIVACY
A. Article I, Section 23 of the Florida Constitution
In 1980, Florida amended its constitution to include a statute providing
an explicit right to privacy ensuring that "[e]very natural person has the right
to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into his private life."'1 6
Section 23 of the Florida Constitution is broader and encompasses
protection of a greater number of privacy interests than the implied right to
privacy in the United States Constitution.
0 7
B. Statutory Construction of the Right to Privacy
The Supreme Court of Florida, in Traylor v. State,'°s held that Florida
courts should look first to the text of the Florida Constitution to determine
the nature and scope of personal rights of Florida residents.' 9  The
lawmakers struck the words "unwarranted" and "unreasonable" from the
preceding phrase "governmental intrusion" in order to make the Florida
Constitution sweep more broadly." 0 The "phrase 'right to be let alone' from
government intrusion" was intentionally chosen to distinguish "Florida's
broad privacy right from the limited federal right.""' This is clear evidence
that the lawmakers and the citizens who voted for the statute intended it to
105. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
106. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23.
107. See, e.g., Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, Dep't of Bus.
Regulation, 477 So. 2d 544,548 (Fla. 1985).
108. 596 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1992).
109. Id. at 962.
110. See, e.g., Winfield, 477 So. 2d at 548.
111. Mozo v. State, 632 So. 2d 623, 632 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994). The federal
right to privacy was significantly narrowed by the Supreme Court in Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347 (1967), when the Court announced that "protection of a person's general right
to privacy.., is... left largely to the law of the individual States." Id. at 350-51. (refusing to
allow federal right to privacy protection for government's listing and recording an individual's
telephone conversation at a public pay phone).
19981
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provide more comprehensive protection from government interference than
that which the national constitution provides.!
2
C. The Right to Privacy Test
Florida's privacy amendment does not explicitly provide a standard for
reviewing a governmental intrusion into an individual's private life.' 3 In
Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, Department of Business
Regulation, 14 the Supreme Court of Florida articulated the accepted test for
Florida's right to privacy challenges." 5 The test can be broken down into
four simple parts. 1 6  First, the challenger must have had a legitimate
expectation of privacy. 117 Second, if a legitimate expectation of privacy
exists, the individual is found to have a fundamental right." 8 Third, since a
fundamental right is at issue, the state must show that it has a compelling
interest to warrant the abridgement of the individual's privacy. 19 Last, the
state must prove that it is utilizing the least intrusive method available to
accomplish its goal.' 2° Florida's right to privacy provides comprehensive
protection from governmental intrusion, but it does not act as an unwavering
warrantee against all intrusion into an individual's private life.121
Defendants may claim protection under Article I, section 23 of the
Florida Constitution because, although some constitutional rights of
prisoners are abridged or alienated completely during incarceration, the right
to privacy guaranteed by the Florida Constitution remains intact.12  Since
the right to privacy protects those to whom the hormonal control statute
applies, the statute must pass muster under the Florida Constitution.
112. See e.g., Mozo, 632 So. 2d at 633.
113. Id.
114. 477 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 1985).
115. Id. at 547. See also, Jon Mills, Sex, Lies, and Genetic Testing: What Are Your
Rights to Privacy in Florida? 48 FLA. L. REv. 813, 823-24 (1996) (discussing the "legal test"
for Florida's right to privacy).
116. Mills, supra note 115, at 823-24.
117. Id. at 823.
118. Id. at 824.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. North Miami v. Kurtz, 653 So. 2d 1025, 1027 (Fla. 1995).
122. Singletary v. Costello, 665 So. 2d. 1099, 1105 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
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1. Legitimate Expectation of Privacy
Florida courts use a "legitimate" expectation of privacy test to
determine the interests protected by Florida's constitutional right to
privacy. 23  The courts have held that the words "unreasonable" and
"unwarranted" are reminiscent of the narrower federal expectation of
privacy test. 124 The federal test provides protection of an individual's
expectation of privacy only if society recognizes it as reasonable to do so.
25
Florida's right to privacy deliberately omitted the words "unreasonable" and
"unwarranted."' 26 This omission "makes it clear that the Florida right of
privacy was intended to protect an individual's expectation of privacy
regardless of whether society recognizes that expectation as reasonable."'127
This is consistent with the fact that the lawmakers intended Florida's right to
privacy to provide broader protection against governmental intrusion than its
federal counterpart. 2
The test for determining whether an individual has an expectation of
privacy is easily broken down into three parts: 1)the individual must have a
subjective expectation of privacy;129 2) the expectation must not be spurious
or false; 30 and 3) the expectation must not conflict with society's values.13 1
First, the existence and scope of an individual's subjective expectation of
privacy as determined by consideration of all of the circumstances must be
established by placing emphasis on the "objective manifestations of that
123. Mozo v. State, 632 So. 2d 623, 633 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (providing an
excellent description and explanation for the legitimate expectation of privacy test).
124. Id. The federal expectation of privacy test was articulated by the Supreme Court in
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) to determine whether an individual qualified for
Fourth Amendment protection against having his telephone conversations at a public phone
booth listened to and recorded. Id. at 361. That case developed a two-prong test for
determining an individual's expectation of privacy. Id. at 361. The person must have an
"actual (subjective) expectation of privacy," and the expectation must be such that society is
willing to accept it as being reasonable. Id. (internal quotations omitted). The test turns on
"whether the defendant was reasonable in his belief of privacy," while the legitimate
expectation of privacy test recognizes an individual's expectation of privacy even if it is not
reasonable. Mozo, 632 So. 2d at 633-34.
125. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361; see also Mozo, 632 So. 2d at 633-34 (distinguishing the
federal and Florida expectation of privacy tests).
126. See, e.g., Mozo, 632 So. 2d at 634.
127. Id. at 633-34.
128. See, e.g., In reT.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1192 (Fla. 1989).
129. See infra note 132 and accompanying text.
130. See infra note 133 and accompanying text.
131. See infra note 137 and accompanying text.
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expectation."'132  Defendants do not manifest an expectation that future
sexual fantasies will be within the protected zone of privacy because they
implicitly invited the state to intrude into such activity by committing sexual
battery. Knowledge that the commission of a crime gives rise to a
governmental -duty to punish and prevent the crime involved should be
imputed. The state needs to intrude into a defendant's sex life to prevent an
offense from occurring again, because sex is the offender's weapon of
choice. Defendants constructively forfeit an expectation of privacy with
respect to sexual activity when they commit a sexual battery, knowing that
criminal activity mandates governmental intrusion to the extent that it is
necessary to punish and prevent future offenses.
Next, the expectation of privacy must not be "spurious" or "false."' 33 A
sexual battery offender's claim of an expectation of privacy for sexual
fantasies is "spurious" and "false" because, while perpetrating a sexual
offense, sexual offenders are aware of the government's duty to prevent him
from doing it again. 134 In addition, he is cognizant of the fact that this duty
necessitates an intrusion by the government into an offender's sexual
fantasy, a component of an individual's private life, when that component is
prompting the illegal activity.135 The government is seeking to intrude upon
the sexual fantasies of offenders whose fantasies cause them to commit
sexual offenses. The offenders' awareness that the government's duty
reasonably warrants such an intrusion negates the truth of subsequent claims
of privacy over the sexual fantasies that prompted him to perpetrate the
sexual battery, making any such claims "spurious" and "false." 3
Finally, these expectations must then be placed "in the context of a
society and the values that the society seeks to foster" because each person is
not an "island of self-determination."'' 37 Society seeks to discourage sexual
offenders from committing sexual batteries. Society does not support
132. North Miami v. Kurtz, 653 So. 2d 1025, 1028 (Fla. 1995) (citing Stall v. State,
570 So. 2d 257, 260 (Fla. 1990) (holding that a legitimate expectation of privacy does not
exist for visiting retail establishments selling obscene materials)) (finding that job applicant
did not have legitimate expectation of privacy against the City's requiring her to reveal
whether or not she smoked, because smokers disclose whether they smoke on a regular basis).
133. Shaktman v. State, 553 So. 2d 148, 153 (Fla. 1989) (Ehrlich, J., concurring
specially).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See id.
137. State v. Conforti, 688 So. 2d 350, 359 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (finding that
erotic dancers did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy while performing lewd acts in
front of a paying customer at a publicly patronized location).
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releasing a paraphilic sexual offender from prison without additional
safeguards because it is probable that he will commit another sexual battery
upon an innocent person. A sexual offender's expectation of privacy for
sexual activity and fantasies after incarceration is not legitimate with respect
to the values that society seeks to support. If the court finds that a legitimate
expectation does exist, that interest is presumptively protected from
governmental intrusion, 38 and the right to privacy is invoked. 39
The privacy issue is best stated as whether an offender retains a
legitimate expectation of privacy for sexual fantasies after being released
from prison, not whether the defendant enjoys an expectation of privacy for
future sexual batteries. The latter is not at issue because it has been held that
there is no legitimate expectation of privacy while committing a sex crime.14°
A sexual battery defendant's subjective expectation of privacy towards his
future sexual activity is limited. Whenever the state attempts to punish or
rehabilitate, a defendant impliedly loses some of the privacy he or she
enjoys.
In Fosman v. State,'4' the Fourth District Court of Appeal limited a
defendant's expectation of privacy by allowing the state's invasion into a
situation derived from his alleged sexual battery.' 42 The court held that a
defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy interest in
refusing to take a blood test in order to inform the victim of the defendant's
mHV status. 143 This case demonstrated that a criminal act might forfeit the
legitimacy of the expectation of privacy not only during the criminal act but
also in subsequent circumstances stemming from the criminal act. 44 The
defendant's HIV status had no relevance to his guilt or innocence. 45 His act
138. Mozo v. State, 632 So. 2d 623, 634 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that
private conversations over a cordless telephone are "presumptively protected" from
government intrusion because it is not "spurious or false" for a person to expect that the
government will not, "without cause or suspicion," listen and record telephone conversations).
139. See, e.g., Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, Dep't of Bus.
Regulation, 477 So. 2d 544, 547 (Fla. 1985).
140. Shapiro v. State, 696 So. 2d 1321, 1326 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (finding no
legitimate expectation of privacy for a therapist's unlawful sexual activity with a patient).
141. 664 So. 2d 1163 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App 1995).
142. Id. at 1166.
143. Id. (reasoning that "where there is probable cause to believe that a person has
committed sexual battery and transmitted bodily fluids to the victim" the defendant does not
have a privacy interest in refusing a HIV test when the results of the test will be "disclosed
only to the victim and to public health authorities" because he does not have a legitimate
expectation of privacy).
144. See id.
145. See id.
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of sexual battery warranted special circumstances rendering him incapable of
maintaining the required expectation of privacy.
46
Thus, by committing a sexual battery, a defendant implicitly extends an
invitation to the state to prevent future sexual batteries by intruding on his
sexual fantasies when those fantasies prompt the illegal sexual activity. That
invitation precludes defendants from having a legitimate expectation of
privacy with respect to sexual fantasies. If the defendant does not have a
legitimate expectation of privacy with respect to his sexual fantasies, then
the right to privacy does not apply to the hormonal control statute.
2. Fundamental Right
If a court finds that an individual's legitimate expectation of privacy
exists, a fundamental right to protect that privacy interest also exists." A
fundamental right qualifies for strict scrutiny, requiring the state to prove
that the law is necessarily related to a compelling state interest. 48 Assuming
that the defendant has a legitimate expectation of privacy in sexual fantasies,
a fundamental right to protect that interest exists. This right can only be
infringed upon by the least intrusive method to achieve a compelling state
interest. 149
3. Compelling Interest
Florida courts have approached the compelling interest issue differently
depending on whether the government was intruding on private information
or private decisions. 5 When the state seeks to discover private information,
the courts have balanced the individual's right to privacy against the state's
compelling interest. 51 However, when a private decision is being infringed
146. See Fosman, 664 So. 2d at 1166.
147. Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, Dep't of Bus. Regulation, 477 So.
2d 544, 547 (Fla. 1985).
148. Id. at 547.
149. Id. The test employed "shifts the burden of proof to the state to justify an intrusion
on privacy." Id. The burden is met when the state establishes that "the challenged regulation
serves a compelling state interest and accomplishes its goal through the use of the least
intrusive means." Id.
150. Mills, supra note 115, at 825.
151. Id. (citing Florida v. Rolling, 22 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2264, 5 (Fla. 8th Cir. Ct.,
July 27, 1994) (holding the public's "right to information" is paramount to an individuals
interest in preventing the release of crime scene photos after balancing the public's right
against the victim's families right to privacy)).
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upon, the court applies the traditional strict scrutiny test, which requires the
state to demonstrate that the law is necessarily related to a compelling state
interest.152 Administration of MPA deals with a private decision, not private
information, because the state is not seeking to compel disclosure of
anything from the defendant. 53  Since the statute infringes on a private
decision, the traditional strict scrutiny analysis, as opposed to the balancing
test, is appropriate. Although Florida courts have developed a different way
of articulating this test by stating that the state must demonstrate that the law
"serves a compelling state interest and accomplishes its goal through the use
of the least intrusive means,"'1-4 this test is the same as traditional strict
scrutiny, requiring that the law be necessarily related to a compelling
government interest. 55
The state has a compelling interest in protecting its citizens. 56 The
legislators who wrote and passed the law intended it to be both a deterrent
and a rehabilitative tool. 57  Thus, the purpose of the law is to protect
innocent third parties from being the victims of sexual batteries.
4. Least Intrusive Method
After the state establishes that the statute serves a compelling interest in
protecting innocent third parties, it must establish that chemical castration is
the least intrusive method for accomplishing that goal. 58 The hormonal
control statute seeks to prevent sexual crimes against its citizens. It purports
to accomplish this through hormonal control. Although hormonal control
may not be an effective treatment for all defendants because the law does not
152. Id. (citing Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So. 2d 1271, 1273 (Fla. 1996) (deciding whether
grandparent visitation could be granted over a parent's objections)).
153. Id.
154. Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, Dep't of Bus. Regulation, 477 So.
2d 544, 547 (Fla. 1985).
155. See id. at 547 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (fundamental rights
may only be limited by a regulation that is narrowly drawn to accomplish a compelling state
interest)).
156. In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 14 (Fla. 1990).
157. Mark Silva, Chemical Castration Approved, MIAMI HERALD, May 3, 1997, at 6B
(quoting Senator Al Gutman, Senate Criminal Justice Committee Chairman, as saying that
MPA treatment "will assist those who can not assist themselves because of high
testosterone"); Jeremy Wallace, Chemical Castration Bill Becomes Law on Oct. 1,
BRADENTON HERALD, May 31, 1997, at L1 (stating that Representative Mark Ogles, co-author
of the law, said "the new law will be a deterrent for many would-be sex offenders").
158. Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, Dep't of Bus. Regulation, 477 So.
2d 544,547 (Fla. 1985).
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apply to all defendants. 159  The law only applies to defendants when a
medical expert determines them to be medically appropriate for MPA
treatment. 160 Medically appropriate is taken to mean that MPA treatment
will produce the desired effect of decrease in sexual libido, 161 which will by
implication lower the probability that the defendant will commit another
sexual battery.
Hormonal control is the least intrusive method of preventing medically
appropriate defendants from committing future sexual batteries against
innocent third parties. Those deemed medically appropriate will experience
a decrease in libido resulting in a decreased chance of recidivism by the
defendant, which will ultimately cause a decrease in sexual crime against
citizens of the state. No other treatment prevents future sexual batteries and
allows the defendant all the other liberties of living a free life. The only
other alternative is incarceration, which is more intrusive than MPA because
it involves a forfeiture of physical liberty.
D. Florida's Right to Refuse Medical Treatment
Unlike the federal constitutional right to refuse medical treatment,
which is in the Due Process Clause, 162 the Supreme Court of Florida found
the right to refuse medical treatment guaranteed by Florida's Constitution.1
63
A defendant retains this right during and after incarceration.164 The right to
refuse medical treatment is not dependent on a determination of a "medical
procedure as major or minor, ordinary or extraordinary, life-prolonging, life-
maintaining, life-sustaining, or otherwise."'' 65 Thus, under this definition,
the administration of MPA falls within this right regardless of the fact that it
is a minor and safe therapy.
159. See supra Part III.B.
160. FLA. STAT. § 794.0235(2)(a) (1997). The hormonal control statute only applies to
those defendants that are "appropriate candidate[s] for treatment." Id.
161. See supra Part III.B.
162. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 262 (1990).
163. In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 10 (Fla. 1990).
164. Singletary v. Costello, 665 So. 2d 1099, 1105 (Fla. 1996) (finding that a prisoner
had the right to refuse food and water while incarcerated).
165. Id. at 1104 (quoting In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 12 (Fla.
1990)).
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1. Consent
A defendant "may not forcibly [be] given medical treatment without
express or implied consent." 166  Under the hormonal control statute, a
defendant is never forcibly injected with MPA without consent. 167  The
defendant may expressly consent to the treatment, but it is more probable
that the defendant will protest its administration. However, by accepting
probation, when hormonal control is a condition of probation, he will
168impliedly consent to the treatment. Consent is also implied when
defendants appear for and submit to weekly MPA injections. Any protest to
administration should be irrelevant so long as the defendant's outward
manifestations of agreeing to the probation and appearing for the injections
are present. All defendants retain the right, at all times, to refuse this
medical treatment and opt for incarceration or physical castration. 169 Anydefendant may refuse MPA treatment, at any time.
2. "Voluntary" Consent
Opponents of the statute argue that consent can not be voluntary
because refusal to consent results in a second-degree felony.17  There is no
reason to think that any defendant will be forced or coerced to accept
probation. Moreover, it is unlikely that the department of corrections is
going to hold defendants down and forcibly administer the weekly
injections. The defendant will voluntarily accept probation and the
conditions of probation and voluntarily submit to weekly injections. Again,
a defendant at all times reserves the right to refuse treatments and return to
jail or be physically castrated.17 1
166. Id. (quoting Metropolitan Dade County v. P.L. Dodge Foundations, Inc., 509
So.2d 1170, 1172 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (stating prisoner's rights in dicta)).
167. FLA. STAT. § 794.0235(2)(a), (5) (1997); see supra Part III.C.
168. FLA. STAT. § 794.0235(2)(a), (5) (1997).
169. I. § 794.0235(1)(b), (5). See discussion infra Part III.C.
170. Spalding, supra note 8, at 128 (arguing that refusing treatment "is no option at
all" because the "choice cannot be held to be made freely, knowingly, or voluntarily" due to
the fact that refusal results in incarceration).
171. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
1998]
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3. Compelling Interest
Even if a court finds voluntary and informed consent is lacking, the
statute does not violate a defendant's right to refuse medical treatment
because the state is utilizing the least intrusive method available to
accomplish a compelling state interest. The Supreme Court of Florida has
articulated four compelling state interests that should be weighed against an
individuals right to refuse medical treatment. 172 They are the preservation of
life, the protection of innocent third parties, the prevention of suicide, and
the maintenance of the ethical integrity of the medical profession.'7 The
court in Singletary v. Costello174 added that where the individual happens to
be a prisoner, the "state interest in . . . the rehabilitation of prisoners is
implicated."'
17
Of the interests identified, the protection of innocent parties and the
rehabilitation of defendants serve as compelling state interests for the
hormonal control statute. 17 6 The protection of innocent persons interest
"arises when the refusal of medical treatment endangers public health.' 77
MPA refusal endangers the public because it increases the chances that a
member of the public will be a victim of a sexual battery, an inherently
violent crime. Hormonal control decreases the chances that the defendant
will commit a sexual battery. 178 The statute protects the public by seeking to
rehabilitate defendants by providing them with the medication they need to
control their sexual impulses and resist the urge to commit sexual
batteries.
4. Least Intrusive Method
MPA treatment is the least intrusive method of protecting the public
against the sexual offenses perpetrated by paraphiliacs.18° The only other
172. Browning, 568 So. 2d at 14 (holding that the state interest should be
"balanced... against an individual's right to refuse medical treatment").
173. Id.
174. 665 So. 2d 1099 (Fla. 1996).
175. Id. at 1105 (quoting Commissioner of Corrections v. Myers, 399 N.E. 2d 452,457
(Mass. 1979)).
176. See supra note 157.
177. Singletary, 665 So. 2d at 1105.
178. See discussion supra Part IV.A-B.
179. See supra Part IV.A-B. and note 157.
180. See discussion supra Part VI.C.4.
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method, incarceration, is more intrusive into the private lives of offenders
because it calls for deprivation of the liberty of freedom.
18 1
VII. CONCLUSION
The lawmakers carefully drafted Florida's new hormonal control statute
to ensure constitutionality. The law's opponents challenge its
constitutionality with bald conclusions. Although medical technology
restricts the statutes' effectiveness by only allowing its success within
certain people, the lawmakers narrowly tailored the statute to apply to that
group, the paraphiliac. Upon careful analysis, however, it is clear that the
law does not violate Florida's Right to Privacy Amendment. The statute is
the first step towards a modem, more humane criminal justice system that
seeks public protection and actual rehabilitation rather than the illusory
rehabilitative benefits provided by the present prison system.
Mary E. Clarke
181. See discussion supra Part VI.C.4.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Florida has been associated with illegal drugs since the television show
Miami Vice and the "Cocaine Cowboys" of the 1980's. Marijuana, cocaine,
heroin, crack, and LSD have fallen from the lips and pens of newscasters
and newspaper writers throughout the Sunshine State. However, Vicodint
1. Vicodin is "indicated for the relief of moderate to moderately severe pain."
PHYsicrAs DESK REFERENCE 1367-68 (Medical Economics Co. 52d ed. 1998). Its chemical
make-up is typically 7.5 milligrams of hydrocodone bitartrate combined with 750 milligrams
of acetaminophen. Id. Under the manufacturer's specifications, it is stated that the tablets are
classified as a SCHEDULE El substance. Id.
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may be the next drug to become a household name, not because of its
prolific use, but because of its impact on the Florida State drug laws. The
2technical name for Vicodin is hydrocodone, which is referred to in sections
893.03 (drug schedules) and 893.135(1)(c)(1) (trafficking) of the Florida
Statutes.3 Two Florida District Courts of Appeal have interpreted these
4
statutes in conflicting ways. When this happens, it creates a somewhat
chaotic situation due to the construction of the Florida court system.
5
In Florida, the trial courts, otherwise known as the circuit courts, are
bound by the decisions of the district court of appeal in that particular
district.6 However, if there is no case on point in that district, and there is a
case on point in another district, the trial court is bound by the other
district's decision.7 Nonetheless, decisions of the district court of appeal in
one district are merely persuasive authority in another district court of
appeal.8 Therefore, the other district courts of appeal are free to disagree.
When this happens, trial courts are not bound by either of the conflicting
districts, /unless the trial court happens to be located in one of the districts,
and then would, consequently, be bound by it anyway. 9 As such, until the
situation with these two district courts of appeal is resolved, trial courts in
Florida have no authority from which to seek guidance.1
0
This article will examine the discordant interpretations of the drug
statutes and attempt to reach a conclusion on which is the best reading. Part
II of this article will discuss the background of the statutes and the holdings
and rationale behind the two conflicting cases. Part III will discuss other
jurisdictions and their similar drug statutes. Part IV will discuss other
controlled substances and how they are regulated under the Florida Statutes.
Part V will suggest what should be done to resolve these inconsistencies.
Part VI will conclude this article.
2. See State v. Holland, 689 So. 2d 1268-69 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
3. FLA. STAT. §§ 893.03, .135(1)(c)(1) (1997).
4. See State v. Baxley, 684 So. 2d 831 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Holland, 689
So. 2d at 1268.
5. See Pardo v. State, 596 So. 2d 665, 666-67 (Fla. 1992).
6. Id. at 666-67 (citing State v. Hayes, 333 So. 2d 51, 53 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1976)).
7. Id. at 666.
8. Id. at 667 (citing State v. Hayes, 323 So. 2d 51, 53 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1976)).
9. Id.
10. An exception, however, would be trial courts in the First and Fifth District Courts
of Appeal, since those courts are still bound to follow their particular district court.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Hydrocodone Statutes
Section 893.135(1)(c)(1) of the Florida Statutes mandates that:
Any person who knowingly sells, purchases, manufactures,
delivers, or brings into this state, or who is knowingly in actual or
constructive possession of, 4 grams or more of any...
hydrocodone... or 4 grams or more of any mixture containing any
such substance, but less than 30 kilograms of such substance or
mixture, commits a felony of the first degree, which felony shall be
known as "trafficking in illegal drugs."
'1 I
Because hydrocodone is listed as a SCHEDULE H drug,12 it is
considered to have a "high potential for abuse."'13 However, pursuant to
section 893.03(3)(c)(4) of the Florida Statutes, if a tablet contains "not more
than 15 milligrams per dosage unit, with recognized therapeutic amounts of
one or more active ingredients, which are not controlled substances," then
the substance is considered a SCHEDULE HI substance.' 4 This would make
the charge punishable as a third-degree felony,15 bringing a lighter sentence.
Reading these two statutes together, it may be possible to reach several
conclusions. The first may be that if a defendant is caught with four grams
of pills that contain hydrocodone, even if each pill contains less than fifteen
milligrams, punishment as a first-degree felony is proper. Perhaps this
should be labeled as the aggregation theory. This is the conclusion that
Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal reached in State v. Baxley.16
Another way to read the statutes is as the Florida First District Court of
11. FLA. STAT. § 893.135(1)(c)(1) (1997).
12. Id. § 893.03(2)(a)(l)j).
13. Id. § 893.03(2). SCHEDULE I drugs are considered to have "a high potential for
abuse" and have "no currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States and in
its use under medical supervision does not meet accepted safety standards." Id. § 893.03(1).
SCHEDULE II drugs have a "high potential for abuse and has a currently accepted but
severely restricted medical use in treatment in the United States." Id. § 893.03(2).
SCHEDULE III drugs have "a potential for abuse less than the substances contained in
Schedules I and II and has a currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States."
FLA. STAT. § 893.03(3) (1997).
14. Id. § 893.03(3)(c)(4).
15. Id. § 893.13(l)(a)(2).
16. 684 So. 2d 831 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
Perry
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Appeal did in State v. Holland,17 which will lead to the conclusion that if a
person is caught with pills that contain hydrocodone, but each pill contains
less than fifteen milligrams, punishment is only proper as a SCHEDULE III
substance, and thus as a third-degree felony. 8 This apparent ambiguity in
the statutes has created a conundrum in the legal world and, likewise, caused
a split in the appellate courts of the State of Florida.
B. State v. Baxley
"Michael Baxley was charged with [both] conspiracy to traffic and
trafficking in hydrocodone" under section 893.135(1)(c)(1) of the Florida
Statutes.' His charges were dismissed in the lower court and the State
appealed.20 The appellate court acknowledged several arguments made by
Baxley, the first of which was that if the tablets in question contain less than
fifteen milligrams, then they are considered a SCHEDULE Ill drug.2' The
court doused this argument, however, by stating that "only a small amount of
hydrocodone is a SCHEDULE I substance. 22 Instead, the court held that
it did not matter if the amount involved was four grams of pure hydrocodone
or four grams of a mixture of hydrocodone; either one would suffice to make
it a SCHEDULE II substance and therefore punishable as a first-degree
felony.a3
Baxley also argued that hydrocodone is listed in both SCHEDULE II
and SCHEDULE III, but both schedules provide an exemption if listed in
another schedule.24 The court, however, stated that this gave its reading of
the statute more credence because it proves that SCHEDULE I substances
are only those limited by section 893.03(3)(c)(4), 25 and all other
hydrocodone is considered a SCHEDULE II substance.26  In reaching this
17. 689 So. 2d 1268 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
18. Id. at 1270; see also § 893.03(3)(c)(4) (1997).
19. Baxley, 684 So. 2d at 832.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. (emphasis omitted).
23. Id.
24. Baxley, 684 So. 2d at 832.
25. FLA. STAT. § 893.03(3)(c)(4) (1997). Section 893.03(3)(c)(4) of the Florida
Statutes states that "any material, compound, mixture, or preparation containing limited
quantities of... [n]ot more than 300 milligrams of hydrocodone per 100 milliliters or not
more than 15 milligrams per dosage unit, with recognized therapeutic amounts of one or more
active ingredients which are not controlled substances" are SCHEDULE III substances. Id.
26. Baxley, 684 So. 2d at 832.
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conclusion, the court cited Lareau v. State,27 and Mack v. Bristol-Myers
Squibb Co.,28 both of which stand for the proposition that when two laws of
the same subject seem to be ambiguous, they should be read in pari
29. 30
materia in order to give effect to them both. In sum, the Baxley court
held that "[i]f the number of tablets aggregates [four] grams or more of
hydrocodone or a mixture of hydrocodone, then we agree with the State that
prosecution is proper under section 893.135. "31 The Supreme Court of
Florida denied review of the Baxley case.
32
C. State v. Holland
In 1997, the Florida First District Court of Appeal certified conflict
with the Baxley court in State v. Holland.33 Holland had been charged with
five counts of trafficking in hydrocodone.34 He subsequently filed a motion
to dismiss pursuant to an affidavit given by a pharmacist asserting that the
drug alleged in the information was in fact a SCHEDULE III drug as
opposed to a SCHEDULE II drug, and therefore did not fall within the
parameters of the trafficking statute.35  The lower court dismissed the
information, and the State appealed.36
The Holland court, in reading section 893.135(1)(c)(1) together with
section 893.03(3)(c)(4), held that "if a mixture containing the controlled
substance falls within the parameters set forth in [Schedule] III, the amount
of the controlled substance per dosage unit, not the aggregate amount or
weight, determines whether the defendant may be charged with violating
section 893.135(1)(c)1, of the Florida Statutes. 37 Therefore, in its case sub
judice, the court found that, since the Vicodin tablets that were allegedly
sold by Holland had less than fifteen milligrams per dosage unit of
27. 573 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1991).
28. 673 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
29. In pari materia is defined as: "[u]pon the same matter or subject." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 791 (6th ed. 1990). Statutes "in pai materia" relate to the same person or thing
and have a common purpose. Id.
30. Baxley, 684 So. 2d at 832-33 (citing Lareau v. State, 573 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1991);
Mack v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 673 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996)).
31. Id.
32. Baxley v. State, 694 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 1997).
33. 689 So. 2d 1268 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
34. Id. at 1269.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1270; see also FLA. STAT. § 893.135(1)(c)(1) (1997).
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hydrocodone, his violation did not fall within the trafficking statute. 38 The
court went on to hold that regardless of the number of tablets sold, the
concentration of hydrocodone per dosage unit will remain below the
threshold of fifteen milligrams. In other words, even if the amount of
milligrams in each pill equals four grams when added together, if each pill
contained less than fifteen milligrams, the defendant would escape the
trafficking statute.
D. Criticism of Both Decisions
The largest problem with the Baxley decision is that it is extremely
harsh in its punishment. Consider this example: a defendant is illegally in
possession of ten Vicodin tablets. Each tablet contains 7.5 milligrams of
hydrocodone and 750 milligrams of acetaminophen, which is the typical
makeup.4°  Therefore, the defendant is in possession of a total of 7575
milligrams of Vicodin. After converting from milligrams to grams, it
brings the total to 6.575 grams of Vicodin.42 However the defendant is only
in possession of 0.075 grams of hydrocodone. 43 In order to be sentenced
under the trafficking statute,44 the defendant has to be in possession of four
grams of hydrocodone or a mixture containing hydrocodone. Therefore, if
the Baxley court were followed, the hypothetical defendant would be subject
to prosecution under the trafficking statute, and thus charged with a first-
degree felony. It is hard to fathom that the legislature intended for a person
to be sentenced for a first-degree felony for the possession of ten Vicodin
pills. In essence, it appears that the Baxley court would be over-inclusive in
its approach.
The Holland case is also not without fault. It appears from that
decision that aggregation of the weight or the amount of any SCHEDULE III
controlled substances under any circumstances is not permitted.4 5 Therefore,
if an individual illegally sold, delivered, possessed, or manufactured a large
38. Holland, 689 So. 2d at 1270.
39. Id.
40. See supra note 1.
41. Calculations are as follows: 750 + 7.5 = 757.5. Then 757.5 x 10 (pills) = 7575
milligrams.
42. There are 1000 milligrams in one gram.
43. This is because there is only 7.5 milligrams of hydrocodone in one Vicodin tablet.
See supra note 1. 7.5 x 10 = 75 milligrams. To convert to grams, divide by 1000, thus the
total grams are 0.075.
44. FLA. STAT. § 893.135(l)(c)(1) (1997).
45. Holland, 689 So. 2d at 1270.
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quantity of pills containing a SCHEDULE iI controlled substance, and the
pills contained less than the requisite fifteen milligrams, that person could
never be charged with trafficking. This follows even if the accused
possessed 1000 pills. This theory fails because, most likely, if a person has
that many pills in his or her possession, he or she would be attempting to
traffic them, and thus should be subject to the trafficking statute. Further,
there are no Vicodin pills that contain more than fifteen milligrams per
dosage unit. Therefore, the holding in the Holland case is weak because it is
under-inclusive. It would render meaningless the provision of SCHEDULE
II as it applies to hydrocodone.
I. HYDROCODONE STATUTES IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
A. Other States
Most states have drug trafficking statutes similar to Florida's. Some,
however, only list hydrocodone in SCHEDULE II, while some list
hydrocodone solely in SCHEDULE J]I.46 Notwithstanding, no other statehas decided a case on point with Holland or Baxley.
B. Federal Statute
Title 21, section 812 of the United States Code4 7 provides the schedules
48
of controlled substances. The construction of the hydrocodone statute in
the federal version is very similar to the Florida Statute, with two
exceptions. The first is an insignificant one, in that the United States Code
refers to hydrocodone as "dihydrocodeinone. ''49 The second, however, may
be considered quite consequential, and is found in the sentencing guidelines.
46. The states that list hydrocodone in both SCHEDULES like the Floida statute are:
Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 16-13-26, 27 (1996); Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT. § 329-18 (1993);
Iowa, IOWA CODE ANN. § 124.206 (West 1997); Mississippi, MIss. CODE ANN. § 41-29-115,
117 (1972); Missouri, Mo. REv. STAT. § 195.017 (WEST 1996); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 50-32-224, 226 (1997); Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. § 195.017 (1995); New York, N.Y.
PUB. HEALTH LAW § 3306 (McKinney 1998); North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE § 1903.1-07,
09 (1997); Texas, TEX. HEALTH & SAFr'y CODE ANN. § 481.104 (West 1998); West Virginia,
W. VA. CODE § 60A-2-208 (1998); and Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 961.18 (1997).
47. 21 U.S.C. § 812 (1994).
48. Id.
49. See id. § 812(d)(3)-(4) SCHEDULE III. Dihydrocodeine and hydrocodone are
used interchangeably. Id. Some states even list them like this: "dihydrocodeine
(hydrocodone)." See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-29-117 (1997).
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Section 2Dl.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines sets forth the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines for federal drug trafficking offenses.5 In
order to obtain uniformity throughout the country, drug offenders are
sentenced according to a base offense level.5' The requisite amount for each
level is very specific, with a range of only ten to twenty grams, 52 as opposed
to Florida's degree-oriented felonies where the range may be four to 400
grams.53 The most important difference in these sentencing guidelines may
be "Note A" inserted by the legislature that reads: "[u]nless otherwise
specified, the weight of a controlled substance set forth in the table refers to
the entire weight of any mixture or substance containing a detectable amount
of the controlled substance. 54
IV. DECISIONS INTERPRETING OTHER DRUG STATUTES
A. Florida
1. State v. Yu
In State v. Yu, 55 the defendants attempted a constitutional attack on
56
section 893.135 of the Florida Statutes. The lower court held that using
the weight of 'any mixture containing cocaine"' instead of the weight of the
pure cocaine was "arbitrary, unreasonable, and a violation of due process
and equal protection of the law. ' 57 Relying on People v. Mayberry,58 an
Illinois case, and United States ex rel. Daneff v. Henderson,59 a federal case,
60the Supreme Court of Florida disagreed. In Daneff, the court noted that
dangerous drugs are typically marketed in a diluted or impure state.61 It also
stated that "[t]he State cannot be expected to make gradations and
differentiations and draw distinctions and degrees so fine as to treat all law
violators with the precision of a computer. ' 62 Relying on the Daneff case,
50. 18 U.S.C.A § 2Dl.1 (West Supp. 1998).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See id.; FLA. STAT. § 893.135 (1997).
54. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2Dl.1 Notes to Drug Quantity Table (A).
55. 400 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 1981).
56. Id. at 763.
57. Id. at 764.
58. 345 N.E.2d 97 (Ili. 1976).
59. 501 F.2d 1180 (2d Cir. 1974).
60. Yu, 400 So. 2d at 764.
61. Daneff, 501 F.2d at 1184.
62. Id.
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the Supreme Court of Florida opined that it was reasonable for the
legislature to conclude that a mixture containing cocaine could be disbursed
to a larger amount of people than the same amount .of pure cocaine and
therefore could create a greater likelihood for harm to the public.
63
The United States Supreme Court almost had an opportunity to decide
this question when one of the defendants from the Yu case appealed the
decision of the Supreme Court of Florida to this nation's highest court in
Wall v. State.64  This appeal, however, was denied for jurisdictional
reasons. Justice Brennan noted in the denial that he would have heard the
case on its merits and postponed the question of jurisdiction. 66  It is
unfortunate that he was not allowed to do so.
2. After Yu
Since the Yu case, other Florida courts have had to apply its principles.
In Asmer v. State,67 the defendant was convicted of trafficking in
methaqualone in an amount exceeding 200 grams. 68 At trial, the expert
witness for the State testified that she had weighed the tablets, and their total
weight was 795.7 grams, well above the requisite 200 grams.69 However,
she admitted that she had only tested one of the tablets at random for
methaqualone, and that particular tablet contained the drug.70 The defendant
appealed his conviction and argued that the State failed to prove that he sold
200 grams of methaqualone alone, since it only tested one tablet.71
The court found no merit in this argument.72 Instead, it referred to Yu,
remarking that the State is not "expected to draw distinctions so fine as to
treat all law violators with the precision of a computer."73 It went on to state
that it would be "patently unreasonable" to require the state to test each of
the 1000 tablets to prove that there were enough tablets that contained pure
63. Yu, 400 So. 2d at 765 (citing United States ex rel. Daneff v. Henderson, 501 F.2d
1180, 1184 (2d Cir. 1974)).
64. 454 U.S. 1134 (1981).
65. Id. at 1134.
66. Id.
67. 416 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
68. Id. at 486.
69. Id. at 486-87.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 487.
72. Asmer, 416 So. 2d at 487.
73. Id. (citing State v. Yu, 400 So. 2d 762, 764 (Fla. 1981)).
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methaqualone to satisfy the statute.74 Therefore, the court upheld Asmer's
conviction on the testing of one tablet."
76In Ross v. State, the court distinguished the holding in the Asmer case
as it did not apply to the random testing of only one of several separately
wrapped packages of cocaine. 77  The defendant in Ross was caught with a
brown paper bag that contained two bundles. 78 The first bundle had thirty-
six separately wrapped plastic bags of white powder.79 The second bundle
had fifty-six separately wrapped plastic packets of white powder.8" The
laboratory technician in the Dade County Crime Laboratory tested one of the
plastic bags from each of the bundles, and found that they both contained
cocaine.81 The technician then emptied the contents of the baggies in the
first bundle into one envelope and then emptied the contents of the second
bundle into another envelope.82 The envelope with the first bundle weighed
8312.6 grams, and the envelope with the second bundle weighed 26.2 grams,
totaling 38.8 grams.84 The defendant was then charged with trafficking in
cocaine under section 893.135(1)(b) of the Florida Statutes.85
The court found this testing to be inadequate.86 It held that simply
visually examining the separately wrapped packets was not sufficient.
87
Instead, the court suggested that each packet (baggie) of the white powder
should have been chemically tested by random sample.88 Furthermore, the
court opined that there are a vast number of white substances that could
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. 528 So. 2d 1237 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
77. Id. at 1240.
78. Id. at 1238.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Ross, 528 So. 2d at 1238.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. See also FLA. STAT. § 893.135(1)(b) (1997). Section 893.135 (1)(b) of the
Florida Statutes states:
Any person who knowingly sells, purchases, manufactures, delivers, or
brings into this state, or who is knowingly in actual or constructive
possession of, 28 grams or more of cocaine, as described in s.
893.03(2)(a)(4),or any mixture containing cocaine ... commits a felony of
the first degree, which felony shall be known as "trafficking in cocaine."
Id.
86. Ross, 528 So. 2d at 1239.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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89easily appear to be cocaine due to their white powdery appearance. s
Therefore, although one of the packets contained cocaine, the others could
very well be just a white powdery substance that looks like cocaine. 90
The court noted that random testing of separate bags containing similar
looking materials is distinguishable from the random testing of pills, which
was the case in Asmer.9' This is because the random sample of pills is taken
from a single packet or bag, and thus the substance is commingled with the
similar looking material. 92 From that, the court opines, one can infer that the
substances are the same.93 The court states, however, that one cannot make
that inference where the "untested material is not commingled with the
random sample."94 Therefore, since the bags in the Ross case were not
commingled, the supposition could not be made, and the defendant's charge
was reduced to simple possession.95
Chief Judge Schwartz dissented in the opinion.9 He disagreed with the
majority because he found that it was reasonable to conclude that the
material in the packet was representative of the other packages.97  He
thought that the fact that there were separate envelopes was simply a
difference, rather than a distinction between Asmer and Ross.98 The Chief
Judge found that: "a reasonable person could conclude beyond a reasonable
doubt that all of the packages in the two bundles contained cocaine." 99 He
observed that since the defendant possessed both bundles at the same time,
they were properly added together.' °
In State v. Clark,'0 ' the Florida Third District Court of Appeal upheld
its decision in the Ross case.1°2 In Clark, the State's chemist had randomly
tested capsules of cocaine contained in separate packages in one defendant's
case, and in a single bag in another defendant's case.'03 The capsules that
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1239-40.
91. Ross, 528 So. 2d at 1240 (citing Asmer v. State, 416 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1982)).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Ross, 528 So. 2d at 1241 (Schwartz, C.J., dissenting).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. 538 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
102. Id. at 501.
103. Id.
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were tested did contain heroin, but it was less than the statutory
requirement.1°4 The chemist then mixed the contents of the capsules that
were taken from each package before they were weighed, and concluded that
the mixture contained enough heroin to violate section 893.135(1)(c) of the
Florida Statutes. 105
The court held that capsules that contained a white powdery substance
are not distinguishable from the plastic packets (baggies) in the Ross case. 1°6
Since Ross requires the testing of samples from each packet, it similarly
requires the testing of the capsules.1c 7 The Ross decision also dictates that
the randomly tested material must add up to at least four grams. °' The court
went on to hold that the chemist in this case did not follow these methods,
and therefore the defendant's charges should be reduced from trafficking to
possession.
10 9
Chief Judge Schwartz, again, did not agree entirely with the majority,
and filed a concurring opinion."10 He stated, again, that he disagreed with
the decision in the Ross case, but since its holding represented the law and it
applied to the case at hand, he was bound to follow it."' He agreed with the
State that the capsules in this case were more analogous to the packets in
Ross than the pills in Asmer.12 However, he stated that "both the untested
capsules and the untested pills in Asmer may just as easily contain harmless
substances-the other capsules may be Contac; the other pills may be
aspirin-as the untested powdery substance in Ross may be flour or
sugar."'"13 "Since the possibility that the untested materials are innocent is
the very foundation of Ross," the judge reluctantly agreed that the decision
of the majority was the correct one." 4 In short, he says, "since we are stuck
with Ross, we are stuck with ruling with the appellees [defendants] in this
case as well."
115
104. Id.
105. Id. See also FLA. STAT. § 893.135(1) (1997). Section 893.135(1) of the Florida
Statutes is the same statute under which Holland and Baxley were convicted. Id.
106. Clark, 538 So. 2d at 502 (Schwartz, C.J., concurring).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at500.
111. Clark, 538 So. 2d at 501 (Schwartz, C.J., concurring).
112. Id. (citing Ross v. United States, 528 So. 2d 1237 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988);
Asmer v. State, 416 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982)).
113. Clark, 538 So. 2d at 501-02 (Schwartz, J., concurring).
114. Id. at 502.
115. Id.
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B. Federal
1. Chapman v. United States
In 1991, the United States Supreme Court came down with a landmark
decision in Chapman v. United States."' In delivering the majority opinion
of the Court, Justice Rehnquist held that "Note A' 117 required blotter paper
to be counted for sentencing purposes in the total weight of lysergic acid
diethylmide ("LSD").'"8  In that case, the defendants were convicted of
selling ten sheets of blotter paper, which contained 1000 doses of LSD." 9
The pure weight of the LSD itself was only fifty milligrams; however,
combined with the blotter paper, the total weight came to 5.7 grams.' 20
Since 42 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(v) mandates a minimum sentence of five
years for distributing more than one gram of LSD, the defendants were
imposed with this sentence.12  This aggregate weight "was also used to
determine the base offense level under the United States Sentencing
Commission Guidelines Manual.
122
The defendants argued that the blotter paper should not be used to
determine the total weight of the LSD because it is only a carrier medium
and should not be included when calculating a sentence for LSD
distribution.123 They reasoned that construing 42 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(v)
in such a manner would lead to aberrant results, and disparity in the
sentencing practices.'24
In order to combat this argument, the Court relied on two things: the
construction of the statute and its legislative history.1' 5 First, the Court
116. 500 U.S. 453 (1991).
117. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2Dl.1 (West Supp. 1998). Notes to Drug Quantity Table (A).
118. Chapman, 500 U.S. at 468.
119. Id. at 455.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 455-56. See also 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(v).
122. Id. at 456.
123. Chapman, 500 U.S. at 458.
124. Id. The court summarized petitioners' argument as follows:
a major wholesaler caught with 19,999 doses of pure LSD would not be
subject to the 5-year mandatory minimum sentence, while a minor pusher
with 200 doses on blotter paper, or even one dose on a sugar cube, would be
subject to the mandatory minimum sentence. Thus, they contend, the weight
of the carrier should be excluded, the weight of the pure LSD should be
determined, and that weight should be used to set the appropriate sentence.
125. Id. at 453-55.
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pointed out that the statute provides for different sentences for an offender
caught with a "mixture or substance containing a detectable amount" of the
drugs and one who is caught with a pure amount of the drug.2 6 The Court
exemplified this by referring to the phencyclidine ("PCP") statute found in
42 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(v)."' The Court's thought process is founded in
the belief that the legislature could have provided for different sentences for
the pure amounts of all the drugs if it so desired. 28 The fact that it did not
do this means that the legislature intended for carrier mediums to be
included in calculating the weight.
29
The Court next looked to the legislative history of the statute to provide
insight into the situation. 13 The Court stated that "[t]he current penalties for
LSD distribution originated in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986.,'3' In the
Act, "Congress adopted a 'market-oriented' approach to punishing drug
trafficking." 32 This means that the total quantity of what is distributed is
the means for calculating the length of a sentence, not the amount of the pure
drug involved. 33 The Court deemed from the legislative history that the
purpose behind this was to keep from punishing the retail traffickers less
severely, even though they deal in lesser quantities of the pure drug, because
they are the people that "keep the street markets going."' 34 This would
explain why a wholesaler caught with 19,999 doses of LSD might be
punished less severely than a street trafficker caught with only 200 doses. 35
The defendants made one last argument. They asserted that the terms
"mixture" or "substance" cannot be given their dictionary meaning, as the
Court implied, because then the statute could be interpreted to embody
carriers such as a glass vial or a car in which the drugs are being transported,
which would make the statute senseless. 36 The Court, however, defrayed
this argument as well. 37 It contended that blotter paper qualified because,
when combined with LSD, "the particles of one are diffused among the
126. Id. at 459.
127. Chapman, 500 U.S. at 459.
128. See id.
129. Id. at 459.
130. Id. at 460.
131. Id. at 461.
132. Chapman, 500 U. S. at 461.
133. Id. at461.
134. Id.
135. See id. at 458.
136. Id. at462.
137. Chapman, 500 U.S. at 462-63.
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particles of the other." 138 Therefore, the "term does not include LSD in a
bottle, or LSD in a car, because the drug is easily distinguished from, and
separated from, such a 'container.
'
'
1 39
2. Beyond Chapman
Lower federal courts have had trouble applying the Chapman
guidelines to other drug situations.14° In United States v. Mahecha-
Onofre, 14 the defendant chemically bonded cocaine to several suitcases in
an attempt to elude customs officials. 142 The district court sentenced
Mahecha-Onofre to a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence under 42
U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(v).1 43 The court based its calculations for sentencing
purposes on the weight of the cocaine and the suitcase material, as opposed
to the pure weight of the cocaine.144 The court rejected the idea that if the
material with which a substance is mixed can not be ingested with the
controlled substance, then it cannot be added to the weight for sentencing
purposes.' 45 Instead, the Court found that the suitcase material should be
included in the total weight for sentencing purposes. 146
The Eleventh Circuit decided to go another way.147 In United States v.
Rolande-Gabrel,14 8 the court held that the term "mixture," for the purposes
of the Sentencing Guidelines, "does not include unusable mixtures."1 49 The
defendant in this case was intercepted at Miami International Airport and
found with sixteen plastic bags filled with a liquid substance containing
138. Id. at 462 (citing 9 OxFoRD ENGLISH DICrIONARY 921 (2d ed. 1989)).
139. Id. at 462-63.
140. Thomas J. Meier, A Proposal to Resolve the Interpretation of "Mixture or
Substance" Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 377,
395 (1993). For a more detailed discussion of United States v. Chapman and the progression
of the interpretations of Section 841 of the United States Code, see Thomas J. Meier, A
Proposal to Resolve the Interpretation of "Mixture or Substance" Under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 377 (1993).
141. 936 F.2d 623 (1st Cir. 1991).
142. Id. at 624.
143. Id. at 625.
144. Id. The weight of the cocaine combined with the weight of the suitcase totaled 12
kilograms, while the pure cocaine weighed only 2.5 kilograms. Id.
145. Mahecha-Onofre, 936 F.2d at 626.
146. Id.
147. United States v. Rolande-Gabriel, 938 F.2d 1231 (11th Cir. 1991).
148. Id. at 1231.
149. Id. at 1238.
19981
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cocaine. Based on scientific evidence, the court stated that the cocaine
found in Rolande-Gabriel's bags was not in a usable form, since it would
have had to be extracted from the liquid to be sold on the streets, and the
cocaine could not be ingested or consumed in that form.151 The court argued
that the cocaine in the mixture was "easily distinguished from, and separated
from" tne liquid.) 2 Therefore, the court held that it would be irrational to
include the liquid in the total weight for sentencing purposes.1
5 3
The Sixth Circuit took yet another approach in United States v.
Jennings. 54 The defendants in that case were interrupted in the process of
"cooking" methamphetamine, and argued that if they had not been disturbed,
the weight of the drug would have been much less.' 55 The court agreed with
the Chapman interpretation that "Congress did not want to punish retail
traffickers of drugs less severely," even when dealing with smaller amounts
of the pure drugs, because they are the people who "keep the street markets
going." 56 However, following that line of thinking, the court held that "the
defendants [in this case] were not attempting to increase the amount of
methamphetamine they had available to sell by adding a dilutant, cutting
agent, or carrier medium, but rather were attempting to distill
methamphetamine from the otherwise uningestible byproducts of its
manufacture."'157 Therefore, the court held that the total weight was not to be
used. 5
Another case that is more comparable to the hydrocodone situation is
United States v. Young. 59 The defendant in the case, John Ed Young, Sr.,
was convicted of possession of Dilaudid' 6° with intent to distribute, in
150. Id. at 1232.
151. Id. at 1237.
152. Rolande-Gabriel, 938 F.2d at 1237 (citing Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S.
453 (1991)).
153. Id. at 1237.
154. 945 F.2d 129 (6th Cir. 1991), opinion clarified by 966 F.2d 184 (6th Cir. 1992).
155. Id. at 134. Testimony at the trial revealed that the total amount in the mixture was
4180 grams but contained only 1.67% methamphetamine. Id. The government's chemist
testified that if the chemicals had been able to react entirely, the solution would have yielded
over 100 grams of methamphetamine. Id.
156. Id. at 136 (citing Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453 (1991)).
157. Jennings, 945 F.2d at 137.
158. Id.
159. 992 F.2d 207 (8th Cir. 1993).
160. Dilaudid is a painkiller similar to morphine. DRUGS IN LmGATION 394, 394
(Richard M. Patterson, J.D. ed., Law Publishers, 1996 ed.) (1996). Its active ingredient is
called hydromorphone, which is a Schedule II substance under the federal statute. Id. at 208
n.2. Also note that hydromorphone and hydrocodone are listed together in all the same
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violation of 42 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(v).' 61 On appeal, he argued that the
district court erred by sentencing him based on the entire weight of the
Dilaudid tablets, instead of the hydromorphone alone. 62 Young argued that
the Chapman case is distinguishable here because it involved 42 U.S.C. §
841(b)(1)(B), 163 which states that the offense is distributing a mixture of the
substance, while he was convicted under 42 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B), 4 which
does not include the mixture language. 65 The defendant claimed that
Congress only intended for the pure substance to be used as the weight for
sentencing purposes.
66
The court cited to several cases that had addressed, and subsequently
dispelled, that argument. 167 In so doing, the court stated that there was no
statutory rule of construction that would exact that reading of the statute.
Therefore, Congress meant to use the same method for computing the
weights of pharmaceutical drugs and the "street drugs" listed in 42 U.S.C. §
§ 841(b)(1)(A), (B). 68 Thus, the court upheld Young's conviction.1 69
Judge Bright, however, disagreed. He opined that Young's sentence
should have been calculated according to the pure weight of the
hydromorphone, rather than the gross weight of the Dilaudid.' 7 ' He states
that in "street weight" cases, such as cocaine and heroin, the weight, dose,
and purity are in the control of the defendant. However, "in
pharmaceutical drug cases, the pharmaceutical manufacturer controls the
weight and quantity of the drug."'7 3 Therefore, the legislative intent to
prevent drugs from being diluted and distributed to more people than non-
diluted drugs is without merit.1 4 The judge summed up his argument asfollows:
statutes, including the trafficking statute, but hydromorphone is not listed in SCHEDULE IlI.
See FLA. STAT. §§ 893.03, .135 (1997).
161. Young, 992 F.2d at 208; see also 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) (1994).
162. Young, 992 F.2d at 208.
163. Id. at 209.
164. Id. See also § 841(b)(1)(C).
165. Young, 992 F.2d at 209.
166. Id. at209-10.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 211.
170. Young, 992 F.2d at 211 (Bright, J., dissenting).
171. Id. (Bright, J., dissenting).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
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In my view, a defendant should be held responsible for the weight
of inert materials in substances containing a proscribed controlled
drug only to the extent he or she in some way has control over its
content. Here, Young clearly had no control over the weight or
proportion of inert material contained in the Dilaudid tablets, and,
thus, his sentence should be calculated according to the pure
weight of the controlled substance hydromorphone.
1
C. Applicability to Baxley and Holland
After examining the other jurisdictions, a question now remains as to
how these apply to the Baxley and Holland cases. First, one of the big
concerns of the Supreme Court of Florida in Yu was burdening the State to
"make gradations and differentiations" between the drugs with the
"precision of a computer."' 176 However, this was referring to street drugs
such as cocaine, LSD, etc., which all have differing degrees of fillers or
cutting agents. As stated earlier, Vicodin pills all have the same amount of
hydrocodone in them.177 Further, it is also easy to distinguish those pills
from each other since each pill is marked with its dosage.178 Following the
same analysis, the worry of disparate sentencing should also be quelled.
Since Vicodin pills all use the same "carrier medium" or filler-
acetaminophen-there is no fear that a sentence could be based on the
weight of different fillers with the same amount of pure hydrocodone.
Next, looking at the ingestible approach adopted by the court in
Rolande-Gabriel,179  acetaminophen could be labeled as such.
Acetaminophen is a "usable" substance, taken by most of us at some time or
another in the form of Tylenol. Therefore, this approach would most likely
call for aggregating the amount of the entire Vicodin pill as opposed to just
weighing the hydrocodone.
180
Further, in following the majority opinion in the Young case, the total
amount of the Vicodin pill would be calculated, since hydrocodone and
hydromorphone are so similar. 18 However, if courts were to follow Judge
Bright's dissenting opinion,182 the total weight should not be used for
175. Young, 992 F.2d at 212.
176. State v. Yu, 400 So. 2d 762, 764 (Fla. 1981).
177. See supra note 1.
178. Id.
179. 938 F.2d 1231 (llth Cir. 1991).
180. Id. at 1232.
181. See Young, 992 F.2d at 209.
182. Seeid.
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sentencing purposes because the defendant does not have control over how
much hydrocodone is contained in each Vicodin pill.
V. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER SENTENCING
A. Finding a Middle Road
One suggestion to clear up the ambiguity may actually be very simple:
use only the pure hydrocodone to determine whether it falls under the
trafficking statute. This seems logical because the statute refers to
hydrocodone, not Vicodin. It does not say that possession of four grams of
Vicodin should be known as trafficking in controlled substances. Therefore,
the amount of hydrocodone in the substance would be the determining
factor. Though the statute does say hydrocodone or a substance containing
hydrocodone,18 3 the legislature surely could not have meant to sentence
someone as a first-degree felon for ten pills of Vicodin.
This approach would also settle the dispute in Holland because it would
allow the amount of the pure hydrocodone to be aggregated, regardless of
the amount per dosage unit. Therefore, people with 1000 pills would not
escape the trafficking statute. Using this interpretation, it would take
184
approximately 533 pills to equal four grams. Therefore, it would be more
difficult to charge someone with trafficking in hydrocodone than it would be
under the Baxley decision, but, at least, it could be accomplished.
Furthermore, the Florida Legislature has mandated that penal statutes
must be strictly construed in favor of defendants.18 5  Section 775.021(1) of
the Florida Statutes mandates that "[t]he provisions of this code and
offenses defined by other statutes shall be strictly construed; when the
language is susceptible of differing constructions, it shall be construed most
favorably to the accused." 186 This statute is most definitely capable of
differing constructions, as evidenced by two Florida District Courts of
Appeal giving two entirely different interpretations.18 7 Therefore, under this
rule of construction, the statute should be interpreted in favor of the
defendant. This would mean that the Holland case would prevail, since it
183. FLA. STAT. § 893.135(1)(c)(1) (1997).
184. Calculations are done as follows: 4000 (amount of milligrams in four grams)
divided by 7.5 (amount of milligrams of pure hydrocodone in Vicodin) = 533.
185. FLA. STAT. § 775.021(1) (1997). See also Thompson v. State, 695 So. 2d 691
(Fla. 1997); Trotter v. State, 576 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1990).
186. FLA. STAT. § 775.021(1).
187. Compare State v. Holland, 689 So. 2d 1268 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997) with
State v. Baxley, 684 So. 2d 831 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
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would classify hydrocodone as a SCHEDULE III drug, making the offense a
third-degree felony, as opposed to Baxley, which would make possession of
ten pills of Vicodin a first-degree felony. 18
B. A Proposal by Thomas J. Meier
In his article, entitled A Proposal to Resolve the Interpretations of
"Mixture or Substance" Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,189
Thomas J. Meier proposes a method for interpreting "mixture or substance"
considering the inconsistencies created by the Chapman case.19° Under his
design, the weight of the pure drug should be added together with the weight
of any non-drug substance only if all of the following elements are met: 191
(1) [t]he substance cannot be easily distinguished or separated
from the pure drug;
(2) the substance is commonly ingested with the pure drug by
street market level consumers; and
(3) the substance dilutes the pure drug in order to increase the
total quantity of the drug available for distribution at the
street market level.'
92
As Meier suggests, the first element is taken from the Chapman
decision and does not include "the weights of containers and other
packaging materials which are clearly not 'mixed or otherwise combined
with the pure drug. '" 93 This would exclude materials such as glass vials.'
94
The second element excludes any materials that are not ingestible,195 such as
suitcases.196 The third element diverges from the Chapman decision. Meier
suggests that "[i]t distinguishes between cutting agents that dilute the pure
drug in order to increase the amount of the drug available to the consumer,
188. Holland, 689 So. 2d at 1268. See also State v. Baxley, 684 So. 2d 831 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
189. Meier, supra note 140, at 403.
190. Id. at403.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 403-04.
193. Meier, supra note 140, at 404 (citing Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453
(1991)).
194. Meier, supra note 140, at 404.
195. Id.
196. See United States v. Mahecha-Onofre, 936 F.2d 623 (1st Cir. 1991).
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and carrier mediums that simply facilitate distribution of the pure drug."' 97
Thus, blotter paper would not be weighed because adding more does not
further dilute the drug.198 There will still be one dose of LSD regardless of
how much blotter paper is added.199
Applying this test to hydrocodone or Vicodin might be a little more
difficult. The first element may not exclude Vicodin because hydrocodone
and acetaminophen are mixed together and not easy to physically separate.
However, there is a prescribed amount of hydrocodone in every Vicodin
tablet. Therefore, in that respect, it would be easy to separate the amount of
hydrocodone from the acetaminophen, even if not physically.
Vicodin would meet the second element, however, because the entire
pill is obviously ingestible and is normally ingested by the street market
consumer. However, there is some question as to the term "street market
level consumers," which calls into question the third element as well.
Hydrocodone is not a drug similar to cocaine or LSD. It is typically not
manufactured illegally, only sold or possessed illegally.? ° Therefore, the
substance is not meant to dilute the drug in order to increase the quantity of
distribution, but is used as part of the entire drug. Acetaminophen is a
painkiller similar to hydrocodone, just not as potent, and not illegal.
Further, it would be practically impossible to dilute the hydrocodone any
more unless you were a pharmaceutical manufacturer, seeing as it is mixed
together chemically. Therefore, Vicodin would most likely fail the third
prong of the test. Since the test is conjunctive, the amount of acetaminophen
cannot be calculated into the total weight under this test.
VI. CONCLUSION
Overall it appears that the prior Florida cases offer little insight into
what to do about the Baxley and Holland situation. The federal cases may
present some guidance, but do not have a great effect since the federal laws
and sentencing structure are set up differently than those of Florida. It
comes down to the fact that section 893.135(1)(c)(1), 2°1 read with section
893.03 of the Florida Statutes,2°2 is susceptible to differing meanings. This
197. Meier, supra note 140, at 405.
198. Id. at 405-06.
199. Id.
200. It is only illegal to possess Vicodin without a prescription, or with a prescription
given under false circumstances.
201. FLA. STAT. § 893.135(l)(c)(1) (1997).
202. Id. § 893.03.
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being the case, the statute has to be read, for now at least, in favor of the
accused. 2°3 This commands following the Holland decision over the Baxley
decision.
The ultimate solution would be for the Florida Legislature to revise
these statutes so as to clarify its intent. With such a split in the Florida
District Courts of Appeal, the alternative is for the Supreme Court of Florida
take a position and answer these questions. Until then, defendants in the
first district will be leaving the courtroom as third-degree felons and
defendants charged with the same crime will leave the Fifth District
classified as first-degree felons.
VII. ADDENDUM
On September 23, 1998, the Fourth District Court of Appeal of Florida
aligned itself with State v. Baxley,204 a Fifth District Court of Appeal
decision, by allowing aggregation of the total weight of a substance
containing hydrocodone, in State v. Hayes.20 5 In Hayes, the defendant called
in a fake prescription of Lorcet2 6 to a pharmacy, under the guise of being
the employee of a doctor.207 The drug store was not able to verify the• - • 208
prescription and thus called the police. When Hayes went to pick up the
prescription, the police were waiting. 209 They arrested her and recovered
forty tablets of the drug Lorcet. 210 Hayes was charged under the trafficking
211
statute , since the aggregate weight of the tablets was more than twenty-
eight grams.212  The trial court dismissed the case, based on State v.
Holland.
213
214The Fourth District Court of Appeal disagreed. In reaching itsdecision, the court looked to some of the legislative history of section
203. FLA. STAT. § 775.021(1) (1997).
204. 684 So. 2d 831 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996). See supra notes 19-24 for a
discussion of the Baxley case.
205. 23 Fla. L. Weekly D2184 (4th Dist. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 1998).
206. Lorcet is a painkiller similar to Vicodin. See supra note 1. Its make-up is mostly
acetaminophen with a small amount of hydrocodone. Id.
207. Hayes, 23 Fla. L. Weekly at D2185.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. FLA. STAT. § 893.135(1)(c)(1) (1997).
212. Hayes, 23 Fla. L. Weekly at D2185.
213. 689 So. 2d 1268 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997). See supra notes 33-38 for a
discussion of the Holland case.
214. Hayes, 23 Fla. L. Weekly at D2185.
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893.135(1)(c)(1) of the Florida Statutes.215 The court noted that section
893.135(1)(c)(1) of the Florida Statutes was amended in 1995 to include
hydrocodone within the ambit of the trafficking statute. 6  In its
interpretation of the legislative history, the court opined that this amendment
was due to the increasing amount of defendants who had been avoiding
conviction for trafficking because of the absence of the substance in the
statute. 7 Therefore, the court concluded, Hayes was exactly the kind of
person that the legislature was trying to allow the state to prosecute when it
broadened the statute.1 8
The court recognized, however, that the statute is still not clear as to
which quantities fall under the SCHEDULE II classification and which are
merely SCHEDULE III substances, keeping them from the reach of the
trafficking statute.2 9 Due to the absence of clear authority in Florida, the
court looked to the federal cases in search of an answer to this question, and
was the first Florida Court to do so.2a0 The court examined Chapman v.
United States221 and United States v. Rolande-Gabriel
2 2 in its opinion.223
Using the analysis from these two opinions, the court opined that, with
respect to the Lorcet tablets in the instant case, "[t]he hydrocodone has been
mixed, or commingled, with the acetaminophen, and the two are ingested
together. The acetaminophen facilitates the use, marketing, and access of the
hydrocodone." 224 Based on this analysis, along with the legislative intent
and the Supreme Court's "mixture" definition, this court concluded that
the "aggregate weight of the tablets seized from Hayes, and not the amount
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Hayes, 23 Fla. L. Weekly at D2185.
220. Id.
221. 500 U.S. 453 (1991).
222. 938 F.2d 1231 (11th Cir. 1991).
223. Hayes, 23 Fla. L. Weekly at D2185.
224. Id.
225. The United States Supreme Court stated in Chapman that "mixture" is defined as:
"matter consisting of two or more components that do not bear a fixed proportion to one
another and that however thoroughly commingled are regarded as retaining a separate
existence." Chapman, 500 U.S. at 461 (citing WEBSTER'S TIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DIcTrONARY 1449 (1986)). The Chapman Court also looked to another dictionary for a
definition: "A 'mixture' may also consist of two substances blended together so that the
particles of one are diffused among the particles of the other." Id. at 461 (citing 9 OXFoRD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 921 (2d ed. 1989)).
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of hydrocodone per dosage unit, is the determinative weight for prosecution
under section 893.135(1)(c)(1) for trafficking in a SCHEDULE II drug."22
6
Though this court at least attempted to look to other sources for its
information, this analysis fails for the same reasons that the case with which
it aligned itself did; it is too over-inclusive. The defendant in this case is
now a first-degree felon for the possession of forty pills. Granted,
punishment for forty pills is more conceivable than being sentenced as a
first-degree felon for possession of ten pills. Yet, this decision would
uphold a prosecution for as little as ten pills. So, essentially, this decision
just serves to render more confusion across the state. Until either the
Supreme Court of Florida or the Florida Legislature takes notice of this
discord, the quandary survives.
Heather A. Perry
226. Hayes, 23 Fla. L. Weekly at D2185.
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